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He Kōrero Whakapopoto – Abstract 
 
 
This thesis searches for appropriate ways to alter entrenched patterns of highly 
negative outcomes for Māori in the criminal justice system. The statistics demonstrate 
that proportionately, Māori are much more likely to be apprehended, arrested, 
prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated than other New Zealanders and ethnic groups, 
and much less likely to be granted parole.  
 
An overview of the current relationship between Māori and the criminal justice 
system provides a background to begin understanding these long-standing patterns. 
An examination of the ancestral conceptions of tikanga Māori, including issues of 
proper conduct, punishment, behaviour and attaining balance, provides a persuasive 
framework to positively transform the criminal justice system. In order to understand 
why tikanga Māori is not meaningfully realised today, an historical review of the 
introduction of English law and legal systems clarifies the negative and almost fatal 
impact English law had on tikanga Māori.  
 
An evaluation of two instruments — Treaty of Waitangi and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples — provides further context for this 
dialogue. A specific focus on the right to culture and the right of self-determination, 
within these two documents, highlights the need to meaningfully revisit and/or realise 
these rights as a pathway to recognise the concepts of tikanga Māori. A review of 
comparative jurisdictions indicates existing support for the right to culture and the 
right of self-determination within respective legal systems and constitutions.  
 
An examination of the current criminal justice initiatives and policies in New Zealand 
highlights the status quo. This current status quo is set against initiatives in 
comparative jurisdictions. Following a domestic and international analysis, models 
underpinned by therapeutic jurisprudence and tikanga Māori, are suggested as a 




In conclusion, new frameworks are proposed. These may provide an opportunity to 
apply the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by an indigenous court premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine as the most promising way forward for Māori to ameliorate the 
disproportionate offending rates. A suggested extension to the Māori Land Court to 
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“Only the law of the Pākehā custom is recognized [in New Zealand]... The 
Maori who seeks justice and redress under Pākehā law must rely on the blunt 
instrument of that very same law which is embedded upon the mechanisms 
designed for his legal control” 
  















                                            
1 Maori Marsden “The Natural World and Natural Resources” in C Royal (ed) The Woven Universe: 
Selected Writings of Rev Maori Marsden (Estate of Rev. Maori Marsden, Masterton, 2003) at 101. 
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Before the arrival of settlers Māori adhered to their own form of ‘law and order’ and a 
world based on the collective. This changed dramatically with the imposition of a 
settler form of ‘law and order’ foreign to a Māori world. The control asserted by the 
settler government resulted in a break down of the collective and social order for 
Māori. This power and control was manifested in legislation that legitimized land 
alienations and the ability to incarcerate Māori for various offences. Subsequently 
Māori became landless and vulnerable to the whims of the settler government. 
Incarceration rates, for Māori, quickly rose and soon Māori were disproportionately 
represented within the criminal justice system. This has not changed and warrants an 
overdue, earnest and thoughtful study.  
 
The central aim of this thesis is to test the proposition that:   
 
Applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine, is the most promising way forward for Māori to ameliorate the over-
representation of Maori in the criminal justice system – A case for an Indigenous 
Court for Maori. 
 
 
This thesis suggests that a more meaningful incorporation of concepts that underpin 
tikanga Maori, within the current criminal justice system, could potentially lead to a 
reduction in recidivism and offending rates for Māori. This thesis further suggests that 
the Marae could be the appropriate forum to implement these concepts. A review of 
comparative jurisdictions lends further support for such an initiative. This proposed 
marae court or indigenous court, underpinned by tikanga Māori concepts, operating 
within the current criminal justice system, provides an example of internal self-
determination for Māori.  
 
Statistics from the Justice Department and the Department of Corrections in New 
Zealand indicate Māori are proportionately over-represented as offenders within the 
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criminal justice system.2 This provides an undesirable groundswell and subsequent 
catalyst that drives this thesis to seek answers. For example, in 1999 the Justice 
Department in its publication Responses to Crime: Annual Review noted:3 
 
Both Mäori and Pacific peoples of all age groups from 14 and older are over-
represented as offenders. This is particularly so for offenders aged 14 to 16, then 
again for those aged 40 and over. Māori have particularly high rates of offending, 
with, for example, a rate of prosecutions for non-traffic offences 5.4 times higher than 
that of other New Zealanders excluding Pacific peoples. Māori and Pacific peoples 
are more likely to be victims of violent offences than are New Zealand Europeans, 
but less likely to be the victims of property offences.  
 
Considering possible initiatives in response to these statistics, the Report notes that:4 
 
The relatively high rates of offending by Māori and Pacific peoples and the need for 
culturally appropriate responses point to the importance of both fostering diverse 
approaches to offending by these two groups and identifying those approaches that 
show most promise of reducing their over-participation in the criminal justice system 
as both offenders and victims. 
 
This indicates that while Māori commit criminal offences at rates higher than those 
for any other ethnic group in New Zealand, there is a need for consideration for 
diverse approaches to reduce the over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice 
system both as offenders and victims. 
 
In its report on the experience of Māori women in the criminal justice system,5 the 
Law Commission concurred with this finding. The report observed that Māori are 
disproportionately represented in court proceedings, with higher rates of criminal 
offending and incarceration than other ethnic groups when measured as a proportion 
                                            
2 Ministry of Justice Responses to Crime: Annual Review (November 1999) at 7; see also Department 
of Corrections Over-Representation of Māori in the Criminal Justice System: An Exploratory Report  
(September 2007) <www.corrections.govt.nz>. There has been no noticeable movement in these two 
sets of statistics. See also 
<http://www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/research_and_statistics/quarterly_prison_statistics/PS_Marc
h_2016.html#ethnicity>  that indicates at March 2016, 51 percent of the prison population identified as 
Maori. 
3 Above n 2. 
4 At 7. 
5 Law Commission Justice: The Experience of Māori Women (NZLC R53, 1999). 
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of the total population.6  
 
A report from the Department of Corrections also noted:7 
 
Relative to their numbers in the general population, Māori are over-represented at 
every stage of the criminal justice process. Though forming just 12.5% of the general 
population aged 15 and over, 42% of all criminal apprehensions involve a person 
identifying as Māori, as do 50% of all persons in prison. For Māori women, the 
picture is even more acute: they comprise around 60% of the female prison 
population. 
 
The true scale of Māori over-representation is greater than a superficial reading of 
such figures tend to convey. For example, with respect to the prison population, the 
rate of imprisonment for this country’s non-Māori population is around 100 per 
100,000. If that rate applied to Māori also, the number of Māori in prison at any one 
time would be no more than 650. There are however currently 4000 Māori in prison - 
six times the number one might otherwise expect. 
 
Marie notes that:8 
 
The Department of Corrections has adopted a specific theory about the causes of 
criminal offending by Māori. A major assumption of this theory is that the 
contemporary overrepresentation of Māori in offending, incarceration, and recidivism 
rates is best understood as the outcome of Māori experiencing impairments to cultural 
identity resulting from colonisation. Central to this theory, therefore, is also the 
assumption that ethnicity is a reliable construct by which distinctions can be made 
between offenders regarding what factors precipitated their offending, as well as best 
practices for their rehabilitation. 
 
More recently the following table was provided by the Ministry of Justice noting the 
composition of the prison population disaggregated by sex, age and ethnicity:9 
                                            
6 At ch 5. 
7 Department of Corrections, above n 2, at 6. See also R Walter and T Bradley “Crime statistics: 
‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ representations of crime and victimization” in R Walter and T Bradley (eds) 
Introduction of Criminological thought (Pearson Longman, Auckland, 2005) pp 20–22. 
8 Dannette Marie ‘Māori and Criminal Offending: A critical appraisal’ (2010) ANZ Jnl of Criminology 
43(2) at 283. 
9 Ministry of Justice Over representation of Māori in Prison, chapter 18 <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
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Table 1: Composition of the Prison Population Disaggregated by Sex, Age and Ethnicity as at 
31 March 2013 
 
At the time of this survey, Māori comprised 14 per cent of the population and yet 50 
per cent of the male prison population identified as Māori and although women 
comprised six per cent of the total prison population (504 out of a total population of 
8,611), Māori women made up 58 per cent of that female prisoner population (291 out 
of a total female prison population of 504).10  
 
Although concerning, Sumner notes that Western criminological theory has nothing to 
say about this genre of statistics and has little interest to contribute to their analysis.11 
Orthodox criminologists are reluctant to examine crimes and the colonial state as “you 
are returned to the criminal economic system underpinning your own state”.12 
Nonetheless an examination of crime and justice can “contribute to understanding the 
crimes of the powerful and the pursuit of human rights agendas in criminology”. 
 
This position is similar to that of other indigenous peoples in many post-colonial 
countries, including Australia and Canada. 13 Jim McLay, New Zealand’s Permanent 
                                            
10 Ministry of Justice Over representation of Māori in Prison, chapter 18, above. For a discussion on 
female offending see Paul Mazerolle ‘The poverty of a gender neutral criminology: Introduction to the 
special issue on current approaches to understanding female offending’ (2008) 41(1) ANZ Journal of 
Criminology. In 2016, this statistic increased to 62 percent of women serving custodial sentences and 
57 percent of women with community sentences identifying as Maori, see < 
http://www.corrections.govt.nz/resources/research_and_statistics/womens_experiences_of_re-
offending_and_rehabilitation.html> 
11 C Sumner (ed) Crime Justice and Underdevelopment (London, Heinemann, 1982) as cited by 
Simone Bull ‘The land of murder, cannibalism and all kinds of atrocious crimes? Māori and Crime in 
New Zealand 1853 – 1919’, (2004) Brit J Criminol 44, 496. 
12 Bull above n 11, 497. 
13 See Chapter V ‘Initiatives in Comparative Jurisdictions’ for statisics. Indigenous peoples is a term 
commonly used to describe any ethnic group who inhabit the geographic region with which they have 
Age Group Māori European Pacific Other Total Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
<20 231 17 87 3 50 1 9 3 401 
20-29 1,527 117 773 44 410 7 124 8 3,010 
30-39 1,097 81 636 50 282 6 108 8 2,268 
40-49 803 49 601 43 143 8 67 4 1,718 
50+ 383 27 636 23 95 3 45 2 1,214 
Total 4,041 291 2,733 163 980 25 353 25 8,611 
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Representative to the United Nations, recently reported:14  
 
Despite many positive developments, we remain realistic about the challenges. We 
recognise that Māori are over-represented in the criminal justice system, that Māori 
women and children experience a greater prevalence of domestic violence and that 
Māori face a higher number of health problems. The New Zealand government is 
committed to addressing these issues by improving social and economic conditions 
for Māori. 
 
Of recent note in the Concluding observations of the sixth periodic report of New 
Zealand the Committee against Torture recommended that:15 
 
The State party should increase its efforts to address the overrepresentation of 
indigenous people in prisons and to reduce recidivism, in particular its underlying 
causes, by fully implementing the Turning of the Tide Prevention Strategy through 
the overall judicial system and by intensifying and strengthening community-based 
approaches with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders and increased 
participation of Māori civil society organizations. 
 
Although it is difficult to ignore the disproportionate nature of these statistics, like 
many statistical surveys, they are limited by their disaggregation. To this end these 
statistics do not include whether the offenders are unemployed, uneducated, endure 
sub standard housing and poverty. Offending rates are instead linked to population 
proportions and disaggregated by gender, ethnicity and age rather than these social 
development factors.16 Simone Bull notes that “as far as our perceptions of Māori 
offending are concerned, reality has been overtaken by stereotypes and assorted 
                                                                                                                             
the earliest historical connection. See also Caecilie Mikkelsen (ed) The Indigenous World 2013 (Eks-
Skolens Trykkeri IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2013). 
14 Jim McLay statement to the Third Committee, 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly 
under Item 66: Rights of Indigenous Peoples 21 October 2013 (GA/SHC/4074). Media report available 
at <www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2013/gashc4074.doc.htm>. Also see <www.mfat.govt.nz > See also 
UN Report on Torture where it was noted at para 14 that: ‘The Committee is also concerned at 
information received that while making up 15% of the State Party’s population, Māori comprise 45% 
of arrests and over 50% of prison inmates, moreover more than 60% of female inmates are Māori 
(arts.2, 11 and 16).’ Available at <http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/> 
15 At para 14. 
16 John Braithwaite Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) as cited in Simone Bull Changing the broken record: New theory and data on  
Māori offending <http://igps.victoria.ac.nz>. 
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misinformation much of which is generated by corporate media”.17 According to 
theorist Jean Baudrillard this ‘hyper-reality’ has become a starting point for research 
as opposed to a sound evidence base.18 
 
In light of the absence of disaggregated data and empirical evidence, these 
assumptions form the basis for criminal justice intervention programmes that target 
Māori offenders.19 Despite initiatives by the Justice System, these statistics have not 
altered much. In the last 30 years, the rate of imprisonment for Māori is 660 per 
100,000 whereas for New Zealand Pākehā the rate is less than 95 per 100,000.20 
Further, proportionally, prisoners starting a prison sentence who are Māori increased 
from 47 per cent to 56 per cent between 1983 and 2013.21 The United Nations 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has urged the New Zealand government to 
investigate why Māori are continually over-represented in the nation's prisons.22 
 
Statistics New Zealand has not signaled any steps to further disaggregate this data, 
referring instead to maintaining the status quo.23 As this statistical disaggregation is 
unavailable, and not likely to be available, for Māori offending rates to be population 
‘proportionate’ on the 2013 statistics, based on a prison population of 8,611 the 
number of Māori inmates would be 1,292 (15 per cent of 8611) rather than the 
indicated 4,332. This is a drop of 70 per cent. Even if the social factors are taken into 
account and reflected in the statistics it is suggested that the imprisonment rate for 
Māori would still figure disproportionately.  
 
It is also acknowledged that to be classified as Māori for the purposes of the statistics 
requires self-identification. Many Māori, for various reasons, chose not to be 
identified as Māori, distorting the statistics. Nonetheless, the importance of these 
social factors on offending is recognised and included in the drivers of crime policy.  
                                            
17 Bull above.  
18 Jean Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (translated by Sheila Glaser)  
(Michigan, University of Michigan, 1995) as cited above. 
19 Marie above n 8, at 283. 
20 Department of Corrections Trends in the offender population 2013 <http://corrections.govt.nz>. 
21 Above. 
22 AAP ‘A UN working group says it wants the NZ government to undertake a review of the degree of 
systemic bias against Māori in the justice system’. April 2014. < 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/04/08/un-wants-review-maori-nz-prisons> 
23 Statistics New Zealand Review of crime and criminal justice statistics report (Wellington, 2009) 22 
<www.statistics.govt.nz> 
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The events of history and humanity, including instances of colonial annexation, reveal 
the need to control and protect.24 For instance, the passing of legislation such as the 
New Zealand Settlements Act 1863,25 the Suppression of Rebellion Act 1863 and the 
Disturbed Districts Act 1869 sanctioned land confiscations and criminalised actions 
taken by Māori to retain their land26 thus controlling the actions of Māori through 
legislation and protecting colonial settlers by criminalising the actions of Māori, 
thereby making the land available for the colonial settlers. 
 
Paul McHugh noted that the colonial legal system is one seeking to establish “a 
constitutionally homogenised population, one that reflected Anglo-settler values, 
rather than a pluralistic one with sources of political authority apart from the state.”27  
 
This desire is reflected in respective criminal justice systems, such as those in 
Australia28 and North America,29 where their accompanying ideologies have been 
imposed upon existing systems. Professor Robert Miller captures this by noting:30 
                                            
24 See Te Paparahi o te Raki Waitangi Tribunal Report, November 2014, Wai 1040, at 529 ‘Rather, in 
the explanations of the texts and in the verbal assurances given by Hobson and his agents, it sought the 
power to control British subjects and thereby to protect Māori.’ However, in ensuing years Māori lost 
control of their lands, territories and resources through imposed legislation; legislation, which in turn 
protected British subjects.  
25 The New Zealand Settlements Act 1963 was ‘An Act to enable the Governor to establish settlements 
for colonization in the North Island of New Zealand’. The Act allowed for land confiscation without 
compensation from iwi who were deemed to be in rebellion against Her Majesty’s authority. 
Subsequently the Government confiscated vast tracks of land from tribes such as Te Ati Awa, from the 
Taranaki district, who were passively protesting against the land policies of the Government that 
resulted in the loss of Māori land. 
26 Simone Bull ‘The land of murder, cannibalism and all kinds of atrocious crimes? Maori and Crime in 
New Zealand 1853 – 1919’, (2004) Brit J Criminol 44, 496 – 519, 507. The imposition of policies and 
legislation to control and criminlaise Maori, such as the Dog Tax, resulted in an increase in offending 
and charge rates for Maori in the 1890s. 
27 Paul McHugh Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law: A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-
Determination (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004), at 49. 
28 For instance see Australia Law Reform Commission ‘Recognition of Aboriginal Laws’ June 1986 
(ALRC Report 31) Chapter 4 where it is noted that ‘The decision to classify the ‘new’ country of 
Australia as a settled colony, rather than as conquered or ceded, meant that the new settlers brought 
with them the general body of English law, including the criminal law.’ < http://www.alrc.gov.au/ > 
See also R v Jack Congo Murrell (1836) 1 Legge 72 where the court held it had jurisdiction to try one 
aborigine for the murder of another confirming that the law of the colonists applied to the indigenous 
aboriginal peoples. This has been reaffirmed. See eg Tuckiar v R (1934) 52 CLR 335; Milirrpum v 
Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141, 261-2 (Blackburn J); R v Wedge [1976] 1 NSWLR 581. In the 
latter case, Rath J concluded that `all the reasons of the court in R v Murrell are as valid today as they 
were when judgment in that case was given’, at 587. 
29 See Chris Cuneen ‘Colonial Processes, Indigenous Peoples and Criminal Justice Systems’ in Sandra 
Buicerious and Michael Tonry (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Ethncity, Crime and Immigration (OUP, 
New York, 2014) at 386 – 408. 
30 Robert Miller and Jacinta Ruru “An Indigenous Lens into Comparative Law: The Doctrine of 
Discovery in the United States and New Zealand” (2009) 111 West Virginia L. Rev 849 at 914. 
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… the European colonists pursued a mission to destroy the cultures, laws and 
governments of Indigenous peoples. A campaign to “civilize” these “others” by 
making illegal the practicing of their ways of knowing was sought through the means 
of law. 
 
If a legal system did not conform to a Western jurist’s perception of a legal system, 
premised on a constitutional framework, then it was not classified as a legal system.31  
The European claim was that “there is no law until there are courts”.32 
 
Prior to colonisation Māori had effective legal, political and social systems in place.33  
The Crown government did not encounter “a legal vacuum, unfilled until the exercise 
of the constituent power.”34 The Māori legal system was based on values rather than 
rules. Although such laws varied from iwi-to-iwi,35 all Māori followed and adhered to 
the principles of tikanga Māori, paricularly when a breach occurred. 
 
Tikanga Māori is often viewed as Māori customary values and practices. Nonetheless, 
it is far more complex than a two dimensional definition. Hirini Moko Mead states 
that:36 
 
… tikanga [Māori] is the set of beliefs associated with practices and procedures to be 
followed in conducting the affairs of a group or individual. These procedures are 
established by precedents through time, are held to be ritually correct, are validated 
by usually more than one generation and are always subject to what a group or 
individual is able to do ... tikanga are tools of thought and understanding. They are 
packages of ideas which help to organize behavior and provide some predictability in 
                                            
31 Moana Jackson The Māori and the Criminal Justice System - He Whaipaanga Hou: A New 
Perspective: Part 2 (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1988), at 37. 
32 Sir Clinton Roper Report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Violence (March 1987) at 37-
41. Also known as the Roper Report where it was urged that legislation be utilized to the fullest extent. 
See also Sue Carswell Family Violence and the Pro-Arrest Policy: A Literature Review (Ministry of 
Justice, December 2006) at ch 2.  
33 See Eddie T Durie “Will the Settlers Settle? Cultural Conciliation and Law” (1996) 8 Otago L Rev 
449 at 451. See also discussion in New Zealand Law Commission Māori Custom and Values in New 
Zealand Law (NZLC SP9, Wellington, 2001) at 17; See also Jackson, above n 31. Wai 1040, above n 
24. 
34 Paul McHugh The Māori Magna Carta: New Zealand Law and the Treaty of Waitangi  (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1991) at 83. 
35 See Hirini Mead Tikanga Māori Living by Māori Values (Huia, Wellington, 2003) at 8. 
36 At 12. 
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how certain activities are carried out. They provide templates and frameworks to 
guide our actions … they help us differentiate between rights and wrong … there is a 
right and proper way to conduct one’s self. 
 
This position infers that in order to realise what is right and appropriate, there must be 
an element of flexibility and adaptability to tikanga Māori.37  A balancing or weighing 
up would be required to determine the proper actions or responses. 
 
Tikanga Māori is not only conceptual, representing beliefs and customs, but is also 
manifest in actions and practices.38 The dynamic between the underlying concepts and 
customs, with actions and practices, assists to discern and maintain social 
understandings and balance within the community. This balance can change to reflect 
the mores of the community, but the essence of the concepts remain.39 Tikangi Māori 
is a relational concept more akin to principles, which prescribed general actions, than 
rules that prescribed specific acts resulting in, for example, specific regulations and 
codes. 40 Upon colonisation most principles of tikanga Māori were neither encouraged 
nor recognised by the colonial authorities.41  
 
The colonial values and ethics imported by the settlers were based on Victorian 
morals.42 The introduced beliefs of the Church instilled a sense of religious morality 
— demanding obedience to God and the will of the Church.43 Central to these morals 
                                            
37 Above n 35. 
38 Mead, above n 35, at 22. 
39 For instance, in light of the health statistics, indicating that Māori have disproportionate rates of 
diabetes, and are three times likely to contract diabetes as non-Māori, warranting kidney transplants, 
the tikanga attached to organ donation be reassessed. The general view is that, for Māori, the body is to 
return to Papatūānuku (mother earth) whole. However, as tikanga is flexible we are to perceive organ 
donation as one of manaakitanga (blessing) and āwhina (help) this would support the activity of organ 
donation. So, the primacy of the tikanga concepts may have changed but their essence remains the 
same, resulting in balance that is reflective of social mores. 
40 Principles are commonly seen to apply from within to internally motivate and are fundamentally 
different to rules that are commonly seen to apply externally to compel action. For further discussion 
on the nature of rules see Joseph Raz “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law” (1972) 81 Yale LJ 838.  
41 See also discussion in Nin Tomas “Indigenous Peoples and the Maori: The Right to Self-
Determination in International Law - From Woe to Go” [2008] NZ Law Review at 645 – 647 where 
she notes that ‘colonisation resulted in the decimation of the social, political and legal organization of 
indigenous societies and their marginalisation within new, imposed colonial regimes’. 
42 Victorian morals included ‘sexual restraint, low tolerance of crime and a strict code of conduct’ see 
also J M R Owens “Christianity and the Maori to 1840” (1968) NZJH at 1 – 40 
<www.nzjh.auckland.ac.nz>. See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 248 – 257. 
43 See discussion in Michael King The Penguin History of New Zealand (Penguin, New Zealand, 2003) 
at 141 – 146. See also discussion in Leonie Pihema “Tihei Mauri Ora: Honouring Our Voices. Mana 
Wahine as a Kaupapa Maori Theoretical Framework” (PhD, University of Auckland, 2001) at ch. 6 
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and values was the notion of the individual and individual rights to property that 
prevailed in the Victorian era.44  
 
For philosophers such as Grotius and Hobbes, the defining “institution of property 
differentiated the savage state from the more advanced stages in society”.45 During 
this time of enlightenment, ‘savages’ or the ‘uncivilized’, such as Māori, were 
required to be transformed into a living model of humanity where a ‘pleasanter way of 
life’ was characterised by individual property rights.46  
 
For Māori their cultural definitions and ontological assumptions that shaped notions 
of criminality and social order, were replaced by these values and morals of the 
colonising power.47 Although the applicability of this new social order and 
accompanying legal system was resisted, in reality, in many areas, English law was 
unknown, unenforced and unenforecable.48 For a large number of communities, 
tikanga Māori was the only legal system in place;49 nonetheless, this resulted in a 





To examine whether the application of Te Ao Māori philosophy is an appropriate way 
forward for Māori to ameliorate the disproportionate offending rates, Chapter One 
will set the scene with an overview of criminality and the relationship between Māori 
                                                                                                                             
“Colonisation and the Importation of Ideologies, of Race, Gender and Class” 
<www.kaupapamaori.com>. Māori have now internalized these religious values e.g. Ratana Church 
44 Owens, above n 42. Wai 1040, above n 24, at 38. 
45 Robert A. Williams Jr Savage Anxieties: The Invention of Western Civilisation (Palgrave, New York, 
2012) at 204. Although the writings of these philosophers were based in Europe Williams uses this to 
emphasise the wider effect this philosophy had on Indigenous peoples.  
46 Williams Jr, above n 45, at 203-204. The alienation was premised on individual property rights 
doctrine. The Waitangi Tribunal was eventually established to ameliorate the alienation and 
confiscation of Māori land by the Crown see Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 s 4. 
47 See comments by Ranginui Walker in Ka Whawhai Tonu Mātou - Struggle without End (Penguin, 
Auckland, 1990) at 10, where he notes that “the outcome of colonization by the turn of the century was 
impoverishment of leaders and chiefly authority and a structural relationship of Pākehā dominance and 
Māori subjection. So in total was Pākehā dominance at a time when Māori population had fallen to its 
lowest point of 45,549, that the colonizer deluded himself into thinking that he had created a unified 
nation state of one people…” 
48 McHugh Aboriginal Societies above n 27, at 180. 
49 McHugh Aboriginal Societies, above n 27, at 180 -181. 
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and the criminal justice system, including areas of criminal offending, parole and 
mental health before the examination of two primary areas: who are Māori and what 
is tikanga Māori in Chapter Two. The discussion of Māori ancestral conceptions of 
tikanga Māori and correct conduct establishes a potential framework for further 
consideration and is set against more commonly known theories of law: natural law 
and positivism. Two examples provide an insightful reflection of the implementation 
of English law on tikanga Māori: first, the changing significance of Māori women in 
society together with the related problem of domestic violence; and second, the issue 
of mental health and Māori.50  
 
To examine the concerning question of the extent to which tikanga Māori has been 
marginalised, Chapter Three will provide a historical review of the introduction of 
English law and legal systems and the adverse impact this has had on tikanga Māori. 
An analysis of two key documents — the Treaty of Waitangi and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples — will be undertaken to provide 
further context to this dialogue. Although the New Zealand government was reluctant 
to include indigenous rights and the concept of tikanga Māori within a possible 
written constitution, an examination of comparative constitutions reveals that it is not 
unusual to entrench indigenous rights. An evaluation of the pivotal right of self-
determination, as set forth in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, and the rights associated with tino rangatiratanga, in the Treaty of 
Waitangi provides a contextual right for the return to the philosophy of Te Ao Māori 
realised by an indigenous legal system.  
 
To provide further context and background, Chapter Four will examine the historical 
and contemporary criminal justice initiatives, including Māori juries, Māori wardens 
and Family Group Conferences. It could be that aspects of these initiatives, such as 
the role of the Māori warden, that have shown success could be employed within a 
proposed indigenous court. A review of how Hauora Māori (Māori philosophy of 
health and well-being) adheres to the relational concept of tikanga Māori within the 
health system provides an interesting comparative analysis. Existing judicial 
                                            
50 The term “English” law refers to the law that was derived from the English Westminster system 
from the United Kingdom that was imported into New Zealand retrospectively clarified by the English 
Laws Act 1858. 
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initiatives to address the disproportionate representation of Māori in the criminal 
statistics will be investigated, including Te Kooti Rangatahi — a youth court held on 
a marae.  
 
Chapter Five provides a review of initiatives from comparative jurisdictions, such as 
the Navajo Courts and the Koori Courts, which indicates State support for indigenous 
people’s right to culture and self-determination. This chapter will conclude that given 
the disproportionate representation of indigenous peoples in areas of crime and mental 
health, drawing upon indigenous concepts and doctrine may provide an answer.51 An 
examination of the Navajo Courts lays the foundation for further discussion.  
 
In light of the preceding dialogue and research, which identifies the concept of 
therapeutic jurisprudence that underpins specialist courts, Chapter Six suggests that a 
judicial model, based on therapeutic jurisprudence, could provide a useful way to 
incorporate tikanga Māori within the criminal justice and court system. 
 
Chapter Seven consolidates this research and tests the implications of a new 
framework. This includes an extension to the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court,52 
or a specialised Tikanga Māori Court,53 in order to provide an answer to the question 
as to whether: 
 
Applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realized by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine, is the most promising way forward for Māori to ameliorate the 
disproportionate offending rates. 
                                            
51 Indigenous law relates to that system of law developed by, and relating to, indigenous peoples. 
Terms such as Customary Law and Aboriginal Law can also be used. For Maori this system of law is 
“tikanga”. See also New Zealand Law Commission above n 33 for discussion on tikanga Maori and 
Maori custom law. 
52 The jurisdiction of the Maori Land Court is currently to hear matters relating to successions, Title 
improvements, Maori land sales and the administration of Maori Land Trusts and Incorporations. The 
jurisdiction also includes cases under the Maori Fisheries Act 2004 and Maori Commercial 
Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004. An extension to the jurisdiction to capture criminal 
offending may be suggested. It is acknowledged that the Maori Land Court is based on the notion of 
individual property rights that is inconsistent with the Maori world and this presents a further 
challenge.  
53 Although phrased as a “new” Indigenous Court there are many such Courts already operating. In 
Canada the National Judicial Institute provides educational courses for the judiciary on Aboriginal 




The purpose of this thesis is to understand the reasons for the continual 
disproportionate offending rates and determine an appropriate framework that may 
assist to alleviate these rates. As the ‘Judicial Participation in Research Projects 
memorandum’ restricted any judicial comment on the existing court structures and 
comments on any proposed fora, I have deferred to the existing traditional and 
comparative research methodology as opposed to quantative or qualitative 
methodology.  
 
A mix of both a ‘black letter’ and ‘sociological’ approach is used throughout the 
thesis. For example, when describing legal rules and the emergence of legal sources 
with the aim of identifying whether or not where tikanga Maori is recognised, or not, 
within the current legal system, reflecting a law and society approach. 
 
This is complemented with a sociological approach. The use of statistics and recent 
evaluation reports are pivotal, particularly when for instance there is a need to 
understand why the statistics have not changed over the last thirty years, this 
highlights the impact of the law, and the role of society and of policy. These two 
traditional research methodologies are further complemented with a comparative 
methodology. Particularly as comparisons between legal systems, constitutions and 
criminal justice initiatives assist to provide contextual understanding that support a 
suggested model. 
 
All discussions that have previously taken place with the Judiciary reflect comments 
made either in lectures or conference presentations and have been referenced. Those 
that cannot be referenced to lectures or conference presentations are formally included 
in publications such as the Law Commission Report.  
 
Chapter One uses the raft of statistics and recent evaluation reports to highlight any 
trends or social changes that complements and adds a point of analysis for my thesis. 
In Chapter Two the significance of Māori women and domestic violence together with 
the issue of mental health assist to consolidate the contextual understanding of who 
Māori are. To examine the historical background, a review of the founding document, 
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the Treaty of Waitangi, is pivotal in Chapter Three, together with the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as the key international document.  
 
Chapter Four returns to analyse current initiatives in New Zealand. To further test the 
proposition a comparative methodology is engaged and applied to Australia and 
Canada as both are Commonwealth jurisdictions to provide these provide beneficial 
comparatives in Chapter Five. This comparative methodology is further extended to 
the recent criminal justice initiatives in the United States to provide an added layer of 
analysis. The discussion of therapeutic jurisprudence as a doctrine with similarities to 
tikanga Māori is helpful in Chapter Six. This provides a basis to propose possible 
































































Schiller notes that the “behavioural definition of crime focuses on, criminality, a 
certain personality profile” that causes a crime.54 The type of “person likely to commit 
a crime is often a style of strategic behavior characterised by self-centeredness and 
indifference to the suffering and needs of others”.55 More “impulsive individuals are 
more likely to find criminality an attractive style of behavior because it can provide 
immediate gratification through relatively easy or simple strategies”.56 
 
Some criminologists believe that the orthodox reasons for criminality that relate to 
sociological, psychological, biological or economic reasons do not explain criminal 
behaviour.57 Rather, they state that the essential element of criminality is the lack or 
absence of self-control, so those with high self-control consider the consequences of 
their behaviour as opposed to those with low self-control who do not.58 Further, once 
self-control is learned, it is highly resistant to change. 
 
The indigenous concept of criminality differs from a non-indigenous concept of 
criminality. For Māori, a crime or hara was inextricably linked to, and explained by 
further concepts such as tapu and mana and the need to rebalance the harm that the 
hara has caused, rather than any associated behaviour of the offender.59  
 
Nonetheless, it is acknowledged that the behaviour or criminality associated with a 
hara, such as trespass and taking of resources, could stem from conventional elements 
of criminality, such as self-centeredness, indifference to the suffering of others and 
possibly low self-control. However, the requirement to rebalance the harm caused is 
mandatory and takes precedence over behaviour that may be classified as criminal.  
                                            
54 Johann Schiller ‘Crime and Criminality’ Chapter 16 University of California, Davis< 
www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/> 
55 See Michael R Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi A general theory of crime (Stanford University Press, 
USA, 1990 
56 Schiller above n 54. 
57 Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi above n 55.  
58 Above.  
59 See Chapter II ‘Maori and Tikanga’ for full discussion. 
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Causes of Offending 
 
Criminology, as a distinct field of study, is devoted to determining the causes of 
crime. It is no surprise that due to the dynamic and complex reasons why people 
offend, various theories, such as conflict and group theory, and various factors, such 
as social and economic factors, can be more heavily weighted than others when 
determining causes of offending.60 Subsequently, sociological and economical 
theories often describe conditions in which crime frequently occurs, without 
explaining why it occurs and why some factors affect some people and not others.61  
 
Further, it is difficult to avoid similarities and overlap in theories; for instance, the 
concept of conflict, as a reason to offend, is also labelled as critical or radical 
criminology.62 To this end it is problematic to ascribe to one school of criminological 
thought when determining causes of offending. A closer examination of the different 
theories and how they may, or may not explain Māori causes of offending will be 
informative. 
 
Theories that are based on scientific evidence, unfortunately, have provided little 
value when explaining causes of offending for Māori. The drive to provide a scientific 
explanation for criminality is a regular feature of the modern discourse on crime.63 
During the 2006 Conference of the International Congress of Human Genetics, it was 
claimed that the presence of a specific gene type, the monoamine oxidase gene, 
contributed significantly to explaining the criminality of Māori.64 This finding was 
flawed and unnecessarily exacerbated the effect that a gene may have on Māori,65 
proving unhelpful in terms of seeking a cause of offending for Māori.  
                                            
60 Above. For a discussion on cultural factors see M O’Brien ‘What is cultural about Cultural 
Criminology?’ (2005) 45 British Journal of Criminology 599. 
61 K.D. Harries, Crime and the Environment (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1980), 4–5. 
62 See Werner J Einstader and Stuart Henry ‘Criminological Theory: An Analysis of its underlying 
assumptions’ second edition (Rowman & Littlefield, USA, 2006) 236, where it stated that ‘the 
predominant cause of crime according to this perspective is societally generated conflict fuelled by a 
capitalist system of domination, inequality, alienation and injustice’. 
63 Ross Hogg ‘The Causes of Crime and the Boundaries of Criminal Justice’ in Julia Tolmie and 
Warren Brookbanks (eds) Criminal Justice in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) at 87. 
64 Hogg, above n 63; See also G Raumati Hook “Warrior Genes and the Disease of Being Māori” 
(2009) 2 Mai Review, which refers to an Annual Meeting of the American Association of Physical 
Anthropologists in Tampa, Florida in 2004 where the ‘warrior’ gene, Monoamine oxidase (MAO) is 
also discussed.   
65 See Rod Lea and Geoffrey Chambers ‘Monoamine oxidase, addiction, and the “warrior” gene 
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The functionalist theory suggests that because crime exists in all societies it must have 
a function, and that function is to help to define what is normal, to make some 
behaviour more attractive and promote social cohesion.66 Whereas the superiority 
theory suggests that humans are conditioned to strive for superiority, and therefore 
some people turn to crime as a means of achieving superiority.67 
 
For Māori, applying a functionalist theory is problematic as tikanga determines what 
is normal, not the presence of crime. Similarly the superiority theory suggests that 
Māori are conditioned to strive to be superior and turning to crime can achieve this. 
For Māori, commiting a crime will not achieve superiority, rather the action of 
commiting good deeds will result in an increase in mana and superiority not 
commiting a crime.  
 
The strain theory suggests that people whose ambitions are severely frustrated will 
experience anger that will lead to rebellion against the real or perceived causes of 
those frustrations.68 Ambition for Māori is linked to achieving the well-being or ‘ora’ 
of the group. If this is not achieved the collective or group are responsible rather than 
the individuals at large.  
 
Another theory holds that persons will be more likely to conform when they stand to 
benefit by conforming.69 Evidence that violence begets violence is also perceived as a 
                                                                                                                             
hypothesis’ (2007) Jnl of the NZ Med Assoc 120, 1250. See also comments by Dr Sam Hancox ‘it is 
extremely unlikely that a single gene explains anything’ in Jon Stokes ‘Māori ‘warrior gene’ claims 
appalling, says geneticist’ NZH Thursday Aug 10, 2006 <www.nzherald.co.nz> 
66 Emile Durkheim, “The Normal and the Pathological” (1938), and Robert A. Dentler and Kai T. 
Erikson, “The Functions of Deviance in Groups” (1959) in Stuart H. Traub and B Craig (eds) Little 
Theories of Deviance (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1975) as cited by Paul L. A. H. 
Chartrand Wendy Whitecloud (Commissioners) The Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission 
‘Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba The Justice System and Aboriginal Peoples’ 
(2001) <www.ajic.mb.ca>.   
67 Alfred Adler, referred to in John Braithwaite, Inequality, Crime and Public Policy (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979) as cited by Chartrand above n 66. 
68 Theodore N. Ferdinand, “The Methods of Delinquency Theory,” Criminology, 25, 4 (1987): 841–62, 
at 849. 
69 Michael Lynch and W. Byron Groves, A Primer in Radical Criminology, 2d ed. (Albany, New York: 
Harrow and Heston, 1989). A related or overlapping theory is the differential association theory that 
provides that crime is learned by associating with others who have already rejected conduct norms and 
have committed themselves to deviance as a way to satisfy their desires, see Edwin H. Sutherland, 
“The Theory of Differential Association” (1947), in Traub and Little above n 66. 
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cause of offending.70 It is difficult to assess the relevance of these theories for Māori 
without a suitable context. For instance, if an act in self defence was deemed violent, 
would that then be a cause of offending?  
 
Theories related to culture and social factors are more relevant. For instance, the 
conflict theory suggests that when a person is influenced strongly by two conflicting 
cultures, the attachment to the rules of one is weakened and can produce deviant 
behaviour.71 For Māori who adhere to tikanga Māori this is usually to the deteriment 
of the existing legal system, subsequently by not abiding by the rules of the existing 
legal system can result in behaviour classified as deviant or criminal. However, this 
theory fails to provide reasons why adhering to the other system cannot be 
accommodated, and thus the resulting actions are not classified as deviant.  
 
For Pākehā, the imposition of legislation72 dictated what a crime was. A crime was 
classified a crime without any consideration of what a crime meant for Māori, thereby 
marginalising their view. For Māori, a ‘hara’ was not dependent on legislation for 
legitimation; a hara was identified as a ‘crime’ if the action or inaction breached a 
concept or concepts of tikanga Māori. The behaviour or criminality of the offender 
was secondary.  
 
Historically justice was administered locally as there was no national centralised 
police system between 1853 and 1876.73 Peaks in offending rates can be directly 
linked to historical events. Bull identifies four such episodes between 1853 and 1920, 
mid 1860s, 1881, 1897, and 1911. These periods are linked to gross violations of 
human rights and the criminalisation of Māori independence.74 
 
                                            
70 Jeffrey Fagan and Sandra Wexler, “Family Origins of Violent Delinquents,” Criminology, 25, 3 
(1987): 643–69. 
71 Thorsten Sellin, “Culture Conflict and Crime” (1938), in Traub and Little above n 66 at pp. 49–58. 
72 In New Zealand, today, all crime is codified in statutes and thus it is not possible to be charged with 
a criminal offence under common law.72 A breach of the legislation results in various forms of sentence 
ranging from community service to imprisonment.  Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s 9 - “Offences not to be 
punishable except under New Zealand Acts”. See also Crimes Act 1961 (NZ), s 2- For procedural 
purposes, there are four categories of offence, see Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 6. 
73 S Bull above n 26, at 499. 
74 S Bull above n 26, at 496. 
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The first peak corresponds to the anti liquor restrictions that were imposed.75 
According to classical criminology, “rational hedonism is the primary motivator of 
crime”. In this light Māori who took pleasure in supplying and consuming alcohol 
perceived this was a risk worth taking.76 However, it is difficult to explain why 
“special restrictions were imposed on Māori as this is incompatible with the idea that 
everyone is driven by the same forces’.77 This is further compounded by the position 
of settlers who considered Māori as deviants, or members of a separate society, 
because they were different and criminalised them accordingly.78  
 
The first peak during the1860s also corresponds to war and the accompanying 
Supression of Rebellion Act 1863, Disturbed Districts Act 1869 and the New Zealand 
Settlements Act 1863 legislation that criminalised Māori resistance to settler 
encroachment on Māori land.79 The Māori Prisoners’ Trial Act and the West Coast 
Settlement Act 1880 also criminalised these actions. The third peak corresponds to the 
imposition of the Dog Tax that led to an increase in convictions, as did the Defence 
Act 1909; in 1911, that coincides with the fourth peak. 
 
The reasons for the imposition of the raft of legislation to control the liquor industry, 
to provide land for settlement, to raise revenue and for the desire of the New Zealand 
Government to establish its own armed forces, criminalised what were benign acts, 
such as owning a dog or passively protesting. Subsequently, Māori were criminalised 
for their actions, arrested and imprisoned as they came in conflict with legislation 
passed to promote the interests of the colonisers. 
 
Criminologists seek to explain this through theories, including group conflict theory 
that states “crime is intimately related to conflict” and critical criminology that holds 
“unequal distribution of power is causally related to crime and this power needs to be 
specified”.80 While conflict occurred group conflict theory assumes a degree of 
                                            
75 The Sale of Spirits to Natives Ordinance 1847, which prohibited the sale of spirits and limited the 
sale of other intoxicating liquors to Māori. 
76 S Bull above n 26, at 502. 
77 S Bull above n 26, at 502. 
78 Pratt as cited by S Bull above n 26 at, 505. 
79 S Bull above n 26, at, 507. 
80 G B Vold Theoretical Criminology (New York, Oxford University Press, 1958) as cited by Bull 
above n 26 at 498.  
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political strength that, in reality, was minimal for Māori who had their own existing 
social, political and legal structures.81 Notwithstanding from 1911 onwards the 
dramatic increase in Māori offending rates and the decrease of non-Māori offending is 
“driven by renewed attention to law and order brought about by political strife”.82 
Bull notes that:83 
 
Government harassment of Māori grows ever more subtle … with a view to 
endorsing the illusion of state control seemingly innocuous legislation is used to 
facilitate the over-policing of Māori. Before long, reported offending by Māori is 
seen as an issue of problem justifying the need for further official intervention and 
initiating a self-fulfilling prophecy that manifests itself today in the contemporary 
stereotype of the Māori criminal. 
 
Although historically this may have been the situation for Māori, in contemporary 
times the orthodox reasons for criminality that relate to sociological, psychological, 
biological or economic reasons assist to explain the contemporary causes of offending 
for Māori. However, the examination of the effect of colonisation and the imposition 
of legislation is required to place causes of offending into context. 
 
Related to the conflict theory is the social disorganization theory that explains 
deviance as a side effect of rapidly changing society; for instance, industrialisation, 
urbanisation and rapid technological change.84 Films and other forms of media, an 
example of technological change, can also be sources of criminality.85 The ecological 
theory that identifies conditions in which crime flourishes by focussing mostly on 
physical conditions as a result of urbanisation, such as high density population, 
poverty, transience (homeless people), dilapidation and overcrowding, could be an 
overlapping theory of the social disorganisation theory.86  
                                            
81 Bull above n 26 at 498. 
82 Bull above n 26 at 517. See also for offending statistics. 
83 S Bull above n 26 at 517. 
84 W.I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, “The Concept of Social Disorganization” (1920), and Robert E. 
Park, “Social Change and Social Disorganization” (1967), in Traub and Little above n 66. 
85 See Y Jewkes Theorising Media and Crime, 10 -37 < http://www.sagepub.com> . Richard Erickson 
“Mass Media, Crime, Law and Justice an Institutional approach” Br J Criminol (1991) 31(3): 219-249.  
See also Daniel Glaser, “Criminality Theories and Behavioural Images” (1956), in Traub and Little 
above n 66. 
86 Rodney Stark, “Deviant Places: A Theory of the Ecology of Crime,” Criminology, 25, 4 (1987): 
893–909. 
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Duncan concluded that higher rates of offending resulted from the effect of migration 
and the movement of Māori from rural areas to urban cities.87 O’Malley focused “on 
culture conflict, recent urbanisation, low socio-economic status, high-risk mores, 
selective processing by control agencies as contextual factors leading to higher crime 
rates” for Māori.88 This was supported through his examination of Magistrates’ Court 
data revealing higher conviction rates for Māori compared to Pākehā.89  
 
The effect of colonisation and urbanisation on Māori is closely tied to the theories of 
conflict and social disorganisation and assists to explain causes of offending for Māori 
by colouring these theories with the changing times and a changing society. 
 
Many scholars have sought to understand why Māori are over-represented as 
offenders in New Zealand.90 To determine a single cause of criminal behaviour is 
problematic as there are “as many causes as there are offenders and each offender’s 
behaviour is in itself the result of several causes”.91  
 
In a study on the causes of youth offending,92 various risk factors were identified, 
including family, school/work, association with peers and biological factors. The 
more risk factors present, the more likely it is that an offence will be committed. 
However, with just one factor present, the risk of offending is significantly less. 
Protective factors such as positive influences or role models can mitigate the risk of 
                                            
87 L Duncan Explanations for Polynesian Crime Rates in Auckland. (1971) Recent Law, October 1971 
as cited by Department of Corrections (2007) above n 2, 7. 
88 P O'Malley “The Influence of Cultural Factors on Māori Crime Rates” in S D Webb and J Collette 
(eds) New Zealand Society - Contemporary Perspectives (John Wiley & Sons Australasia Pty Ltd, 
Sydney, 1973) as cited by Department of Corrections (2007) above n 2, 7. 
89 O’Malley above n 88 at 7. 
90 See S Bull “The land of murder, cannibalism, and all kinds of atrocious crimes? Māori and crime in 
New Zealand” 1853–1919, (2004) British Journal of Criminology, 44, 496–519; J K Fifield and A.A 
Donnell Socioeconomic status, race, and offending in New Zealand (Research Report No 6) 
(Wellington, New Zealand, Government Printer, 1980); D.M Ferguson, F Vitaro, L J Horwood and N 
Swain-Campbell “Ethnicity and criminal convictions: results of a 21-year longitudinal study” (2003) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 36, 354–67; Jackson above n 31; K Maynard, B 
Coebergh, B Anstiss, B, L Bakkerand T Huriwai “Ki te arotu: Toward a new assessment: The 
identification of cultural factors which may predispose Maori to crime” (1999) Social Policy Journal of 
New Zealand, 13, 43–54; Greg Newbold The problem of prisons: Corrections reform in New Zealand 
since 1840 (Wellington, New Zealand, Dunmore Press, 2007); John Pratt “Assimilation, equality, and 
sovereignty in New Zealand/Aotearoa” in Paul Havemann (ed) Indigenous rights in Australia, Canada 
& New Zealand (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1999); P Spier Conviction and sentencing of 
offenders in New Zealand: 1991 to 2000 (Wellington, Ministry of Justice, 2001). 
91 Jackson above n 31,at 57. 
92 D.M Fergusson and M T Lunskey “Adolescent Resiliency to Family Adversity” (1996) 37(3) Journal 
of Child Psychology and Psychiatry at 281-292 
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offending.93 In noting the potential effect of the offender’s background, Gendall J 
stated: 94 
 
Equality before the law is fundamental to the administration of justice, but … the 
penalty must reflect matters of mitigation arising from an offender’s background and 
which recognises the structure and operation of the society within which he lives and 
in particular the degree to which the cultural or ethnic heritage predominates, in any 
problems of a cross-cultural nature. 
 
Judge Becroft commented that:95  
 
It is very difficult to know which risks are actually causes, and of course, this may 
differ between individuals. It may be possible to look at a particular individual who 
has already committed an offence and determine the causes of his or her offending. 
But at a population level, the best information we can produce is a study of risk 
factors for offending, and an understanding that the more risk factors an individual 
possesses, the more likely they are to commit offences. There is no single factor that 
can be specified as the 'cause' of anti-social or criminal behaviour... [emphasis 
added]. 
 
For Indigenous peoples “the causes of offending generally fail to explain crime 
satisfactorily, in part because there is so much confusion about correlations, causes 
and crime and when it comes to explaining disproportionate crime rates there can be 
many different conclusions based on different interpretations of the same data”.96 
 
 
                                            
93 Te Puni Kokiri Addressing the Drivers of Crime for Māori (Working Paper 014-2011, July 2011) 
identifies similar risks including social, economic and community factors. In attaining answers the 
focus is on the community who will also design, develop and deliver the initiatives, this is an example 
of self-determination and will be discussed in a later chapter <www.tpk.govt.nz>. 
94 Nishikata v Police HC Wellington AP126/99, 22 July 1999, at [8]. 
95 Judge Becroft “What Causes Youth Crime and What Can We Do?” (paper presented to NZ Bluelight 
Ventures Inc – Conference and AGM, Queenstown, 7 May 2009) <http://www.justice.govt.nz>. See 
also Judge Becroft presentation to the International Indigenous Therapeutic Jurisprudence Conference 
October 9 and 10, University of Britsh Columbia, Canada, 2014 where he states that poverty is a main 
factor that underpins offending.  
96 Paul L. A. H. Chartrand Wendy Whitecloud (Commissioners) The Aboriginal Justice 
Implementation Commission ‘Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba The Justice System 
and Aboriginal Peoples’ (2001) <www.ajic.mb.ca>. See also K.D. Harries, Crime and the Environment 
(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1980), 4–5. 
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In order to elicit an improved understanding of the association between Māori 
ethnicity and offending, attempts have emerged from a number of different disciplines 
that provide a range of causal theories about criminal offending. What characterises 
this history, however, is the assumption that the problem is not only best construed 
and analysed as a population level phenomenon, but also that initiatives developed to 
address the problem should be targeted toward the population of Māori.  
 
It has been proposed that socio-economic factors, such as unemployment, poverty, 
poor education, single parent families, and anti-social behaviour by Māori, are the 
cause of these disproportionately unfavourable outcomes in the criminal justice 
system. According to Moana Jackson:97 
 
These causes are offender specific and attempt to isolate the social and psychological 
factors that may predispose an individual to commit crime … they tend to define an 
offender by his social responses or his psychological makeup and ignore the 
interrelationships between the two and the role which culture plays in that 
interrelationship. 
 
The existence of a multiplier or ‘amplifier’ effect between these stages of 
criminalisation suggests that, once apprehended, Māori are often subjected to harsher 
treatment than are non-Māori.98 
 
A government report noted that systemic factors exist at one or more of the stages in 
the process.99 This serves to increase the likelihood that compared to other ethnic 
groups, Māori will progress further into the criminal justice system and will be dealt 
                                            
97 Jackson above n 31, 58. 
98 See Department of Corrections ‘Over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system: An 
exploratory report (Wellington, 2007), 11 – 26 <www.corrections.govt.nz> See also Gabrielle 
Maxwell “Impoverished Lives-Impoverished Childhoods: Research on Social and Economic Inequality 
and the Occurrence of Crime” (paper presented to the seminar “Does Inequality Matter? A Policy 
Forum, Wellington, November 2010) <igps.victoria.ac.nz>See also Kim Workman Māori Over-
representation in the Criminal Justice System – Does Structural Discrimination Have Anything to Do 
with It? (2007) Rethinking Crime and Punishment < http://www.rethinking.org.nz> 
99 For a comparative discussion on systemic discrimination within the criminal justice system for 
Indigenous peoples in North America see Paul L. A. H. Chartrand Wendy Whitecloud 
(Commissioners) The Aboriginal Justice Implementation Commission ‘Report of the Aboriginal 
Justice Inquiry of Manitoba The Justice System and Aboriginal Peoples’ (2001) <www.ajic.mb.ca>. 
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with more severely.100 This report further noted, given that there is the potential for 
some degree of correlation between offender ethnicity and these variables, reasonably 
sophisticated statistical analysis is required to understand the relative contributions to 
outcomes that may be made by diverse factors.101 In the absence of such analysis, 
interpretations of apparent differences must be made with great caution. However, it 
is clear that if Māori are to be treated equally, some systemic transformations are 
required, not only at the time of sentencing, but also from apprehension through to 
imprisonment and parole.  
 
B. Apprehension and Prosecution102 
 
Although Māori comprise 15 percent of the New Zealand population, they are over 
three times more likely to be apprehended for a criminal offence than non-Māori.103 In 
2006 Māori accounted for 43 per cent of all police apprehensions.104 From 1997 to 
2006 Māori apprehensions increased by 10 per cent, whereas total apprehensions only 
increased by 4 per cent.105  
 
Although the number of apprehensions for violent offences increased overall for 
Māori, the number of violent apprehensions increased by 40 per cent.106 In 2006 
nearly three times as many Māori were likely to be apprehended for robbery than 
were Pākehā; and more Māori were likely to be apprehended for homicide, 
                                            
100 See Department of Corrections, above n 2 <www.corrections.govt.nz>. See also Just Speak – Māori 
and the Criminal Justice System Position Paper (2012) <www.rethinking.org.nz>. See also AAP ‘A 
UN working group says it wants the NZ government to undertake a review of the degree of systemic 
bias against Māori in the justice system’. April 2014. < 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/04/08/un-wants-review-maori-nz-prisons>. 
101 Just Speak, above n 100. 
102 Portions of this section are taken from a paper already published Valmaine Toki “Are Parole Boards 
Working or is it Time for an Indigenous Re Entry Court?” (2011) International Journal of Law, Crime 
and Justice 39 at 230-248  
103 Pat Doone ‘Hei Whakarurutanga Mo Te Ao Wellington’ (Crime Prevention Unit, 2000) at ch 4. 
104 Kim Workman “Māori Over Representation in the Criminal Justice System” (2009) Rethinking 
Crime and Punishment <www.rethinking.org.nz >.  See also Ministry of Justice “Māori over-
representation in the Criminal Justice System” Straegic Policy Brief (2009) March. 
<www.justice.govt.nz>  
105 Kim Workman “Māori Over Representation in the Criminal Justice System” (2009) Rethinking 
Crime and Punishment <www.rethinking.org.nz >.  See also Ministry of Justice “Māori over-
representation in the Criminal Justice System” Straegic Policy Brief (2009) March. 
<www.justice.govt.nz> 
106 Rethinking Crime, above n 104. 
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kidnapping and abduction, as well as grievous and serious assaults.107 In contrast, 
Pākehā108 were more likely to be apprehended for minor assaults, intimidation and 
threats and the offence of unlawful group assemblies.109  
 
Of all apprehensions 72 per cent of Māori apprehensions were resolved by 
prosecution compared with 66 per cent for Pākehā. Moreover, far fewer Māori 
offenders were diverted, warned or cautioned.110 Arguably, this manifests Moana 
Jackson’s claim that the criminal justice system is institutionally racist toward 
Māori.111 
 
The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has recommended a 
review be undertaken of the degree of inconsistencies and systemic bias against Māori 
at all levels of the criminal justice system, and further:112 
 
The working group noted that Māori are over-represented in the prison population 
and warned that incarceration that is the outcome of bias “constitutes arbitrary 
detention in violation of international law”. 
 
Māori aged between 17 and 19 are nearly three times more likely to be prosecuted for 
a criminal offence than non-Māori in the same age bracket.  Overall, Māori are over 
                                            
107 Rethinking Crime above n 104. 
108 The term Pākehā commonly relates to those of British or European descent. 
109 Rethinking Crime above n 104. Although see section 16 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
which provides for ‘Freedom of Peaceful Assembly’. 
110 Rethinking Crime above n 104. See also Gronfors (1973) study cited by Corrections Department 
above n 2, that states ‘when controlled for socio-economic factors and seriousness of offending, he 
found that first offenders who were Māori were still significantly less likely than non-Māori first 
offenders to be discharged without conviction. Neill (1983) found no difference in sentencing 
according to ethnicity once type of remand, seriousness of offence, previous record, and age were 
accounted for. However, McDonald (1987), taking type of offence into account but not seriousness of 
offence and previous convictions, found that Māori offenders received more severe sentences. Lovell 
and Norris (1990), using a cohort of New Zealand males born in 1957, came up with a finding that, 
even controlling for nature of offence, age, and prior offending, Māori between the ages of ten and 
twenty-four appearing in court were more likely than non-Māori to receive a custodial sentence.’ < 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/sentencing-policy-and-guidance-a-
discussion-paper/10.-a-maori-view-of-sentencing>  This indicates that if the seriousness of the offence 
is known, type of remand, previous record and age are known it is less likely that Māori will receive 
more severe sentences; however, this is not assured. 
111 Jackson above n 31.  
112 AAP ‘A UN working group says it wants the NZ government to undertake a review of the degree of 
systemic bias against Māori in the justice system’. April 2014. < 
http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2014/04/08/un-wants-review-maori-nz-prisons> The final report 
will be presented to the Human Rights Council in 2015. 
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five times more likely to be prosecuted than non-Māori. 113 For all age groups, Māori 
are more likely to be convicted for a non-traffic criminal offence than non-Māori.  
Māori aged between 17 and 19 are more than three times more likely to be convicted 
than non-Māori of this age (excluding Pacific youth).114 For those aged 40 and over, 
Māori are nearly seven times more likely to be convicted for a criminal offence than 
non-Māori.115 Māori are nine times more likely than non-Māori to be remanded in 
custody awaiting trial.116 In 2005, of all the criminal cases that resulted in conviction 
where the ethnic identity of the offender was known, 43 per cent were Māori.117 Half 
of the prison population identify as Māori.118 
 
A recent review of the Statistics New Zealand data relating to prosecutions in 2011 
revealed that Māori aged between 10 and 16 are significantly more likely to be 
prosecuted than Pākehā across a wide range of offences.119 In the most extreme 
example, 46 per cent of Māori who were apprehended for dangerous or negligent acts 
were prosecuted, compared to 6 per cent of Pākehā offenders.120  
 
These statistics indicate that Māori are more likely to be apprehended, prosecuted, 
convicted and imprisoned than non-Māori. At each stage of the criminal justice 
process from apprehension right through to prosecution, trial and sentencing, a 
significant degree of built-in discretion exists with respect to decision-making.121 
                                            
113 Ministry of Justice Responses to Offending by Māori and Pacific Peoples (1999) 
<www.justice.govt.nz>. 
114 Ministry of Justice, above n 113.  
115 Ministry of Justice, above n 113. 
116 Mark Burton, Minister of Justice, “The Effective Interventions Initiatives and the High Number of 
Māori in the Criminal Justice System” (paper presented to Ngakia Kia Puawai, New Zealand Police 
Management Development Conference, November 2006). 
117 Ministry of Justice Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand 1996-2005: Executive 
Summary (Wellington, 2006) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
118 See <www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/snapshots-of-
nz/yearbook/society/crime/corrections.aspx> that states at 30 June 2012, Māori comprised 51 per cent 
of the prison population. See also Bronwyn Morrison and others Conviction and Sentencing in New 
Zealand: 1997 – 2008 (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, April 2008) at 118 <www.justice.govt.nz>. See 
also Michael Rich Department of Corrections, Census of Prison Inmates 1999 (2000) at 43 
<www.corrections.govt.nz >. 
119 See Lydia Nobbs ‘Just Speak exposes variation in youth prosecution rates’ (2013) April 
<www.justspeak.org> where she cites Statistics NZ <www.statistics.govt.nz> See also “Young Māori 
‘More Likely’ to Be Prosecuted than Pākehā” Radio New Zealand (online, New Zealand, 10 April 
2013) <www.radionz.co.nz >. 
120 Above. 
121 See also analysis by McDonald (1987), cited by Corrections Department, that states ‘of 1983 Justice 
statistics, taking type of offence into account but not seriousness of offence and previous convictions, 
found that Māori offenders received more severe sentences.’ , 
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Upon apprehension the police may exercise judgment about whether or not to detain 
an individual for questioning.122 If an individual is apprehended, there is discretion 
about whether or not to arrest the person, and later, whether or not to proceed with 
prosecution. At the prosecution stage, the court may or may not convict the 
individual. Upon conviction, judges may remit the offender’s sentence.  
 
In 2006 over-representation patterns for Māori were evident within the court system. 
Furthermore, 13 per cent of Māori who were convicted of an offence received a 
custodial sentence compared with 8 per cent for Pākehā.123  
 
Once sentenced the offender, if applicable, has an opportunity to be released through 
an application for parole. Although the Annual NZPB Reports do not provide an 
ethnic breakdown of offenders if Māori comprise 50 per cent of custodial sentences 
then it is reasonable to assume that at least half of the offenders that come before the 
Parole Board will be Māori.124 This taken together with the fact that more prisoners 
are serving the length of their sentence, or, alternatively more prisoners are not being 
granted parole raises concerns for Māori. Despite these disproportionate statistics,125 
there is no clear policy direction on how the obligations of the Treaty of Waitangi 
impact on the decision-making processes of the NZPB. Similarly, there are no policy 
guidelines for cultural consideration. It is now timely to consider the process of 
parole. 
 
                                                                                                                             
<http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/sentencing-policy-and-guidance-a-
discussion-paper/10.-a-maori-view-of-sentencing> 
122 Although you have the right not to be arrested, or detained, without good reason. See New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23 “Rights of Persons Arrested or Detained” which states that ‘Everyone 
who is arrested or who is detained under any enactment (a) shall be informed at the time of the arrest or 
detention of the reason for it’.  
123 Rethinking Crime, above n 104. See also Lovell and Norris (1990), study cited by Corrections 
Department, above n 2, which stated that ‘using a cohort of New Zealand males born in 1957, came up 
with a finding that, even controlling for nature of offence, age, and prior offending, Māori between the 
ages of ten and twenty-four appearing in court were more likely than non-Māori to receive a custodial 
sentence.’ <http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global-publications/s/sentencing-policy-and-
guidance-a-discussion-paper/10-a-maori-view-of-sentencing> The reference to Pākehā includes all 
New Zealanders of European or British descent. 
124 The available statistics are not disaggregated to reflect the percentage of Māori that appear before 
the NZPB.   
125 See Department of Corrections above n 2 ‘from 2004 onwards, [the] proportion of sentence served 
has crept up and up, and is in fact still rising.  Currently, around 30% of prisoners who were eligible for 
parole are kept in until the entire sentence is served. Average across all parole-eligible prisoners is 75% 
at present.’   
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C. Parole126   
 
The New Zealand Parole Board (NZPB) can make a decision (now only for 
transitional cases) to release an offender in home detention cases as long as it is 
satisfied on reasonable grounds that the offender will not pose an undue risk to the 
safety of the community or any person or class of persons if he or she is detained on 
home detention rather than in a prison, or whether the prisoner should be granted an 
early release.127 Parole reports and documents prepared by probation officers and 
psychologists can also be influential in such decision-making.128  
 
As 50 per cent of the prison population identify as Māori,129 it is assumed that at least 
half the offenders that come before the NZPB are Māori. Although there may be a 
moral incentive, the Parole Act is silent on any specific provision for gender balance 
and indigenous representation on the NZPB.130 Nonetheless, in light of the recent calls 
to encourage women, and those of an indigenous background to apply for judicial 
positions,131 it is presumed that this approach may eventually be entertained for 
positions on the NZPB. This would reflect gender and ethnic parity. 
 
The role of the NZPB begins not upon incarceration, but when the offender applies 
for release. Although legislative amendments provide for the NZPB to monitor and, if 
                                            
126 Parts of this section are taken from a paper already published Valmaine Toki “Are Parole Boards 
Working or is it Time for an Indigenous Re Entry Court?” (2011) 39 International Journal of Law, 
Crime and Justice at 230-248.  
127 Section 33(1) of the Parole Act 2002 provides that ‘The Board may impose on an offender the 
special conditions referred to in section 15(3)(ab) (residential restrictions) if the residence in which it 
is proposed that the offender reside is in an area in which a residential restriction scheme is operated by 
the chief executive.’  From 1 October 2007 home detention was no longer an option for the Board, 
which now only considers “transitional” cases. 
128 In light of the number of Māori offenders likely to come before the NZPB it is important that 
adequate and continual training of parole and probation officers within the area of culture and tikanga 
issues is accomplished.  
129 See Department of Corrections above n 2 ‘Māori have constituted 50% of the prison muster since 
1985, and it has hardly shifted at all – the rate of imprisonment for Māori is 660 per 100,000 M, and for 
New Zealand Europeans it is less than 95.’  
130 See Parole Act 2002 section 111.  
131 See Rod Vaughan ‘Judicial makeover opens more doors to wannabe Judges’ ADLSI 6 Sepetmber 
2013 ,http://www.adls.org.nz/for-the-profession/news-and-opinion/2013/9/6/judicial-makeover-opens-
more-doors-to-wannabe-judges/> See also District Court Judges - Expressions of Interest  
The Attorney-General's Judicial Appointments Unit, where it is noted that ‘The Attorney-General is 
conscious of the value of increasing diversity on the District Court bench generally and therefore seeks 
to encourage expressions of interest from qualified women as well as those from under-represented 
ethnic groups.’ June 2013 <http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/district-court-judges-expressions-of-
interest>   
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necessary, recall the offender, hearings are before a panel, not a single judge. Despite 
the Parole Board’s efforts to assess the same recalled parolee, there is no guarantee 
that the parolee will come before the same Judge and/or the same panel. This reduces 
the benefits of a powerful ‘one on one’ relationship with the offender.132  
 
(a) Māori and Parole133  
 
Statistics indicate that the current parole system is not working for Māori.134 Under 
the Parole Act 2002, there is no clear direction within the policies of the NZPB as to 
how obligations relating to the Treaty of Waitangi135 or cultural considerations might 
impact on the decision-making process. And there is nothing within the raft policy 
documents136 to determine how this is to be achieved and, if it has not been achieved, 
whether any redress may be available. By default it is assumed that this obligation lies 
with the decision-maker. There is no specific allocation of Māori representation at the 
decision-making stage, despite the assumption that up to half of the offenders who 
appear before the NZPB are Māori. This raises procedural and substantive concerns 
for Māori about how they are treated in the decision-making processes of the NZPB. 
In comparison, other jurisdictions, such as Canada, have established a specialised 
indigenous forum to act as an advisory group on cultural issues that come before the 
National Parole Board.  
 
Popular disenchantment with the NZPB has led to calls for the overhaul of the New 
Zealand parole system.137 The current framework policy of the NZPB acknowledges 
that the Treaty of Waitangi gives rise to certain rights and obligations.138 It indicates 
that the NZPB “will always operate in a way that is sensitive to whānau, hapū, and iwi 
                                            
132 For instance, the success of drug treatment courts has been attributed to this one on one relationship. 
133 I am grateful for the academic guidance of Judge David Carruthers whilst writing this section and 
also express my appreciation for the opportunity to observe a Parole Board hearing chaired by Judge 
Paul. 
134 See Bronwyn Morrison, Natalie Soboleva and Jin Chong Conviction and Sentencing Offenders in 
New Zealand: 1997 – 2006 (Ministry of Justice, 2008) at 120. 
135 See discussion in Mason Durie Nga Tai Matatu – Tides of Maori Endurance (Oxford University 
Press, Australia, 2005) at 146 for discussion on increasing government consciousness of Treaty 
obligations. 
136 See NZPB policies available http://www.paroleboard.govt.nz/nzpb-policies.html. 
137 “Justice groups urge government to tighten parole laws” Radio New Zealand (4 November 2010) 
<www.radionz.co.nz >.  
138 NZPB “Framework Policy Covering the Development of the Board's Policies: Policy 1, 
Introduction” (2009) <www.paroleboard.govt.nz>. 
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as well as Māori communities”.139 The framework policy further states that the NZPB 
will ensure that Māori cultural concepts, values and practices are respected and 
safeguarded.140  
 
The Parole Act 2002 requires the NZPB to develop policies on how it will discharge 
its functions.141 To achieve this purpose, the NZPB regularly reviews its policies. As 
part of an effort to improve the decision-making process, the NZPB engaged 
Professor Jim Ogloff to develop a straightforward, comprehensive and user-friendly 
methodology for structured decision-making on New Zealand conditions and 
reflecting New Zealand concerns.142 It is unclear whether or not this methodology will 
provide for cultural considerations on decision-making. It would be helpful if part of 
this review recognised the need to provide for Māori membership on the NZPB.143  
 
Māori are not only disproportionately represented as offenders in the criminal justice 
system but are also disproportionately represented in the forensic mental health 
facilities. Three out of every five Māori will suffer from a mental disorder during their 
lifetime (59.9 per cent).144 Taken separately these are concerning facts. Taken 
together these issues provide disastrous results. It is timely to now consider 
criminality and mental health to discern whether the current system affords a 





                                            
139 Above. 
140 Above. 
141 Parole Act 2002, s 109. 
142 Professor Jim Ogloff; Director, Centre for Forensic Behavioural Science, Monash University and 
Director of Psychological Services. This review was commissioned by Judge David Carruthers, the 
then Chair of the NZPB, in response to public concern on the release of high-risk offenders. 
Specifically Graeme Burton who murdered two people in two separate incidents. The second murder 
occurred 6 months after he was released on parole. See J Johnson and J Ogloff ‘Review of NZPB 
decision given on 28 June 2006 to release Graeme William Burton on Parole’ (5 March 2007) 
<www.paroleboard.govt.nz> 
143 See Parole Act 2002 s 111 that provides for the Membership of the NZPB. 
144 J Baxter Māori Mental Health Needs Profile. Summary. A Review of the Evidence. (Palmerston 
North: Te Rau Matatini, 2008), 6 <www.matatini.co.nz> 
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D. Mental Health145 
 
The Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 defines a 
mental disorder, in relation to any person, as: 146   
 
… an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or an intermittent nature), 
characterised by delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, 
of such a degree that it— 
(a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or of others; or 
(b) seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or herself 
… 
 
In New Zealand there are two legislative routes to address the psychological needs of 
offenders. The first is through generic mental health legislation, permitting the 
compulsory detention of a person for assessment and treatment of a mental disorder 
that has manifested, or is at risk of manifesting dangerous behaviour.147 In such case 
the focus is on the protection of the individual.  
 
The second route is through criminal justice legislation for people with a mental 
disorder who have been charged with a criminal offence.148 For most mentally 
impaired offenders, the process is one of arrest and initial court appearance in the 
District Court (criminal jurisdiction). Specialist services149 are then triggered to assess 
the offenders’ mental health status and, if required, make recommendations for 
treatment or diversion to either a mental health or a compulsory care facility. A well-
integrated system of forensic psychiatric services is available to offenders entering the 
criminal justice system. Despite the availability of these services, offenders are often 
required to be processed through the criminal justice system before receiving any 
                                            
145 Parts of this section are taken from a paper already published Valmaine Toki “Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and Mental Health Courts for Māori” (2010) 33 International Journal of Law and 
Psychiatry at 440 – 447. 
146 Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, s 2. 
147 Warren Brookbanks “Mentally Disordered Offenders” in Julia Tolmie & Warren Brookbanks (eds) 
Criminal Justice in New Zealand (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) at 419; Mental Health (Compulsory 
Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992. 
148 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003. 
149 See Brian McKenna and Kevin Seaton “Liaison Services to the Courts” in Warren Brookbanks and 
Sandy Simpson (eds) Psychiatry and the Law (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005) at 447–448. 
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mental health assessment.150 Accordingly, the stress of arrest, remand, the impending 
court appearance and possible sentencing can all lead to a further deterioration in their 
mental state.151 There is no dedicated indigenous fora to process Māori with mental 
disorders. 
 
Although a defendant can be redirected from the criminal justice system through an 
insanity plea or unfitness to stand trial, the court will still determine whether insanity 
has been established (on the balance of probabilities) before any orders can be 
made.152 A finding of unfitness to stand trial will result in diversion from the trial 
process. However, judges lack sentencing options to ensure that mentally impaired 
offenders will receive adequate services.153  
 
In New Zealand the Family Court is responsible for the administration of the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992.154 Although the Family 
Court has no criminal jurisdiction, it can oversee offenders who have entered the 
system of compulsory care through the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and 
Rehabilitation) Act 2003.155  
 
In New Zealand Mental Health Tribunals review compulsory treatment orders as well 
as special and restricted patient orders issued by the Family Court. In certain 
circumstances these tribunals may discharge offenders who they no longer consider to 
be mentally ill.156 These tribunals are subject to the procedural provisions under 
Schedule One of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 
                                            
150 McKenna and Seaton, above n 149, at 447-448. 
151 See for discussion Luke Birmingham “The Mental Health of Prisoners’ (2003) 9(3) Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 191. 
152 Crimes Act 1961, s 23. See also s 20 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 
2003, for the new procedure on determining insanity. This is the default for most insanity cases. 
153 McKenna and Seaton, above n 149. 
154 Section 17 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 provides for 
“Applications to be heard and determined wherever practicable by Family Court Judge”. 
155 Section 74 of the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 provides 
for “Review by Family Court” and section 76 provides that the “Family Court may make 
recommendations”. 
156 See Re IM [2002] NZFLR 846, where the Mental Health Review Tribunal reported on whether the 
applicant was fit to be released from care and considered the provisions under ss 4, 66, and 77 of the 
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 and the Intellectual Disability 
(Compulsory Care) Bill. 
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1992.157 Mental Health Tribunals can discharge civilly committed patients directly if 
they are no longer mentally disordered but only have the power to make non-binding 
recommendations in respect of special and restricted patients and their decisions are 
subject to judicial review.158 
 
There is no specific reference to the Treaty within this raft of legislation, nor is there 
any recognition of tikanga Māori. In any event judicial deference is given to cultural 
identity, personal beliefs159 and cultural assessment.160  
 
The policy of de-institutionalisation in New Zealand has led to higher numbers of 
people with mental illness living in the community.161 As three out of every five 
Māori will suffer from a mental disorder during their lifetime (59.9 per cent),162 it is 
thus no surprise that the policy of deinstitutionalisation may have contributed to the 
fact that Māori are over-represented among the homeless.163  
 
Many refuse to take their medication, and if left unchecked their mental illness can 
lead to inappropriate behaviour, such as petty theft or urinating in public.164 The 
justice system treats such behaviour as ‘criminal’. Social commentators have referred 
                                            
157 This includes the power to call for reports, witnesses, evidence, examination of the patient, and 
attendance of the patient and other persons. The hearings are not open to the public. 
158 Waitemata Health v Attorney General & Ors CA [2001] NZFLR 1122. The Court of Appeal 
reviewed a decision of the Tribunal under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) 
Act 1992 that the patient was no longer mentally disordered and was fit to be released from compulsory 
treatment. 
159 See Section 5 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992, “Powers to 
be exercised with proper respect for cultural identity and personal beliefs”. 
160 See Section 23 of the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003; 
“Cultural assessment” provides that the coordinator must try to obtain the views of any suitable Māori 
person or Māori organization concerned with, or interested in, the care of persons who have an 
intellectual disability. 
161 McKenna and Seaton, above n 149, at 447–448. 
162 J Baxter above n 144.  
163 Steve Richards Homeless in Aotearoa: Issues and Recommendations Report for Regional Public 
Health (Ministry of Health, Wellington, 2009) <www. http://nzceh.org.nz/>  
164 Bruce Winick and David Wexler (eds) Judging Law in a Therapeutic Key – Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Courts (Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina, 2003) at 59.   
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to this process of mentally ill offenders re-entering the criminal justice system post 
de-institutionalisation as “the criminalization of the mentally ill”.165 
 
The extreme stress of remand, court appearance and possible sentencing can lead to 
further deterioration among mentally ill offenders. Imprisonment will often be 
inappropriate for those individuals whose problems stem from their mental illness, as 
opposed to their criminality, unless the mental illness is treated whilst imprisoned.166 
 
Psychiatric morbidity167 within New Zealand prisons reveals a disproportionately high 
incidence of substance abuse and psychotic illness when compared with the 
community as a whole.168 Such prisoners have a greater need for specialist forensic 
services. This high incidence of mental illness is not confined to the prison 
population, but as might be expected, extends to parolees and those serving non-
custodial sentences.169 
 
The National Study indicated the need for a:170 
 
… level of service provision that is quite beyond the capacity of current forensic 
psychiatric services … The high rates of common disorders argue for the use of 
screening techniques [emphasis added]. 
 
                                            
165 Robert Miller “The Continuum of Coercion: Constitutional and Clinical Considerations in the 
Treatment of Mentally Disordered Persons” (1997) 74 Denver University Law Review 4 at 1169 –1214. 
Although see Eric B. Elbogen, PhD; Sally C. Johnson ‘The Intricate Link Between Violence and 
Mental Disorder Results From the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions 
JAMA Psychiatry Feb 2009 Vol 66 No 2, where they state that recent ‘findings challenge perceptions 
that mental illness is a leading cause of violence in the general population. Still, people with mental 
illness did report violence more often, largely because they showed other factors associated with 
violence.’ 
166 See Auditor General’s report ‘Mental Health services for prisoners’ (2008) that found that the most 
seriously mentally ill prisoners received adequate and prompt treatment. However, there was a risk that 
prisoners with mental health needs that are not picked up through initial screening or those who 
develop mental illness during imprisonment will not be identified and get access to treatment. Often for 
these people imprisonment is inappropriate < http://www.oag.govt.nz/> 
167 Psychiatric morbidity or psychiatric illness commonly refers to the occurrence of both physical and 
psychological deterioration resulting from a mental or psychological condition. 
168 Alexander Simpson and others The National Study of Psychiatric Morbidity in New Zealand 
Prisons: An Investigation of the Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders among New Zealand Inmates 
(Department of Corrections, Wellington, 1999) <www.corrections.govt.nz>. 
169 Ministry of Health Services for People with Mental Illness in the Justice System: Framework for 
Forensic Mental Health Services (2001) at 6 <www.moh.govt.nz>. 
170 Simpson and others above n 168, at Executive Summary (13 April 2007) 
<www.corrections.govt.nz>. 
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This opens the door for the introduction of an alternative intervention approach, such 
as a Mental Health Court. As Simpson has noted:171 
 
One way of limiting the entry of mentally ill into the prison system is to establish 
mental health courts [emphasis added], which link the offender with critically needed 
medical treatment, apply appropriate release conditions and use the threat of 
imprisonment as an incentive for compliance. 
 
The onus is upon the criminal justice system and the mental health system to 
investigate options that allow for the recognition of, and early intervention for the 
mentally impaired prior to entering the criminal justice system. The lack of successful 
options of this kind has placed a burden on the criminal justice system,172 requiring 
innovative responses. According to Professor Warren Brookbanks:173 
 
It is clear … that the New Zealand correctional system has a significant role in the 
management of offenders with varying degrees of mental impairment, and that this 
group makes heavy demands on the use of forensic patient services. The immediate 
challenge for New Zealand health and justice planners is to explore options which 
allow for the diversion of mentally impaired offenders from the correctional system. 
In my view, mental health courts offer one such option [emphasis added)]. 
 
 
(a) Māori and Mental Health  
 
Three out of every five Māori will suffer from a mental disorder during their lifetime 
(59.9 per cent).174 For this reason Māori are disproportionately represented within 
forensic mental health facilities. Within the health system,175 recognition of the Treaty 
is identified with allowing Māori to participate in decision-making and in the delivery 
                                            
171 Sandy Simpson “A Strategy that Works – Mental Health Courts” Recap Newsletter: Re Thinking 
Crime and Punishment in New Zealand (2008) Issue 35 at <www.rethinking.org.nz>. 
172 McKenna and Seaton, above n 149 at 448. 
173 Warren Brookbanks “Making the Case for a Mental Health Court in New Zealand” (Paper present to 
3rd International Conference on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 7 – 9 June 2006, Perth, Western Australia). 
174 J Baxter above n 144.  
175 Section 4 of the New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000 provides that “in order to 
recognise and respect the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and with a view to improving health 
outcomes for Māori, Part 3 provides for mechanisms to enable Māori to contribute to decision-making 
on, and to participate in the delivery of, health and disability services”. 
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of health services. In New Zealand District Health Boards must appoint two members 
who are Māori.176 The Minister will appoint two Māori members if they have not 
been elected. Despite this provision, however, there is no clear direction within the 
policy documents as to how effective this contribution is, and if it has not been 
effectively achieved, whether any redress may be available.  
 
There is much evidence to suggest that the current mental health framework is not 
delivering for Māori with mental disorders.177 According to Dr. R. Tapsell:178 
 
If some of the disparities currently apparent within our mental health system are to be 
reversed we must look for alternative models [emphasis added] that provide the 
highest quality of psychiatric care and rehabilitation, yet reflect the Māori world 
view… [emphasis added]. 
 
In order to facilitate improvements in Māori health, and especially in mental health, a 
number of principles have been identified. These include the principles of the Treaty.  
 
It is clear that the New Zealand criminal justice system plays a significant role in the 
management of Māori offenders with a relatively high prevalence of mental illness. 
The onus is upon the criminal justice system and the health system to explore options 
that allow for the early recognition and intervention for the mentally impaired before 
they enter the criminal justice system. This has placed a burden on the criminal justice 
system requiring an innovative response. 179   
 
Māori are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system. Māori are also 
disproportionately represented in the forensic mental health facilities. Separately, 
these are concerning facts, but together these issues provide disastrous results. Despite 
the incorporation of decision-making for Māori within health policies, these facts 
clearly indicate that another approach is required.  Rees Tapsell stated in 2007: 180  
                                            
176 See New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, s 29(4)(b) which provides that ‘In making 
appointments to a board, the Minister must endeavour to ensure that …  (b) in any event, there are at 
least 2 Maori members of the board.’ 
177 Rees Tapsell “The Treatment and Rehabilitation of Māori” in W Brookbanks and S Simpson (eds) 
Psychiatry and the Law (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2007) at 419. 
178 At 419. 
179 McKenna and Seaton, above n 149, at 448-499. 
180 Tapsell, above n 177, at 419. 
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… the scientific evidence supporting the effectiveness of a specific model for forensic 
rehabilitation which reflects the Māori World View does not yet exist [emphasis 
added]. 
 
Further, Peter Jansen has commented:181  
 
In many ways, the essential aspects of such a model may have universal appeal … as 
has been said many times before; if we can get it right for Māori we will get it right 
for everyone [emphasis added]. 
 
In his recent New Zealand Country Report, Professor James Anaya, the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, recommended: 182 
 
In consultation with Māori leaders, the Government should redouble efforts to 
address the problem of high rates of incarceration among Māori. Specific attention 
should be given to the disproportionate negative impacts on Māori of any criminal 
justice initiatives that extend incarceration periods, reduce opportunities for probation 
or parole, use social status as an aggravating factor in sentencing, or otherwise 
increase the likelihood of incarceration. 
 
These calls are also echoed by many commentators, including Kim Workman,183 who 
has urged for the establishment of an independent research institute to examine the 
issues of Māori within the criminal justice system. Workman, of Ngāti Kahungunu 
and Rangitāne descent, has also highlighted the important role the whānau as a 
collective might play in reducing the disproportionate criminal offending rates for 
Māori. In a recent address, he noted:184 
 
                                            
181 Peter Jansen MD Pacific Region Indigenous Doctors Congress, Cairns, 2004, as cited by Rees 
Tapsell, above 177.  
182 James Anaya Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Situation 
of Māori People in New Zealand (2011) (A/HRC/18/XX/Add.Y) at 83.  
183 Kim Workman was the Head of Prison Services between 1989 – 1993, a retired public servant and 
currently a senior associate of the Institute of Policy Studies at the Victoria University, Wellington. 
184 See Kim Workman “Redemption Denied: Aspects of Māori Over-Representation in the Criminal 
Justice System" (Paper presented to the Justice in the Round Conference, University of Waikato, 
Hamilton, 18 – 20 April 2011) at 14 < www.rethinking.org.nz >.  
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Over many years, the government has introduced policies which have undermined 
and destroyed whānau as a social construct. It is only in recent times, that there has 
been official recognition that whānau continues to be a key cultural institution for 
Māori and is therefore a key (and potentially highly effective) site of intervention 
and/or development. The recent emphasis on whānau in social policy acknowledges 
that changes in the antisocial behaviour of individual Māori can be brought about by 
focusing on the collective of whānau. It is an area of research waiting to be fully 
explored. 
 
A recent announcement by the Minister for Māori Affairs calls for a review of the 
criminal justice system stating:185 
For most Māori, justice in New Zealand is not positive; it is a system that is unfair, 
biased and prejudiced … the justice system, including the police, courts and 
corrections, systematically discriminates against Māori. 
The current relationship between Māori and the criminal justice system is undeniably 
problematic on a number of different levels, resulting in and, confirming that Maori 
are disproportionately represented across all stages of the criminal justice system. The 
examination of two areas, parole and mental health highlight these issues. To provide 
further context to this discourse it is timely to unpack who exactly Māori are and 
explore the concept of tikanga Māori, in order to attempt to understand whether a 
tikanga approach to crime will assist to ameliorate the disproportionate offending 
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A. Who are Māori? 
 
Māori are the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa, New Zealand.186 The term Māori, as 
applied to people, was initially coined by Captain James Cook, an English navigator 
who sighted New Zealand on 6 October 1769. According to Dame Anne Salmond:187 
 
… In 1910 … Te Waaka Te Ranui of Ruaatoki wrote a letter to the editor of Te 
Pipwharauroa, a Māori language newspaper asking “He aha tatou i kiia ai he Māori? 
Why are we called Māori?” In his letter, Te Waaka offered some answers … when 
Captain Cook arrived at Tuuranga-nui in 1769, he was almost out of potatoes, so he 
asked the local people if they had any. They answered that they had a similar root, 
and when asked for its name they said it was ‘Māori’ (ordinary). Cook turned to his 
companions and said “These people are Maori” [emphasis added] … according to 
Nikora the term Māori was a description for ancient things, ordinary things, things 
from inland and for local people. 
 
Notwithstanding this unconventional beginning, Māori is now the commonplace term 
for the tangata whenua, or original peoples, of Aotearoa, New Zealand.  
 
The legal definition of Māori has varied over time.188 Prior to 1947 the legal term was 
usually ‘native’. Early electoral provisions determined that to be ‘Māori’ and listed on 
the Māori roll that person must have more than 50 per cent Māori lineage or blood 
quantum.189 If the person had exactly 50 per cent Māori blood quantum, then they 
could choose to enlist on the Māori or European roll. Prior to 1998 Statistics New 
Zealand provided the following definition:190 
A person is said to have Māori ancestry if they have any Māori ancestors, no matter 
how distant.  
                                            
186 See Ian Hugh Kawharu Waitangi: Māori and Pākehā Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 1989) for discussion. See also Manuka Henare “Nga Tikanga me nga 
Ritenga o te ao Māori: Standards and Foundations of Maori Society” (1988) Vol III Part 1 Royal 
Commission on Social Policy: Future Directions 3 at 36-69.  
187 Anne Salmond Between Worlds: Early Exchanges between Māori and Europeans, 1773 – 1815 
(Penguin Books, Auckland, 1997) at 21. 
188 For example, the term Māori includes Polynesians, Australasians and Melanesians under s 2 of the 
Juries Act 1908. 
189 See section 148 Electoral Act 1893 Part V ‘"Māori" means an aboriginal inhabitant of New Zealand, 
and includes half-castes and their descendants by Natives.” 
190 See Statistics NZ Maori Descent at <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
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To be consistent with the 1993 Electoral Act and the 1974 Māori Affairs Act in 1998, 
Statistics New Zealand changed this definition to: 191 
‘Māori’ means a person of the Māori race of New Zealand; and includes any 
descendant of such a person.  
Although this latest definition of Māori is more reflective of what it means to be 
Māori, for some Māori, identification by iwi was more appropriate. According to John 
Rangihau:192 
 
My being Māori is absolutely dependent on my history as a Tuhoe person as against 
being a Māori person … I have a faint suspicion that Māoritanga is a term coined by 
the Pākehā to bring the tribes together. Because if you cannot divide and rule, then for 
tribal people all you can do is unite them and rule. 
 
It is acknowledged that in comparative Indigenous jurisdictions, such as First Nations 
in Canada, 193 blood quantum will dictate federal recognition as an indigenous person 
and also membership in a tribal nation.194 This will allow that person to access certain 
benefits and resources. Any inter-marriage with a non-indigenous person or a person 
from a different tribe will reduce that blood quantum, effectively jeopardising the 
ability to access indigenous or Indian status.195  
 
In New Zealand blood quantum is not a contentious issue; it is within the purview of 
that person as to whether or not they identify as Māori. 196 For example, despite the 
                                            
191 See the Māori Affairs Amendment Act 1974 (No 73) which stated “that the present restriction in the 
legal application of the term ‘Māori’ to persons of more than a fixed degree of Māori blood should be 
relaxed”. See also the Electoral Act 1993 where the term ‘Māori’ is defined, in section 3, as a person of 
the Māori race of New Zealand; and includes any descendant of such a person. 
192 John Rangihau “Being Māori” in Michael King (ed) Te Ao Hurihuri Aspects of Māoritanga (Reed 
Books, Auckland, 1992) at 190.   
193 The term First Nations refers to various indigenous groups in Canada that are neither Inuit nor 
Metis. 
194 Paul Spuhan “Legal History of Blood Quantum in Federal Indian Law to 1935” (2006) 51 S.D. L. 
Rev. 1. See also Hilary N Weaver "Indigenous Identity: What Is It and Who Really Has It?" (2001) 
25(2) The American Indian Quarterly at 240-255. 
195 Spuhan, above n 194. 
196 In the case of scholarship applications, however, there is usually a requirement to establish your 
connection with your culture e.g. whakapapa (family tree) and marae. Further see an explanation of 
Harrison J’s comments in R v Mika [2013] NZCA 648 where it was noted "Because he has some Māori 
blood - and we're not sure how much - he's somehow less blameworthy or culpable. That's an 
extraordinary proposition” in David Clarkson “Mob member wants short sentence for being Māori” 
Stuff.co.nz (online ed, Auckland, 20 November 2013). See also Tahu Kukutai ‘The Problem of 
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option for Māori to choose which roll (the Māori Electoral Roll or the General 
Electoral Roll) to be enrolled on, many Māori elect not to change from the General 
Electoral Roll. 197 Although factors such as voter apathy contribute to this, arguably 
this reflects the unwillingness of some Māori to self-identify as Māori and perhaps a 
reluctance to participate in an indigenous court if such a court was established. 
 
B. What is Tikanga Māori? 
 
The Māori legal system is sourced from Te Ao Māori or the Māori World,198 as 
opposed to the Māori Worldview, which can imply observing from a distance rather 
than a turning of the mind to the world in which Māori lived.199 The Māori World is a 
complex three-dimensional philosophy that communicates concepts from the ‘inside’, 
whereas a view necessitates observations from outside.200  
 
Cosmology and the creation accounts are intrinsic to Te Ao Māori.  Cosmology 
establishes the relationships or whakapapa between people, the environment and the 
spiritual world.201 The dynamic between these elements underpins a mechanism 
similar to that of a social constitution.202  
 
Tikanga Māori is a contextual concept. 203 The commonly accepted meaning is 
“straight, direct, tied in with the moral notions connotations of justice and fairness 
including notions of correct and right”.204 This can, however, vary according to the 
people involved and in relation to particular circumstances.205  
                                                                                                                             
defining an ethinic group for public policy: Who is Māori and why does it matter?’ (2004) Social 
Policy Journal 23, December 2004. 
197 Section 76 of the Electoral Act 1993 notes that ‘a Māori … shall have the option of being registered 
either as an elector of a Māori electoral district or as an elector of a General electoral district’.  
198 Although Te Ao Māori is often referred to as the Māori worldview, Te Ao Māori more correctly is 
the Māori World.  
199 See M Marsden God, Man and Universe: A Māori view in Michael King (ed) Te Ao Hurihuri 
Aspects of māoritanga (Reed Books, Auckland, 1992) 117 - 136. 
200 Marsden above. 
201 See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 20 – 22. 
202 See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 22 – 25. 
203 See New Zealand Law Commission above n 33. See also H W Williams A Dictionary of the Māori 
Language (7th ed, Government Printer, Wellington, 1971).  
204 Richard Benton, Alex Frame and Paul Meredith (eds) Te Mātāpunenga: A Compendium of 
References to the Concepts and Institutions of Māori Customary Law, compiled for Te Matahauariki 
Institute (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2013) at 429. 
205 See also submission from Ngati Korokoro in Wai 1040, above n 24, at 495, that stated ‘…many 
hapu lived side by side practicising different tikanga very successfully’. 
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Correct practices that have been derived from the accounts of how the cosmos 
emerged are known as ‘ritenga’. 206 Whereas tikanga is a system prescribing what is 
considered normal and right, it is defined and influenced by contextual factors 
inferring flexibility; ritenga refers to those practices that are similar or equivalent to 
those followed by ancestors,207 providing a ‘standard’ or ‘precedent’ in the same way 
as a legal precedent.208 The use and implementation of this standard or ‘precedent’ 
gives effect to kaupapa, ground rules209 or ‘body of principles that create the law’.210  
 
Ritenga, together with kaupapa, provides a framework by which further concepts such 
as mana, tapu and mauri are given effect. Mana is defined as:211 
 
A key philosophical concept combining notions of psychic and ritual force and 
vitality, recognized authority, influence and prestige, thus also power and the ability 
to control people and events. 
 
However, within the Māori world, mana is simply effective power and authority 
sourced from the presence of ancestors in a person, taonga, event or place.212 
Tapu is:213 
 
… a key concept in Polynesian philosophy … a term … used to indicate states of 
restriction and prohibition whose violation will (unless mitigated by appropriate 
karakia and ceremonies) automatically result in retribution, often including the death 
of the violator and others involved, directly or indirectly. Its specific meanings 
include “sacred, under ritual restriction, prohibited”. 
 
                                            
206 Consistent with this view, section 9 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 
defines tikanga as “Māori customary values and practice”. Satisfying the definition of tikanga is pivotal 
to the success of any claim of customary rights under the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) 
Act 2011. See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 25 and 47. 
207 See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 25 that notes ‘An example of ritenga, Aldridge said, was the 
requirement for people who went fishing to return the first fish to Tangaroa’. 
208 See Mead, above n 35, at 12. 
209 Kaupapa derives from kau’ which means to appear for the first time or be disclosed, while papa is a 
reference to the Earth or Papatuanuku, So together kaupapa means ‘ground rules’ or ‘first principles’. 
See Māori Marsden, above n 1, at 173. 
210 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 25. 
211 Benton and others, above n 204. See also Marsden, above n 1, at 1. 
212 Marsden above n 1, at 118.  
213 Benton and others above n 204, at 404. See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 23 – 24. 
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But within the Māori world, tapu simply refers to the presence of ancestors, and the 
resulting restrictions that their presence places on people, places, taonga or events.214  
Mauri is:215 
 
… a central notion in Mäori philosophy … in its abstract sense [denotes] the essence 
which gives a thing its specific natural character … The meaning of the word is 
difficult to grasp because it encapsulates two related but distinct ideas: the life 
principle or essential quality of a being or entity, and a physical object in which this 
essence has been located. Williams defines the abstract sense term first as “life 
principle”... There is certainly no single English word to express this concept.   
 
The principle of whakapapa is fundamental to Te Ao Māori. It is a complex network 
of reality linking animate and inanimate objects.216 As a relational construct, it 
provides an explanation of how the universe emerged and how the convergence of 
complementary, or balancing pairs created new forms of life.217  
 
Whakapapa has always been central to the identity of an individual. The individual 
forms part of the collective and, in turn, is linked to others by whakapapa. These 
flexible and dynamic collectives, or traditional organisational structures are whānau, 
hapū and iwi.  
 
So through a ‘legal’ lens, tikanga is the ‘legal’ structure that gives effect to basic 
principles or ground rules.218 And concepts such as mana and tapu assist in the 
regulation of the relationships or whakapapa between people, the environment and the 
spiritual world. The aim of tikanga Māori is to achieve balance.219 The regulators — 
tapu and mana — assist in the restoring of any imbalance and are relevant for any 




                                            
214 Marsden above n 1, at 119. 
215 Benton and others, above n 204, at 239. 
216 In my grandfather’s’ Hohaia Toki Pangari’ writings, he traced this ‘whakapapa’ of inanimate and 
animate objects from Te Kore to contemporary times. See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 22 – 25. 
217 Marsden above n 1, at 117 - 137. 
218 Marsden, above n 1. 
219 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 25. 
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C. Tikanga Māori and Disputes  
 
Tikanga is central to the Māori World, preserving balance (the aim of tikanga) and a 
positive dynamic. When conduct that is hee (a mistake or error) occurs, it destabilises 
the balance in the relational network constituting a hara that needs to be rectified.220 
This imbalance is the central issue in tikanga Māori.  
 
Disputes between people are a manifestation of hee, resulting in, for example, an 
assault, rape or killing. All of these are a hara (crime or offence), breaching a 
personal tapu. This breach results in an imbalance in both the individual and in the 
community. Eloping, cheating on one’s spouse and insults to one’s reputation are 
insults to one’s personal mana and a hara, also resulting in an imbalance. 
 
Disputes between groups are also a manifestation of ‘hee’; for example, when one 
tribe takes resources from another area without consent. This involves a breach of, 
and challenge to the collective mana. Historically, a trespass was an affront to the 
group’s ‘mana whenua’.221 These collective disputes may be criminally, politically or 
territorially based. 
 
For Māori, through a tikanga lens, the intention to offend is not important. Rather, it is 
the action of breaching one’s personal honour or authority that is considered relevant. 
It is this breach of personal or collective mana that forms the basis of disputes. 
Historically, the collective nature of disputes could result in inter-tribal fighting,222 
and matters would continue to deteriorate until a rangatira (leader) intervened. The 
Wai 1040 Report notes that:223  
 
While hapū could cooperate, breaches of tapu and threats to mana (including 
challenges over territory or resources) could also lead them to conflict. Forceful 
responses were seen as legitimate and indeed essential means of restoring mana, 
reflecting universally accepted tikanga. Failure to respond would itself be degrading. 
                                            
220 See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 31. 
221 “Mana whenua” defined as trusteeship of land – a phrase that ‘links where the political 
responsibilities to land related authorities’ – see Benton and others, above n 204, at 178. 
222 From my history on Aotea (Great Barrier Island) - The taking of a pet pig from a rangatira’s 
daughter lead to an inter-hapū war.  
223 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 33. 
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A major criticism of the Pākehā criminal justice system is that it does not recognise 
collective structures such as ‘iwi’ or the relational construct that requires to be 
‘rebalanced’.224 The Child Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 does, however, 
make a provision for a family group conference to acknowledge the whānau 
structure.225  
 
The current criminal justice system, instead, provides a forum in which a series of 
individual rights become enforceable against other individuals, thereby making 
strangers of close relatives. To ameliorate this concern, it has been suggested that 
when Māori are both the offender and victim, a Family Group Conference be 
convened by Māori to provide more control to Māori, rather than by a coordinator 
who has no relationship or respect from the parties.226 However, although Family 
Group Conferences facilitate the participation of Māori, their control is limited. 
 
Some Māori today, who are not familiar with marae justice, prefer to only use the 
Pākehā legal system and, for instance, will not opt for a hearing on a marae that the 
Youth Justice system offers.227 The various reasons for this include anonymity, 
privacy and an unwillingness to take responsibility for their actions. In addition, the 
effects of colonisation228 and urbanisation on past generations have effectively 
alienated many urban Māori from tikanga.229 
 
It is acknowledged that issues of parental neglect, unemployment, poverty, 
homelessness, and drug and alcohol misuse and abuse are not confined to indigenous 
                                            
224 See Kim Workman, Director of Rethinking Crime and Punishment, New Zealand “Restorative 
Justice: Victims, Violators and Community- The Path to Acceptance” (International Conference and 
Workships of Restorative Justice, Human Rights and Peace Education, Chang Jung Christian 
University, Taiwan, Taiwan, 6th March 2012) at 9 <www.restorativejustice.org>.  
225 Section 20 CYPF Act 1989.  
226 Gale Burford and Joe Hudson Family Group Conferencing: New Directions in Community-Centered 
Child and Family Practice (Transaction Publishers, New York, 2000). 
227 For some urban Māori who do not desire to affiliate to an “iwi” group, it is generally not unusual 
that they find a marae forum alien and prefer to use the general court system. 
228 For comments on the effect of colonisation see Ani Mikaere “Are We All New Zealanders Now? A 
Māori Response to the Pākehā Quest for Indigenity” (Bruce Jessop Lecture, 2004) <www.d.yimg.com 
>.  
229 The onus is upon the individual to choose to learn their tikanga as opposed to tikanga being a part of 
everyday life. It is acknowledged that media, including Māori TV and Waatea Radio, and kura kaupapa 
assist to provide opportunities to reconnect with tikanga; however, it is not the norm but a conscious 
decision must be made to reconnect. For example, learning te reo is only successful if it is part of 
everyday life. 
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people. Rather, these issues pervade all sectors of society. However, in light of the 
disproportionate social statistics, on these factors, experienced by indigenous peoples 
generally, this thesis explores an indigenous court as an appropriate vehicle to address 
these issues for indigenous peoples. As an indigenous court would be underpinned by 
indigenous concepts, it is suggested that an indigenous court, or similar adjudicative 
body could potentially be available to non-indigenous people with a provision similar 




The facilitation of any type of dispute between Māori parties is usually conducted by 
a rangatira,231 kuia or a kaumātua as an advocate.232 For most disputes the 
responsibility lies with the group as a collective. 233 Most facilitators or rangatira have 
been born into the role234 and are trained for this position from an early age. They 
have acted on behalf of their people in public forums and entered into binding 
agreements with other hapū. Although the leadership of some rangatira has gone 
unchallenged, those rangatira that are subjected to tests of character usually emerge 
with the support and respect of their hapū.235  
 
The concept of rangatiratanga is complex and interconnected with related concepts, 
such as awhina (assistance, care, support). For instance, when Sir George Grey retold 
                                            
230 The Rangatahi Courts or Te Kooti Rangatahi are youth court proceedings that held on a marae. See 
Chapter IV ‘Maori and the Current Criminal Justice Initiatives’ for further discussion. 
231 “Rangatira” is defined as chief (male or female), noble and a ‘weaver of people’. See Benton and 
others, above n 204, at 325 and Wai 1040, above n 24, at 31 respectively. 
232 It is acknowledged that s 62(1)(b) of the Te Ture Whenua Māori Land Act 1993 – “Additional 
members with knowledge and experience in tikanga Māori” provides an opportunity for “1 or 2 other 
members (not being Judges of the Māori Land Court) to be appointed by the Chief Judge”. See also 
Wai 1040, above n 24, at 30, that stated ‘Within hapū, political leadership was provided by rangatira … 
They also mediated in disputes among their people, built consensus in group decision-making, and 
allocated land and other resources for people to live on within their rohe…’ 
233 Responsibility for the muru and dispute. 
234 It is acknowledged that instances can arise where a rangatira can be appointed by their people for 
example when a hapū loses a rangatira. 
235 This is commonplace particularly in view of Treaty settlements and the requirement for the rights of 
iwi members to be efficiently and effectively represented. 
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the story of Māui, 236 he stated that the virtue of awhina is upheld as the distinctive 
feature of rangatiratanga.237  
 
In demonstrating mana and the need to strengthen the cohesiveness of the group, the 
rangatira demonstrated three principles of whanaungatanga (relatedness). The first 
was aroha (love), an emotional response instigated by kindness to others. The second 
was atawhai (foster), the obligation to protect the well-being of their people. The third 
was manaaki (blessing), the ability to look after those temporarily in your care. A 
parallel exists here between the rangatira and a judge in a therapeutic jurisprudence 
forum.238  
 
In the Pākehā criminal justice system, however, principles such as aroha and atawhai 
have been replaced by rules of statutory law. It is acknowledged that actors within the 
criminal justice system, including social workers and probation officers,239 may 
exhibit aroha and atawhai. It is also acknowledged that a judge has a certain amount 
of discretion that could be couched in terms of aroha and atawhai. However, the 
judge’s main task in a dispute is to supervise the proceedings and ensure that 
procedural fairness is adhered to,240 rather than to provide aroha and atawhai for the 
parties.  
The aim for the rangatira is to secure an outcome that is achieved by consensus and 
guided by principles of tikanga Māori.241 In this way the well-being and balance of 
the group could be restored to enable the successful functioning of the community.242  
 
                                            
236 It is understood that in Governor Grey’s collection of materials Te Rangikaheke of Te Arawa was 
the author and source. 
237 Benton and others, above n 204, at 57, where noting, in the story, that the two oldest brothers 
persuaded the next two that they should not entertain the thought of killing Māui, the fifth and only 
recently re-discovered child, because of their jealousy of him. 
238 See Chapter VI ‘Tikanga Maori and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ for discussion on therapeutic 
jurisprudence. 
239 Careers NZ indicates that, in 2012, there were 1050 probation officers and 6645 social workers see 
<www.careers.govt.nz>. The percentage of Māori is not indicated. However, based on Māori 
comprising 15 per cent of the total population, it is assumed 157 and 985 would be Māori. On this 
assumption, the numbers are too low to be effective in terms of administering tikanga. Moreover, these 
workers are required to adhere to the Department of Corrections Criminal Conviction policy. 
240 Caslav Pejovic “Civil Law and Common Law Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal” 
(2001) 32 VUWLR at 817 - 840 
241 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 30. 
242 This is analogous to the healing approach inherent in the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence. See 
Chapter VI ‘Tikanga Maori and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’. 
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(b) Forum and Process 
 
The importance of the marae as a forum for resolving disputes cannot be 
underestimated.243 It represented the body of ancestors and a world in balance. It was 
a place where mana could be restored and wairua (spirit) healed. The marae protocol 
was similar to court protocol in the sense that there was an agreed framework.  
The whole point of a marae encounter was to dispel tapu and bring people together, 
the notion of pae here tangata (binding together). Thus dispute resolutions and marae 
encounters dispel the tapu of visitors/disputants so that they may unite for a common 
purpose.  
 
For Māori, the focus of the dispute resolution process is on the source of the problem, 
seeking the take (the reason) for the offending — the cause and the effect. Any 
reoffending on a regular basis indicates an imbalance of the individual’s tinana 
(body), wairua and mauri (life force). This results in the inability to establish a state of 
ora (well-being) or balance, which, in turn, creates an imbalance within the 
community.  
 
Inclusiveness, participation and accountability underpin the process of dispute 
resolution. All parties to a dispute must be represented and given the opportunity to be 
heard. These principles are similar to the natural justice requirements under 
administrative law: the duty to act in good faith and listen fairly to both sides, and the 
opportunity to be heard.  
 
In contrast to the present criminal justice system, it is not essential that the individual 
is present. Rather, it is the collective that is the defendant and the plaintiff. In any 
event, an individual will suffer a loss of mana if they do not attend. 
 
If a person alleges that another has, for example, taken his or her resources, then 
according to tikanga, they have. This is consistent with the notion of strict liability 
                                            
243 In contemporary times, the ‘marae’ refers to the traditional meeting house (whare nui) and the area 
in front. However, the orthodox definition of the marae refers to the courtyard or area in front of the 
whare nui only. See Wai 1040 above n 24, at 211 that describes the marae as a ‘centre for debate and 
discussion’. 
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under the criminal law.244 Taking responsibility, irrespective of fault, increases one’s 
mana.245 It is through the dispute resolution process that the matter is further 
discussed. 
 
If the hara or wrong-doing is not admitted by the group or the offender, it is passed on 
to the living relations through the concept of whanaungatanga. This is because of the 
obligations between them; that is, an intergenerational relationship. The offender is 
encouraged to accept responsibility and, in doing so, re-establish mana amongst the 
group. The group will then decide what actions are required by the offender to 
establish utu with the victim and their community. The dispute process is one of pono 
(just) and tika (right and proper). After the dispelling of tapu between people, visitors 
and the hosts, food is shared to show acceptance. 
 
Traditionally, ‘going through the process’ was seen as therapeutic. For Māori, the 
process by which justice is achieved is just as important as the result. There was no 
distinction between the procedural or substantive justice. Māori place as much value 
on the process as on the outcome. Both have to be ‘tika’ and restore a state of ‘ora’. 
The process is seen as an inherent good because it empowers the parties and the 
community to take responsibility for the future. Allowing time and resources for a 
proper airing of the grievance is, of itself, a large part of the healing process.246 In 
practical contemporary terms, this is demonstrated within the Waitangi Tribunal 
Claims process,247 where the therapeutic nature of ‘airing the grievance’ is an 




                                            
244 Strict Liability is a rule whereby a person is legally responsible for the damage or loss caused by his 
or her acts and omissions irrespective of fault. 
245 See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 31, that notes ‘… mana could [also] grow or diminish depending 
on exploits in warfare, diplomacy, hospitality, and in making their people more prosperous.’ 
246 See Benton and others, above n 204, at 63 where a traveller described a Ngapuhi gathering as ‘a 
time when parties joined together for a conversation and grievances were brought forward and rectified 
and resolutions were made’. See also Marsden, above n 1. 
247 See Muriwhenua Waitangi Tribunal Claim Wai 45 particularly submissions given on 7 July 1993. 
See also Eddie Durie and Gordon Orr “The Role of the Waitangi Tribunal and the Development of a 
Bicultural Jurisprudence” (1990) 14 NZULR at 62 – 81. 
248 This fundamental element is also a tenet central to therapeutic jurisprudence. See Chapter VI 
‘Tikanga Maori and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ for further discussion on therapeutic jurisprudence.  
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(c) Punishment  
 
Within the criminal justice system, the concept of punishment is not always 
necessary. For instance, the court may impose a penalty, such as diversion249 or a 
discharge without conviction.250 But for Māori, a form of utu or reciprocity is always 
necessary to restore balance. Section 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides: 
(1) If a person who is charged with an offence is found guilty or pleads guilty, 
the court may discharge the offender without conviction, unless by any enactment 
applicable to the offence the court is required to impose a minimum sentence. 
(2)  A discharge under this section is deemed to be an acquittal. 
A ‘s 106 discharge order’ for domestic violence offences includes little by way of 
offender accountability. Discharges are frequently used in New Zealand family 
violence courts. For example, in the ‘Manukau Family Violence Court 15.9 per cent 
of offenders were given a Section 106 in comparison to just 1.5 per cent before the 
introduction of the court’.251 Further that “in the first three months of the Auckland 
court operation, 71 percent of cases were given a recommendation that they complete 
a treatment programme with an indication that this will result in a Section 106 
                                            
249 ‘Diversion is a scheme that provides an opportunity for Police to deal with some offences and/or 
offenders without going through formal court prosecution. The purposes of diversion are to: 
• address offending behaviour that has resulted in charges 
• balance the needs of victims, the offender and their communities 
• give offenders an opportunity to avoid conviction 
• reduce re-offending. 
Diversion involves an offender agreeing to fulfil certain conditions in exchange for the charges being 
withdrawn. The charges are withdrawn only after the conditions have been fulfilled. The benefit of this 
scheme is that it provides an incentive for non-recidivist offenders involved with low level offending to 
be punished and to take responsibility for their actions without receiving a conviction. There are 
several key criteria for determining when diversion should be considered. Firstly, it is important that 
there is sufficient evidence and public interest in pursuing the prosecution of the case. Once this has 
been established the following factors need to be satisfied: 
• generally, it is the offender's first offence 
• the offence is not serious 
• the offender has accepted full responsibility for the offences as described in the summary of 
facts 
• the offender has been explained their legal rights 
• the offender agrees to the terms (conditions) of diversion. 
250 See Section 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002 and Section 19 of the Criminal Justice 1985 (repealed). 
251 A Mills, K Thom, C Meehan, and M Chetty (2013). Family Violence courts: A Review  
of the Literature. Auckland: Centre for Mental Health Research, 11. <www.lawfoundation.org.nz> 
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discharge without conviction”.252 This is inconsistent with tikanga Māori, mainly 
because reciprocity and balance are always required.  
 
A civil case can also be taken by the victim to seek reparation. However, the offender 
is not normally in a financial position to pay damages. Although not usually part of a 
formal order, the court may order the offender to pay reparation to the victim in the 
case of a s 106 discharge order, a step towards achieving balance.253 It is suggested 
that more use could be made of this provision to satisfy the tikanga requirements of 
reciprocity and balance.254 
 
Both punishment and utu involve a deliberate response to an offence and aim to 
achieve retribution or to requite the wrong-doing. However, they differ in important 
aspects. Ethically speaking, punishment may be foregone, but utu cannot. Punishment 
should be unpleasant enough to deter further offending, but utu may be entirely 
friendly and welcoming. Punishment should be confined to offenders who have been 
proven guilty of intentional offences, but utu may be exacted from individuals, as 
members of a whānau or hapū, who have committed no wrong.255 This alternative 
conceptual thinking cannot be accommodated within the existing criminal justice 
system.  
 
Traditionally, muru was used to wipe or rub the hara. In doing so it absolved one of 
their wrong-doings. By extension muru included the act of ritual seizing to address 
and correct the imbalance. An early example256 noted that the action of a chief’s wife 
                                            
252 At 12 
253 Section 106(3) of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides: 
A court discharging an offender under this section may— 
(a) make an order for payment of costs or the restitution of any property; or 
(b) make any order for the payment of any sum that the court thinks fair and reasonable to 
compensate any person who, through, or by means of, the offence, has suffered— 
(i) loss of, or damage to, property; or 
(ii) emotional harm; or 
(iii) loss or damage consequential on any emotional or physical harm or loss of, or damage to, 
property: 
       (c) make any order that the court is required to make on conviction. 
254 It is not uncommon for a discharge without conviction to be granted by the Court on the condition 
reparation is paid. e.g. See Latimer v R [2013] NZCA 562 where the Court found that the ‘s 106 should 
be considered, burglary committed was reasonably serious but not premeditated, carpentry course had 
been completed by the defendant’. Court ordered $2,500 in reparation and conviction quashed.  
255 John Paterson Exploring Māori Values (Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1992) at 135.   
256 Samuel Marsden in a journal entry, 1815, recounting the loss of the fowls given to a head chief as 
told by Elder 1932 as cited in Benton and others, above n 204, at 255. 
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remarrying created a ‘hee’, thereby destabilising the balance constituting a hara 
manifest in a breach of mana. To address this imbalance, a muru, or raiding party 
stripped the wife of all her property. Unlike an act of war, a muru was accepted and 
well-planned. In assessing what muru was to be paid, factors such as precedents, the 
status of the parties, what could be afforded, and what was appropriate for the type of 
offending were often considered. This was not always the case, as in some instances, 
the appropriate muru could be death.257 
 
The penalty agreed upon reflected a ‘collective’ concern. Muru, like hara, was inter-
generational and receiving the penalty also increased the group’s mana. It is 
acknowledged that non-indigenous families will sometimes collectively meet the 
costs of a fine on behalf of the offender.258 However, it is less likely that the collective 
would agree to meet the costs of an intergenerational debt. 
 
The primary aim in the breach of hara, as in dispute resolution, is to restore the 
balance or whakahoki mauri. In other words, restore the mauri of the parties and the 
kin groups to which they belong, restore both the mana of the offender and the victim 
so that they can continue to be part of a functioning community and provide a healing 
approach. The group, as a collective, has an interest to maintain their mauri. Thus utu 
was an ongoing process of restoring the balance.259  
 
(d) Overall Aim 
 
The overall aim of dispute resolution remains the restoration of mana through utu; to 
achieve a balance in the relational networks and to achieve a consensus. Although the 
process can be inquisitorial, it is not usually an adversarial process. When a dispute 
has adversely impacted on one’s spirit and mauri, the question is how to bring it back 
                                            
257 See Wai 1040, above n 24, at 32 that stated ‘The ultimate physical sanction for transgression was to 
be killed and eaten – an action that resulted in the complete removal of the victim’s tapu and its 
consequent transfer to the victor’. 
258 For instance, it is not uncommon for families of non-indigenous university students who have 
traffic, library, or similar outstanding fines to meet these costs. However, if these fines remain unpaid it 
is less likely that the following generation will feel obliged to pay these. See also 
<www.justice.govt.nz> where ‘parents interviewed play a financial role in their children’s infringement 
fines. They generally paid in full or significantly contributed to their children’s earlier fines and many 
are still contributing (either directly or through subsidised board)’. 
259 Again, this holistic healing approach has similarities with therapeutic jurisprudence. See Chapter VI 
‘Tikanga Maori and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ for full discussion. 
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into balance. Regardless of societal level or the status of the parties involved, the 
same fundamental principle applies, namely, the principle of whakahoki mauri or, 
restoring the balance.260  
 
Two examples provide an insight into the traditional dispute resolution process.  First, 
the changing significance of Māori women in society and the related problem of 
domestic violence provide compelling reasons to consider a return to a framework 
informed by tikanga Māori. The second example views the issue of mental health 
through a tikanga Māori lens. 
 
D. Tikanga Māori and Women261  
 
According to Ani Mikaere, the roles of men and women in traditional Māori society 
can be understood only in the context of Te Ao Māori, the Māori World, which 
acknowledged the interrelationship or whanaungatanga of all living things and the 
overarching principle of balance. 262 Both men and women were essential parts of the 
collective group. They formed part of the whakapapa that linked Māori people back to 
the beginning of the world, and women, in particular, played a key role in linking the 
past, present and the future.263 The survival of the group as a whole was dependent on 
everyone; they were all part of the collective. In fact, it was a collective responsibility 
to see that their respective roles were valued and protected. 
 
The gender neutral aspect of Māori language indicates the presence of gender balance, 
where men were given prominence in some roles and women in others. 264 The 
importance of women is also symbolised by language and concepts expressed through 
                                            
260 This system is often employed in smaller rural communities, such as at my marae in Motairehe, 
Aotea, for lesser offences such as burglary. For instance when a person had climbed through a 
neighbour’s window and stole some food the reparation was an apology and community work for two 
days. See also Stephanie Vieille “Māori Customary Law:  A Relational Approach to Justice” (2012) 3 
The International Indigenous Policy Journal 3 at 4. 
261 As currently approximately 60 per cent of incarcerated women in New Zealand identify as Māori, 
the inclusion of this example assists to unpack this untenable position. Parts of the section have taken 
from a paper already published Valmaine Toki “Are Domestic Violence Courts Working for 
Indigenous Peoples?” (2009) 35(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin 255. 
262 Ani Mikaere ‘Collective Rights and Gender Issues: A Māori Women’s Perspective’ in Nin Tomas 
(ed) Collective Human Rights of Pacific Peoples (Indigenous Research Unit for Māori and Indigenous 
Education University of Auckland, 2004) at 84. See also Ani Mikaere Colonising Myths Māori 
Realities He Rukuruku Wahaaro (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2011). 
263 Mikaere, above n 262, at pps 79 - 99. 
264 Mikaere, above n 262, at pps 79 - 99 . 
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proverbs. Māori scholar Rose Pere has written on the association of positive concepts 
with females, highlighting the description of women as whare tangata (the house of 
humanity); the use of the word whenua to mean both land and afterbirth, and the use 
of the word hapu as meaning both pregnant and large kinship. 265 
 
Instances of abuse against women and children were regarded as whānau issues, and 
action could be taken against the perpetrator. Stephanie Milroy has noted:266 
 
In pre-colonial Māori society a man’s house was not his castle. The community 
intervened to prevent and punish violence against one’s partner in a very straight 
forward way. 
 
Women could retain various roles. However, child rearing was a collective 
responsibility, with grandmothers, aunts and other females being responsible for all 
children in the whānau. By sharing the workload, mothers could still develop 
expertise in other areas and perform leadership roles.267 Women had the role of 
keeping the affairs of the communal group in order and passing on the customs of the 
ancestors within the whānau.268 This role of women conflicted with the colonialists’ 
view that treated the man as head of the family.269 
 
The role of high-ranking women as leaders was challenged by the Europeans’ 
patriarchal views.270 When a woman had a higher social status than her husband, it 
was common that the line of descent be traced through the woman, rather than 
through the male.271 
 
Unlike Pākehā women Māori women maintained their rights over land and resources. 
Those rights were passed to her by either parent and remained her property upon 
                                            
265 Rose Pere “To Us the Dreams are Important” in S Cox (ed) Public and Private Worlds (Allen & 
Urwin, Wellington, 1987) at 53. 
266 Stephanie Milroy “Domestic Violence: Legal Representation of Māori Women” unpublished paper 
1994, at 12 as cited in Mikaere, above n 262. 
267 Mikaere, above n 262, He Rukuruku Whakaaro, at 193. 
268 See J Binney and G Chaplin Ngā Mōrehu: The Survivors (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 
1986) at 24 
269 Law Commission, above n 5, at [38]. 
270 Mikaere, above n 262.   
271 Law Commission above 5, at [46]. See also discussion in Berys Heuer Māori Women (Wellington, 
Reed Publications, 1972) on the importance of leadership and Māori women leaders or wahine ariki. 
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marriage.272 They were not the common property of the marriage or property of the 
woman’s husband. She could then pass those rights on to any or all of her children. 
Prior to colonisation Māori women had both property and leadership rights. Pākehā 
women did not enjoy the same level of rights to property and leadership. 
 
The colonisation of Aotearoa changed the order of affairs. The British settlers had 
culturally specific views on the role and status of women, which did not fit with 
tikanga Māori. After the arrival of the Pākehā, Māori women continued to play a 
significant role in Māori society.273 Heni Pore of Te Arawa fought against the British 
in the 1860s in support of the Kingitanga movement, and also at the Battle of Gate Pa 
in 1864.274 Māori women continued to be acknowledged as landowners as well as 
negotiators and religious leaders. However, the introduction of disease, a new 
economy, land grabbing and Christianity saw Māori women’s role change.275  
 
With respect to landownership, the Native Land Court and accompanying raft of 
Native Land legislation progressively undermined land rights of Māori women.276 By 
1873 the legislation had been amended, with s 86 of the Native Land Act 1973 
requiring husbands to be a party to any deed executed by Māori women. However, 
husbands could dispose of their wife’s land interests without any requirement that the 
wife be party to that deed.277 The move from communal land ownership into 
individual (usually male) ownership, as opposed to guardianship, further eroded the 
rights of Māori women.278  
 
Pākehā officials insisted on the use of husbands’ surnames for Māori women.279 
Pākehā writers rewrote many of the Māori stories and myths to marginalise the role 
played by women in them.280 The practice of customary marriage was gradually 
                                            
272 King, above n 26, at 87. 
273 Mikaere, above n 262, at 191. 
274 Mikaere, above n 262, at 192. 
275 For a comparative perspective see Sarah Carter “Categories and Terrains of Exclusion: Constructing 
the ‘Indian Woman’ in the Early Settlement Era in Western Canada” in Mary-Ellen Kelm and Lorna 
Townsend (eds) In the Days of our Grandmothers (University of Toronta Press, Canada, 2006) at 146 – 
169. 
276 Law Commission, above n 5, at [74]. 
277 At [75]. 
278 At [75]. 
279 Law Commission above n 5 at [59]. 
280 Ani Mikaere above n 262. 
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eliminated in law.281 The recognition of only legal marriage in accordance with 
English law contributed to the breakdown of the whānau and hapū unit.282 The legal 
relationship of marriage places the husband and wife relationship above all others, 
including those that the woman has with her parents and siblings.283 
 
The right to vote was extended to Māori men in 1867. In 1893 Meri Te Tai 
Mangakahia addressed the Māori Parliament to advocate for the right of Māori 
women to vote. Arguably, the rights of Māori women to property, together with their 
leadership roles, contributed to the 1893 Electoral Act, which gave all New Zealand 
women, including Māori, the right to vote.284 
 
A Māori woman was viewed as equal and complementary to her Māori male 
counterpart. The Common Law notion of individual land ownership and property 
rights clashed with the relationship of women with the land, as well as the status of 
women.285 
 
(a) Tikanga Māori and Domestic Violence 
 
As tikanga Māori is sourced from cosmology, issues such as domestic violence are 
premised on actions and resolutions from stories that underpin relational concepts 
found in the realm of the cosmos. For instance, domestic violence is an essential 
component of the story of Mataora and Niwareka where ‘wife beating’ was deemed 
unacceptable.286 Violence against women was regarded as a ‘hee’ that breached 
Niwareka’s personal mana. This destabilised the balance for Niwareka and between 
her and her wider collective, as well as Mataora and his wider collective. This 
imbalance required reconciliation. It was only after a change in attitude from Mataora 
that the decision on whether he could return to his wife could be considered by her 
and her immediate family; the restoration of balance being pivotal. 
 
                                            
281 Law Commission above n 5 at [66], [79]. 
282 Ani Mikaere above n 262; see also Law Commission above n 5 at [77]. 
283 Law Commission above n 5 at [80]. 
284 Michael King, above n 26, at 203. 
285 Law Commission, above n 5, at [38]. 
286 Mead, above n 35, at 243. 
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Upon the introduction of British law and culture to Aotearoa, in particular the 
Marriage Act 1908, Māori women had no legal personality. They could not enter into 
contracts, be sued, or own property. Accordingly, the position of Māori women was 
rendered equivalent to their European counterparts.287  
 
A woman’s legitimate sphere of activity was now within the home. This private 
domain was beyond the reach of the law, where men were able to discipline their 
spouses and children. As a result of this paradigm shift, the laws of personal tapu and 
privacy fell apart. No longer was there a requirement to restore balance following a 
breach of personal tapu, such as wife beating. As such, the imbalance created is not 
addressed. 
 
Apprehensions and convictions for domestic violence assisted.288 The introduction of 
social services, such as the Labour Government’s Domestic Purposes Benefit in 1973, 
provided financial assistance for solo parents. Despite some criticism that this benefit 
created a culture of dependence, it provided economic support for Māori women. 
Initiatives such as the Māori Women’s Welfare League established a cultural reprieve. 
 
However, the social and cultural imbalance has not been addressed.289 In addition, 
many within Māori society have adopted discriminatory attitudes towards women as a 
result of colonial views and stereotypes, thereby compounding this imbalance. The 
detrimental effect of colonisation on Māori women is reflected in the disproportionate 
statistics, in which 60 per cent of incarcerated women identify themselves as Māori.290 
Arguably, the imposition of legislation291 that deemed acts such as customary 
                                            
287 Law Commission, above n 5, at [60]. 
288 For a review of apprehensions and convictions see <www.justice.govt.nz> 
289 It is acknowledged that the gender imbalance exists generally. However, barring equal pay, in 
theory, women have had equal rights for the last 100 years and yet imbalance remains. For instance, 
women are still paid less than men. For Māori women they face double discrimination; by gender and 
also by race. 
290 See Department of Corrections Over-representation of Māori in the Criminal Justice System – An 
Exploratory Report (Policy, Strategy and Research Group, Wellington, September 2007) at 6. 
However, in 2012 58 per cent of inmates identified as Māori and women. See <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
291 For instance the Adoption Act 1955 provided that, ‘since the commencement of the Native Land 
Act 1909, no person shall have been capable of adopting a child in accordance with Mäori custom and 
with certain exceptions, no adoption is of any force or effect’ and Maori Affairs Act 1953 ss 8, 78 and 
79 read together with the Marriage Act 1955 resulted in no Mäori customary marriage being considered 
valid for any purpose. 
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marriage and customary family arrangements as illegal, contributed as causes to these 
statistics. 
 
E. Tikanga Māori and Mental Health292 
 
The overall aim of tikanga Māori remains the restoration of mana through utu. This 
involves a balance of all considerations, with the purpose of achieving a consensus or 
reconciliation.293 Historically, this has included conflict or fighting as a means to 
restore balance. However, it is not necessarily an adversarial process as tikanga Māori 
is aligned with an inquisitorial model of dispute resolution, in which all parties seek a 
common goal.294 When there has been a transgression of tapu, or a dispute that has 
affected one’s wairua (immaterial element of a person) and mauri (life force), the 
question is how to bring these back into balance. Regardless of the nature of the 
dispute or who is implicated, the same fundamental principle is involved: the 
principle of whakahoki mauri or ‘restoring the life force’.  
 
With respect to mental illness, there is a difference between Māori and non-Māori 
concepts of health. For Māori, ‘health’ concerns are based on mate Māori or Māori 
sickness.295 Mate Māori is a difficult term to define but may include a spiritual 
sickness brought about by transgression of tapu, perhaps even unwittingly, by the 
sufferer. It could also be the result of a mākutu or curse placed on the sufferer.296 Due 
to the collective nature of responsibility, a breach of tapu may not even be brought 
about by the sufferer. Rather, it may come about as a result of the actions of his or her 
tīpuna (ancestors). Such sickness may be manifested in ways that non-Māori would 
identify as schizophrenia or other psychiatric disorders, although this is not 
necessarily the case.  
 
When instances such as mate Māori arose often, a ‘tohunga’ would be called upon to 
assist in healing. Tohunga were the traditional knowledge holders and were tasked 
                                            
292 As half the prison population in New Zealand identify as Māori and half of all Māori are predicted 
to suffer from a mental illness this example assists to highlight this situation. 
293 Paterson, above n 255, at 116–135. 
294 Heath J “Problems in Applying Māori Custom Law in a Unitary State” Yearbook of NZ 
Jurisprudence (2010 and 2011) at 199. 
295 See Mason Durie Whaiora – Māori Health Development (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 66-73. 
296 See Mead, above n 35, at 55.  
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with restoring balance in the community.297 The introduction of the Tohunga 
Suppression Act 1907 provided that:298  
 
Every person who gathers Māoris around him by practicing on their superstition or 
credulity, or who misleads or attempts to mislead any Māori by professing or 
pretending to possess supernatural powers in the treatment or cure of any disease, or 
in the foretelling of future events, or otherwise is liable for prosecution. 
 
The penalty included imprisonment. This effectively banned the use of tikanga Māori 
by tohunga to address Māori health issues. The alienation of Māori from their 
traditional healing methods and tikanga could provide one reason for their appalling 
mental health statistics. In fact, it has been suggested that one in every two Māori will 
suffer from a mental disorder.  
 
F Tikanga Māori in Context  
 
If tikanga Māori is to be considered as the appropriate doctrine to underscore a 
proposed indigenous court, it is now timely to consider how tikanga, as a discreet 
system of law, compares with the more orthodox jurisprudential schools of thought 
and legal sources, such as natural law, positivism and common law, that our current 
justice system depends on. 
 
(a) Natural Law 
 
At a basic level, tikanga Māori is akin to theories of natural law and positivism. 
Natural law theorists hold that law is properly understood as having been derived 
from natural principles, such as divine will and the natural world.299 The Māori legal 
system originates from Te Ao Māori and embraces the creation stories that determine 
our relationship to each other, the environment and the spiritual world. In this sense it 
is comparable to natural law theory; that is, law is determined by nature and so is 
                                            
297 For comprehensive discussion on Tohunga see Samuel Timoti Robinson Tohunga: The Revival 
Ancient Knowledge for the Modern Era (Reed Publishing, Auckland, 2005). 
298 Second clause of the Tohunga Suppression Act 1908. 
299 See Lon Fuller The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1969) for further discussion. 
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universal. Further, as with natural law, tikanga Māori draws no distinction between 




If one were to draw an analogy with Western concepts of jurisprudence, tikanga 
would lie midway between natural law and positivism. There is a belief in the nature 
of humankind and the way we should act. Laws reflect the ancestral precedent from 
the atua or Gods  
 
Positivism is based on the assumption that the law is properly understood as the 
positive expression of those who make the law — the sovereign.300 The leadership 
and decision-making structures in Māori society did not correspond with Austin’s idea 
of law as the command of a sovereign,301 as cited by Borrows:302 
 
At its origin, a custom is a rule of conduct which the governed observe 
spontaneously, or not in the pursuance of a law set by a political superior [emphasis 
added]. The custom is transmuted into positive law, when it is adopted by the courts 
of justice … but before it is adopted by the courts and clothed in legal sanction, it is 
merely a rule of positive morality: a rule generally observed by the citizens … but 
deriving the only force which it can be said to possess from the general 
disapprobation falling on those who transgress it. 
 
However, not all law is deemed valid if created by a sovereign. The Māori social 
structure revolves around the whānau or extended family, and the hapū is the primary 
social and economic unit. Tikanga, as a discrete system of law, focused on 
communities, societies based around smaller social-political groupings, and local 
economies. The smaller size of the group anticipated consensual enforcement of laws, 
rather than law enforcement by objective courts and juries. If negotiations reached a 
stalemate, the rangatira, leaders with mana, would step in and exercise their influence 
to make a decision.  
                                            
300 See HLA Hart The Concept of Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1997) for further 
discussion. 
301 John Austin is a well known British jurist who wrote extensively on the philosophy of law and 
jurisprudence. He was a leader in the theory of legal positivism. 
302 John Borrows Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (University of Toronto Press, Canada, 2010) at 12. 
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Tikanga Māori, a values-based doctrine, provides criteria against which other values 
are assessed. In this sense Tikanga Māori is could be aligned with Hart’s “rule of 
recognition”.303 However, the flexibility of tikanga Māori to change and adapt to 
novel situations limits this alignment.304 Nonetheless, according to Mamari 
Stephens:305 
 
… his [Hart’s] rule of recognition also exists subjectively in the beliefs of officials 
that they are bound by it. For those who perceive the internal aspect of tikanga 
fluidity presents no fatal uncertainty. 
 
Hart’s rule of change caters for the ability of a legal system to introduce a new 
primary rule, adapt rules already in use and powers to amend these rules.306 Tikanga 
Māori provides the ability of the decision maker to adapt values, provided that tikanga 
was maintained.307 These similarities between tikanga Māori and positivism, although 
somewhat tenuous, provide a degree of synergy. 
 
According to the Māori worldview, there is a belief in the nature of humankind and 
the way we should and do act. Laws derived from cosmology and Te Ao Māori 
established legal precedent, although they were also subject to change. If we are to 
assume, as previously stated, that tikanga lies between natural law and positivism, 
then perhaps examining facets of the middle ground can be helpful to assist the 
incorporation of tikanga concepts.  
 
(c) Common Law 
 
A function of tikanga is to enforce collective values so that communities can live in 
peace and attain stability.308 This is also analogous to common law. Another similarity 
is the importance of precedent. The nature of tikanga depends on reference to 
traditional use and practice. For Māori, the tradition is oral, whereas the existing 
                                            
303 See Hart above n 300. 
304 Mamari Stephens “Māori Law and Hart: A Brief Analysis” 32 VUWLR 2001 at 861.  
305 Mamari Stephens above n 304 at 859. 
306 Hart above n 300. 
307 Stephens above n 304. 
308 See for further discussion Robert Joseph, “Re-creating Legal Space for the First Law of Aotearoa-
New Zealand” (2009) 17 Waikato Law Review: Taumauri at 74–97; E W Thomas “The Treaty of 
Waitangi: E. W. Thomas Reviews Matthew Palmer’s Book” [2009] NZLJ 277. 
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judicial system relies on a written tradition.309  
 
Common law has been created by judges over the centuries. The landmark cases 
exhibit spirit and vision that society, once informed, accepts for that reason. For 
example, in Oyekan v Adele,310 the Privy Council employed the judge-made concept 
of aboriginal title to convert indigenous custom into property rights actionable under 
colonial law.  
 
According to Justice Heath:311 
 
… Māori custom law and the existing common law are not fundamentally different. 
While the values that inform it are different, their overriding function (as representing 
the practices of the community) is identical. Where Parliament permits (or does not 
prohibit) the development of common law, there is scope in theory for the 
development of substantive law which infuses European values and tikanga Māori  
 
Notwithstanding the ability of the common law to convert indigenous rights into 
common law rights, this action still lies within the purview of a non-indigenous 
decision-maker and a non-indigenous paradigm.  
 
Despite the relevance of common law to the rights of Māori, noted in Ngati Apa v 
Attorney-General,312 judges have not kept the common law up to date. This is seen by 
some as the reason as to why Parliament has, all too often, decided to intervene.313 
The intersection between common law and tikanga was recently discussed by the 
court in Takamore v Clark. The issue in that case was whether the recognition of 
tikanga Māori prevailed over the common law right as to who decides the right to a 
                                            
309 Heath J, above n 294 at 199. 
310Adeyinka Oyekan v Musendika Adele [1957] 1 WLR 876, [1957] 2 All ER 785; See also Tijani v 
Secretary, Southern Nigeria [1921] 2 AC 399. 
311 Heath J, above n 294 at 199. 
312 Attorney General v Ngati Apa [2003] NZCA 117 which overruled the decision of Re the 90 Mile 
Beach  [1963] NZLR 461 (CA).  Attorney General v Ngati Apa determined that the Māori Land Court 
had the jurisdiction to determine whether Māori held customary title to the foreshore area. 
313 This occurs for instance when the common law rights applicable to women and minorities 
are not recognised by the courts, resulting in parliament seeking changes. See Baragwanath D “Good 
Faith Symposium” New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 687 A Perspective 




(d)  Case Law - Takamore 
 
In 2007 Mr James Takamore died in Christchurch, where he had lived with his partner 
(Ms Clarke) and their children.  James was from Whakatōhea and Tūhoe. In 
accordance with Tūhoe tikanga, Mr Takamore’s family collected his body and buried 
him at Kutarere in the Bay of Plenty. Ms Clarke did not consent and, as the executor 
of James’ will, she initiated proceedings to reclaim his body.  In an action before the 
High Court, Fogarty J found that Mr Takamore’s Tūhoe whānau had no right to take 
his body.   
 
Ms Josephine Takamore (Mr Takamore’s sister) appealed Fogarty J’s decision to the 
Court of Appeal, which dismissed the case. In reaching their decision, all three of the 
justices noted a legal test, that in order to recognise Māori custom as part of the 
common law of New Zealand, the custom must: 
 
1. be long standing 
2. have continued without interruption since its origin 
3. be reasonable  
4. be certain in its terms; and 
5. not have been displaced by Parliament through clear statutory wording. 
 
It was held that the custom or Tūhoe tikanga failed on the reasonableness criteria, in 
that the perceived use of force was contrary to the rule of law. The application of 
principles that are not sourced from tikanga, but from New Zealand common law does 
not provide for parity. 
 
The justices also noted that this conclusion was also reinforced by the need to develop 
the common law, as far as possible with the Treaty of Waitangi, the importance of 
recognising the collective nature of indigenous culture (as set forth in the United 
                                            
314 Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587. 
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Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) and by international human 
rights covenants to which New Zealand is a party.  
 
Leave was granted to Ms. Takamore to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal to 
the Supreme Court.315 The central issue was whether the Court of Appeal was correct 
to hold that New Zealand law entitled Ms. Clarke, as executor of Mr. Takamore’s 
Will, to determine his place of burial and to take possession of his remains. The 
Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal. Accordingly, Ms. Clarke was 
entitled to collect James’ body.  
 
The Supreme Court had the difficult task of balancing the executor’s (Ms Clarke) 
right over the deceased’s body and the relevant tikanga protocols.Tipping, McGrath 
and Blanchard JJ stated:316  
 
The common law is not displaced when [emphasis added] the deceased is of Māori 
descent and the whānau invokes the tikanga [emphasis added] concerning customary 
burial practices … Rather, the common law of New Zealand requires reference to any 
tikanga [emphasis added], along with other important cultural, spiritual and religious 
values, and all other circumstances of the case as matters that must form part of the 
evaluation.  Personal representatives are required to consider these values if they form 
part of the deceased’s heritage…  
 
Elias CJ concluded that Māori custom according to tikanga is a part of the ‘values’ of 
New Zealand’s common law and is a matter to be weighed.317 The exact meaning of 
‘value’ is unclear, as are other ‘values’ that would need to be weighed or considered.  
 
Despite the recognition tests set out by the Court of Appeal and whether tikanga can 
indeed satisfy these tests, it is clear that tikanga is now part of New Zealand’s 
common law.  This case sets a precedent for tikanga becoming a consideration or part 
of the ‘values’ that come to influence outcomes. Perhaps it may be that for a claim 
under existing legislation such as the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 
                                            
315 Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116, [2012] 2 NZLR 733. 
316 At [164]. 
317 At [94] per Elias CJ. 
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2011 or Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, tikanga could be submitted as a ‘value’ to 
be weighed, rather than putting the onus on the claimants to establish tikanga.318  
 
Legal scholar, Sir Edmund Thomas notes:319 
 
… to vest tikanga Māori with legal status. As tikanga are essentially principles rather 
than rules, and those principles are not static, tikanga Māori could readily be 
absorbed into the common law of this country [emphasis added]. Again, there is no 
reason why the judges should not assimilate the principles of tikanga in the 
development of the law generally so as to develop an endemic jurisprudence 
[emphasis added], just as the judges in days gone by assimilated the customs of the 
times into the growing body of the common law of England. 
 
Sir Edmund Thomas further noted:320 
 
The aim would be to enrich the law by incorporating tikanga as and when 
appropriate [emphasis added]. Māori principles regarding respect for the 
environment, for example, could have much to offer ... 
 
This also suggests that tikanga should be a part of our common law and a value to be 
considered.  
 
The nature of the Māori legal system is value-based, rather than rule-based. The 
advantage of a customary law system over a rules-based system that relies on written 
law and statutes is the flexibility of the former to disregard a custom when it becomes 
unpalatable, outdated or inconvenient.321 It is acknowledged that some negative 
customs can be entrenched.322 However, it could be easier to affect change in 
instances where there is no longer support for a particular custom.  
                                            
318 It is acknowledged that section 51 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act provides a 
test to establish a protected customary right. This comprises of three grounds to be satisfied of which 
tikanga relates to only one ground.  
319 E W Thomas “The Treaty of Waitangi: E. W. Thomas Reviews Matthew Palmer’s Book” [2009] 
NZLJ 277. 
320 Thomas, above n 320. 
321 This aligns with Hart’s concept of secondary rules allowing for change to laws. 
322 For instance gender based customs in the Pacific. See Converging Currents Customs and Human 
Rights in the Pacific September 2006 NZLC Study Paper 17, at 94 where it is noted that ‘an introduced 
practice of ‘bride-price’ is now viewed by many men as a licence to treat their wives as property’. 
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However, there is also an aspect of tikanga that is empirical; it is made and enforced 
having regard to practical observations in the world around us. This allows some 
flexibility in the application of laws emanating from principles rather than rules. For 
instance, where there is a need to be aware of particular circumstances, such as the 
appropriate time to harvest or impending warfare. 
 
Indigenous traditions have been incorporated to further define the parameters of the 
common law.323 It would follow that tikanga Māori could also be used to inform the 
common law by enforcing collective values in order to achieve balance and harmony. 
Alternatively, it could be used as a sword in checking the actions of the Crown if they 
are inconsistent with tikanga Māori.324 
 
According to Gordon Christie:325 
 
Indigenous legal scholars … have vital work to do in revealing ways in which the 
dominant system has functioned to trap Indigenous aspirations within webs of theory 
and principle [emphasis added] … and articulating how indigenous understandings 
and conceptualisations underpin the theoretical perspectives… 
 
Exploring the questions of who are Maori and what is tikanga Maori is not only 
insightful but consistent with the philosophy that underpins existing Indigenous 
justice systems, such as the Navajo Court system.326 Two examples, the changing 
significance of Māori women in society and the related problem of domestic violence 
and the issue of mental health, provide compelling reasons to consider a return to a 
framework informed by tikanga Māori. Contrasting tikanga Māori against more 
traditional sources of law such as natural law and positivism assists to illustrate the 
existing synergies. It provides a persuasive framework and support for the thesis that 
the application of the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal 
                                            
323 See Raymond Austin Navajo Courts and the Navajo Common Law: A Tradition of Tribal Self 
Governance (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009) at xxii. 
324 For instance this could be a cause of action taken by iwi groups who are challenging the decisions of 
the Crown to grant rights to another iwi in an area where they hold mana whenua i.e. overlapping 
claims when the Crown is failing to consider the tikanga concept of mana whenua and granting rights 
as a result of a Treaty claim to an iwi who does not hold mana whenua within that region. 
325 Gordon Christie “Indigenous Legal Theory” in Benajmin Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil 
(eds) Indigenous Peoples and the Law Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 
Portland, 2009) at 231. 
326 See Chapter V ‘Initiatives in Comparative Jurisdictions’ for discussion. 
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system and manifested by an indigenous court, is a way forward for Māori to 
ameliorate the disproportionate offending rates. It is now timely to consider the 




































































A. Introduction of European law 
 
The British sought to establish their own form of legal system upon the colonisation 
of territories including New Zealand, Australia and Canada.327 As in the case for 
Australia,328 New Zealand was regarded by the British as a settled territory329 and 
vacant upon discovery. This is the view maintained by scholars and also by the 
courts.330 Scholars, such as Austin, have tended to belittle this approach because 
societies, such as First Nations peoples and Māori, have been inappropriately labelled 
as inferior or even savage.331 According to First Nations legal scholar, Borrows:332 
 
While Indigenous peoples lived in the territory prior to its colonization it has been 
said that “their laws and customs were either too unfamiliar or too primitive to justify 
compelling British subjects to obey them [emphasis added]”. 
 
Williams, a Navajo law professor, noted that, in respect of the indigenous Cheyenne 
peoples:333 
 
Cheyenne … demonstrated the ‘juristic beauty’ … underlying assumption that the 
Cheyenne were not stereotypical lawless savages but sophisticated legal thinkers and 
actors showed that the evolution and practice of law among the so called primitive 
                                            
327 See Wai 1040, above n 24, at 38 that stated ‘these victories made Britain the world’s pre-eminent 
imperial and naval power … provided protection for core elite values such as … rule of law, sanctity of 
private property rights and the spread of Christ’s Protestant gospel.’ 
328 See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) (SC) 72; see also discussion in David 
Williams “Wi Parata is Dead, Long Live Wi Parata” in Andrew Erueti and Claire Charters (eds) Māori 
Property Rights and the Foreshore and Seabed: The Last Frontier (VUP, Wellington, 2007). 
329 Despite the Treaty travelling around the country and receiving further signatories, Hobson on 21 
May 1840 declared the sovereign rights of Britain in two proclamations. One proclaimed sovereignty 
over the North Island by virtue of cession under the Treaty of Waitangi and the other over the South 
Island on the ground of discovery. The British Government acknowledged this where the proclamation 
was published in the London Gazette on 2 October 1840. 
330 See J E Cote “Reception of English Law” (1977) 25 Alberta Law Review 29 at 38. See also, for 
example, Norman Arthur Foden New Zealand Legal History (1642-1842)  (Sweet & Maxwell, 
Wellington, 1965) at 24-25 and 179-190; Alan Ward A Show of Justice: Racial "Amalgamation" in 
Nineteenth Century New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1995); Peter Adams Fatal 
Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830-1847  (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 
1977) at chapter 7. 
331 John Austin The Province of Jurisprudence Determined vol 2, in Wilfrid Rumble (1832 Reprint 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1995) at 178 as cited in Borrows, above n 302, at 12. 
332 Borrows, above n 302, at 13. 
333 Robert Williams “Foreword” in Raymond Austin Navajo Courts and the Navajo Common Law: A 
Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2009) at 1.  
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peoples of the United States was far more advanced and nuanced than had been 
generally supposed [emphasis added]. 
 
This is not the line of reasoning expressed in early New Zealand case law. Richmond 
J and Prendergast CJ in the 1877 Supreme Court decision of Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington,334 Professor David Williams noted:335 
 
In the judgment of Prendergast C.J. and Richmond J., delivered by the Chief Justice, 
the 1841 Ordinance was said to “express the well-known legal incidents of a 
settlement planted by a civilised Power in the midst of uncivilised tribes [emphasis 
added].” The Treaty of Waitangi was dismissed “as a simple nullity. No body politic 
existed capable of making a cession of sovereignty, nor could the thing itself exist 
[emphasis added]”. 
 
And further Williams noted: 
 
Prendergast CJ and Richmond J had opined in 1877, that “the supreme executive 
Government must acquit itself as best it may, of its obligation to respect native 
proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice 
[emphasis added]”. 
 
However, Borrows commented that:336 
 
Indigenous legal traditions will not receive the respect they deserve if [emphasis 
added] governments, courts, lawyers, political scientists and law professors fail to 
more fully articulate their place in our country [emphasis added]. 
 
Upon the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty, the status of tikanga Māori was initially 
contingent on the common law. The doctrine of continuity recognised that “British 
                                            
334 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZ Jur (NS) (SC) 72. 
335 Williams, above n 333. This perspective is consistent with that of Sir Edward Coke’s report of the 
Calvin case where Coke asserted that the ‘laws of a conquered Christian nation survived, but the laws 
of an infidel nation were abrogated’ see Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, 77 ER 377 (Comm Pleas). 
However, see McHugh Māori Magna Carta, above n 34, at 89 where he notes that Lord Mansfield did 
not follow this line of reasoning by Coke and Lord Mansfield clarified that Indigenous laws enjoyed 
the same presumption of continuity as found in The Case of Tanistry (1608) Davies 28, 80 ER 516 
(KB).  
336 Borrows, above n 235, at 180. 
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sovereignty … of itself did not make legal order from chaos, but rather, extended 
some legal recognition to the pre-existing tribal system of government and law”.337  
 
Although as Paul McHugh asserts, continuity is “a deep-seated trait of human nature”, 
tikanga Māori was nonetheless marginalised. To understand why, a historical review 
of the introduction of British legal systems provides a background to discussing the 
almost fatal impact British law had on tikanga Māori. 
 
To provide some context for the question of how any domestic and international 
instruments impacted upon or may recognise ‘culture’ or ‘tikanga Māori’ within the 
New Zealand justice system, a review of three broad timeframes will assist in ‘setting 
the scene’. This will also trace the presumed cession of Māori sovereignty and the 
imposition of a new legal order for New Zealand. The first timeframe covers the pre-
Treaty era. The second timeframe ranges from the signing of the Treaty to the year 
1900. The third and final period ranges from 1900 to the present day.  
 
Law is generally defined as a system of rules that relate to a community, regulating 
and determining the actions of its members and enforcing these rules through the 
imposition of penalties. In contrast, tikanga Māori is a contextual concept derived 
from a completely different source, with the imposition and consideration of measures 
to achieve balance. Although there may be some abstract similarities, tikanga Māori 
and British Law were influenced by different historical and philosophical doctrines.338 
Notwithstanding these differences, it is only through a Westminster or British lens 
that tikanga Māori can be claimed to be the first ‘law’ of Aotearoa.339  
 
New Zealand’s present constitutional framework derives from the British 
Westminster system of government, which advocates parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law.340 While the judiciary scrutinise the actions of Parliament to ensure 
                                            
337 McHugh Māori Magna Carta, above n 34, at 83. See also Waitangi Tribunal Report, Wai 1040, 
above n 24, at 40 – 44. 
338 For further discussion see Wai 1040, above n 24, at 19 – 47. 
339 Ani Mikaere “The Treaty of Waitangi and the Recognition of Tikanga Māori” in Michael Belgrave, 
Merata Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005) at 334. 
340 See Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd edition, Thomson 
Brookers, Wellington, 2007). 
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they are consistent with New Zealand’s constitutional framework (using tools of 
statutory interpretation and alternative formulations of the rule of law),341 the courts 
inevitably respect parliamentary sovereignty in all its forms — the supreme power of 
Parliament.  
 
As a British colony and a member of the Commonwealth, New Zealand inherited 
many of its laws from England at various stages in time.342 English laws were deemed 
to have been in force in New Zealand from 14 January 1840, at least “so far as 
applicable to the circumstances of the … colony”.343 In addition to its many laws, 
New Zealand inherited an unwritten constitution that is untidy, inaccessible, sullied 
by colonisation and not reflective of the community.344 New Zealand’s unwritten 
constitution is comprised of a collection of statutes, the Treaty of Waitangi, decisions 
of the courts and certain unwritten constitutional conventions.345 This distinctive 
feature must be contended with when determining the place of Māori and tikanga 
Māori within it.346 Further, as the Treaty is only one of many constitutional 
components, the exact role and constitutional influence the Treaty may hold is 
unclear. 
 
(a) Pre-Treaty of Waitangi  
 
While Abel Tasman arrived in 1642, it was Captain Cook who was ultimately credited 
with the ‘discovery’ of New Zealand.347 In the early phases of European settlement, 
Māori significantly outnumbered the British settlers and Britain’s policy towards New 
Zealand was one of non-intervention.348 This approach is supported by obiter dicta 
statements in R v Symonds; that is, until 1840, New Zealand was “not within His 
                                            
341 Sections 4, 5 and 6 were intentionally inserted into the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 to 
protect the sovereignty of Parliament from such as situation. This being said, the courts will strive to 
uphold the rights contained therein given the nature and content of the Act.  See Shaw v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue [1999] 3 NZLR 154 (CA) for further information. 
342 For general discussion see Peter Spiller (ed) A New Zealand Legal History (2nd ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 2001). 
343 English Laws Act 1854 s 1. 
344 Bruce V Harris “The Treaty of Waitangi and the Constitutional Future of New Zealand” [2005] 2 
NZLR 189 at 212. See also D V Williams “The Foundation of Colonial Rule in New Zealand” (1988) 
13 NZULR.  
345 Only two other states have unwritten constitutions: the United Kingdom and Israel. 
346 Harris, above n 344, at 212. 
347 To provide full context to the time period prior see Anne Salmond The Trial of the Cannibal Dog: 
Captain Cook in the South Seas (Pengiun Books, Auckland, 2004). Wai 1040, above n 24, at 57 – 67. 
348 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 156, 193, 231, 268,  
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Majesty’s dominions”.349 Further, Justice Chapman upheld the notion of native title 
and observed:350 
 
Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or weakness of the Native 
title, whatsoever may have been the past vague notions of the Natives of their 
country, whatever may be their present clearer and still growing conception of their 
dominion over land, it cannot be too solemnly asserted that it is entitled to be 
respected, that it cannot be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by 
the free consent of the native occupiers [emphasis added]. 
 
On the matter of the Treaty itself, Justice Chapman declared that it was simply a 
declaration of the law the court had applied in making its judgment on this matter:351 
 
It follows … that in solemnly guaranteeing the Native title, and in securing what is 
called the Queen’ s pre-emptive right, the Treaty of Waitangi, confirmed by the 
charter of the Colony, does not assert either in doctrine or in practice anything new 
and unsettled. 
 
The interventions of the Imperial Statutes of 1817, 1823 and 1828 collectively, 
founded a paradox: they disclaimed New Zealand as part of the British Empire and 
not subject to the Queen’s writ, yet they extended the jurisdiction of the New South 
Wales’ Courts to punish crimes committed by British subjects in New Zealand.352  
 
To some extent the only other British intervention was the Declaration of 
Independence of 1835, He Whakaputanga o te Rangatira o Nui Tireni (‘the 
Declaration of Independence’). Signed by 34 Māori Chiefs and James Busby, the 
official British Resident, on 28 October 1835, the Declaration declared independence 
of the country, confirmed that all sovereign power rested in the hereditary chiefs, 
agreed to meet regularly in Congress and thanked the King for acknowledging the 
independence flag of 1834.353  
 
                                            
349  R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387 at 395. See also D V Williams “Queen v Symonds Reconsidered” 
19 Victoria U Wellington Law Review (1989) at 385 – 402.  
350 R v Symonds, above n 349 at 232. 
351 At 390. 
352 Joseph above n 340, at 39. See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 326, 504, 108. 
353 See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 153 – 183. 
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Thus the Declaration of Independence was a clear articulation binding the Crown and 
proclaiming the sovereign independence of the signatories (mainly Northern 
rangatira), and affirming their independence from all other sovereign powers.  
 
The proclamation was recognised by King William IV and perceived as a response to 
concern over lawless British subjects in New Zealand coupled by fears that France 
would declare sovereignty over the territory.354 The Declaration of Independence 
signalled a step towards a formal constitutional relationship with the Crown and 
affirmation of Māori sovereignty. The Wai 1040 report stated:355 
 
There can be no doubt that he Whakaputanga was a resounding declaration of the 
mana and rangatiratanga of those who signed it on behalf of their hapū. Nor can there 
be any doubt that it amounted to a declaration of sovereignty and independence of 
those hapū. 
 
Although the recent Waitangi Tribunal Report has addressed the debate as to whether 
the Declaration of Independence secured sovereign rights for Māori,356 for some legal 
commentators, the Treaty received a greater and wider range of signatories, usurping 
the status of the Declaration of Independence.357 Some question its validity on the 
grounds that it is not representative of all Māori. In this way the Declaration of 
Independence is viewed as a mere step towards the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi.  
 
Nonetheless, the Declaration of Independence provides a clear purpose of the 
signatories’ intention: to declare independence, thereby reinforcing the claim that the 
Northern chiefs did not cede sovereignty to the Crown when signing the Treaty. The 
recent Waitangi Report, Wai 1040 stated:358 
 
To those rangatira who signed, none of this – including the agreement to meet 
annually – would have implied any loss of authority on the part of either themselves 
or their hapū, or any transfer of authority to a collective decisionmaking body. 
                                            
354 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 157. 
355 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 501. 
356 Margaret Mutu “Constitutional Intentions: The Treaty of Waitangi Texts” in Malcolm Mulholland 
and Veronica Tawhai (eds) Weeping Waters The Treaty of Waitangi and Constitutional Change (Huia 
Publishers, Wellington, 2010). See also Wai 1040, above n 24. 
357 Joseph, above n 340, at 37. 
358 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 502. 
 89 
Rather, he Whakaputanga was an unambiguous declaration that hapū and rangatira 
authority continued in force – as, on the ground, it undoubtedly did – and that Britain 
had a role in making sure that state of affairs continued as Māori contact with 
foreigners increased. 
 
Historian Paul Moon has argued that the Declaration of Independence represented 
“regional goodwill”.359 This is consistent with Britain’s immediate response to the 
Declaration that indicated it did not see itself as being bound by the Declaration of 
Independence.360 The Waitangi Report, Wai 1040 noted that:361 
 
The official response to the declaration in 1836 by the Secretary of State for War and 
Colonies, Lord Glenelg, did not take those commitments any further, and rather 
signalled only a very conditional willingness to protect Māori independence. 
 
Michael King maintained that the Declaration of Independence had no substance 
“since there was in fact no national indigenous power structure within New 
Zealand”.362 King also noted that some of the United Tribes were at war with one 
another within a year of signing the document.363 
 
Notwithstanding these views many historians, including Tom Brooking, assert that the 
Colonial Office accepted that the Confederation of United Tribes, the Māori 
signatories, retained “title to the soil and sovereignty of New Zealand”.364 Māori have 
relied on this affirmation of sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence in 
contemporary legal proceedings.365 For example, although unsuccessful, Ngāti 
Whātua argued before the High Court that they remained an independent sovereign 
state under the Declaration of Independence (1835), which preceded the Crown 
annexation of New Zealand in 1840.366 In light of the Wai 1040 Report,367 although 
only recommendations, if this case taken by Ngāti Whātua was heard today, the 
findings from the High Court may have been different.  
                                            
359 Joseph, above n 340. 
360 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 502. 
361 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 502. 
362 See King, above n 26. 
363 See King, above n 26. See also Wai 1040, above n 24, at 157 – 158. 
364 Tom Brooking Māori and Pākehā Relations: 1800-1860 (Ministry of Education, Wellington, 1991). 
365 See Morunga v Police 16/3/04HC Auckland, CRI-2004-404-8. 
366 Re Manukau HC Auckland M 1380/92, 10 June 1993. 
367 Wai 1040, above n 24. 
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The Declaration of Independence is a source of indigenous rights. In view of the 
recent findings from the Waitangi Tribunal368 on its examination of the intersection of 
the powers successively reserved to Māori in the Declaration of Independence, an 
examination of the Treaty will be important.  
 
(b) 1840 – 1900 
 
With the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, the Crown claimed, contentiously, 
that Māori ceded sovereignty and the New Zealand Parliament subsequently 
established. The current Waitangi Tribunal Claim, Te Paparahi o te Raki, Wai 1040, 
questions whether the Māori signatories of the Treaty did cede sovereignty. Stage one 
of the Wai 1040 report, released on 14 November, 2014, found that the chiefs who 
signed the Treaty did not cede sovereignty to the British Crown, but agreed “to share 
power and authority with Britain”.369 The report further stated that “the detail of how 
this relationship would work in practice, especially where the Māori and European 
populations intermingled, remained to be negotiated over time on a case-by-case 
basis”.370 The report is silent on how and when the Crown acquired sovereignty. 
However, Paul McHugh, in the report, states that “the Crown acquired sovereignty 
not through the Treaty but a series of jurisdictional steps” so the signature gathering 
was no longer necessary after securing the following jurisdictional steps and 
proclaimations. 371 Wai 1040 notes: 
 
Entering into a Treaty with Māori would meet Britain’s self-imposed condition prior 
to asserting sovereignty, but the assertion of sovereignty itself would be an entirely 
independent step 
 
In the six months preceding the signing, New Zealand transformed from an 
independent Māori nation into an appendage of New South Wales before becoming an 
                                            
368 Wai 1040 above n 24. 
369 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 528, 529. 
370 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 528. 
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General and Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations Minister Chris Finlayson said: "There is no question that 
the Crown has sovereignty in New Zealand. This report doesn't change that fact" in Kate Kenny 




infant colony of Great Britain. During this time several proclamations were issued in 
anticipation of New Zealand becoming a British possession.372  
 
On 15 June 1839 Letters Patent were issued under the Great Seal, altering the 
boundaries of New South Wales. Pursuant to the Letters Patent, New Zealand became 
a British possession as an appendage of the Australian Colony of New South 
Wales.373 On 19 January 1840 the Governor of New South Wales, Sir George Gipps, 
issued three proclamations, which he retrospectively dated to 14 January 1840. The 
first extended the boundaries of New South Wales to include:374  
 
… any territory which is or may be acquired in sovereignty by Her Majesty… within 
that group of Islands … known as New Zealand. 
 
The second and third proclamations announced that he had administered oaths of 
office to Hobson,375 as Lieutenant-Governor “in and over the same”, and that the 
Queen would not recognise any title to land purchased directly from Māori after 14 
January 1840.376 
 
On 6 February 1840 the Treaty of Waitangi received its first signatories. Despite the 
Treaty travelling around the country and receiving further signatories, on 21 May 
1840 Hobson declared the sovereign rights of Britain in two proclamations.377 One 
proclaimed sovereignty over the North Island by virtue of cession under the Treaty of 
Waitangi, and the other over the South Island on the grounds of discovery. The British 
Government acknowledged Hobson’s proclamations, which were subsequently 
published in the London Gazette on 2 October 1840. 
 
On 16 June 1840 the Legislative Council of New South Wales passed an Act 
extending the laws of New South Wales to “Her Majesty’s Dominions in the Islands 
of New Zealand”.378 New Zealand was now part of New South Wales.379 On 7 August 
                                            
372 Foden above n 330, at 12-17. 
373 See Joseph above n 340 at 39. Wai 1040, above n 24, at 314. 
374 Wai 1040, above n 24, at 314, 340. 
375 William Hobson was the first Governor of New Zealand and assisted in the drafting of the Treaty. 
376 See Foden, above n 330. 
377 At 17-20 
378 See Joseph, above n 340, at 40.  
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1840 the New South Wales Continuance Act of 1840 provided that New Zealand was 
a separate colony from New South Wales, and now a British Colony.  
 
Hobson was appointed as Governor of the new colony, pursuant to Letters Patent 
issued on 24 November, 1840, and officially in existence on 3 May, 1841.380 This 
signalled the beginning of New Zealand as an infant colony.  
 
(c) Constitutional Beginnings 
 
Between 1840 and 1860 New Zealand’s constitutional and legal structures provided 
Parliament the power to pass laws in New Zealand under the English Laws Act of 
1858 (UK).381 Section 1 of this Act ensured the adoption of the common law in New 
Zealand.382 The English Laws Act of 1854, the English Laws Act of 1858 and the 
English Laws Act of 1908 were recognised as part of New Zealand municipal law as 
of 14 January 1840.383 
 
It was not until the 1852 Constitution Act (UK) (“1852 Act”) that New Zealand’s 
constitutional beginnings were formalised.384 The 1852 Act was the third 
‘constitutional’ Act in New Zealand.385 The first, the Charter of New Zealand 1840, 
came into force in 1841 when New Zealand was separated from New South Wales 
and constituted a separate colony. The second constitution passed by the Imperial 





                                                                                                                             
379 New Zealand Charter 1840 was the first constitutional document, the second was the Constitution 
Act 1847 (UK) which Governor Grey did not apply, the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 (UK) 
380 See Joseph, above n 340, at 21. 
381 At 21. 
382 See Attorney General v Ngāti Apa [2003] 3 NZLR 643 at [17-19]. See also Fuller v MacLeod 
[1981] 1 NZLR 390 where the Court established that subject to statutory limitations there is a common 
law right, in this instance, for the owner of land fronting a road to have access. 
383 R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387. 
384 See also Phillip A Joseph and Gorder R Walker “A Theory of Constitutional Change (1987) 7 
Oxford J. Legal Stud 155 at 157. 
385 See Joseph, above n 340. 
386 Governor Grey refused to administer the 1846 Act. 
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(d) Inclusion of Tikanga Māori 
 
The implementation of this constitution did not consider the inclusion of tikanga 
Māori or the requirement of the “right ways of acting and being”, subsequently 
marginalising these values. For Māori, if the action did not result in a breach of 
personal or collective tapu, it was not regarded as a crime. This perception did not 
always equate with the provisions of the British law that had been imposed upon 
Māori. Collective responsibility for individual transgressions, in accordance with 
tikanga Māori, had no place in British law.387  
 
The Native Exemption Ordinance No. 18 came into effect on 16 July, 1844 to assist 
the “aboriginal native population to yield a ready obedience to the laws and customs 
of England” as this “may be more speedily attained by gradual rather than immediate 
enforcement of the law so that in the course of time the native population may 
willingly submit”.388 Under this Ordinance, if the victim and offender were both 
Māori, the proceedings could be instigated by two chiefs from the tribe to which the 
offender belongs.389 This “positioned Māori outside the jurisdictional boundaries”390 
and was more consistent with how Māori rangatira perceived their exception rather 
than subjection to the colonial law.391 
 
If the victim was non-Māori, then any action taken was not to disturb the peace of the 
community.392 The chiefs were remunerated for their time and effort.393 Consistent 
with the notion of reciprocity and utu, and in lieu of imprisonment, this Ordinance 
enabled the payment of a fine for a debt incurred.394 In the case of R v E Hipu,395 the 
court records show that: 
 
                                            
387 See Wai 1040, above n 24, at 33 that stated ‘Consistent with the principle of whanaungatanga, utu 
would be taken against the group, rather than solely against the offending individual if there was one.’ 
388 Preamble Native Exemption Ordinance (No 18). 
389 Native Ordinance, s 1: Mode of procedure in cases of crime committed by the natives inter se. 
390 Nan Seuffert Jurisprudence of National Identity: Kaleidoscopes of Imperialism and Globalisation 
from Aotearoa New Zealand  (2006, Ashgate, Aldershot UK) at 32. 
391 McHugh Aboriginal Societies, above n 27, at 170. 
392 Section 2: By Natives against others. 
393 Section 4: Allowance for Chiefs for causing apprehension of offenders. 
394 Section 12: Aborigines not to be imprisoned for debt. 
395 R v E Hipu 1 December 1845 Supreme Court, Wellington, Chapman J. As cited at 
<www.victoria.ac.nz/law>. 
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E Hipu, a native, was tried and found guilty of having stolen a piece of print from Mr. 
Lyon’s store about twelve months since, and sentenced (under the Native Exemption 
Ordinance) to pay eight pounds, or four times the value of the goods stolen. The fine 
was paid for the prisoner. The prisoner had escaped from custody and was recaptured 
only a fortnight before trial. 
 
A later Ordinance extended this to include assault.396  
 
In recognition by Governor Fitzroy of the negative effect imprisonment had on Māori, 
he insightfully noted:397 
 
The Natives [do] not regard imprisonment as we [do], deprivation of personal liberty 
often ended in the death of the savage; and regarding them in a transitional state, he 
thought imprisonment would tend to retard their improvement [emphasis added]. 
 
Today the disproportionate criminal justice statistics for Māori confirm this comment 
by Governor Fitzroy. Notwithstanding the potential for this Ordinance to assist in 
achieving balance, it was not popular amongst the settler population.398  
 
This Ordinance was replaced by Governor Grey with the Resident Magistrates Court 
Ordinance 1846. Perceived as a successful initiative, the 1846 Ordinance sought to 
incorporate Māori decision-making and tikanga into legislation. The 1846 Ordinance 
provided that, for disputes involving only Māori, a Resident Magistrate was to sit with 
two Māori rangatira (chiefs) appointed as Native Assessors. As a non-Māori system, 
each case was determined according to the principles of equity and good conscience, 
without being constrained by strictly legal evidence. 399 In accordance with s 22, the 
decision was to be made by consensus. Rangatira were responsible for their own 
people, delivering to the magistrate those individuals who were guilty of serious 
                                            
396 Fines for Assault Ordinance 1845 
397 Legislative Council Minutes, Tuesday 9 July, printed in the Daily Southern Cross, 13 July 1844 at 3 
<www.victoria.ac.nz >. See also comments from Paul Butler ‘… less punitive crime policy is in our 
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Michigan Law Review, 1009.  
398 New Zealand Spectator and Cooks Strait Guardian 15 February 1845, at 2 
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399 As per ss 7, 10, 13, 19 and 20. See Robert Joseph “Re-Creating Legal Space for the First Law of 
Aotearoa, New Zealand” (2009) 17 Waikato Law Review at 74. 
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offences against settlers, and reporting regularly on the state of their districts.400  
 
The ability to incorporate concepts of tikanga Māori, including the notion of 
consensus together with strong leadership and the involvement of the Resident 
Magistrates system with Māori Assessors, all contributed to the success of this 
Ordinance.  
 
Through seeking to recognise tikanga Māori in R v Rangitapiripiri,401 Chapman J 
noted that: 402 
 
 as far as the law to be applied in the new colony, this only indicated that as between 
the settlers, or the settlers and Māori that English law should be applied.  
 
For matters between Māori, Chapman J stated that “Māori laws and customs remained 
in place unless specifically abrogated on the basis that they were against the law of 
humanity”.403 This reasoning supports the notion of a parallel justice system or the 
application of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal system, manifested by an 
indigenous court, and premised on fundamental Māori concepts and doctrine, is the 
appropriate way forward for Māori. 
 
The two constitutions, the Charter of New Zealand 1840 and the New Zealand 
Constitution Act of 1846,404 remained in force until the Constitution Act of 1852 was 
passed in 1853. The Constitution Act of 1852 established the organs of government. 
Section 32 of the Constitution Act of 1852 (UK) established a General Assembly 
consisting of the Governor, the House of Representatives and the Legislative Council. 
Section 53 granted the General Assembly the power to make laws for New Zealand. 
                                            
400 Joseph, above n 399. 
401 1 December 1847 Supreme Court, Wellington, Chapman J heard together with R v Native 
402 For further information, see Shaunnagh Dorsett ""Sworn on the Dirt of Graves": Sovereignty, 
Jurisdiction and the Judicial Abrogation of Barbarous Customs in New Zealand in the 1840s" (2009) 
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403 Shaunnagh Dorsett ""Sworn on the Dirt of Graves": Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and the Judicial 
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Section 71 provided the Governor with the power to set apart ‘Māori districts’, where 
Māori laws and customs would prevail, stating:405  
 
And whereas it may be expedient that the laws, customs, and usages of the Aboriginal 
or native inhabitants of New Zealand, so far as they are not repugnant to the general 
principles of humanity, should for the present be maintained for the government of 
themselves [emphasis added], in all their relations to and dealings with each other, 
and that particular districts should be set apart within which such laws, customs, or 
usages should be so observed:  
 
It shall be lawful for her Majesty, by any Letters Patent to be issued under the Great 
Seal of the United Kingdom, from time to time to make provision for the purposes 
aforesaid, any repugnancy of any such native laws, customs, or usages to the law of 
England, or to any law, statute, or usage in force in New Zealand, or in any part 
thereof, in anywise notwithstanding.  
 
This carried the potential to create domestic dependent Māori nations, analogous to 
those in the United States.406 The provisions for ‘Māori/Native Districts’ implied that 
Māori customary law could prevail over national laws.407  
 
It is suggested that had this statutory intention been realised, Māori would be on par 
with their Native American counterparts. It is also plausible that a tribal system of 
governance, such as the Navajo Tribal Court System408 which recognises and 
implements Navajo customary law, could have been accomplished.409 Although many 
Native Americans still experience disproportionate social statistics, a tikanga based 
court system may have alleviated the current disproportionate social statistics for 
Māori.  
 
                                            
405 Constitutions of Nations Volume II France to New Zealand (Brill Archive) at [71]. 
406 See Chapter V ‘Initiatives in Comparative Jurisdictions’ for further discussion on the Navajo 
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407 McHugh Aboriginal Societies, above n 27, at 200. See also Jim Cameron Plural Justice, Equality 
and Sovereignty in New Zealand (unpublished paper for the Law Commission, 22 October 1997) at 48. 
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However, s 71 was never invoked.410 No districts were ‘set apart’ in terms of the Act, 
despite the efforts of various Māori groups, including the Kīngitanga movements, to 
have the provisions of s 71 implemented.411   
The Kīngitanga movement attempted to use s 71 in their claims for self-governance. 
However, that section is no longer available as it was eventually repealed by the 
Constitution Act of 1986. No analogous section, allowing the legal recognition of 
customary governance, was included in the 1986 Act. 
 
Despite the fact that s 71 was never implemented, Ngāi Tūhoe has always sought tino 
rangatiratanga within Aotearoa. The Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896 
(Urewera Act) provided for the “ownership and local government of the native lands 
in the Te Urewera district”.412 In recognition of the existing tikanga of Ngāi Tūhoe, 
the preamble noted: 
 
It is desirable in the interests of the Native race that the Native ownership of the Native 
lands constituting the Urewera District should be ascertained in such manner, not 
inconsistent with Native customs and usages, as will meet the views of the Native 
owners generally and the equities of each particular case, and also that provisions be 
made for the local government of the said district. 
 
This clear statutory recognition of traditional customary structures within the 
traditional area or ‘te Rohe Pōtae’413 of Ngāi Tūhoe, provided internal self-
governance through local government, protecting the Ngāi Tūhoe from external 
alienation. However, “the Act was designed not to guarantee autonomy to Ngāi 
Tūhoe, but to open up Te Urewera to the Europeans”: 414  
                                            
410 For a current comparative example where laws established by the State recognizing Indigenous 
rights have not been utilized see the law “On Territories of Traditional Nature Use of Indigenous, 
Small Numbered Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (7 May 2001, 
No 49-FZ) adopted by Russia in 2001 provided for the creation of Territories of Traditional Natural 
Use. This law guaranteed land use rights to Indigenous peoples; however, more than a decade after 
adoption no territory has been established. 
411 See New Zealand Law Commission above n 33, at [92]. For a discussion on the development of, 
and attempts to implement, s 71 of the Constitution Act 1852 see Robert Joseph Historical Bicultural 
Developments: The Recognition and Denial of Māori Custom in the Colonial Legal System of 
Aotearoa/New Zealand (LIANZ: Te Matahauriki Research Unit, Hamilton, 1998). 
412 Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896. 
413 Te Rohe Pōtae is the name given to describe the boundaries of the Tūhoe territory. 
414 Danny Keenan “Autonomy as Fiction: The Urewera Native District Reserve Act 1896” in Keenan 
(ed) Terror in our Midst (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2008) at 91. 
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Government policy, however, was firmly focused on the purchase of Urewera land, not 
on the promotion of Māori development of land and agricultural enterprise (in spite of 
Tūhoe efforts at Ruatoki). This came in spite of Ngata’s assurances in Parliament that 
section 8 of the Urewera Amendment Act 1909 was ‘for the purpose of promoting 
settlement on their lands by Natives themselves’. From this point onward, Tūhoe non-
sellers were placed in a position of reacting to and protesting against aggressive 
Government purchase policy in the Urewera. 
 
During the reading of the Bill, the then Leader of the Opposition, Captain Russell, 
focused on the illusion that Tūhoe would be given self-governance and states the 
Bill:415 
 
… pretends to confer upon the Native people the complete isolation and control of a 
portion of the country about 665,000 acres in extent, but I am happy to say it will do 
no such thing … To give effect to this Bill we have to make a district with which the 
land-law of the Native people shall be absolutely different [emphasis added] from that 
in any other part of the colony. 
 
Tūhoe were granted something far less than self-government. The aspirational 
beginnings of the Urewera Act resulted in legislation with the purpose of gaining land 
ownership.416 
 
Unfortunately, the overlaying of non-indigenous values, such as individualism, has 
led to conflict and the marginalisation of fundamental Māori values, such as 
reciprocity, relatedness and balance. To meaningfully recognise these fundamental 
values, concepts based on state and private ownership would need to be abandoned in 
favour of concepts underpinned by a relational worldview — one that is closely 
aligned with the indigenous worldview and the Māori world.  
 
Despite this positive intention, it did not translate into meaningful Māori governance 
structures.417 What did eventuate were four Māori seats under the Māori 
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416 See Joseph, above n 341, at 74-97 for full discussion. 
417 See Robert Joseph Colonial Biculturalism? The Recognition & Denial of Māori Custom in the 
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Representation Act 1867. The 1852 Act disenfranchised Māori from political 
participation. It stipulated that eligible land ownership was a requirement of the Māori 
Representation Act 1867.  
 
After the 1852 Act, the judiciary evaded the obligation to continue the application of 
Māori customary law and usage until customary title was extinguished. In Re The 
Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871, the Court of Appeal reasserted: 418 
 
The Crown is bound, both by the common law of England and by its own solemn 
engagements, to a full recognition of native proprietary rights [emphasis added]. 
Whatever the extent of that right by established native custom appears to be, the 
Crown is bound to respect it. But the fullest measure of respect is consistent with the 
assertion of the technical doctrine, that all title to land must be derived from the 
Crown; this of necessity importing that the fee-simple of the whole territory of New 
Zealand vested and resides in the Crown, until it be parted with by grant from the 
Crown. 
 
This judicial recognition of Māori aboriginal or customary title was unfortunately 
short lived. During the following time frame, Māori customary law was gradually 
displaced and alienated by a raft of statutes.  
 
(e) 1900 – present day 
 
The beginning of the 20th century marked a period during which New Zealand 
seceded from the United Kingdom and developed into an independent country. The 
Constitution Act 1852 gave the New Zealand Parliament the power to pass its own 
legislation. However, as a dominion of the United Kingdom, Parliament could not 
pass laws repugnant to the United Kingdom, nor amend the Constitution Act 1852, 
thus limiting its law making power. 
 
The Imperial Parliament enacted the Statute of Westminster in 1931 to give Great 
Britain’s dominions greater legislative autonomy.419 This statute purported to allow 
                                            
418 In Re The Lundon and Whitaker Claims Act 1871 (1872) 2 NZCA 41 at 49. 
419 See BV Harris “Law-making Powers of the New Zealand General Assembly: Time to Think about 
Change” (1984) 5 Otago LR 565 at 565-571. See also Joseph and Walker, above n 384, at 157. 
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laws to be valid even where they were repugnant to the laws of Great Britain.420 
However, s 8 of the Statute of Westminster 1931 provided an important qualification 
to the broadening of local law-making powers.421 It did this by articulating that the 
New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 was only to be altered or repealed in accordance 
with the law as it existed before the commencement of the 1931 Act.422 This left the 
then General Assembly without the power to amend or repeal the remaining 
entrenched provisions of the 1852 Act that limited the law making powers for New 
Zealand. The passing of the New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (UK) 
provided such a power.423 
 
The New Zealand Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 (UK) gave Parliament full 
powers of constitutional amendment, thereby allowing New Zealand to pass laws 
repugnant to the Constitution Act 1852. While the 1947 Act was considered a 
breakthrough, it added to the growing number of complex and fragmented sources of 
New Zealand’s constitution. 
 
The Constitution Act 1986 (“1986 Act”) provided some clarification by amalgamating 
the constitution process into a single Act, replacing the 1852 Act, the Statute of 
Westminster Act 1947 and the New Zealand Constitution (Request and Consent) Act 
1947. The 1986 Act removed the power of the United Kingdom to pass laws for New 
Zealand and consolidated the constitutional sources within a single Act, representing 
our current constitutional arrangements. 424   
 
Although the Ordinances provided for the recognition of tikanga Māori, the 1986 Act 
does not include any reference to the Treaty. The lack of Māori involvement has been 
an implicit feature throughout New Zealand’s constitutional history. However, during 
the 1980s there was a period of Māori Renaissance, which led to the establishment of 
the Waitangi Tribunal, among other innovations.425 In light of this historical context, 
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it is surprising the Treaty was not expressly included in New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements.  
 
This very concern was raised with the passing of the Bill of Rights Act in 1990. The 
Fourth Labour Government, led by Prime Minister David Lange, tabled a White Paper 
to include the Treaty of Waitangi within the Bill of Rights.426 Under the Bill the 
Treaty would strike down other Acts that “unreasonably encroached” upon the 
Treaty.427 However, many Māori did not agree with inserting the Treaty into a rights 
charter. Some Māori believed that the Treaty had the status as the founding document 
rather than a mere right.428 No mention of the Treaty was made in this Act, nor has 
one been made in our current Constitution Act 1986. 
 
Had the 1986 Act and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act1990 included a reference 
to the Treaty of Waitangi, the 1986 Act would have provided effective tools for 
promoting indigenous rights. A resulting re-focus upon the right of self-determination 
as the cornerstone for indigenous peoples and Māori rights, supported by international 
indigenous jurisprudence, may have offered a degree of protection for Māori.  
 
The 1986 Act repealed s 71 of the 1852 Act, which provided for customary Māori 
governance and the establishment of native districts where the first law — tikanga 
Māori — would prevail. The repeal of s 71 halted any contemporary devolution of 
power to uphold customary Māori governance.  
 
The next feature within this period concerns the abolition of the Privy Council as our 
final appellate court. The Supreme Court Act 2003 established the New Zealand 
Supreme Court as our final appellate court.429 It was enacted by the Labour 
Government and ignited a debate in New Zealand society around our constitutional 
directions. The establishment of the Supreme Court indicated that New Zealand was 
                                                                                                                             
2009) on the aspirations of Māori for rangatiratanga with the establishment of, for instance, Māori 
Womens Welfare League and Māori Committees. 
426 See discussion under Entrenchment of the Treaty. 
427 See Joseph, above n 340. 
428 See discussion under Entrenchment of the Treaty. 
429 See Joseph, above n 340, at 24. 
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becoming more independent.430 The New Zealand court structure is now governed by 
the Judicature Act 1908 (High Court and Court of Appeal), the District Courts Act 
1947 and the Supreme Court Act 2003. 
 
Despite the above issues and recent developments, there remains the thorny obstacle 
of where the Treaty of Waitangi and tikanga Māori will sit within the unwritten 
Constitution.431 The recent recommendations by the Constitutional Advisory Panel 
highlighted this issue by noting there is no broad support for a supreme constitution. 
However, it also noted that there is support for entrenching elements, although this 
does not include the Treaty of Waitangi or tikanga Māori.432 On the matter regarding 
the role of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Constitutional Review Panel put forward the 
following recommendations:433 
 
- continues to affirm the importance of the Treaty as a foundational document; 
- ensures a Treaty education strategy is developed that includes the current role and 
status of the Treaty and the Treaty settlement process so people can inform 
themselves about the rights and obligations under the Treaty; 
- supports the continued development of the role and status of the Treaty under the 
current arrangements as has occurred over the past decades;  
-  sets up a process to develop a range of options for the future role of Treaty, 
including options within existing constitutional arrangements and arrangements in 
which the Treaty is the foundation; and 
- invites and supports the people of Aotearoa New Zealand to continue the 
conversation about the place of the Treaty in our constitution. 
 
 
B. Treaty of Waitangi  
 
In 1840 the Crown and Māori signed the Treaty of Waitangi (the Treaty). This action 
subsumed the existing social, political, legal and economic rights for Māori into a 
                                            
430 A major reason was the physical proximity of Privy Council to New Zealand. The Law Lords could 
not appreciate New Zealand’s context. 
431 For further discussion see <www.beehive.govt.nz>. 
432 Ministry of Justice Constitutional Advisory Panel New Zealand’s Constitution: A Report on a 
Conversation (He Kōtuinga Kōrero Mōte Kaupapa Ture o Aotearoa, Wellington, November 2013) at16  
433 Ministry of Justice, above n 361. 
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non-Māori paradigm. According to David Williams, the Treaty of Waitangi may be 
seen as:434  
… the starting point and the foundation stone for the legitimacy of an autochthonous 




There were several different texts of the Treaty in English and in Māori. Although it is 
the English text that is always referred to, for the purposes of the developing 
jurisprudence, it is the Māori that should be preferred.435 
 
Signed in 1840, Article 1 of the English text stated:436 
 
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand … cede to Her 
Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and 
powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation … respectively exercise or 
possess… 
 
In Article 2 the Crown, in exchange, confirmed and guaranteed:  
 
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes 
of New Zealand … the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and 
Estates, Forests, Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or 
individually possess … 
 
In Article 3, the Crown also extended: 
 
[…] Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her 
royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects.  
                                            
434 David Williams “Indigenous Customary Rights and the Constitution of Aotearoa New Zealand” 
(2006) 14 Waikato Law Review 106 at 132. 
435 This is consistent with the contractual doctrine ‘contra proferentum’ which ‘holds that the words of 
a document are construed more strongly against the party who drafted the document or in whose 
benefit it is intended to operate’ Spiller New Zealand Law Dictionary (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2005) 
at 63. 
436 Ian Hugh Kawharu “The Treaty of Waitangi (the text in English) by I Hugh Kawharu” in M 
Belgrave, M Kawharu and D Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of 
Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005) at 389–390. 
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Te Tiriti text stated:437 
 
Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu 
o Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga me to 
ratou wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaro 
ia he mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira - hei kai wakarite ki nga Tangata maori 
o NuTirani - kia wakaaetia e nga Rangatira maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki nga 
wahikatoa o te Wenua nei me nga Motu - na te mea hoki he tokomaha ke nga tangata 
o tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei. 
 
Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino e puta 
mai ki te tangata maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana. Na kua pai te Kuini kia 
tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te Roiara Nawi hei Kawana mo nga 
wahi katoa o Nu Tirani e tukua aianei, amua atu ki te Kuini, e mea atu ana ia ki nga 
Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me era Rangatira atua enei ture 
ka korerotia nei. 
 
Ko te tuatahi 
 
Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoke ki hai i uru ki taua 
wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu atu - te Kawanatanga 
katoa o o ratou wenua. 
 
Ko te tuarua 
 
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu - ki nga 
tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino rangatiratanga o o ratou wenua o ratou kainga me o 
ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa 
atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te wenua 
- ki te ritenga o te utu e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei 





                                            
437 Distinguished Professor Dame Anne Salmond’s Brief of Evidence for the Waitangi Tribunal Wai 
1040 dated 17 April 2010 at 4. 
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Ko te tuatoru 
 
Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaeetanga ki te Kawanatanga o te Kuini - Ka 
tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangata maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou 
nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o Ingarani. 
 
[signed] W. Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor 
 
Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani ka huihui 
nei ki Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga o 
enei kupu, ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou, koia ka tohungia ai o matou 
ingoa o matou tohu. 
 
Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono o nga ra o Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e waru 
raue wa te kau o to tatou Ariki. 
 
Although not widely acknowledged, a fourth article was added to the Māori text. This 
stated:  
 
E mea ana te Kawana ko nga whakapono katoa o Ingarani, o nga Weteriana, o Roma, 
me te ritenga Maori hoki e tiakina ngatahitia e ia, 
 
This has been translated as:438 
 
The Governor says that the several faiths (beliefs) of England, of the Wesleyans, of 
Rome and also of Māori custom shall alike be protected by him.  
 
Thus Article 4 of the Treaty confirms the support for religious freedom and the ability 
for Māori to retain their own customs and culture. Notwithstanding this support, it is 
the first three articles that are referred to by the Crown. 
 
There are several different translations of the Māori text into English. The 
reconstruction of the Māori text by Sir Ian H. Kāwharu is widely recognised and 
accepted. The reconstruction states:439 
                                            
438 Salmond, above 437. 
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In Article 1: 
 
The Chiefs of the Confederation … give absolutely to the Queen of England forever 
the complete government over their land. 
 
Kāwharu noted that Māori signatories had no understanding of ‘government’ in the 
sense of sovereignty when signing the Treaty. There was no equivalent translation of 
‘kāwanatanga’. 
 
In Article 2: 
 
The Queen of England agrees to protect the chiefs … in the unqualified exercise of 
their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures … 
 
 
In Article 3: 
 
[…] the Queen of England will protect all the ordinary people of New Zealand and 
will give them the same rights and duties of citizenship as the people of England. 
 
The exact meaning of the Treaty is often debated.440 However, it is commonly 
accepted that Article 2 confirms and guarantees to Māori the full, exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries and other treasures. 
The use of ‘taonga’, or treasures, implies a connection between the Treaty and Māori 
social and economic development. Thus, although Article 2 may seem to be restricted 
to forests and fisheries, the 1988 Royal Commission on Social Policy broadened the 
application of Article 2 to conclude that the Treaty also has implications for health 
and social policies.441 
 
                                                                                                                             
439 Ian Hugh Kawharu “A Reconstruction of Māori Text” in Michael Belgrave, Merata Kāwharu and 
David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University 
Press, Australia, 2005) at 389–390. 
440 See, for example, discussion in Maui Solomon “The Wai 262 Claim” in in Michael Belgrave, 
Merata Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005) at 216-217. 
441 Royal Commission on Social Policy, the April Report (1988) 11 Future Directions 27 at 80. 
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Article 3 of the Treaty states that the “Queen of England will protect all Māori of New 
Zealand and will give them the same rights as those of the people of England.” This 
not only includes protection and equality, but also, arguably, extends to include the 
provision of health.442 According to Te Kani Kingi:443 
 
It is little wonder, therefore, that Māori have come to view the Treaty as an ideal 
framework for Māori health development…[;] it is clear that above all else it [the 
Treaty] is concerned with equity and the promise that Māori can enjoy, at the very 
least, the same health and well-being as non-Māori. 
 
However, a more accurate translation is provided by Merimeri Penfold and 
distinguished Professor Anne Salmond:444 
 
Victoria the Queen of England in her caring concern [mahara atawai] for the rangatira 
and the hapū of New Zealand, and in her desire that their chieftainship 
[rangatiratanga] and their land should be preserved to them, and that lasting peace 
and also tranquil living [te Rongo... me te Atanoho hoki] should be theirs has thought 
it right that a Rangatira should be sent — as a mediator [kai wakarite ] to the māori 
people [tangata māori pl.] of New Zealand — that the māori rangatira might agree to 
the Governorship [Kāwanatanga ] of the Queen over all parts of the land and the 
islands, since many of her people have settled in this land, and others are yet to come. 
 
Now the Queen wishes that the Governorship should be established, so that evil may 
not come to the māori people and the pākehā who are living without law [ture]. 
 
Now the Queen has been pleased that I, William Hobson, a Captain in the Royal 
Navy, should be sent [tuku] as Governor for all those parts of New Zealand which are 
now or shall be released [tukua] to the Queen, and declares to the rangatira of the 
Confederation [whakaminenga] of the tribes [hapū] of New Zealand the laws [ture] 
that are spoken here: 
 
                                            
442 Te Kani Kingi The Treaty of Waitangi and Māori Health Te Mata o Te Tau Lecture Series, Massey 
University, New Zealand (2 March 2006). More recently see also Waitangi Tribunal (Wai 2358, 2012) 
The Interim Report on the National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources Claim ‘Treaty conferred a 
development right’ at 106. 
443 Te Kani Kingi, above n 371. 




The rangatira of the confederation and all of the rangatira who have not joined that 
confederation give completely [tuku rawa atu] to the Queen of England forever — all 




The Queen ratifies [whakarite] and agrees to the unfettered chiefly powers [tino 
rangatiratanga] of the rangatira, the tribes and all the people of New Zealand over 
their lands, their dwelling-places and all of their valuables [taonga]. Also, the 
rangatira of the Confederation and all the other rangatira release [tuku] to the Queen 
the trading [hokonga] of those areas of land whose owners are agreeable, according to 
the return [utu] agreed between them and the person appointed by the Queen as her 




In recognition of this agreement to the Governorship of the Queen — the Queen will 
care for [tiaki] all the maori people [nga tāngata māori pl. katoa] of New Zealand and 
give [tukua] to them all and exactly the same customary rights [tikanga rite tahi] as 
those she gives to her subjects, the people of England. 
 
[Signed] W. Hobson Consul and Lieutenant Governor 
 
Now we the Rangatira of the Confederation of the hapū of New Zealand assembled 
here at Waitangi, and also we the Rangatira of New Zealand see the likeness of these 
words. We accept and agree to all of this, and so we sign our names and marks. 
 
This is done at Waitangi on the sixth day of February in the year one thousand, eight 
hundred and forty of our Lord [Ariki]. 
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The discrepancies between the English and Māori texts and translations of the 
Treaty/te Tiriti are to be noted and have caused much debate and misunderstanding.445 
One of the functions of the Waitangi Tribunal is to have regard to the two texts and 
the Tribunal has exclusive authority to determine the meaning and effect of the 
Treaty, as embodied in both texts and to decide issues raised by the differences 
between them.446  
 
According to Professor Salmond, this is due to the fact that the Treaty of Waitangi 
and Te Tiriti are:447 
 
… two very different documents, with divergent textual histories and political 
implications; and for that reason, it is a mistake to bracket them together. I have 
observed that this error has led to a confused and confusing historiography of the 
Treaty, which should not be perpetuated. 
 
From a legal perspective, the most important discrepancy lies within the translation of 
‘kāwanatanga’ to mean governorship, and not sovereignty.  
 
According to Professor Salmond:448  
 
In summary, one must conclude that in 1840, kāwanatanga was not an accurate or 
even a plausible translation equivalent for sovereignty — supreme, irresistible, 
absolute, uncontrolled authority. Rev. Richard Davis’s back translation of Te Tiriti, 
which translated rangatiratanga (which was guaranteed to the chiefs) as entire 
supremacy indicates that the missionaries were aware that what was proposed in Te 
Tiriti was a balance of powers, with the rangatira in the ascendant within their own 
domains. 
 
The fact that so many subsequent commentators have claimed that at Waitangi and 
elsewhere, the rangatira ceded the sovereignty of New Zealand to Queen Victoria, 
                                            
445 For discussion, see Claudia Orange The Treaty of Waitangi (Allen & Unwin, Wellington, 1997) at 
32–59 and also He Tirohanga o Kawa ki te Tiriti o Waitangi (Te Puni Kokiri, Wellington, 2001) at 37 
<www.tpk.govt.nz>. See also Te Paparahi o te Raki Waitangi Tribunal Report, Wai 1040, 348 – 351 
446 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 5(2). Section 6 (1) also provides that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
is for actions inconsistent with the ‘principles of the Treaty’ as opposed to the ‘text’. 
447 Salmond above n 437, at 84. 
448 Salmond, above n 437 at 26. 
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tells us more about the political interests involved, the rhetorical dominance of the 
English draft of the Treaty and perhaps unexamined assumptions about those hands in 
which goodness, wisdom and power are most likely to be found (to quote Blackstone) 




I do not believe, however, that in signing Te Tiriti, the rangatira ceded sovereignty to 
the British Crown. 
 
If Māori did not, in fact, cede sovereignty as the recent Waitangi Report, Wai 1040, 
has found, then the Crown’s subsequent actions to acquire sovereignty require close 
scrutiny and review, otherwise these actions can be perceived as illegitimate. For that 
reason alone, the implementation of an indigenous legal system should be supported. 
 
(b) Entrenchment of the Treaty  
 
In 1985 a government White Paper proposed a Bill of Rights for New Zealand that 
would control the powers and actions of the legislature as well the executive.450 The 
White Paper’s authors dealt with the Treaty of Waitangi in the same way that s 35 of 
the Constitution Act 1982 (Canada) dealt with the rights of native Canadian peoples 
and proposed that the Treaty be included within a Bill of Rights. Once enacted, the 
Bill of Rights would be “supreme law”.451 Irrespective of which text should be 
entrenched, the added debate on the place of the Treaty in New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework contributes to this confusion. 
 
The majority of submitters to the Justice and Law Reform Committee on the White 
Paper did not favour this approach. The principal reason was the power the White 
                                            
449 Salmond, above n 437, at 87. 
450 Geoffrey Palmer “A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper” (1985) 1 AJHR A6; Andrew 
Butler and Petra Butler The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 
2005) at 27. 
451 Paul Rishworth “The New Zealand Bill of Rights” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott 
Optician and Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 2003); Paul Rishworth “Human Rights” [2003] NZLR 261 at 276; Ripeka Evans “Is the 
Treaty of Waitangi a Bill of Rights?” in A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (Legal Research Foundation 
Seminar, Auckland, 1985) at 195; Shane Jones “The Bill of Rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi” in A Bill 
of Rights for New Zealand (Legal Research Foundation Seminar, Auckland, 1985) at 207. 
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Paper would have given to the judiciary. Including the Treaty in the Bill of Rights 
also proved unpopular for some Māori. The lack of enthusiasm among some Māori 
was enough to thwart its enactment as supreme law, the Government having indicated 
that success of the White Paper proposal would require the support of Māori.452  
The long title and preamble of the 1985 Bill read:  
 
Whereas  
(1) New Zealand is a democratic society based on the rule of law and on principles of 
freedom, equality and the dignity and worth of the human person;  
(2) New Zealand in 1978 ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;  
(3) The Maori people, as tangata whenua o Aotearoa, and the Crown entered in 1840 into 
a solemn compact known as te Tiriti o Waitangi, and it is desirable to recognise and 
affirm the Treaty as part of the supreme law of New Zealand [emphasis added];  
(4) It is desirable to affirm the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people of 
New Zealand without discrimination and to ensure their recognition and observance as 
part of the supreme law of New Zealand by the Parliament and Government of New 
Zealand.  
 
Part 2 of the Bill was entitled “The Treaty of Waitangi” and consisted of a single 
article as follows:  
 
4. The Treaty of Waitangi  
 (1) The rights of the Māori people under the Treaty of Waitangi are hereby 
recognised and affirmed [emphasis added].  
 (2) The Treaty of Waitangi shall be regarded as always speaking and shall be 
applied to circumstances as they arise so that effect may be given to its spirit and 
true intent.  
 (3) The Treaty of Waitangi means the Treaty as set out in English and Māori in the 
Schedule to this Bill of Rights.  
 
The original Bill recognised both texts of the Treaty, but clause 26 provided that in 
the event of any inconsistency between an enactment and the Treaty, application 
                                            
452 Paul Rishworth “The New Zealand Bill of Rights” in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott 
Optician and Richard Mahoney (eds) The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press,  
Auckland, 2003) at 18.  
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could be made to the Waitangi Tribunal.453 This avenue would have avoided 
restrictive judicial interpretations of s 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, and 
the concept of ‘reasonable limits’ that are demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. However, Māori were unhappy with including the Treaty in a 
legal system, where it might be subjected to restrictive judicial interpretations, even as 
supreme law.454 Many Māori considered that the matter should be dealt with 
separately and not subordinated in any way to other constitutional measures.455  
 
Bearing in mind the unique place that the Treaty holds for Māori, Geoffrey Palmer, 
who was the Prime Minister at the time, considered that a Bill of Rights that ignored 
the Treaty would, at best, be an incomplete document.456 By declaring that certain 
rights were the supreme law of New Zealand and saying nothing about the Treaty, a 
Bill of Rights could be seen as relegating the Treaty and the rights of Māori to second 
class citizens.457 This would also be consistent with relegating human rights for Māori 
to an indigenous or minority right. Palmer described the effect of affirming and 
recognising the Treaty as part of the supreme law of New Zealand:458  
 
Governments, Courts and Parliament will no longer be able to claim that these rights 
are only moral rights and have no substance in law, or that they can be overridden, 
expressly or impliedly, by the ordinary process of legislation.  
 
Although judicial decisions have limited the application of the Treaty,459 there has 
been legislative recognition of the principles of the Treaty in public and private acts. 
Although it could be assumed that, if the 1985 proposal was reintroduced today, it 
would find more support from Māori. The recent report from the Constitutional 
Advisory Panel indicates this as unlikely, but the discussion should continue.460 
                                            
453 See also Second Reading of the NZ Bill of Rights Bill 14 August 1985. <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
454 Shane Jones “The Bill of Rights and Te Tiriti o Waitangi” in A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: a 
White Paper (Legal Research Foundation, University of Auckland, Auckland 1985) at 195 and 207; 
Claire Charters “Māori, Beware the Bill of Rights Act!” [2003] NZLJ 401; Claire Charters “BORA  
and Māori: The Fundamental Issues” [2003] NZLJ 459.    
455 Butler and Butler, above n 379, at 27.  
456 At 27. 
457 At 30. 
458 At 30. 
459 See for example New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [2008] 1 NZLR 318; [2007] 
NZAR 569 (CA). 
460 Ministry of Justice Constitutional Advisory Panel New Zealand’s Constitution A Report on a 
Conversation He Kōtuinga Kōrero mō Te Kaupapa Ture o Aotearoa November 2013 Wellington,16  
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The rights indicated in s 4 (1) of the 1985 draft suggest legislative recognition of the 
Treaty obligations with respect to human rights for Māori. However, if enacted, the 
principles of the Treaty would need to be applied compatibly with New Zealand’s 
international obligations. It is assumed that the human rights standards contained in 
the International Covenants, to which New Zealand is a party, together with the 
general principles of international law that form part of municipal law, without the 
express words of a statute, provide techniques for balancing interests.461 
 
The Treaty is the main vehicle through which Māori continue to express their desire 
to survive as distinct peoples. In this regard the Treaty stands on its own,462 as a 
source of rights and obligations between Māori and the Crown.463  
 
It is clear that the Māori text enables ongoing rangatiratanga of Māori tribes over their 
possessions and taonga (including intangibles such as language and culture) and that 
the Crown should protect that rangatiratanga. This also includes the right to self-
determination and the right to development. The Crown would receive the right to 
govern a delegated power, subject to continuing Māori authority.464 
 
(c) Rights and Duties Created by the Treaty 
 
The Treaty has significant moral, spiritual and legal force. It is seen as “the founding 
document of New Zealand” and has been referred to variously as “a constitutional 
document”.465 The late Lord Cooke of Thorndon even referred to the Treaty as 
“simply the most important document in New Zealand’s history”.466 It has also been 
referred to in case law as “essential to the foundation of New Zealand”, “part of the 
fabric of New Zealand society”467 and “of the greatest constitutional importance to 
                                            
461 Ian Brownlie Treaties and Indigenous Peoples (Oxford University Press, New York, 1992) at 93.  
462 But see further discussion in point “Legal Status of the Treaty” and Te Heu Heu Tu Kino v Aotea 
District Māori Land Board [1941] NZLR 590. 
463 Alison Quentin-Baxter “The International and Constitutional Law Contexts” in Alison Quentin-
Baxter (ed) Recognising the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington, New Zealand 1998) at 32. 
464 Salmond above n 437, at 25. 
465 Geoffrey WR Palmer Constitutional Conversations (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) at  
22  
466 Sir Robin Cooke “Introduction” (1990) 14 NZULR 1 at 1-8.  
467 Chilwell J in Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority & Bowater [1987] 2  
NZLR188; (1987) 12 NZTPA 129 (HC) especially at [206] and [210]. But see also the obiter  
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New Zealand”.468  
 
Baragwanath J states:469 
 
It is time to recognize that the Treaty did not contemplate a society divided on race 
lines between two groups of ordinary citizens — Māori and non-Māori — set against 
one another in opposing camps. 
 
Baragwanath J further states:470 
 
Because the Treaty itself picked up the need to apply British justice in New Zealand it 
follows that any construction of the RMA that will work injustice to non-Māori is 
likely to infringe the principles of the Treaty as injustice to Māori. 
 
The Treaty is designed to ensure unity within the state, while recognising Māori as 
tangata whenua. It has been proposed as a vehicle that may offer tino rangatiranga 
(self-governance) for Māori, from which Māori could negotiate the ongoing 
development of New Zealand, and prescribe a relationship in the form of human 
rights, social policy, economic policy and indigenous peoples’ rights.471 Or perhaps 
even an indigenous court underpinned by tikanga Māori. 
 
Although that option may exist, the realisation and manifestation of tino 
rangatiratanga is more problematic.472 
 
There are some issues of general principle to consider. Notwithstanding s 7 of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA),473 and the now repealed Foreshore 
                                                                                                                             
reservations of Casey and Hardie Boys JJ in Attorney-General v New Zealand Māori Council  
(No 2) [1991] 2 NZLR 147 (CA) at [149].  
468 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513 (PC) at 516. 
469 Ngāti Maru ki Hauraki Inc v Kruithof [2005] NZRMA 1 at [48]. 
470 At [52]. 
471 Michael Belgrave, Merata Kawharu and David Williams (eds) Waitangi Revisited: Perspectives on 
the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005) at 15-16.  
472 For example even though the Urewera District Native Reserve Act 1896 provided for the 
“ownership and local government of the native lands in the Te Urewera district” and allow tino 
rangatiratanga for the Tuhoe people this was eventually to result in the opening up of traditional lands 
to settlers. Compare Tuhoe Claims Settlement Act 2014; Te Urewera Act 2014, ss 17, 18 (management 
of Te Urewera). 
473 Section 7 provides: Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be inconsistent 
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and Seabed Act 2004,474 it is possible to apply to the High Court to seek a declaration 
that certain legislation is discriminatory based on the Crown’s Treaty obligations.  
 
In examining the relationship between the principles of the Treaty and the 
International Human Rights Covenants, it would not be impossible to determine 
whether analysing the principles of the Treaty against international human rights 
standards would result in the enhancement or subversion of the economic and social 
rights of Māori.475 Nevertheless, there is no domestic legislative direction to uphold to 
Māori the guarantees of tino rangatiratanga. Māori are reliant on the Treaty principles 
of partnership, including utmost good faith and reasonableness, active protection and 
the honour of the Crown.476  
 
(d) Status in Law 
 
Initially viewed as a simple nullity,477 the orthodox view on the legal status of the 
Treaty is that unless it has been adopted or implemented by statute, it is not part of 
domestic law and creates no rights enforceable in Court. In Te Heu Heu Tukino v 
Aotea District Māori Land Board, the Privy Council ruled that:478 
 
… it is well settled that any rights purported to be conferred by such a Treaty of 
cession cannot be enforced by the Courts, except so far as they have been 
incorporated in municipal law. 
 
 
                                                                                                                             
with Bill of Rights –  
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General shall, –  
(a) In the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or  
(b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, –  
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be  
inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights. 
474 Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 replaced the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004. 
475 Brownlie, above n 390, at 24. 
476 See Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga The Politics of Māori Self Determination (Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 1998). See also discussion in Kelly Russ “Modern Human 
Rights: The Aboriginal Challenge” (LLM unpublished thesis, The University of British Columbia, 
April 2006) at ch 2. 
477 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZJur (NS) 72 at 78 per Prendergast CJ. However, see 
also R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC(SC), per Chapman J at 390 for earlier recognition of native title at 
common law and consideration of the Treaty. 
478 Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Māori Land Board [1941] 2 All E.R. 93 at 98; [1941] NZLR 
590. 
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Viscount Simon LC then quoted the passage from Lord Dunedin's judgment in 
Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secretary of State for India, 479 and continued: 
So far as the appellant invokes the assistance of the Court, it is clear that he cannot 
rest his claim on the Treaty of Waitangi, and that he must refer the Court to some 
statutory recognition of the right claimed by him. 
 
This view was consistent with the constitutional principle that treaties are not part of 
the law in New Zealand, and if rights and duties are to be altered, legislation is 
required.480 This was also the view in Ashby v Minister of Immigration, where Cooke 
J commented:481 
 
… a treaty that Parliament had not incorporated into New Zealand law could not 
possibly override the broad discretion conferred by Parliament on the Minister. 
 
Sir Kenneth Keith noted that:482 
  
… the Court of Appeal has yet to consider fully the proposition stated by the High 
Court of Australia that the ratification of a treaty gives rise to a legitimate 
expectation, in the absence of any legislation or executive indication to the contrary, 
that the executive would act in accordance with the treaty. 
 
It is now generally accepted that the Treaty has constitutional importance and is part 
of New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements.483 There is, however, major 
                                            
479 Vajesingji Joravarsingji v Secretary of State for India (1924) LR 51 Ind App 357. 
480 See Morag McDowell and Duncan Webb The New Zealand Legal System (4th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2006) at 181. 
481 Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) at 224; See also comments by Michael 
Taggart “Rugby, the Anti-apartheid Movement and Administrative Law” in Rick Bigwood (ed) Public 
Interest Litigation (Lexis Nexis, New Zealand, 2006) at 81 where the conferral of a broad discretionary 
power does not of itself exclude or displace the interpretive principle. 
482 Sir Kenneth Keith “Roles of the Courts in New Zealand in Giving Effect to International Human 
Rights – With Some History” (1999) 29 VUWLR 27; See also Minister of Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v Teoh (1995) 128 ALR 353 (HCA) and New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General 
[1996] 3 NZLR 140 (CA) at 184. 
483 See comments by GWR Palmer Constitutional Conversations: Geoffrey Palmer Talks to Kim Hill 
on National Radio 1994-2001 (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) at 22, and comments by 
Lord Woolf in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1994] 1 NZLR 513; [1994] 1 AC 466 
(PC) at 516; 469. 
 117 
disagreement on its precise role and the nature and extent of the importance of the 
Treaty.484  
 
In 1986 the Royal Commission on Electoral Law recommended that:485  
 
Parliament and Government should enter into consultation and discussion with a wide 
range of representatives of the Māori people about the definition and protection of 
rights of the Māori people and the recognition of their constitutional position under 
the Treaty of Waitangi.  
 
In 2005 the Constitutional Arrangements Committee recommended that:486  
 
… there should be some specific process for facilitating discussion within Māori 
communities on constitutional issues.  
 
Notwithstanding this recognition, it is the “Principles of the Treaty”487 that are 
referred to in legislation,488 and policy documents,489 rather than the text of the Treaty 
itself.  
 
(e) Principles of the Treaty 
 
Legislation and policy require decision-makers to take into account, when 
appropriate, the principles of the Treaty.490  For instance, when assessing an 
application for resource consent, the decision-maker is required by the Resource 
Management Act 1991 to take into consideration the principles of the Treaty.491  
                                            
484 See notes on the presentation by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, “The Treaty of Waitangi – Where to from 
here? Looking Back to Move Forward” (Presented to Te Papa Treaty of Waitangi Debate Series, 2 
February 2006) at [25]. 
485 Royal Commission on the Electoral System: Towards a Better Democracy (1986) at [3.111]. 
486 See “Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional Arrangements” (2005). 
487 See decision of Cooke P in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 64. 
488 For example Conservation Act, s 4; State Owned Enterprises Act, s 9. 
489 For example see the policy for the Office for Disability Issues where the Treaty underpins the 
development of their Strategy and is consistent with the relevant principles of the Treaty at 
<www.odi.govt.nz>. 
490 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641, (CA). 
491 Resource Management Act 1991, s 8. For general discussion see Mason Durie Nga Tai Matatu – 
Tides of Māori Endurance (Oxford University Press, Australia, 2005). 
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The Ministry of Health strategy Moving Forward: the National Mental Health Plan 
for More and Better Services, identified the Treaty of Waitangi as its fourth principle 
to satisfy.492 Both of the Ministry of Health Strategies, Moving Forward and An 
Approach for Action, describe the principles of the Treaty as relevant to mental health 
programmes. Nonetheless, the Treaty reference is general, rather than specific.493 
Although this is positive for Māori, it is a strategic, as opposed to a legislative 
recognition. 
 
A breach of Treaty obligations by the Crown, such as failing to provide for the health 
and well-being of Māori, can be heard by the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal then 
recommends to the Crown the appropriate form of redress.494 This could include 
negotiations to address health inequalities and the inclusion of Māori within the 
decision-making process.495 It would follow that the consideration of the principles of 
the Treaty is vital when providing adequate care for Māori mental health. 
 
Although the courts have rejected the argument that s 5(2) of the Treaty of Waitangi 
Act 1975 requires the Waitangi Tribunal to apply the principles of the Treaty or 
consider them a mandatory relevant consideration, 496 Baragwanath J, in considering s 
6(6) of the Act, found that it does not actually remove the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
to consider a claim at a time when a Bill to settle a claim or a related one is before 
Parliament, confirming the right of legal access.497 
 
Partnership reflects the purpose of the Treaty, where Māori and the Crown have equal 
roles with “responsibilities analogous to fiduciaries”.498 The principle of partnership is 
arguably the most important principle. In New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-
General, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that:499 
 
                                            
492 Mason Durie Mauri Ora: The Dynamics of Māori Health (Oxford Universty Press, 2005) at 258-
259. 
493 At 259. 
494 See Waitangi Tribunal, Contemporary Aspects of the Napier Hospital and Health Services Report 
(Wai 692). The claim concerned the Crown’s treaty obligation to Māori in respect of health services. 
495 Waitangi Tribunal, Contemporary Aspects of the Napier Hospital and Health Services Report (Wai 
692) above n 494. 
496 Attorney General v Mair [2009] NZCA 625 per Chambers and O’Regan JJ. 
497 See also Natalie Baird “Administrative Law” [2010] NZLJ. 
498 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR at 664 per Cooke P (CA). 
499 At 641 per Cooke P (CA). 
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The Treaty signified a partnership between races … the issue becomes what steps 
should have been taken by the Crown, as a partner acting towards the Māori partner 
with the utmost good faith which is the characteristic obligation of partnership … 
 
 
The principle of partnership acknowledges both parties and requires that the Crown 
and Māori act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good faith. Justice 
Casey noted that the partnership principle required the Crown to recognise and 
actively protect Māori interests. In his Honour’s view, to assert this was “to do no 
more than assert the maintenance of ‘the honour of the Crown’ underlying all its 
treaty relationships”.500 Justice Richardson also agreed, stating that the concept of the 
honour of the Crown:501 
 
… [C]aptures the crucial point that the Treaty is a positive force in the life of the 
nation and so in the government of the country [emphasis added]. What it does not 
perhaps adequately reflect is the core concept of the reciprocal obligations of the 
Treaty partners. In the domestic constitutional field … there is every reason for 
attributing to both partners that obligation to deal with each other and with their 
treaty obligations in good faith [emphasis added]. That must follow both from the 
nature of the compact and its continuing application in the life of New Zealand and 
from its provisions. 
 
Referring to Richardson J’s comments, Gendall J stated:502   
 
The Lands case recognises that the Treaty created a continuing relationship of a 
fiduciary nature, akin to a partnership, and that there is a positive duty to each party 
to act in good faith, fairly, reasonably and honourably towards the other. 
 
Māori are reliant on the Treaty principles of partnership, such as utmost good faith 
and reasonableness, active protection and the honour of the Crown.503 The strict 
application of partnership, half the representation in Parliament, would be difficult to 
                                            
500 At 703 per Casey J (CA). 
501 At 682 per Richardson J (CA). 
502 New Zealand Māori  Council v Attorney-General HC Wellington CIV-2007-485-95, 4 May 2007 at 
[62]. 
503 See Mason Durie Te Mana, Te Kāwanatanga The Politics of Māori Self Determination (Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 1998) at 183. See also discussion in K Russ “Modern Human 
Rights: The Aboriginal Challenge” (LLM Thesis, The University of British Columbia, 2006) at ch 2. 
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justify. The intention of this principle is to promote greater protection and 
participation by Māori.  
 
Sir Robin Cooke (as he was at the time) also noted that the Treaty must be viewed as 
a living document capable of adapting to new circumstances. As a living document, it 
is proposed that the new circumstance of Māori as a minority should neither diminish 
their status as tangata whenua and Treaty partner, nor the rights of partnership. This 
would necessarily include Māori’s rights to participation and representation within the 
rule-making and decision-making bodies.  
 
Although partnership is given a range of legislative expressions, the reality is that 
political power is not shared equally as partners.504 The Treaty partnership is also 
subject to the constitutional norm of parliamentary sovereignty,505 which gives little 
status to rangatiratanga (Māori self-determination). The former New Zealand Deputy 
Solicitor-General, Matthew Palmer, has summarised the position at the constitutional 
level: 506 
 
Because of the political nature of the New Zealand constitution, I conclude that Māori 
political representation is the most significant manifestation of the Treaty of Waitangi 
in New Zealand’s constitution in reality. This accords with representative democracy 
and parliamentary sovereignty being fundamental norms of New Zealand’s 
constitution. Māori political representation relies on representative democracy to 
access influence over the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty. Māori have managed 
to convert a pragmatic Pākehā initiative, the Māori seats, into a symbolic 
representation of their own identity and political relationship with the State. MMP has 
broadened that representation and given it real political power.  This ensures that 
Māori have a voice in the constitutional dialogue in New Zealand — in the branch of 
government that speaks the loudest, Parliament. 
 
 
                                            
504 See Matthew S R Palmer, The Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand’s Law and Constitution 
(Wellington, Victoria University Press, 2008) at 85-151 for an overview of this material. 
505 See Constitution Act 1986, s 15(1) which states ‘the Parliament of New Zealand continues to have 
full power to make laws.’ 
506 Palmer, above n 504, at 291. 
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Palmer does, however, sound a note of caution: 507 
 
However loudly Māori voices are heard within Parliament, that institution is 
ultimately ruled by the majority and Māori do not now constitute a majority in New 
Zealand. A group of people that consistently forms the majority [i.e Pākehā] has few 
incentives not to exploit, or ignore a group of people that consistently forms a 
minority. 
 
As a minority in Parliament, Māori concerns are at the whim of Parliament and 
dependent on the political mood, and Māori may suffer in consequence. High Court 
Justice, David Baragwanath, echoed this point, commenting that:508  
 
The Treaty should like any other treaty be a mandatory consideration when it is 
relevant to decision-making, including adjudication … it is an expression of the rule 
of law: a statement that Western norms do not exhaust the values of society: that even 
in the absence of entrenched rights we cannot tolerate any tyranny of the majority. 
 
However, Williams observes that “it appears that the Treaty is a mandatory relevant 
consideration, unless the context otherwise requires but it will not sustain a separate 
cause of action”.509 
 
Māori are reliant on the principles of the Treaty, but as Professor James Anaya, 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, recently noted:510 
 
From what I have observed, the Treaty’s principles appear to be vulnerable to 
political discretion, resulting in their perpetual insecurity and instability.  
 
                                            
507 Palmer, above n 504, at 292. See also comments by Philip A Joseph The Māori Seats in Parliament: 
A Study of Māori Economic and Social Progress (Working Paper 2, New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 2008) where he advances the proposition that separate seats are unnecessary to secure 
effective Māori representation. <www.nzinitiative.org.nz>. 
508 Hon Justice David Baragwanath “The Evolution of Treaty Jurisprudence” (2007) 15 Waikato Law 
Review 1 at 10. 
509 Joseph Williams “Māori in New Zealand Law at the End of the Cooke Era – Where Have We Got 
to?” in Rishworth, P. (ed.) The Struggle for Simplicity in Law: Essays for Lord Cooke of Thorndon 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) at 168. 
510 Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, Professor James Anaya, upon conclusion of his visit to 
New Zealand, 22 July 2010 at 9. 
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The principle of partnership and the guarantee of rangatiratanga from the Treaty have 
established limited mechanisms that facilitate a distinct Māori voice in both central 
and local government decision-making to achieve the implementation of tikanga. 
However, there is no special constitutional protection for the Treaty. There is, on 
occasion, a lack of support and political will to implement measures to ensure 
effective participation.511 And a simple Act of Parliament can revoke the protection 
for Māori measures in government.512 Nevertheless, this does not detract from the 
fundamental right of Māori to engage in the implementation of tikanga Māori — their 
legal system. Yet there are hurdles and challenges in the road ahead. 
  
(f) Treaty - Summary 
 
The Treaty has a significant moral, spiritual and legal force, encapsulating many 
rights for Māori that complement indigenous peoples’ rights. 513  It is viewed as “the 
founding document of New Zealand”,514 “a constitutional document”,515 “simply the 
most important document in New Zealand’s history”,516 “essential to the foundation 
of New Zealand”, “part of the fabric of New Zealand society”517 and “of the greatest 
constitutional importance to New Zealand”.518 The Treaty is now a vehicle for Māori 
to negotiate the ongoing development of New Zealand, prescribing a relationship in 
the form of human rights, social policy, economic policy and indigenous peoples’ 
rights.519 It also provides a platform for the right to implement tikanga Māori within 
an indigenous court. 
 
                                            
511 See Hon Peter Salmon, Dame Margaret Bazley and David Shand Royal Commission Report on 
Acukland Governance (March 2009) that recommended three Māori seats on the new Auckland 
Council. Nonetheless lack of political will to support this recommendation resulted in no Māori seats 
allocated. In its stead a Maori Advisory Board was established. 
512 For instance the ongoing dialogue to remove the dedicated Māori seats in Parliament as noted in 
speech from National Party Leader Don Brash, Orewa Rotary Club, Auckland 7.30pm January 27, 
2004. Also see the Foreshore Seabed Act 2004 which although now repealed vested ownership of the 
foreshore into the Crown (section 13). 
513 See discussion in “Status in Law” for further discussion. 
514 Morag, McDowell and Webb, above n 410, at 194. 
515 Geoffrey W R Palmer Constitutional Conversations (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2002) at 
22. 
516 Sir Robin Cooke “Introduction” (1990) 14 NZULR 1 at 1–8. 
517 See Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188, especially at 206, 
and 210. But see also the obiter reservations of Casey and Hardie Boys JJ in Attorney General v New 
Zealand Māori Council (No 2) [1991] 2 NZLR 147 at 149.  
518 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General [1994] 1 NZLR 513, 516 (PC). 
519 Belgrave, Kawharu and Williams, above n 471, at 15-16.  
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The Māori text of the Treaty provided for the continuing rangatiratanga of Māori 
tribes over their possessions and taonga and that the Crown would protect that 
rangatiratanga. The Crown received the right to govern — a delegated power — 
subject to continuing Māori authority.520  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal found that Māori did not cede sovereignty.521 Subsequently the 
ensuing actions by the Crown to secure sovereignty require close examination, 
otherwise all actions by the Crown may be considered illegitimate. 
 
However, it is the English text that is preferred and the principles of the Treaty that 
are included in domestic legislation, not the text itself, further diluting the rights 
guaranteed to Māori. The Treaty stands on its own as a source of rights and 
obligations between Māori and the Crown,522 including the principle of partnership 
and participation. The Crown’s duty to Māori is analogous to a fiduciary duty that 
informs the key characteristics arising from the relationship between Māori and the 
Crown, including that of reasonableness and consultation.523  
 
Claims before the Waitangi Tribunal,524 with respect to resources and rights 
guaranteed by the Treaty, have had mixed results.525 Despite the provision enabling 
the Waitangi Tribunal to pass binding recommendations for claimants, recent case law 
highlights the reluctance of the Waitangi Tribunal to do so. 526  
 
Irrespective of the positive social, economic and cultural obligations provided for in 
the Treaty, these obligations and rights for Māori are not always realised through a 
Treaty claim.  Māori social, economic and cultural rights are often marginalised to 
                                            
520 Salmond above n 437, at 25. 
521 Wai 1040 above n 24. 
522 See Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Māori  Land Board [1941] NZLR 590 for further 
discussion 
523 NZMC v Attorney General [2008] NZLR 318 (CA) at [81] per O’Reagan J. See also Greenpeace v 
Minister of Energy CIV-2011-485-1897 [22 June 2012] HC Wellington where Gendall J describes 
active protection as akin to a fiduciary duty. 
524 Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 pursuant to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 to hear 
breaches of the Treaty. See Fisheries Claim and see also Taranaki Petroleum claim. 
525 The “Sealord” or Fisheries claim was perceived by most Maori as a successful outcome for iwi 
Māori. For discussion of claim see M Robinson “The Sealord Fishing Settlement an International 
Perspective” (1992) AULR at 559–566. However, the Taranaki Treaty claim to petroleum was 
unsuccessful. See Waitangi Tribunal, The Petroleum Report (Legislation Direct, Wellington 2003) at 
44–64. 
526 Haronga v Waitangi Tribunal and Others (SC54/2010) [2011] NZSC 53. 
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that of a minority group.527 Māori are not a minority group, but first and foremost 
tangata whenua — the indigenous peoples of Aotearoa.528 For this reason Māori 
should be accorded these rights that may support an indigenous court structure. 
 
Although indigenous rights for Māori are marginalised within our domestic 
legislation, comparative jurisdictions in the seven regions, recognised by the United 
Nations, have acknowledged indigenous rights within their respective constitutions.529  
 
C. UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
While there is no separate treaty to provide for indigenous rights, there is the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007 (Declaration).530 As a 
Declaration the orthodox view is that it will not be legally binding upon the States.531 
However, the Declaration provides a benchmark against which indigenous peoples 
can measure state action as well as a means of appeal in the international arena.532 It 




                                            
527 Don Brash, National Party Leader (Orewa Rotary Club, Auckland, 7.30pm January 27, 2004) where 
he noted that the Treaty should not create any greater right for Māori than any other New Zealander – 
in doing so relegating Māori to a minority group. 
528 See Mikaere, above n 339, at 334 - 337. 
529 See report written for the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues by Professor 
Megan Davis, Simon William M’Viboudoulou, Valmaine Toki, Paul Kanyinke Sena, Edward John, 
Álvaro Esteban Pop and Raja Devasish Roy “Study on National Constitutions and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2013) E/C.19/2013/18. I would also like to 
acknowledge the assistance of Professor Brad Morse in writing this section and the provision of the 
research material that has been reproduced in particular the Technical Report “Indigenous provisions in 
constitutions around the world”. 
530 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/295 of 13 September 2007: the full text is 
available at <www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html>. 
531 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008) at 4. 
532 See generally Megan Davis “United Nations Reform and Indigenous Peoples” (2005) 6 (14) 
Indigenous Law Bulletin at 12–16.  
533 S James Anaya International Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples (Aspen Publishers, New York, 
2009) at 80 (emphasis added). See also Kiri Toki “What a Difference a Drip Makes: The Implications 
of Officially Endorsing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (2010) 16 
Auckland UL Rev at 243–273; See also Paul McHugh The Māori Magna Carta (Oxford University 
Press, 1991) for a general discussion on the development of indigenous rights through international 




The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was the initiative of the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP). Established in 1982 the mandate 
of the WGIP was to develop international standards concerning indigenous peoples’ 
rights. The Declaration was a manifestation of this mandate and a clear articulation of 
international standards on the rights of indigenous peoples. It was not until 25 years 
later, in September 2007, that the final text was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, with a majority of 143 states in favour. Eleven states abstained,535 
while four states opposed the Declaration altogether: Australia, Canada, the United 
States of America (the United States) and New Zealand.  
 
This position has now changed with Australia,536 New Zealand,537 Canada538 and the 
United States 539 all signalling their support for the Declaration. While perceived as a 
major moral victory, a closer analysis of the wording for support of the Declaration 
provides concern about intentions to meaningfully recognise the indigenous rights 
articulated in the Declaration.  
 
To ascertain whether these rights can support the implementation of culture and 
tikanga Māori, after providing a background to the genesis of the Declaration and 
highlighting the key provisions, including that of self-determination and participation, 
this section will analyse the wording of the support that has been offered by Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada and the United States. The legal effect of the Declaration will 
be examined and some thoughts will be provided as to a creative way to realise the 
indigenous rights articulated in the Declaration, including the provision that will 
support the application of the philosophy of Te Ao Māori.  
                                            
534 Parts of this section have now been published. See Valmaine Toki “Indigenous Rights – Hollow 
Rights?" [2011] 19 Waikato Law Review 29 at 29 – 44. 
535 Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russian Federation, 
Samoa and Ukraine. 
536 Jenny Macklin “Statement on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples” (2009) at <www.jennymacklin.fahcsia.gov.au>. 
537 “Announcement of New Zealand’s Support for the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples” at <www.converge.org.nz>. 
538 “Canada's Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples” (2010) at <www.ainc-inac.gc.ca>. 
539 Susan E Rice “Announcement of U.S. Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (2010) at <usun.state.gov>. 
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(b) Indigenous Peoples – Indigenous Rights 
 
The Declaration provides no definition of indigenous peoples. Sha Zukang offers the 
following definition:540 
 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre- invasion and pre- colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories and their ethnic identity as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal systems. 
 
A Background Paper noted that:541 
 
In the thirty-year history of indigenous issues at the United Nations, considerable 
thinking and debate have been devoted to the question of definition of “indigenous 
peoples”, but no such definition has ever been adopted by any UN-system body.  
 
One of the most cited descriptions of the concept of the term indigenous was given by 
Jose R. Martinez Cobo, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, in his Study on the Problem of 
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations.  
 
Significant discussions on the subject were held during the drafting of the 
Declaration. After consideration of the issues involved, the Special Rapporteur 
offered a working definition of “indigenous communities, peoples and nations”. In 
doing so, he expressed a number of basic ideas to provide the intellectual framework 
for this effort, which included the rights of indigenous peoples themselves to define 
                                            
540 Sha Zukang “State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples” ST/ESA/328 (Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, Division for Social Policy and Development, United Nations, New York, 2009) at v. 
541 See PFII/2004/WS.1/3 - (New York, 19-21 January 2004). 
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what and who is indigenous. The working definition of “indigenous communities, 
peoples and nations” read:542  
 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social 
institutions and legal system. 
 
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period 
reaching into the present of one or more of the following factors: 
a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them; 
b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; 
c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living 
under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means 
of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.); 
d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the 
habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, 
preferred, habitual, general or normal language); 
e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world; 
f) Other relevant factors. 
  
On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these indigenous 
populations through self-identification as indigenous (group consciousness) and is 
recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by 
the group). This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to 
decide who belongs to them, without external interference. 
 
During the period leading up to the formulation of the Declaration, many indigenous 
organisations rejected the idea of a formal definition of indigenous peoples that would 
                                            
542 See Special Rapporteur, Mr. José Martínez Cobo  Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations. Final report submitted by the Introduction  30 July 1981E/CN.4/Sub.2/476 
10 August 1982E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/2, 5 August 1983E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21. 
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be adopted by States. Similarly, government delegations expressed the view that it 
was neither desirable nor necessary to elaborate a universal definition of indigenous 
peoples.  
 
Finally, at its fifteenth session in 1997, the Working Group concluded that a definition 
of indigenous peoples at the global level was not possible at that time, and certainly 
not necessary for the adoption of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. Article 8 of the Draft Declaration, stated that: 
 
Indigenous peoples have a collective and individual right to maintain and develop 
their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves 
as indigenous and to be recognized as such. 
 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention No. 169 — a legally binding 
instrument that articulates the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples — provides a 
statement of coverage rather than a definition. Article 1 states that the Convention 
applies to:543 
 
a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic 
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community and whose 
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special 
laws or regulations; 
 
b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of 
their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical 
region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the 
establishment of present state boundaries and who irrespective of their legal status, 
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
 
Article 1 also indicates that self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded 
as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of the 
Convention apply. The terms ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘tribal peoples’ are used by the 
ILO as there are tribal peoples who are not ‘indigenous’ in the literal sense, but who 
                                            
543 International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribunal Peoples Convention No. 169 (opened 
for signature 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 September 1991), art 1. 
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nevertheless live in a similar situation. An example would be Afro-descended 
Saramaka Peoples (Suriname); or tribal peoples in Africa such as the San (Botswana) 
or Maasai (Kenya and Tanzania) who may not have occupied the region they 
currently inhabit longer than other population groups. Cultural difference is a criteria 
required by the ILO Convention to determine an indigenous or tribal people as 
opposed to a group of people who have occupied an area since time immemorial. 
Nevertheless, many of these peoples refer to themselves as “indigenous” in order to 
fall under discussions taking place at the United Nations.544 
 
For practical purposes, the terms ‘indigenous’ and ‘tribal’ are used as synonyms in the 
UN system when the peoples concerned identify themselves as indigenous. The lack 
of formal definition of ‘peoples’ or ‘minorities’ has not been crucial to the 
organisation’s successes or failures in those domains, nor to the promotion, protection 
or monitoring of the rights recognised for these groups. With regard to the concept of 
‘indigenous peoples’, the prevailing view today is that no formal universal definition 
is necessary. For practical purposes the common understanding of the term is the one 
provided in the Martinez Cobo study mentioned above. 
 
The rights of indigenous peoples that have been recognised are essentially those 
associated with and intrinsic to their custom and culture, such as control over their 
lands and resources.545 For the Sami peoples (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia), 
it was the watershed Alta case that provided the catalyst for recognition of their 
indigenous rights to natural resources.546 In Australia the Aboriginal peoples have 
sought recognition of title to their traditional lands in a series of cases illustrated by 
Mabo,547 and in Canada, recognition was sought through the Calder case.548 In New 
                                            
544 Andrew Erueti ‘The Demarcation Of Indigenous Peoples' Traditional Lands: Comparing Domestic 
Principles Of Demarcation With Emerging Principles Of International Law ‘Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law Volume 23, Number 3, Fall 2006 p.543 
545 The realisation of these rights is recognised as a form of self-determination. 
546 Henry Minde “The Challenge of Indigenism: The Struggle for Sami Land Rights and Self-
Government in Norway 1960–1990” in Svein Jentoft, Henry Minde and Ragnar Nilsen (eds) 
Indigenous Peoples, Resource Management and Global Rights (Eburon, Netherlands, 2003) at 75.  
547 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR; Wiks Peoples v Queensland (1996) 121 ALR 129. 
548 Calder v Attorney General of British Columbia [1973] SCR 313. 
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Zealand, the Attorney General v Ngati Apa case549 also centred on determining land 
and resource rights as well as the rights of due process.550  
 
(c) UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Rights 
 
Perceived as a major triumph, the Declaration551 is the only international instrument 
that views indigenous rights through an indigenous lens.552 As a Declaration the 
orthodox view is that it will not be legally binding upon the States.553 However, it 
provides a benchmark as an international standard, against which indigenous peoples 
can measure State action, and a means of appeal in the international arena.554 Parts of 
the Declaration may also represent binding international law. According to Professor 
James Anaya:555  
 
… the Declaration may be understood to embody or reflect, to some extent, 
customary international law [emphasis added]. A norm of customary international 
law emerges – or crystallizes – when a preponderance of states … converge on a 
common understanding of the norm’s content and expect future behaviour to conform 
to the norm … [emphasis added] 
 
The Declaration opens with general statements. Articles 4 and 5 then provide 
fundamental additions from the perspective of indigenous people’s rights: 
 
Article 4 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
                                            
549 Attorney General v Ngati Apa [2003] NZCA 117. 
550 These instances of progress have sometimes been reversed; for example, the ensuing Foreshore and 
Seabed Act 2004 vested ownership of the foreshore in the Crown, limiting any customary claim. 
Although this Act has now been repealed, with the Takutai Moana Act, customary claims are still 
limited. 
551  “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Adopted by the General 
Assembly 13 September 2007” (2007) <www.un.org>. 
552 It is acknowledged that ILO Conventions 107 and 169 also recognise indigenous rights. However, 
unlike ILO Conventions 107 and 169, the Declaration has been adopted and/or endorsed by the 
majority of States. 
553 Brownlie, above n 390, at 4. 
554 See generally Davis, above n 460, at 12.  
555 Anaya, above n 461, at 80; Toki, above n 464, at 243; Claire Charters “Developments in Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights under International Law and Their Implications” (December 2005) 21 NZULR at 519. 
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Article 5 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, 
legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to 
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life 
of the State.  
 
Other articles build upon these basic provisions, including the rights against 
assimilation or destruction of indigenous culture and effective redress for past 
breaches of this right (Art 8), the right to practice and revitalise the cultural traditions 
and customs of indigenous peoples is also accompanied by redress for past removal of 
cultural property (Art 11),556 and the right to establish their own media (Art 16). It is 
clear that cultural rights are central to the Declaration. In relation to other economic, 
social and cultural rights, Art 21 provides that: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of 
their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, 
employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social 
security. 
 
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to 
ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions. Particular 
attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, 
youth, children and persons with disabilities. 
 
This is supplemented by other specific rights, including rights to presently occupied 
lands as well as rights to lands that were traditionally, but no longer occupied by the 
indigenous peoples concerned (see Arts 26–28). 
 
The Declaration clarifies and places indigenous peoples within a human rights 
framework.557 In doing so it recognises Māori, the indigenous peoples of New 
Zealand, as a collective, not just as individuals.  
                                            
556 See also art 13, relating to the protection of the histories, languages, philosophies, and art 14, 
relating to educational systems; art 31 provides for the protection of traditional knowledge, including 
sciences and technologies. 
557 Rainforest Foundation US “Promoting Indigenous Rights Worldwide: S. James Anaya” (7 July 
2009) Blogging the Rainforest <www.rainforestfoundationus.wordpress.com>. 
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The Declaration contains more than 20 provisions affirming indigenous peoples’ 
collective right to participate in decision making. It emphasises indigenous peoples’ 
right to participate as a core principle of international human rights law. In particular, 
Article 18 provides:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making 
in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as 
well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-
making institutions. 
 
Further provisions supporting indigenous peoples’ right to participation include 
Articles 19 and 20 of the Declaration. Article 19 states: 
 
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in 
order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them. 
 
The more significant right is contained in Article 20. This provides: 
 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their 
political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in 
the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, 
and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic 
activities. 
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and 
development are entitled to just and fair redress.  
 
The lynchpin of the Declaration, however, is contained in Article 3, which provides:  
 
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
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The principle of participation in decision-making has a clear relationship with 
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination, which includes, the right to autonomy 
or self-government (Arts  4 and 5), and the State’s obligation to consult indigenous 
peoples in matters that may affect them based on the principle of free, prior, and 
informed consent (Art 19). These legal concepts are integral to the right of indigenous 
peoples to participate in decision-making.  
 
It is acknowledged that the Declaration provides no explicit text to establish a judicial 
system for criminal or civil matters beyond or outside the existing respective judicial 
or legal system. Nonetheless Article 5 (right for indigenous peoples to maintain their 
own distinct legal institutions, such as tikanga Māori), when read together with 
Article 20 (right to develop this legal institution) and Article 3 (right to freely pursue 
their culture), provides support for the implementation of an indigenous court 
underpinned by tikanga Māori within our current legal system.558 
 
(d) Legal effect of the Declaration 
 
The orthodox view is that the Declaration is soft law559 and will not be legally binding 
upon the State unless it is incorporated into domestic legislation.560 The doctrine of 
state sovereignty provides a restriction on international instruments, such as the 
Declaration, to regulate matters within the realm of the state.561 
                                            
558 It is acknowledged that the right of indigenous peoples to use their own systems of law is also 
recognized by the International Labour Organization Convention No. 169. Articles 8 and 9 of ILO 
C169 outline the right of indigenous peoples to preserve and apply their legal system. However, this 
right is not absolute, as its exercise must not be incompatible with fundamental national and 
international human rights. Art. 8(1) “In applying national laws and regulations to the peoples 
concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs or customary laws.” Art. 8(2) “These peoples shall 
have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with 
fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognised human 
rights”. 
559 The term "soft law" refers to quasi-legal instruments that do not have any legally binding force. The 
term is traditionally associated with international law including most resolutions and declarations of the 
United Nations General Assembly. 
560 Brownlie, above n 390, at 4. It is acknowledged that in June 2006 the International Law Association 
Executive Council approved the establishment of a Committee on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. At 
the first meeting of the Committee (Pretoria, 2007), it was decided that the Committee would focus on 
the actual legal meaning of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2007. This work is currently in progress focusing 
on relevant cases that may reviewed and evaluated against the UNDRIP. 
561 S James Anaya “The Rights of Indigenous People to Self-determination in the Post-Declaration Era” 
in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations 




In Bolivia the recently promulgated Constitution has fully incorporated the collective 
rights of indigenous peoples, including those rights contained in the Declaration.562 
Bolivia’s Electoral Transition Law created seven special indigenous electoral districts. 
For the first time, the indigenous peoples of Bolivia have direct representation in the 
Legislative Assembly. Nonetheless, indigenous leaders believe that the current 
number of electoral districts does not give indigenous peoples enough voice in the 
Assembly. The intention is that the new electoral law will propose a fairer 
representation system.563 Ecuador has also incorporated the Declaration into its 
Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008.  
 
If New Zealand followed this approach and incorporated the Declaration into 
domestic legislation, the onus would be on the New Zealand government to provide 
Māori the ability to fully participate in decision-making matters that may affect them 
socially, politically and economically. This could be achieved through the meaningful 
application of Te Ao Māori. As in Bolivia, discrete legislation could be enacted to 






                                                                                                                             
Copenhagen, 2009) at 194. See also International Law Association “The Hague Conference (2010): 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples” Interim report (2010) <www.ila-hq.org>. 
562 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  “Report of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Activities of Her office in the Plurinational State of Bolivia” 
(2010) United Nations Human Rights Council A/HRC/13/26/Add.2 18 at [4] <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org>. 
563 At [16].  
564 Also see discussion by Naomi Kupuri “The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the African context” in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work: 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (International Working Group for 
Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, 2009) at 255, on the Ilchamus (indigenous) community who 
successfully claimed that their rights to political representation had been violated. The presiding judge 
took into consideration the then draft Declaration to determine this case in favour of the Ilchamus 
community. 
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(f) Legal Reception565 
 
How the Declaration is received depends, in part, on the respective jurisdictions of the 
area.566 For instance, notwithstanding the current status of the Declaration as soft law, 
Chief Justice Conteh in the Supreme Court of Belize found that:567 
 
Given the Government’s support of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples [emphasis added] … which embodies the general principles of international 
law relating to Indigenous peoples … the Government will not disregard the 
Declaration [emphasis added]. 
 
Belize is a common law jurisdiction. Should reliance be placed on the Declaration, 
this decision could provide a persuasive authority for extending the ability for Māori 
to fully participate in decision-making affairs, as one example. 
 
Furthermore, Bolivia and Ecuador have incorporated the Declaration into domestic 
law,568 with Ecuador also incorporating the Declaration into its legislative 
framework.569 In 2010 Professor James Anaya, the Special Rapporteur, visited New 
Zealand and commented that: 570 
 
                                            
565 It is acknowledged that a growing body of case law from all jurisdictions is currently being collated 
in the form of a database. See UNDRIP Online Public Database 
<http://www.ilc.unsw.edu.au/research/undrip-online-public-database> 
566 See Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Domestic Courts above n where it is noted that ‘in Latin 
America, although variable between regions, there is a body of developing jurisprudence on the 
recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and those incorporated in UNDRIP. For instance, under the 
guidance of its Constitutional Court, in Colombia reference to the UNDRIP and to the Inter American 
jurisprudence is common. In the recent Tres Islas case in Peru, the Constitutional Court interprets the 
provisions of the Constitution in the light of the Inter American jurisprudence, but also on Articles 3 
and 4 of UNDRIP. Undoubtedly, the progressive interpretation of the Inter American human rights 
system has been instrumental for these developments, as well as the constitutional and legal recognition 
in the countries of the region. Nevertheless, reference to the UNDRIP, in domestic courts reasoning is 
non-existent in many of the countries in the region’. See also Megan Davis “To Bind or not to Bind: 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Five Years On” (2012) 19 
Austl.Int’l L.J 17 at 31. 
567 Cal & Ors v the Attorney General of Belize & Anor (2007) Claim Nos 171 and 172 of 2007, Conteh 
CJ (Belize Sup Ct) at [132]. 
568 New Political Constitution of the State Act 2009 (Bol), s 1(1), art 2. 
569 Anaya, above n 461. 
570 Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Professor James Anaya, upon conclusion of his visit to 
New Zealand 22 July 2010 at [4]. <www.ohchr.org>. 
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It should be noted that certain initiatives underway in New Zealand represent 
important steps towards advancing the purpose and objectives of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This Declaration, far from affirming 
rights that place indigenous peoples in a privileged position, aims at repairing the 
ongoing consequences of the historical denial of the right to self-determination and 
other basic human rights. I am, of course, very pleased to note that New Zealand 
recently declared its endorsement of the Declaration, thus joining the overwhelming 
majority of States that have expressed their support for this historic instrument.  
 
In New Zealand the utilisation of the Declaration in a judicial forum is not novel.571 
The Waitangi Tribunal has positively referred to the then Draft Declaration in respect 
to claims relating to tino rangatiratanga.572 The High Court decision of Ngai Tahu 
Māori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation also referred to the Draft 
Declaration.573 More recently the Supreme Court, in referring to the Declaration, 
noted that:574 
 
… whether Ms. Clarke’s decision as executor as to the burial of Mr. Takamore was 
one to which she was entitled to come, in application of common law principles as 
developed in conformity with human rights norms, the Treaty of Waitangi, and the 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which recognises the interest of 
many indigenous peoples in the repatriation of human remains and which emphasises 
the collective nature of the rights of indigenous peoples).  
 
If Māori engaged in a judicial challenge to realise their right to participate fully in the 
decision-making process, reliance could be placed on Conteh CJ’s comments in Cal 
& Ors v the Attorney General of Belize & Anor.575 Māori could argue that, as New 
Zealand has endorsed the Declaration, the government should not disregard the 
general principles contained therein. 
 
 
                                            
571 See also reference to the Declaration in Takamore v Clarke SC 131/2011 [2012] NZSC 116, [2012] 
2 NZLR 733 at [12] and [35]. 
572 “The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi” (Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1996) Wai 143 
<www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz> 
573 Ngai Tahu Māori Trust Board v Director General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553. 
574 Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116 at [35] per Wild J and Glazebrook J. 
575Cal & Ors v the Attorney General of Belize & Anor (2007) Claim Nos 171 and 172 of 2007, Conteh 
CJ (Belize Sup Ct) at [132]. 
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In the absence of direct incorporation by statute, there are different methods of 
recognising international human rights instruments, including recourse through 
administrative law. First, the (outdated) concept of legitimate expectation in 
Australia576 and mandatory relevant consideration in New Zealand577 have been 
utilised to treat unincorporated international obligations as considerations for the 
decision maker. Also the presumption of consistency, a common law principle of 
statutory interpretation, recognises that Parliament is presumed not to legislate 
intentionally in breach of its obligations.578 In Zaoui v Attorney-General, the Supreme 
Court applied this presumption using New Zealand's international law obligations.579  
 
Notwithstanding the successful application of administrative law to recognise 
international obligations in Zaoui, Gieringer expresses some concern with the 
application of the principle of mandatory relevant considerations.580 Based on this 
analysis, recourse to the principle of mandatory relevant consideration to recognise 
the Declaration’s provisions could provide a useful option for Māori. Through this, 
the New Zealand Courts could uphold Māori rights to full participation in decision-
making, as per Article 20 of the Declaration.  
 
D. Can the principles of the Treaty be used as an aid to clarify and import the 
rights contained in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples?  
 
Wilton Littlechild proposes that the application of Treaty principles, such as 
partnership, can assist to bridge the gap between the recognition of an indigenous 
right and the relevant article in the Declaration. 581 Is this a viable perspective for 
Māori? 
                                            
576 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 (HCA). 
577 Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 2 NZLR 257; (1993) 11 FRNZ 508; (1993) 1 HRNZ 30 
(CA). 
578 Joseph, above n 340, at 533; Treasa Dunworth “Public International Law” [2000] NZLR 217 at 225, 
states this area is shrouded in much uncertainty.  See, for example, Brind v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [1991] 1 All ER 720 (UK). 
579 Zaoui v Attorney-General [2004] 2 NZLR 339. See also Claudia Gieringer “International Law 
through the Lens of Zaoui: Where is New Zealand At?” (2006) 17 PLR 318. 
580 Claudia Gieringer “International Law through the Lens of Zaoui: Where is New Zealand At?” 
(2006) 17 PLR 318. Although Gieringer still considers Tavita to be good law above n 452. 
581 Oral statement provided to the pre-sessional meeting of the UNPFII, Ottawa, Canada, March 2011. 
Wilton Littlechild is a past member of the United Nations Permanent Forum for Indigenous Isues and 
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(a) Treaty of Waitangi  
 
Viewed as a simple nullity,582 unless the Treaty has been implemented by statute, it 
creates no enforceable rights.583 It is the “Principles of the Treaty”584 that are referred 
to in legislation585 and policy documents,586 rather than the text of the Treaty itself. 
Professor James Anaya, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People recently noted:587 
 
From what I have observed, the Treaty’s principles appear to be vulnerable to 
political discretion, resulting in their perpetual insecurity and instability. 
 
Nevertheless, this does not detract from the ability of the Treaty principles to provide 
clarity on the rights articulated in the Declaration. The principles of the Treaty could 
be imported to provide clarity and act as a bridge between the recognition of Māori 
rights and the relevant Articles of the Declaration.  
 
In the case of Huakina v Waikato Valley Authority, Chillwell J noted that:588  
 
The Treaty is a part of the fabric of New Zealand society and can provide judicial aid 
in interpreting statutes ‘when it is proper, in accordance with the principles of 
statutory interpretation, to have resort to extrinsic material’. 
 
During a recent United States Senate Committee meeting, Professor James Anaya 
noted:589 
 
                                                                                                                             
current Chair of the United Nations Expert Mechanism on the Rights for Indigenous Peoples, a well- 
respected indigenous leader. 
582 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZJur (NS) 72 at 78 per Prendergast CJ. However, see 
also R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC (SC), per Chapman J at 390 for earlier recognition of native title at 
common law and consideration of the Treaty. 
583 Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Māori Land Board [1941] 2 All E.R. 93 at p 98; also [1941] 
NZLR 590 per Viscount Simon LC, 
584 See decision of Cooke P in New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
585 For example, Section 4 Conservation Act 1987; Section 9 State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. 
586 For example, Office for Disability Issues “New Zealand Disability Strategy Discussion Document: 
Incorporating the Treaty of Waitangi” at <www.odi.govt.nz>. 
587 James Anaya “New Zealand: More to be Done to Improve Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Says UN 
Expert” (2010) Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights <www.ohchr.org>.       
588 Huakina v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188 at 210. 
589 “US Senate Committee Holds Controversial Hearing on UN Indigenous Declaration” (10 June 
2011) <www.bsnorrell.blogspot.com>. 
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[T]he courts should take account of the Declaration in appropriate cases concerning 
indigenous peoples, just as federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have referred 
to other international sources to interpret statutes [emphasis added], constitutional 
norms, and legal doctrines in a number of cases. 
 
It would then follow that the principles of the Treaty could also, where appropriate, be 
used as an aid to provide clarity and support for the rights articulated in the 
Declaration.590  
 
For example, if the New Zealand government were to grant rights over matters that 
affected Māori without their participation and if the legislation directed that the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi have to be taken into account, then Māori could 
place reliance on Article 18 to contextualise these rights. Article 18 of the UNDRIP 
recognises the right for indigenous peoples to participate in decision-making in 
matters which would affect their rights.591  
 
(b) Status Quo 
 
The Declaration does not create any new rights,592 but it is the only international 
instrument that views indigenous rights through an indigenous lens: 593 
 
The Declaration … will go a long way in consolidating gains made by indigenous 
peoples in the international arena toward rolling back inequities and oppression. It 
builds upon numerous decisions and other standard setting measures over recent 
decades by a wide range of international institutions that are favourable to indigenous 
peoples’ demands … 
 
                                            
590 Despite the requirement for domestic legislative recognition, the Waitangi Tribunal established 
under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 can hear and make recommendations as to claims relating to 
acts or omission of the Crown that breach the promises made in the Treaty. See also article 37 of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples that recognizes indigenous peoples’ 
treaty rights. 
591 See also Valmaine Toki “Indigenous Rights – Hollow Rights?" [2011] 19 Waikato Law Review 29 
for a further example. 
592 The rights affirmed are those derived from human rights principles that are deemed of universal 
application, such as those contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
593 Anaya, above n 461, at 63. 
 140 
There should not have been a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
because it should not be needed. But it is needed. The history of oppression cannot be 
erased, but the dark shadow that history has continued to cast can and should be 
lightened. 
 
The Declaration simply affirms rights derived from generic human rights principles, 
such as equality and self-determination.594 The Declaration seeks to recognise 
indigenous peoples’ rights and contextualises those rights in light of their particular 
characteristics and circumstances, and promotes measures to remedy the rights’ 
historical and systemic violation.595  
 
The significance of the Declaration lies in its normative effect. The Declaration 
provides a benchmark, as an international standard, against which indigenous peoples 
may measure State action. State breach of this standard provides indigenous peoples 
with a means of appeal in the international arena.596 
 
Recognised and supported by United Nations member states,597 the Declaration 
contains norms that are already binding in international law. Thus the Declaration 
provides an additional international instrument for indigenous peoples when their 
rights, such as the right to participate fully in decision-making, have been breached. 
Indigenous peoples can now argue that not only have international treaties been 
broken, but a breach of a right in the Declaration has occurred. The available remedy 
is uncertain; nonetheless, it would be reasonable to conclude that this would provide 
an avenue to engender effective dialogue between the State and indigenous peoples.598 
                                            
594 Although see also Karen Engle “On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in the Context of Human Rights” (2011) 22 1 EJIL 141 – 163 where she examines 
the limitations of the Declaration and that notes it ‘temporarily mediates multiple tensions’ but there 
may still be some potential. 
595 Anaya, above n 461, at 63.  
596 Three United Nations Indigenous mechanisms that can be petitioned to when breaches occur include 
the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Rights, the United Nations Expert Mechanism on 
the Rights of Indigenous People and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. 
597 148 member states have adopted/supported the Declaration. Columbia and Samoa have reversed 
their abstention leaving nine states still abstaining. See <www.un.org>.  
598 The recent support of the World Conferenec Outcome Document/High Level Plenary Meeting 
Document by the General Assembly of States in September 2014 signals a further recognition by States 
of these fundamental rights. 
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In any event the Declaration provides indigenous peoples with an international arena 
to shame or embarrass a government.599  
 
(c) Summary  
 
The recent support of the Declaration by Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the 
United States is significant. Their actions contribute a moral air of robustness to the 
indigenous rights articulated in the Declaration.  
 
The orthodox position on the Declaration is that it will not be legally binding upon the 
State,600 unless it is incorporated into domestic legislation. Notwithstanding this 
position, principles of administrative law provide a window to import the rights 
contained in the Declaration. Adopting the perspective of Wilton Littlechild, the 
principles of the Treaty can be employed to provide clarity and act as a bridge to the 
rights articulated in the Declaration. 
 
According to Sir Taihākurei (Eddie) Durie:601 
 
We have completed the trilogy. The 1835 Declaration acknowledged indigenous self- 
determination. The 1840 Treaty upheld it within the structures of a State. This 
Declaration now confirms it and says how it should be applied.  As rights go, that’s a 
big step. It fills the gaps in the Treaty of Waitangi.  It is something to, famously, 
applaud.    
 
Already it has had practical effect.  Last week it was the basis for submissions before 
the Waitangi Tribunal in North Auckland, to support a more principled approach to 
managing Treaty settlements, and before the Māori Affairs Select Committee in 
Wellington, to support a greater Māori role in Māori policy development.   
 
                                            
599 As happened on 11 March 2005, when the United Nations Committee on Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination concluded, in its 66th session, that New Zealand’s Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 
contained discriminatory aspects against Māori. See “Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: Decision on Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004” Sixty Sixth session Decision 1 (66): 
New Zealand CERD/C/DEC/NZL/1. <www.converge.org.nz>. 
600 Brownlie, above n 390, at 4. 
601 Eddie Taihakurei Durie “Address on the Declaration” Statement given May 2010. Parliament 
Buildings. 
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Irrespective of the concerns surrounding the wording of support given to the 
Declaration, and the legal effect of the Declaration itself, it is without a doubt the 
most significant document on the rights of indigenous peoples. The current 
perspective of States and United Nations Agencies 602 is one of support and 
willingness to engage and implement the rights contained in the Declaration. The 
challenge ahead will be the practical manifestation of these rights for indigenous 
peoples and, in particular, whether applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised 
by an indigenous legal system, manifested by an indigenous court and premised on 
fundamental Māori concepts and doctrine is the most promising way forward for 
Māori to ameliorate the disproportionate offending rates.  
 
Self-determination has been identified as a key provision in the Declaration. Tino 
rangatiratanga is a key provision in the Treaty of Waitangi. A closer analysis of the 
synergy between these two concepts may assist to inform this discourse.  
 
E. Self-Determination  
 
The right of self-determination is provided for in Article 3 of the Declaration: 
 
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
  
According to Professor James Anaya:603 
 
Understood as a human right the essential idea of self-determination is that human 
beings, individually and as groups, are equally entitled to be in control of their own 
destinies and to live within governing institutional orders that are devised 
accordingly. 
 
                                            
602 For example, a recommendation from the recent 10th session of the United Nations Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues noted “The Permanent Forum welcomes the World Intellectual Property 
Organization facilitating a process, in accordance with the Declaration, to engage with indigenous 
peoples on matters including Intellectual Property, Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore". 
603 Anaya, above n 461 at 187. 
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The term self-determination is synonymous with terms such as equality and 
freedom.604 There is no definition of self-determination within the Declaration. 
However, there are different schools of thought as to its meaning, namely ‘external’ 
self-determination, or the right to secede, and ‘internal’ self-determination. As an 
alternative, Professor Anaya articulates ‘substantive’ versus ‘remedial’ self-
determination. 
 
The underlying rationale for ‘substantive’ versus ‘remedial’ self-determination 
derives from “the substance of the right of self-determination, as opposed to any 
remedies that may have resulted from violations of the right of all peoples to control 
their own destinies under conditions of equality”.605 The process of decolonisation 
reversed the process of colonialism and the associated implementation of foreign rule. 
This was a process that did not, on its own, address the substantive right of self-
determination. Rather, it was a remedy to address the violation of rights that existed 
prior to colonisation. Anaya argues that rather than self-determination requiring that 
each group form its own state or enjoy external self-determination, self-determination 
provides the right for people to be entitled to participate freely and equally in the 
constitution and governing institutional order of the State. However, those peoples 
who have suffered extreme violations of their right to self-determination would be 
entitled to a regime separate from the existing regime as would those peoples who 
have been denied effective remedies within the existing regime. Anaya appears to be 
insinuating that the more serious the violations of basic human rights, the more likely 
the group would be entitled to external self-determination. Conversely, those groups 
who have not suffered from similar human rights violations would be entitled to 
exercise self-determination within the existing regime. 
 
For Māori, the latter form of self-determination would apply, thereby allowing them 
to exercise self-determination within the existing regime.606 Extensions to the 
                                            
604 See also discussion by Federico Lenzerini ‘The Trail of Broken Dreams, the Status of Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law’ in Federico Lenzerini (ed) Reparation for Indigenous Peoples 
International and Comparative Perspectives (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) at 98 – 102. 
605 S James Anaya ‘The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-determination in the Post Declaration Era’ 
in Claire Charters and Rudolfo Stavenhagen (eds) Making the Declaration Work The United Nations 
Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples (IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2009) at 189.  
606 This is consistent with comments by Jeremy Waldron ‘The Cosmopolitan Alternative’ in Will 
Kymlicka The Rights of Minority Cultures (OUP, New York, 1995) at 103 where he notes that 
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jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court or the creation of a Tikanga Court provide two 
such examples of this form of self-determination. That is, a form of self-determination 
captured in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. 
 
(a) Self Determination and Tino Rangatiratanga  
 
According to Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi (Māori text), Māori retain their ‘tino 
rangatiratanga’. In contrast, the English version only guarantees to Māori possession 
over their lands and estates.  
Tino rangatiratanga and self-determination are both rights that have not yet been 
incorporated by the State into domestic legislation. To this end, both are aspirational 
rights, representing ideals as opposed to fixed standards.607 Both advocate for legal 
pluralism, thereby enabling iwi to practice internal self-government and manage their 
own affairs.608 However, they differ slightly. 
 
It is suggested that tino rangatiratanga provides the stronger claim for Māori.609 The 
Waitangi Tribunal has acknowledged that sovereignty was acquired subject to tino 
rangatiratanga and more recently that Māori did not cede sovereignty to the Crown.610 
This implies that tino rangatiratanga can exist independently to State sovereignty.  
In contrast, the right of self-determination derives from, and exists under 
sovereignty.611 Furthermore, self-determination has clear boundaries; it can either 
prevail or fall when in conflict with other human rights. In the context of tino 
rangatiratanga, it is uncertain whether such boundaries exist.612 Finally, tino 
rangatiratanga expresses the unique Māori concept of rangatiratanga that relates to 
                                                                                                                             
‘indigenous communities make claims for special provision and for the autonomous direction of their 
own affairs … and must accept some responsibility to participate in … [the] wider life’. 
607 Toki above n 464 at 256. 
608 The Waitangi Tribunal has defined tino rangatiratanga as “self-determination”. See Waitangi 
Tribunal Taranaki Kaupapa Tuatahi Report (Wai 143, 1996) at 307. Also Toki above n 464, at 256. 
609 Toki above n 464, at 256. 
610 See the Waitangi Tribunal Report of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Orakei Claim (Wai 9, 1987) and 
Wai 1040, 2014.  
611 Toki, above n 464. 
612 The Waitangi Tribunal sees the Crown’s right to govern may only override rangatiratanga as a last 
resort. Waitangi Tribunal The Whanganui River Report – Wai 167 (1999), 330. The Tribunal saw the 
“national interest in conservation [was] not a reason for negating Maori rights of property”. 
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concepts such as leadership and governance. Self-determination, however, is a 
creation of a Western paradigm.613 
 
While self-determination acts and strives for similar goals, it is philosophically 
distinct from tino rangatiratanga. Nonetheless, the right of self-determination will 
support and complement Māori claims to tino rangatiratanga. Mason Durie regards 
the Treaty Settlements as the perfect union between tino rangatiratanga and self-
determination.614 They provide for tino rangatiratanga in the sense that they recognise 
the mana of the Māori people and often provide an economic basis for their 
development.  
 
Thus Treaty Settlements could provide an opportunity for iwi to financially support an 
initiative, such as an indigenous court, either as a pan iwi Court or an iwi 
jurisdictional Court. However, the settlements themselves require legislation and 
delegated authority. In this way the two concepts support each other. 
 
This analysis shows that tino rangatiratanga is the stronger right for Māori, unlike 
self-determination. Self-determination does not fundamentally change the nature of 
existing indigenous Māori rights. Rather, it supports and complements tino 
rangatiratanga.  
 
(b) A Right to Secede 
 
Many Māori commentators, such as Andrea Tunks,615 have argued that Māori do not 
seek secession, but rather tino rangatiratanga. According to Moana Jackson, tino 
rangatiratanga is more akin to sovereignty.616 Such an approach would facilitate the 
implementation of tikanga Māori. 
 
                                            
613 Toki, above n 464. 
614 Mason Durie, Te Mana Te Kāwanatanga (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1998). 
615 Andrea Tunks “Pushing the Sovereign Boundaries in Aotearoa” (1999) 4(23) Indigenous Law 
Bulletin 15 at 69  
616 Moana Jackson “Where Does Sovereignty Lie?” in Colin James (ed) Building the Constitution 
(Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 2000) at 196 – 197. 
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Brookfield acknowledges that, prior to the Declaration, a right of self-determination 
and the right to secession for indigenous peoples was uncertain.617 Nonetheless, in 
light of its development, some states considered that the Declaration would provide 
indigenous peoples with a similar right to secede from the encapsulating State.618 This 
would impact on concepts such as state sovereignty and political unity. 
 
The right to secession is limited by existing international law norms and is confined to 
particular peoples such as those who are subject to ‘alien domination’.619 
 
According to Anaya, secession is available when it is remedial in nature,620 and 
distinguishes this from a substantive form, in which self-determination is a human 
right. When this substantive form of self-determination is denied, a breach occurs, 
requiring a remedy. This remedial form of self-determination is proportionate to the 
nature of the breach or violation.621 Following this reasoning, secession would only be 
invoked when the nature of the violation was so great that secession, or external self-
determination, is the only remedy.  
 
In order for Māori to claim secession, the violations and actions, or inactions, by the 
Crown would need to be viewed as so harmful that secession or external self-
determination is justified. Although it is uncertain when this would apply, alternatives 
such as self-government, legal pluralism622 or internal self-determination may be 
appropriate. An indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine through an extension to the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court or a Tikanga 
Court, could be an example of such a situation.  
 
The key distinction between internal and external self-determination is that internal 
self-determination operates within the existing legal framework.623 ‘Internal self-
determination’ or self-government is viewed as the right for a people to freely choose 
                                            
617 FM (Jock) Brookfield Waitangi & Indigenous Rights (updated ed, Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 2006) at 77. 
618 Brookfield, above n 540.  
619 Claire Charters “The Rights of Indigenous Peoples” October 2006 NZLJ 335 at 336. 
620 Anaya, above n 461, at 189. 
621 At 189. 
622 See Chapter III ‘Maori and Indigenous Rights’ for further discussion on Legal Pluralism. 
623 Toki, above n 464.  
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their own political and economic regime.624 Internal self-determination is consistent 
with Article 46 of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
  
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair totally or in part, the territorial integrity or 
political unity of sovereign and independent States. 
  
And, also Article 4: 
 
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as 
well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
It would appear that the Declaration provides for two schools of self-determination. 
An external form of self-determination may be more difficult to achieve, nonetheless 
an internal form of self-determination is also available.  
 
Thus Article 4 bestows the ability for indigenous peoples to realise their right of 
autonomy or self-government over their internal and local affairs. Read together with 
Articles 5, 18 and 19, the Declaration provides for indigenous people the right to 
participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life 
of the State, and to participate in all decisions affecting them or their rights. Although 
the orthodox concept of self-determination was important in mobilising the 
international indigenous movement, it does not capture or reflect the diversity within 
national systems.625 This provides fertile grounds for the ability of Māori to apply 
their philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal system, manifested 
by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and doctrine at the 
same time as their right to participate in external decision making processes and the 
political order of the State.  
 
                                            
624 See Cassese Self Determination of Peoples (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995) at 101. 
625 Malgosia Fitzmaurice “The Question of Indigenous Peoples Rights: A Time for Reappraisal?” in 
Statehood and Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013) at 350 
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The thrust of self-determination is to enable indigenous peoples to be in control of 
their destinies and to create their own political and legal organisation of their 
territories.626 This does not necessarily amount to separate statehood, although that 
possibility remains.627 Erica Irene Dias argues that indigenous peoples have a mutual 
duty to share power with the existing state and perceives Article 3 as grounds for an 
argument for external self-determination.628 Further, Professor James Anaya argues, 
that although secession often is not the intention of indigenous peoples, it has, 
nevertheless, held a symbolic rhetoric.629  
 
(c) Self-Determination: A Human Right 
 
Despite the text of the articles in the Declaration, the Declaration couches the right of 
self-determination as a fundamental human right for indigenous peoples. To this end 
attributes of statehood or sovereignty are, at the most, instrumental to the realisation 
of these values. But according to Professor James Anaya, they are not the essence of 
self-determination for indigenous peoples:630 
 
And for most peoples, especially in light of cross cultural diverse identities, full self-
determination, in a real sense, does not justify a separate state and may even be 
impeded by a separate state. It is a rare case in the post-colonial world in which self-
determination, understood from a human rights perspective, will require secession or 
the dismemberment of states. 
 
The objective of this section is to ascertain whether the Treaty of Waitangi and the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples could support the 
implementation of an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine. Intrinsic to this review is the right of self-determination provided in 
international documents. In this regard the internationally recognised right to self-
                                            
626 See discussion by Iris Marion Young ‘Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group 
Political Conflict’ in Will Kymlikca The Rights of Minority Cultures (OUP, New York, 1995) at 155 – 
175 where she notes that ‘what a bicultural society means… for Māori … has not ended’ highlighting 
the importance for Indigenous peoples to be in control of their destinies. 
627 See also discussion by James Tully “Indigenous Peoples and Freedom” in J Tully (ed) Public 
Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008) at 285 – 287.  
628 As cited in Fitzmaurice, above n 548. See also Charters and Stavenhagen, above n 530. 
629 Anaya, above n 461. 
630 Anaya, above n 461, at 60. 
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determination is fundamental to recognising and realising the rights of indigenous 
peoples, including that of culture, tikanga Māori. Achieving self-determination would 
allow Māori to freely choose and determine their own political and legal systems. The 
synergy with tino rangatiratanga provided for in the Treaty of Waitangi further 
supports this dialogue.  
 
New Zealand’s legal system ascribes to parliamentary sovereignty 631 and the rule of 
law as articulated in the Constitution Act 1986, which stipulates that the Parliament 
continues to have full power to make laws.632 The duties and obligations contained in 
the Treaty recognise the human rights responsibilities between the Crown and Māori. 
It is suggested that to alleviate the disproportionate social and economic statistics of 
Māori, the entrenchment of fundamental indigenous rights, including that of self-
determination, is required. In the absence of entrenchment, it is foreseeable that 
applying the text of the Treaty consistently with the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous People could provide an avenue for Māori to attain self-
determination.633 
 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples simply affirms rights derived 
from human rights principles such as equality and self-determination. These basic 
rights have been denied to indigenous peoples and the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples seeks to recognise such rights and contextualises them in light of 
their particular characteristics and circumstances.634 Moreover, the Declaration 
promotes measures to remedy the historical and systemic denial of indigenous 
people’s rights.635  
 
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is the only United Nations 
document dedicated to indigenous human rights and addresses indigenous-specific 
                                            
631 Supreme Court Act 2003, s 3(2). 
632 Constitution Act 1986, s 15(1). 
633 With the support of the provisions in the ICCPR and ICESCR. However, the ICESCR and ICCPR 
contain general human rights and, on their own, do not meet the cultural and political concerns of 
indigenous people. However, considered in light of favourable general comments and creative legal 
interpretations of treaty monitoring-body decisions can, advance indirectly indigenous rights.  
634 Anaya above n 461. 
635 Anaya, above n 461, at 63. 
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concerns. The Declaration does not create any new rights; however, it is the only 
international instrument that views indigenous rights through an indigenous lens.636 
 
Professor James Anaya stated:637 
 
I have observed several positive aspects of New Zealand’s legal and policy landscape, 
as well as ongoing challenges, in relation to Māori issues. A unique feature of New 
Zealand is the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, which is understood to be one of the 
country’s founding instruments. The principles of the Treaty provide a foundation for 
Māori self-determination based on a real partnership between Māori and the New 
Zealand State, within a framework of respect for cross cultural understanding and the 
human rights of all citizens. I have learned of steps being taken within this 
framework, which can be described as constituting a good practice in the making, and 
I hope that concerted efforts will continue to be made in this regard. 
 
If the right, for Māori, of self-determination was realised through a Treaty 
partnership, this would result in a pluralistic society. It is now timely to consider the 




Sally Engle Merry describes legal pluralism as “a situation in which two or more legal 
systems coexist in the same social field”638. However, Anne Griffiths notes that “legal 
pluralism has been invoked to uphold notions of authority and legitimacy, to favour or 
promote one set of legal claims over another, or to validate and acknowledge the 
existence of alternative or coexisting forms of legal ordering within a particular 
domain”.639 This raises questions regarding the power to make law and who is to 
benefit. As the formulation of law is underscored by differing epistemologies if 
                                            
636 At 63. 
637 Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Professor James Anaya, upon conclusion of his visit to 
New Zealand, 22 July 2010 
638 Sally Engle Merry “Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 Law and Society Rev 869 at 870. See also Nicole 
Roughan ‘Conceptions of Custom International Law’, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072965, for an 
interesting discussion on compound custom and community 84 – 88. 
639 Anne Griffiths presentation to Human Rights and Legal Pluralism in Theory and Practice 
Conference 5th to 6th December 2014, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights (NCHR)in co-operation 
with the Rights, Individuals, Culture and Society Research Centre (RICS) at the Faculty of Law , 
University of Oslo. 
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claims are made that are inconsistent with the dominant legal order, they will be 
ignored.640 Anne Griffiths further contends that “with the rise of the nation-state a 
particular paradigm of law became predominant, one in which state law acquired 
jurisdiction and took precedence over other forms”.641  
 
With the use of case studies from Australia and Canada, Kristen Anker provides 
convincing dialogue on ways to make space for indigenous legal traditions within a 
sovereign nation.642 Anker states:643 
 
that an approach to law known as ‘legal pluralism’ provides a more apt language for 
treating ‘the justice question’ of the place of Indigenous law than orthodox legal 
theory because, in the way I conceive it, a legal pluralist recognition is an 
engagement about the nature of law and not about a formal relationship between two 
fixed entities.  
 
She ‘looks out’ to other laws and the second ‘looks in’ towards the nature of state 
law.644 Whilst this may be logically sound, on a practical note, within a legal system 
that fiercely adheres to the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty underpinned by 
legal positivism, entertaining the notion of legal pluralism in New Zealand to 
accommodate tikanga Māori appears unworkable.645  
 
Equally, in order to adopt legal pluralism, Māori would be required to accept a legal 
system that was responsible for land alienation and displacement of their customs. 
Although Eddie Durie contends that “the Treaty of Waitangi is not just a Bill of 
Rights for Māori but also for Pākehā too” 646 and to this end if the Treaty of Waitangi 
was entrenched constitutionally it could realise a legal pluralism within New Zealand 
                                            
640 Griffiths above. 
641 Griffiths above. 
642 Kirsten Anker Declarations of Interdependence A Legal Pluralist Approach to Indigenous Rights 
(2014, Ashgate Publishing, UK). 
643 Above. 
644 Above. 
645 Also Nicole Roughan “The Association of State and Indigenous Law: A Case Study in 'Legal 
Association'” (2009) 59 UTLJ 135 at 143 
646 New Zealand 1990 Commission The Treaty of Waitangi: The Symbol of our life together as a 
Nation, Wellington: NZ 1990 Commission, 1989 14. 
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society,647 Ani Mikaere and Moana Jackson are skeptical of any benefits in legal 
pluralism for Māori and depict it as “inherently assimilative and rascist”.648 Moana 
Jackson further contends that under “a guise of sensitivity and good faith the colonial 
certainty of overt dismissal [tikanga Māori] has been replaced by a new-age 
legalism”.649 Further Jackson has stated that:650 
 
The redefinition and incorporation of basic Māori legal and philosophical concepts 
into the law is part of the continuing story of colonization. Its implementation by 
government, its acceptance by judicial institutions, and its presentation as an 
enlightened recognition of Māori rights are merely further blows in that dreadful 
attack to which colonization subjects the indigenous soul. 
 
Despite the international jurisprudence and constitutional examples articulating the 
recognition of indigenous rights,651 including that of self-determination, the right to 
implement the philosophy of Te Ao Māori within the criminal justice system in New 
Zealand is still unclear.  
 
It is appropriate to now consider the current legal provisions, practices and policies 
that have been historically and currently implemented in the New Zealand criminal 









                                            
647 R Stavenhagen ‘Mission to New Zealand’ in United Nations Economic and Social Council, 
Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous Issues (62nd session, item 15) 13 March 2006 para 85. 
648 Moana Jackson “Changing Realities: Unchanging Truths” in Commission on Folk Law and Legal 
Pluralism (ed) Papers Presented to the Congress at Victoria University of Wellington, August 1992: 
Volume II  (Law Faculty, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, 1992) at 444. 
649 Moana Jackson above n 648. 
650 Moana Jackson “Justice and political power: Reasserting Māori legal processes” in Kayleen 
M. Hazlehurst (ed) Legal pluralism and the colonial legacy: Indigenous experiences of justice in 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Avebury, Aldershot, 1995) at 254. 




































Prior to the arrival of the British, Māori adhered to the realm of the Māori world. 
Colonisation impacted negatively on the realm of the Māori world, marginalising 
tikanga Māori.652 Subsequent laws and policies were introduced, alienating Māori 
from their land and resources.653 The failure to recognise tikanga Māori also resulted 
in the breakdown of existing familial structures and the legacy of violence in 
contemporary families is also attributed to colonisation.654  
 
The Hunn Report recommended that New Zealand move beyond assimilation and 
towards integration where the two cultures would become one.655 As Māori were the 
minority, the effect was the gradual erosion of tikanga Māori. This was reflected in 
the report’s lack of provision to protect Māori identity and culture — tikanga 
Māori.656 Ralph Piddington, a former Professor of Anthropology at the University of 
Auckland, stated that for most Pākehā, “Māori are envisaged as dark-skinned Pākehā, 
having no distinctive cultural characteristics of their own”.657    
 
The establishment of the Māori Education Foundation and New Zealand Māori 
Council provided positive vehicles for Māori to assert their rights. However, in 1965, 
85 per cent of Māori children left school without any formal qualifications,658 and the 
offending rates for Māori were still disproportionately high.659 Not surprisingly the 
increase in Māori criminality, most noticeable in youth offending, continued unabated 
through the 1960s where Māori youth represented 1,269 or 23 per cent of the ‘distinct 
cases’ dealt with by the Children’s Court.660 By 1970 these figures had increased to 
4,866 and 42 per cent respectively. 
                                            
652 See Iris Marion Young Five Faces of Oppression in Lisa Heldke and Peg O’Connor (ed) 
Oppression, Privilege and Resistance (McGraw Hill, Boston, 2004) for discussion on marginalization. 
653 See for example David V Williams Te Kooti Tango Whenua: The Native Land Court 1864 – 1909 
(Huia Publishers, Wellington, 1999) for discussion on the alienating legislation. Williams coins the 
Native Land Court “the Engine of Destruction”. See also for example ss 102 – 103 Public Works Act 
1928 where Maori land could be taken by an Order in Council without provision for any statutory 
notice or objection rights which were accorded to the owners of non-Māori. 
654 See for example Te Puni Kokiri Rangahau Tukino Whanau Maori Research Agenda on Family 
Violence (2008) at 4 <www.tpk.govt.nz>. For general discussion see also Walker, above n 25. 
655 See discussion in Hill, particularly the Hunn Report (1960), above n 425. 
656 See Walker, above n 30; Jarod Gilbert Patched: The History of Gangs in New Zealand (AUP, 
Auckland, 2013) at 46 < www.press.auckland.ac.>. 
657 Gilbert, above n 656, at 46 
658 At 47. 
659 See NZDP 323 (1960) 1414 -7; Mason (1965), 23 as cited in Antje Kampf Mapping out Venereal 
Wilderness: Pubic Health and STD in New Zealand 1920 – 1980 (Transaction Publishers, London, 
2007) at 184. 
660 Gilbert, above n 656. 
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Ranginui Walker stated:661 
 
In 1970, there were 9,094 young Māori offenders before the Children’s Court. The 
following year … the offending rate of Māori boys under 16 years was 5.1 times the 
rate of Pākehā … for Māori girls the rate was higher at 7.4. 
 
Even though colonisation had a negative effect on Māori identity662 and tikanga 
Māori, it also provided an impetus for Māori to protect and assert their identity.663 
This is reflected in historical events, including Māori Land March and the 
establishment of groups such as Ngā Tamatoa to promote Māori rights.  
 
Since colonisation the subsuming of tikanga Māori into the existing legal system has 
resulted in chequered policies seeking to oppress and also assist tikanga Māori, such 
as those included in the Hunn Report (1960). Notwithstanding these policies and 
contemporary social problems, such as unemployment and drug and alcohol 
addiction, the disproportionate offending rates of Māori remain.664  
 
A. Current Legal Provisions, Practices and Policies – New Zealand 
 
The express and meaningful recognition of indigenous law/tikanga Māori within the 
justice system varies from recognition of Māori customs and values665 to rejecting 
claims based on lack of jurisdiction.666 Within the criminal justice system, this is 
further limited to incorporation into programmes by the Corrections Department,667 
and more recently inclusion in the Youth Court at sentencing. This thesis may suggest 
                                            
661 Walker, above n 30, at 208. 
662 For example, Māori were punished by the colonists for speaking their language in schools thereby 
alienating Māori from their language. My father, Aterea Toki, recalls such events. 
663 T Moeke Pickering Māori Identity within the Whanau: A Review of Literature (Hamilton: 
University of Waikato, 1996) <www.researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz>.  
664 For a contemporary discussion, 1994 – 2009, of Maori rights see Margaret Mutu The State of Māori 
Rights (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 2011). 
665 T Bennion “Ngati Hokopu ki Hokowhitu v Whakatane District Council” Māori Law Review July 
(2003) at 2 – 8.  
666 R v Toia CRI 2005 005 000027 Williams J HC Whangerei 9 August 2006.  See also Hunt v R 
[2011] 2 NZLR 499 at [82] and [85] for discussion breach of tikanga, this claim was rejected by the 
Court. 
667 For example Te Whanau Awhina. See also domestic violence programmes at 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz> 
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that, if Māori are to be fairly treated, some transformations are required not only at 
sentencing, but also from the time of apprehension through to imprisonment.  
 
The term tikanga is incorporated into various statutes; however, only half of these 
provide a definition of tikanga and refer to concepts such as culture and custom. The 
inclusion of tikanga Māori can be found within a raft of Acts.668 Within these Acts the 
inclusion of tikanga varies from tikanga being an express and relevant consideration 
in decision-making669 to ensuring a knowledge base of tikanga exists on certain 
statutory boards670 to where tikanga forms part of a policy directive.671 These 
references are more descriptive than definitive.672 This undermines the consistency 
and intention of the legislative provision. 
 
As Māori are disproportionately represented in the prosecution process and in light of 
calls for a return to an all Māori jury, this would appear to support this thesis’ 
proposition that the application of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal 
system, manifested by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts 
and doctrine is the only way forward for Māori. A review of whether, or how the 
current legislative initiatives and programmes recognise Te Ao Māori and tikanga 
Māori will inform this analysis. 
 
As offending is often linked to social and environmental factors, such as excessive 
alcohol or drug use, prevention of causative factors is of relevance to the rate of Māori 
offending and incarceration. Māori Committees established by the Māori Community 
Development Act 1962 provided a forum to address low level offending.673 Māori 
wardens, also established by the Māori Community Development Act 1962, provided 
a voluntary service to the community to control disruptive social behaviour that may 
result from excessive alcohol and drug use by Māori. To this end, an examination of 
these two roles will be informative. 
 
                                            
668 It is acknowledged that tikanga Māori also exists within the Māori prose of legislation, such as the 
Waikato Claims Settlement Act and the preamble to Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993. 
669 For example Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, ss 106, 107, 114, 129 
670 For example the Education Act 1989, s 61. 
671 For example Historic Places Act 1993, s 42. 
672 See Fiona Wright “Law, Religion and Tikanga Māori” (2007) 5 NZJPIL at 261 – 299.  
673 An example of low level offending could be shoplifting. 
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(a) Māori Wardens 
 
Created by an Act of Parliament, the Māori Community Development Act 1962, the 
Māori warden programme attracts a voluntary status. Viewed as agents of social 
control, Māori wardens were perceived as continuing the policing role that had 
existed amongst various iwi, including the Ringatū and the King Confederacy.674 This 
legislative recognition was seen to consolidate the historical commitment to utilise iwi 
leaders to maintain public order.675  
 
The provision of legislation allows Māori wardens to exercise control over other 
Māori and perform minor policing duties, such as the control of drunken behaviour 
and discouraging crime on the streets.676 The role of the Māori warden is often 
applauded, with comments by Douglas Graham to the inaugural meeting of Security 
New Zealand in 1996, entitled “The Role of the Private Sector in Law and Order” 
where he noted: 677 
 
Here in New Zealand, Māori wardens are one of the most successful examples of the 
role of the private sector in law and order. They were established in 1945 by the 
Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act at a time when more than 80 per cent 
of Māori were living in rural areas. The wardens were well known to all members of 
the tribe by virtue of the fact that they had grown up within the community with a 
reputation established by ancestry and leadership qualities. 
 
Over the last 30 years there has been a spectacular movement of Māori people to the 
cities and the work of the wardens has become largely an urban function. Today they 
carry a heavier workload than their rural counterpart as they cope with some of the 
less savoury aspects of life in the city. 
 
Māori wardens were not introduced with the intention of usurping the duties of the 
                                            
674 Augie Fleuras “Māori Wardens and the control of Liquor among the Māori of New Zealand” (1981) 
90(4) at 495. 
675 Fleuras, above n 674, at 495. See also Hill, above n 425, at 128. 
676 Sian Elias “Equality under Law” (2005) 13 Waikato Law Review 1 at 7. For a comparative 
perspective on the effectiveness of indigenous community based policing groups - the presence of the 
Regional Coordinating Body of the Community Authorities/Community Police in Mexico has, due its 
presence, reported a 90 per cent decline in common crime.  
677 As cited by Tom Bennion “Law and Order Māori and the Private Sector” (April 1996) Māori Law 
Review at 1. 
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Police, but rather they are an influence among the people in maintaining law and 
order. 
 
Their powers of arrest are only those of members of the public … On many occasions 
I and the officials who accompanied me on this character-building exercise were 
extremely grateful for the presence of Māori wardens — backed up by kuia when the 
going got really tough … 
 
The State observed Māori protocol and a potentially dangerous situation was diffused 
by skilful handling and a lot of wisdom and humour from kuia and Māori wardens. 
 
Although the role of the Māori warden declined in the 1970s, it has enjoyed a recent 
resurgence, assisted in part by the announcement in 2008, by the then Minister of 
Justice, Annette King, that NZ$2.3 million would be allocated to strengthen the 
capacity and capability of Māori wardens.678  
 
However, the establishment of a Māori Warden’s branch in Queensland, Australia, to 
promote safer communities, has been challenged by the broader community with 
allegations of racism and arrogance.679 Nonetheless, the importance of their role is the 
subject of a current review by Te Puni Kōkiri, which is currently seeking feedback on 
the strengthening of their current role.680  
 
Māori wardens contributed positively to the Māori Committee and Māori Courts’ 
initiative. It is suggested that this role could be revived and accommodated within an 
indigenous court as a lay advocate to support the offender between arrest and 




                                            
678 Tom Bennion “Editorial” (May 2008) Maori Law Review at 6. 
679 “Māori Wardens in Queensland under Fire” Radio NZ News (online, New Zealand, 18 July 2013) < 
www.radionz.co.nz >. 
680 There are currently 883 warranted Māori wardens who are engaged on a voluntary basis. See Te 
Puni Kōkiri Māori Wardens Options for Change (2013) <www.tpk.govt.nz>. Current funding is 
$1,000,000 per annum to assist Māori Wardens deliver ‘community based services, improve 
organizational capacity and capability’. See <http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/in-print/our-
publications/publications/maori-wardens-project-funding-programme/page/1> 
681 See Chapter VII ‘A New Framework’ on a proposed model. 
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(b) Māori Courts 
 
Historically Māori Committees, constituted under the Māori Community 
Development Act 1962, adjudicated on low level offending and were informally 
referred to as Māori Courts.682 Chaired by at least three Māori Committee members, 
the intention was to prevent and deflect offenders from the criminal justice system. 
With the assistance and support of the community, the offender was reintegrated into 
the community. Māori wardens often contributed to the Māori Courts. However, the 
then Secretary for Māori Affairs, Jock McEwen, noted that the Māori Courts were 
struggling as the “traditional authority exercised by elders had been lost”.683 Despite 
the positive effect of the Māori Committees, a lack of funding and resources together 
with continual dislocation of Māori from their culture, and an unwillingness by some 
Māori to fall under the jurisdiction of the Māori Committee, led to its demise.684 
Notwithstanding this, it is suggested that a similar forum could be revisited. 
 
Considering that the jury system, as a collective, provides a means to impart 
community norms and values into a judicial proceeding, a review and analysis of the 
historical involvement of Māori within this system is helpful.  
 
(c) Māori Juries 
 
Prior to 1844 Māori were unable to serve on ordinary juries. However, in 1844 the 
Native Exemption Ordinance was passed. This was one of a suite of exceptional laws; 
the others being the Unsworn Testimony Ordinance,685 the Cattle Trespass 
Amendment Ordinance686 and the Jury Amendment Ordinance. The Jury Amendment 
Ordinance authorised the Governor to exempt certain Māori from the property-
ownership requirements and allow Māori to serve on mixed juries. Although no 
proclamation was ever made to authorise this, it was declared that any Māori whose 
capability was certified would qualify to serve on a mixed jury for the trial of any case 
                                            
682 Hill, above n 425, at 130. 
683 At 131. 
684 At 134. 
685 The Unsworn Testimony Ordinance enabled Māori who had no religious beliefs to provide sworn 
evidence 
686 The Cattle Trespass Ordinance required settlers to keep their cattle fenced in, rather than requiring 
Māori to fence them out of their cultivations. 
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in which the property or person of a Māori might be affected.687 
 
Section 2 of the Juries Act 1908 provided a definition of Māori to include persons of 
the aboriginal race of New Zealand, including Polynesian, Melanesian and 
Australasian races as well as half castes, provided they lived with a Māori tribe or 
community.  
 
According to Dr Ken Palmer:688 
 
The significance of the categorisation, is to allow for an all Māori jury in a criminal 
case involving Māori offending against another Māori, with like provision for civil 
cases. Where a civil case involves one Māori against a non-Māori, a mixed jury of 
races may be allowed but no equivalent provision applied to criminal charges 
involving non-Māori people. 
 
A Māori accused of a crime against another Māori could claim trial before an all-
Māori jury. However, no Māori could serve on a jury if either the accused or the 
victim was a non-Māori.689  
 
In civil cases a Māori jury could be claimed if both parties were Māori, and a mixed 
jury if one party was Māori.690 The law remained in this form for nearly a century. In 
1962 legislation abolished separate Māori juries and placed Māori on an equal footing 
for jury service, including cases involving non-Māori.691  
 
Although regarded as equals, research has since confirmed that Māori are still under-
represented on both panels of potential jurors as well as on trial juries.692 This is a 
result of bias at both the out-of-court and the in-court selection stage.693 The 
                                            
687 Shaunnaugh Dorsett “R v E Hipu Supreme Court Wellington’ 1 December 1845” (2010) 41(1) 
VUWLR 89 at 91 
688 Ken Palmer ‘Law Land and Māori Issues’ (1988) Canterbury Law Review at 323 
689 S Dunstan, J Paulin and K Atkinson Trial by Peers? The Composition of New 
Zealand Juries. (Department of Justice: Wellington, NZ, 1995). 
690 Dunstan, Paulin and Atkinson, above n 689. 
691 Mark Israel ‘Ethnic Bias in Jury Selection in Australia and New Zealand (1998) International 
Journal of the Sociology of Law 26 at 35 – 54. The special provisions for Māori juries were abolished 
with effect from the end of 1964 by the Juries Amendment Act 1962. 
692 See Dunstan, Paulin and Atkinson, above n 689. 
693 Israel, above n 691. See also, Paulin and Atkinson, above n 689, for empirical study. 
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underlying reasons are many, including the nature of the boundaries of the jury 
districts, the exclusive use of the electoral roll as the source list and the criteria 
adopted for excluding people from the jury list.694 However, a significant source of 
under-representation also derives from the use of challenges by prosecuting 
counsel.695 
 
In 1988 a report written by Moana Jackson for the Department of Justice drew 
attention to fears that the continuing prevalence of monocultural juries might be 
denying Māori people a fair trial.696 Jackson argued that an all-Māori jury should 
again provide for Māori defendants.  
 
(d) CYPF Act and Family Group Conferences 
 
A Family Group Conference (FGC) is a meeting where a young person who has 
offended, their family, victims and other people meet to discuss how to assist the 
young offender to take responsibility for their actions and implement practical ways to 
make amends.697 The objective is to reach a group consensus on an outcome.  
 
The preamble to the Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 Act 
(CYPF) states that the purpose of the Act is to:  
 
advance the well-being of families and the wellbeing of children as young persons as 
members of … whānau, hapū, iwi … make provisions for whānau, hapū, iwi … and 
the matters to be resolved where possible by their own… whānau, hapū, iwi… 
 
Section 13 of the Act refers to principles and makes it clear that the primary role for 
caring and protecting the child or young person lies with the whānau, hapū or iwi. 
                                            
694 Dunstant, Paulin and Atkinson, above n 689.  
695 Dunstant, Paulin and Atkinson, above n 689. 
696 Jackson above n 31.  
697 See also Ministry of Justice ‘The Family Group Conference in Youth Justice.’ 
<www.justice.govt.nz.>. 
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Various programmes, such as FGC,698 are also provided for in the CYPF Act that 
acknowledge and support the participation of whānau.699  
 
Involving the victim in the process and encouraging mediation of concerns between 
the victim, the offender and their families is a means to achieve reconciliation, 
restitution and rehabilitation.700 The FGC allows for the participation of whānau and 
iwi. There is also provision for the FGC to be held on a marae.  
 
The success of the FGC and its adoption by other jurisdictions is to be applauded and 
adds weight to the case for an indigenous court701. However, in practice, “levels of 
restorativeness vary between FGCs as approximately half of FGCs do not have  the 
victim or victims’ representative present, thereby dimishing the effectiveness of the 
restorative initiative”702. 
 
Notwithstanding the inclusion of a marae setting, there is no impetus to connect the 
offender with their cultural identity. And although tikanga may be implicit, there is no 
explicit mention of ‘tikanga’ within the CYPF Act 1989.  
 
(e) Restorative Justice703 
 
Central to restorative justice is the objective for the victim and the offender to meet 
face-to-face and restore the relationship, focusing on redress for the harm done to the 
victim, while holding the offender accountable and repairing any damage to the 
community.704 As a voluntary process, both the victim and the offender must agree 
                                            
698 The immense contribution of Judge Mick Brown and Judge Fred McElrea to the area of Youth 
Offending and the Family Group Conference initiative has been invaluable. It was their pioneering 
approach that led to these reforms. 
699 Specifically Part Two of the Act and ss 256 Procedure and 258 Functions. 
700 Youth Court of New Zealand ‘Family Group Conferences’ < www.justice.govt.nz >. 
701 FGC have been adopted in the United Kingdom and also United States where they are known as 
Family Guided Decision Making. 
702 Yvette Tinsley and Elisabeth McDonald ‘Is there any other way? Possible alternatives to the current 
criminal justice process’ vol 17, 2011, Canterbury Law Review, 204. 
703 It is acknowledged that Restorative Justice is similar to Therapeutic Jurisprudence. However, this 
thesis will be confined to Therapeutic Jurisprudence as it provides a ‘broader umbrella’ and more 
appropriate to consider for the purposes of this thesis. 
704 Ministry of Justice “Restorative Justice”<www.justice.govt.nz >. See also discussion in Helen 
Bowen and Jim Consedine Restorative Justice Contemporary Themes and Practice (Ploughshare 
Publications, New Zealand, 1999). See also Gabrielle Maxwell and James Liu (Eds) Restorative Justice 
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and the offender must admit responsibility prior to the process. The outcome of a 
Restorative Justice Conference is taken into account by the judge at sentencing. 
 
In recognition of the positive effect restorative justice can have, this process will soon 
be available in every court across New Zealand.705 This is unsurprising given that 
benefits identified include:706 
 
- 20 per cent reduction in reoffending by those who participated. The frequency of 
those who did reoffend dropped by nearly a quarter 
- 77 per cent of victims were satisfied with their overall experience, before, during 
and after the conference 
- 74 per cent of victims said they felt better after attending the conference 
- 80 per cent of victims said they would be likely to recommend Restorative Justice to 
others in a similar situation  
 
More recently a follow up study by the Ministry of Justice confirmed the positive 
effect of a restorative justice process finding that:707 
 
On average, offenders who participated in a Police or court-referred restorative 
justice conference committed 23 per cent fewer offences than comparable offenders 
over the following 12 month period; and had a 12 per cent lower rate of reoffending 
than comparable offenders over the following 12 month period.  
 
Despite statistical threshold requirements the Report further noted: 
 
The percentage difference in the frequency of reoffending remained stable over the 
four-year period of the study. Although the two to four-year results did not meet the 
threshold for statistical significance, nevertheless the findings suggest that restorative 
justice may continue to have a positive impact on the number of offences committed 
over time.  
                                                                                                                             
Practices in New Zealand: Towards a Restorative Society (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 
2007) for discussion of New Zealand experiences and perspectives. 
705 Frank Neill “Restorative Justice: Chance to Help Clients Turn Their Lives Around” Law Talk (New 
Zealand, November 2013) at 9. Also noteworthy is the Government’s funding of 4.4 million 
investments in adult pre sentence Restorative Justice. 
706 Neill, above n 705, at 12. 




The study also suggested that conferenced offenders were 28 per cent less likely to be 
imprisoned for reoffending over the following 12 month period than comparable 
offenders. However, again that result was not statistically significant. It also needs to 
be viewed in light of the reoffending rates for high-level offending, which suggest 
restorative justice has no significant impact on the seriousness of reoffending. 
 
Although restorative justice like tikanga may be implicit in legislation, such as the 
CYPF Act 1989, there is no explicit mention of restorative justice nor tikanga within 
the CYPF Act 1989.  
 
Notwithstanding, the positive aspects of restorative justice and suggestion that tikanga 
Māori is consistent with restorative justice,708 academics contend that through a 
tikanga Māori lens, the concept of restorative justice is incompatible with tikanga 
Māori.709  Restorative justice infers that something has been broken and needs to be 
restored. For Māori, conduct that is hee unbalances the relational network. This 
conduct is not perceived as broken, but conduct that requires balance — the aim of 
tikanga Māori through the use of further tikanga concepts. Further, Juan Tauri 
contends that restorative justice was imposed upon Māori, is not community driven 




Before addressing how the criminal justice system has included tikanga within 
various programmes, the presence of tikanga values, such as ora, implemented by the 
Ministry of Health, Hauora, Māori Health Care Providers and Whānau Ora, as a firm 
policy directive, provides an interesting example. 
 
 
                                            
708 See David Carruthers “Restorative Justice: Lessons from the Past, Pointers for the Future” (2012) 20 
Waikato Law Review: Taumauri at 1, who acknowledges that the principles underpinning restorative 
justice are consistent with those of tikanga Māori. 
709 See Yvette Tinsley and Elisabeth McDonald ‘Is there any other way? Possible alternatives to the 
current criminal justice process’ vol 17, 2011, Canterbury Law Review, 206 who state that there is 
limited research on whether restorative justice is compatible with indigenous notions of justice. 
710 Juan Tauri ‘Family Group Conferencing: A Case Study of the Indigenistaion of New Zealands’s 
Justice System (1998) 10 CICJ 168 as cited by Tinsley and McDonald above n 709, at 206. 
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(a) Hauora – Māori Health 
 
A recent survey revealed that over 80 per cent of New Zealanders reported good 
health.711  For Māori, however, high smoking rates (two in five or 41 per cent of 
Māori adults are current smokers), obesity rates (44 per cent), mental health rates 
(Māori adults have higher rates of psychological distress than other adults, with one in 
ten Māori affected) indicate that Māori are disproportionately represented in adverse 
health statistics. This study confirms that Māori have the poorest health of any ethnic 
group in New Zealand.712 
 
Māori health providers are contracted to deliver health services, predominantly to 
Māori under the Hauora scheme. According to Māori Marsden:713  
 
… a synonym for mauri in certain contexts is hau (breath). ‘Hau-ora’ the breath of 
life is the agent or source by and from which mauri (life principle) is mediated to 
objects both animate and inanimate … and hauora as applied to animate objects are 
synonymous … mauri is applied to inanimate objects; whilst hau is applied only to 
animate life … mauri was the force or energy mediated by hauora – the breath of the 
spirit life. 
 
Anne Salmond noted:714 
 
… The hau, like the tapu and mana of the ancestors, was once dispersed throughout 
the kin group … gifts or insults to any part of the group thus affected the hau of the 
entire kin group [emphasis added] … in this way utu, reciprocal exchange, required 
the return of hau [emphasis added] whether by gifts or insults. Insults diminished the 
rangatira’s hau and had to be requited. Gifts, by embodying mana and carrying the 
donor’s hau created an obligation for return gifting… If gifts were not requited this 
was hau whitia … in such a situation, the source of life was weakened, causing 
misfortune, even dying [emphasis added].  
 
                                            
711 Ministry of Health ‘The Health of New Zealand Adults 2011/12 - Conclusions’ at 130 < 
www.health.govt.nz >. 
712At 130. 
713 Marsden above n 1, at 44. 
714 Salmond, above n 520, [at 176 – 177]. 
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In more recent times, the term hauora has been further developed into a model of 
general well-being prescribing four dimensions: Taha Tinana (physical well-being — 
health), Taha Hinengaro (mental and emotional well-being — self-confidence), Taha 
Whānau (social well-being — self-esteem) and Taha Wairua (spiritual well-being — 
personal beliefs).715 Should one component become damaged, a person or the 
corresponding collective will become unbalanced and feel unwell, thus requiring a re-
balance.716 This model recognises the importance of the relational dynamic and 
ultimately the need for balance: the aim of tikanga. 
 
The fundamental philosophy is consistent with tikanga values and programmes such 
as He Korowai Oranga: Maori Health Strategy. This programme provides a 
framework for the public sector to participate in supporting the health status of Māori 
with an overall aim of whānau ora: Māori families achieving well-being. Whānau ora 
is a strategic tool for the health and other government sectors to work together with 
iwi Māori providers and Māori communities as well as whānau to reduce the 
disproportionate health statistics for Māori. The Māori Action Plan Whakatātaka 
Tuarua 2006 – 2011 further contributes by setting objectives.717  
 
In response to Māori over-representation within the health system, the Ministry of 
Health has implemented programmes and strategies that are underpinned by tikanga 
values to reduce the disparity. The approach is relational, premised on the 
interconnectivity of the four dimensions. Notwithstanding the similar rates of 
disparity for Māori and offending rates, the Ministry of Justice does not provide 
comparable programmes and plans.  
 
The Department of Corrections has recently evaluated two programmes.718 The first, 
Te Whare Ruruhau o Meri, is a dynamic programme that offers a Whānau 
Reconciliation Support Service. The programme recognises that many women want to 
return to their partners and the Service needs to support them to do so, while 
providing them with the best possible opportunity to be free from violence. The 
                                            
715 See Mason Durie ‘Te Whare Tapa Whā Māori Health Model Hauora Māori’Ministry of Health. 
Available at www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/maori_health_model_tewhare.pdf 
716 Durie, above n 638. 
717 See Ministry of Health, Whakatākata Tuarua: Māori Health Action Plan 2006-2011 (Wellington, 
2006) < www.health.govt.nz > for full discussion. 
718 Ministry of Health, above n 717. 
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second programme, Tu Tama Wahine o Taranaki, provides a support network for 
Māori respondents.  
 
An exciting initiative between Te Whare Whakaruruhau (Māori Women’s Refuge in 
Hamilton) and prisoners within the Māori Focus Units has emerged. This initiative 
permits the members of the Māori Focus Units to perform work tasks, such as 
gardening and furniture removal, within the confines of Te Whare Whakaruruhau. 
Although still in its early days and under close scrutiny and monitoring, the 
‘relationship’ between these two vehicles has provided a ‘healing’ process for the 
prisoners in the Māori Focus Units. Through this relationship the participants within 
the Māori Focus Units who provide this assistance become ‘more aware’ of the 
difficulties and trauma faced by the victims of domestic violence. 
 
The Domestic Violence (Programmes) Regulations 1996 specify that Māori values 
and concepts are to be taken into account.719 Three key principles evident in these 
programmes are the use of te reo (Māori language), the importance of kaupapa (Māori 
culture) and the provision of healing for both the individual and the collective. This 
incorporation of tikanga has led to a favourable review.720 
 
A recent evaluation of the Department of Correction’s community-based tikanga 
Māori programmes shows that offenders with a heightened awareness of their Māori 
heritage are more likely to choose law abiding lifestyles.721 By encouraging offenders 
to increase their cultural knowledge and reconnect with whānau, the report finds that 
tikanga Māori programmes are changing lives for the better. For Māori, the learning 
of pepeha (identify) and whakapapa (family lineage) is about reaffirming a connection 
with their tribes, ancestors and history.722 
 
The Ministerial Review for Tikanga Māori Programmes (TMP) has confirmed that 
                                            
719 The Domestic Violence (Programmes) Regulations 1996, r 27 and 28. 
720 See Report by Fiona Cram, Leonie Pihema, Kuni Jenkins and Matewiki Karehana Evaluation of 
Programmes for Māori Adult Protected Persons under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 (Ministry of 
Justice, June 2002) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
721 See Department of Corrections Underpinning the Department’s Five-Year Strategic Business Plan 
is the Recognition that “To Succeed Overall We Must Succeed for Māori Offenders” (2010). 
<www.corrections.govt.nz>. 




a) are motivational programmes incorporating principles that acknowledge Te Reo, 
Tikanga Māori solutions and whānau involvement; 
 
b) are programmes tailored to Māori offenders to motivate them to address the 
underlying causes of their offending behaviour; 
 
c) have been operating nationally (male offenders) and locally (women) within the 
Public Prisons Service and the Community Probation Service; 
 
d) are well structured, and incorporated a range of active, passive and interactive 
teaching methods such as haka, waiata and kōrero to help increase responsivity; and 
 
e) are consistent with Corrections legislation. 
 
One particular initiative which provides for assistance prior to release from prison is 
Whare Oranga Ake. This involves the establishment of kaupapa Māori centres to 
reintegrate Māori prisoners back into their communities. This initiative by Minister of 
Māori Affairs, Dr. Peter Sharples, has attracted NZ$19.8 million to build and run two 
16-bed units in Auckland and the Hawkes Bay.724  
 
Integration has been identified as a problem with many prisoners not wanting to 
return to their dysfunctional families and peer groups.725 During a recent visit to the 
Māori Focus Units the lack of support for offenders released into the community was 
identified as the major hurdle facing inmates. If there is no assistance for newly 
released offenders the slide back into an environment that fosters offending and 
                                            
723 Department of Corrections Report on Tikanga Māori Programmes (2010) <www.ssc.govt.nz>. See 
also see Department of Corrections above n 2 ‘Tikanga based programmes share in a budget $100 
million’.  
724 Department of Corrections Whare Oranga Ake (2011) <www.corrections.govt.nz>.  
725 Department of Corrections Māori Focus Leads to Positive Gain (2010) <www.corrections.govt.nz>. 
See also comments by Nigel Latta in Jimmy Ryan Nigel Latta picks lock on prison system  
<www.stuff.co.nz>where he noted that ‘to reduce offending, the issues driving criminal behavior have 
to be resolved... the need for a solid support structure that is there for inmates upon their release, which, 
if not present, can leave them between a lock and a hard place.’ 
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recidivism is inevitable.726 Although newly released offenders do not desire to 
reoffend if they are released into the same environment in which they offended, the 
probability of reoffending is high. On its own, initiatives such as Whare Oranga Ake 
are not enough. Whare Oranga Ake needs to be complemented with a wider education 
and support structure that will encompass the family, community and environment 
into which the offender is released.  
 
It is acknowledged that initial problems with Whare Oranga Ake are inevitable. 
However, this should not stifle the enormous benefit this offers to prisoners re-
integrating into society.  
 
(b) Youth Action Plan 
 
Chester Borrows, the past Associate Justice Minister, released a Youth Action Plan to 
identify three strategies to influence how youth crime should be addressed. This 
initiative includes partnering with communities. In recognising the success of the 
youth justice system, Mr Borrows, as part of the Partnering with Communities 
strategy, announced a NZ$400,000 "innovation fund" to finance community-based 
youth justice initiatives. Further, Mr Borrows notes:727 
 
This plan brings together the gains we've made in youth justice recently, through 
initiatives like our Fresh Start reforms, Policing Excellence, and the Children's Action 
Plan, and looks at the gaps, challenges and opportunities that remain. 
 
Statistics released with the plan indicate a decrease in criminal charge rates, down 
from 2007 (the highest proportion of 116 charged per 10,000 young people), and also 
down from 2011 (with 3,577 charged, representing 86 per 10,000) to 3,016 young 
people charged in court in 2012, which equated to a rate of 74 per 10,000 young 
people.  
 
                                            
726 See Department of Corrections above n 2, ‘the recidivism rates for Māori are higher than any other 
ethnicity in New Zealand and furthermore that within a 12 month period the impact on reoffending and 
prison rehabilitation falls between 0.0 – 3.3 for Māori Focus Units’. 
727 Chester Borrows ‘Action Plan the next step forward for youth justice’ 31 October, 2013 
<www.beehive.govt.nz> 
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Whilst such initiatives and reports may be applauded, these programmes are the 
exception to what is generally available for Māori. Mainstream programmes offered 
by providers lack substance and often contribute to the disproportionate offending 
rates of indigenous peoples, especially for women.728 The Human Rights Commission 
has also suggested that many of these programmes that are focused on individual 
victims and offenders, rather than on broader relationships, are unlikely to satisfy the 
ambitions of those who seek the introduction or extension of programmes based on 
tikanga Māori and further that appropriate programmes should seek legislative 
backing.729  
 
Further, Justice Joe Williams noted recently that despite the current legislative 
mechanisms in place, the judiciary is not being creative enough and is failing to make 
use of these provisions to encourage Māori participation and Māori self-
governance.730 The inclusion of tikanga Māori within our justice system was recently 
considered by the High Court.731 
 
(c) Tikanga Māori in the Criminal Justice System 732 
 
Māori have long advocated that tikanga Māori, the first law of Aoteroa New 
Zealand,733 be meaningfully recognised within the New Zealand legal system. The 
case of R v Mason revisits the applicability of tikanga Māori within our current 
                                            
728 Such as “Preventing Violence in the Home” programme. The Montgomery House violence 
prevention programme is a joint project between the New Zealand Department of Corrections and the 
New Zealand Prisoners’ Aid and Rehabilitation. The programme is an 8-week group based intervention 
established upon social learning and cognitive behavioural principles. Due to concerns the programme 
now includes a Te Whare Tapa Wha aspect that seeking to address te taha tinana (physical), te taha 
hinengaro (psychological), te taha wairua (spiritual), and te taha whanau (familial) needs of all 
residents. See The Montgomery House violence prevention programme <www.corrections.govt.nz>. 
729 Human Rights Commission “Submission to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee on the 
Victims’ Rights Bill, 6 March 2001” at [9] <www.hrc.co.nz>.  
730 See Joseph Williams, Honourable Justice of the High Court of New Zealand “Lex Aotearoa: a 
Heroic Attempt at Mapping the Māori Dimension in Modern New Zealand Law” (Harkness Henry 
Lecture 2013, Te Piringa Faculty of Law, University of Waikato, 7 November 2013). Justice Williams 
was referring to provisions such as s 33 of the Resource Management Act 1991 that allows the transfer 
of powers to iwi from Local Council and ss 8(i) and 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002 that requires the 
Courts to take an offender’s cultural background into account for rehabilitative purposes, and allows 
the court to hear from any person on behalf of the offender thereby recognising that an offender’s 
cultural background may contribute to offending, respectively. 
731 R v Mason [2012] 2 NZLR 695. 
732 This section contains portions of an article already published Valmaine Toki “A Breath of Fresh, or 
Recycled Air – R v Mason” NZLJ (December 2012). 
733 Mikaere, above n 339, at 331–332. See also Ani Mikaere ‘Tikanga as the first law of Aotearoa’ 24 
(2007) Yearbook of NZJ 
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criminal justice system.734 Referring to oral evidence provided by Moana Jackson, 
and writings of Māori academics, Dr Robert Joseph and Matiu Dickson, the case 
provides fertile ground for an invigorated and fresh judicial discussion of an area 
often traversed.  
 
The case involved an application for a ruling to enable the accused charged with 
murder and attempted murder, to be dealt with in accordance with tikanga Māori.  
The court considered that for the appellants to succeed, two distinct propositions 
would need to be met:735 
  
(a) that around the time He Whakaputanga o Nga Hapu o Niu Tireni (the 
Declaration of Independence of 1835) and Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of 
Waitangi 1840), there was a developed Māori legal system (the customary 
system) that could investigate and impose sanctions for serious criminal 
conduct; and 
(b) the customary system continues in force today and represents a parallel 
system of criminal justice by which Māori charged with serious criminal 
offences may elect to be tried. 
 
The second proposition can be split into two further subgroups: 
 
(a)  whether Māori themselves practice tikanga Māori within a criminal   
context; and 
(b)   whether the law of New Zealand allows tikanga Māori to be practiced. 
 
Noting that there was a general acceptance that existing customary practices (tikanga 
Māori) had “the character and authority of law”,736 the court referred to a dispatch 
from Lord Russell, on behalf of the British Government, to instruct Governor Hobson 
to recognise the customs developed by Māori.737 From this point on, the court also 
referred to the form of the 1873 judicial oath and the adoption of the term “usages”, 
                                            
734 Past examples include the current Rangatahi Courts held on a Marae. This seeks to incorporate the 
tikanga of the Marae within the current criminal justice system see R v Mason above n 731, at [41]-
[42]. 
735 R v Mason, above n 731, at [10]. 
736 At [13]. 
737 At [13]. 
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within that oath, as more likely to apply to Māori than the European settlers.738 
Section 71 of the Constitution Act 1852 and the recent cases of Attorney-General v 
Ngati Apa739 and Takamore v Clark740 were also referred to as acknowledging the 
existence of laws, customs and usages of aboriginal or native inhabitants, and Māori 
customary title to land and customs associated with burial, respectively.741  
 
The court found that there was:742 
 
no doubt that before the 1835 Declaration and the Treaty, Māori operated a 
customary system that could deal, for the social purposes of the time, with alleged 
breaches of societal norms of type now characterised as ‘serious crime’.  
 
However, the court notes that the combined effect of ss 5 and 9 of Crimes Act 1961 
extinguished the customary system, so it was not possible to regard the customary 
system as an existing parallel system.743 In doing so the court clearly negated the 
continuance of any customary system by which Māori charged with serious criminal 
offences may elect to be tried. 
 
The court accepted that the first proposition was likely to be satisfied,744 but found it 
more difficult to accept the second proposition, referring to the Crimes Act 1961 as 
extinguishing this ability. 
 
In order to affirm the second proposition, regard must be paid to the first proposition 
together with the existence of any reliance between the two propositions. 
 
The court accepted that at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Māori 
had a developed legal system. For Māori, reliance was placed on the imposed legal 
system to meaningfully recognise their own developed legal system — tikanga Māori. 
                                            
738 At [14]. 
739 Ngati Apa v Attorney General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). 
740 Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587; [2012] 1 NZLR 573 (CA). 
741 R v Mason, above n 731, at [14]. 
742 At [28]. 
743 At [31] and [37]. See also comments by Max Harris ‘More on Mason Cultural factors in sentencing’ 
(2013) Māori Law Review Feb. Available also < maorilawreview.co.nz/2013/02/more-on-mason-
cultural-factors-in-sentencing/>   
744 At [28]. 
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Notwithstanding this reliance, successive Court decisions and legislation have 
negatively impacted and effectively extinguished their legal system. If it was not for 
the Crown’s reluctance to meaningfully accept the Māori’s pre-existing system of 
law, it is highly likely that it would still exist, to the same degree, today.  
 
It is acknowledged that Article III of the Treaty of Waitangi bestows on Māori the 
same rights and privileges of British subjects. However, the Māori text of the Treaty 
of Waitangi (Te Tiriti) guarantees to Māori “nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea, ki 
nga tangata o Ingarangi” (the same customary rights as those given to the British). By 
implication, this bestowal could displace any existing system of law. However, when 
read together with Article I, where Māori arguably have not ceded sovereignty but 
governorship, this displacement is less clear. 
 
If this “reliance” was meaningfully considered by the court, it would follow that the 
second proposition should be rephrased as: 
 
(b) absent the incorrect legal findings745, the customary system would 
have continued in force today, representing a parallel system of criminal 
justice by which Māori charged with serious criminal offences may elect 
to be tried. 
 
The initial direction to acknowledge pre-existing Māori “customs and practices” 
originated from the British Government in 1840.746 This direction was pitted against a 
backdrop of a need to secure land for European settlers. Consistent with this direction, 
early case law indicates the acceptance of existing native customs and practices and 
rights to land at a time when Māori still comprised the majority of the population.747   
 
After the Constitution Act 1852, the judiciary evaded the obligation to continue the 
                                            
745 See Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington where the existing political, social and legal systems by 
Māori were found not to exist.  
746 R v Mason, above n 731, at [13]; Lord Russell was Home Secretary and then Leader of the 
Opposition. 
747 R v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387. 
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application of Māori customary usage and law.748 The seminal case of Wi Parata in 
1877 was decided against a very different backdrop when Māori were no longer the 
majority. Prendergast CJ found that Māori had no “body politic”, reversing any prior 
acknowledgement of tikanga Māori. This finding was reinforced in Rira Peti v 
Ngaraihi Te Paku,749 where Prendergast CJ denied any recognition of Māori custom 
law, despite s 10 of the New Zealand Government Act 1846.750 His Honour stated:751  
 
… The natives are British subjects; their relations to each other are governed by the 
laws of the land, and not by their usages. 
 
This statement was a clear rejection of Māori custom. It was not until 1941 when Te 
Heu Heu Tu Kino v Aotea District Land Board was decided by the Privy Council, that 
recognition of tikanga Māori re-emerged.752 
 
It would be inappropriate to cast aside the 70 years between R v Symonds,753 and Te 
Heuheu Tu Kino v Aotea District Land Board754 without due consideration of the 
detrimental effect on tikanga Māori and Māori land rights. The raft of statutes,755 
consistent with Government’s land acquisition policies, provided legitimate avenues 
for the Crown to continue the alienation process.756 Redress for the wrongful 
acquisition of lands is addressed today through the Treaty Settlement process.  
 
Had it not been for the imposition of a later incorrect legal finding — a finding 
“which can no longer be sustained”757 — tikanga Māori would continue to be in force 
today and would represent a parallel system of criminal justice. It is acknowledged 
that tikanga Māori would have evolved considerably since 1840.  
 
                                            
748 Robert Joseph “The Government of Themselves: Case Law, Policy and Section 71 of the New 
Zealand Constitution Act 1852” (Te Matahauariki Institute Monograph Series, University of Waikato, 
2002) at 54.  
749 Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1889) 7 NZLR 235 as cited in Joseph, above n 748. 
750 Section 10 recognised the laws, customs and usages of Māori in native districts. 
751 Rira Peti v Ngaraihi Te Paku (1889) 7 NZLR 235, 238-9. 
752 Te Heu Heu Tu Kino v Aotea District Land Board [1941] AC 308. 
753 (1847) NZPCC 387. 
754 [1941] AC 308. 
755 See for example Public Works Act 1928. 
756 See discussion in David Williams Te Kooti Tango Whenua (Huia Publishing, Wellington,1999) 
757 R v Mason, above n 731, at [16]. 
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Tikanga Māori is not dependent on a statute for its existence. The failure of our 
current criminal justice system and legislative framework to recognise tikanga Māori 
does not minimise or detract from its existence. Developing case law observes that 
statutes, although addressing the general subject area, do not extinguish certain 
rights.758 In this way the courts have confirmed this position, thus providing a small 
window to import the recognition of tikanga Māori. 
 
In R v Mason, the court noted that:759 
 
… [there is a need to] identify some problems that emerge from both the academic 
literature and the evidence of Mr. Jackson. I identify them by reference to my own 
starting point: nothing should be done to move away from a core criminal justice 
system that is applicable to all New Zealanders. 
 
Had the court turned its mind to the principles that underpin tikanga Māori that share 
similarities with the developing “main stream” initiatives, such as therapeutic 
jurisprudence,760 then perhaps the court might have adopted a different perspective. It 
is difficult to ignore the over-representation of Māori within all stages of the criminal 
justice system. This places a further obligation to meaningfully consider alternative 
discourses that have shown success in comparative jurisdictions. 
 
With the promise of a fresh perspective on a well-worn request, the case delivered a 
recycled argument using different ingredients to reach the same conclusion. 
 
C. Specialist Courts and the New Zealand Judicial System 
 
Courts are the guardians of the rule of law, providing a check and balance on the 
actions of the government and upholding the separation of powers. If the High Court 
were to be replaced by a specialised court, the High Court would become redundant 
and a constitutional conundrum would result.761 This is perceived as an obstacle for 
                                            
758 See Ngati Apa v Attorney General [2003] 3 NZLR 643 (CA) and Paki and Ors v Attorney-General 
of New Zealand for and on behalf of the Crown - [2012] NZSC 50 - Elias CJ, Blanchard, Tipping, 
McGrath and William Young JJ 
759 R v Mason, above n 731, at [46]. 
760 See Winick and Wexler above 164 for discussion. 
761 See also Paul McHugh “Court Structure” Editorial NZLJ August 2001 at 261. 
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the establishment of specialised courts. 
 
The role of a specialist court is largely determined by substantive law and is usually to 
be found in areas where the rule of law is weak and the role of discretion and policy is 
strong.762  The spread or implementation of specialised courts, such as Drug Courts, 
indicate that both practitioners and judges wish to expand the role of discretion and 
that the rule of law is weak.  
 
It is acknowledged there are some compromises to the rule of law when specialised 
courts are implemented. However, if the benefits of specialised courts include the 
reduction of the offending and recidivism rates, then this must outweigh any 
compromise to the rule of law.  
 
(a) Family/Domestic Violence Courts 
 
The repetitive nature of offending in a family violence context suggests that the 
conventional sentencing practices have been ineffective deterrents. Judge Mather 
noted that while recidivism is a feature of general criminal offending, it is particularly 
concerning when one victim (usually a partner or former partner) is the object of 
repeat offending against a number of victims/partners.763 According to Judge Mather, 
it was these concerns, as well as the high failure rate for family violence prosecutions 
due to the refusal, or unwillingness of complainants to give evidence, that led to a 
new approach. This resulted in the establishment of a pilot Family Violence Court at 
Waitakere in 2001. These courts “specifically aim to respond quickly to cases of 
family violence, while ensuring the victims’ safety and encouraging offenders to take 
responsibility for their actions in a coordinated way”.764  
 
The Family Violence Court and the Drug Court have no specific statutory recognition. 
An administrative action allows the judges to specialise procedures in anticipation of 
better outcomes. The continuation of these arrangements is not entrenched in 
                                            
762 At 261. 
763 Judge David Mather “The Waitakere Family Violence Court: A More Focused Approach” (Paper 
presented, 22 October 2005, District Court of New Zealand) <www.justice.govt.nz>.  
764 Elizabeth Richardson, Katey Thom and Brian McKenna “Problem-Solving Courts in New Zealand 
and Australia: A Trans-Tasman Comparative” in Richard Wiener and Eve Brank (eds) Problem Solving 
Courts (Srpinger, USA, 2013) at 193. 
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legislation and reliant on the commitment by the judges, officials or community 
groups. It is suggested that should these specialised courts or a proposed indigenous 
court prove successful then legislation be promulgated and adequate resourcing 
allocated. 
 
In 2004 Judge Johnson called for a new, effective and workable model for processing 
family violence cases in the criminal court.765 Basic certainty should be provided and 
the fear of unknown characteristics should be removed. According to Judge Johnson, 
any new system should provide immediacy of response, safety for victims, 
accountability for guilty defendants, consistency and co-ordination of information 
sharing, and community involvement. There should also be a therapeutic sentencing 
regime, properly balanced by traditional sentences, such as incarceration. In addition, 
the responses should be culturally workable.  
 
Family Violence Courts have been established in Waitakere in 2001, Manukau in 
2005 and Auckland in March 2007. Currently, the Family Violence Courts hear 
criminal cases in eight District Courts, with a dual focus on both the victim and 
offender.766  
 
The attention paid to details, such as venue, rostering, and the communication and 
reflective processes between all the stakeholders (judges, defence bar, duty solicitors, 
family law, probation, victim advisors, Preventing Violence in the Home, prosecution, 
Legal Aid Services and court staff) contribute to the initial success of such a Court. 
As in Canada this continual sharing and communication between the stakeholders is 
viewed as key to the ongoing success.767  
 
Whilst many aspects of the new Family Violence Courts are working well, there are 
fundamental problems that could seriously impede their long-term success.768 One 
                                            
765 Catriona MacLennan “Judge Says Domestic Violence Court Process a ’Masquerade’” (2004) 
Auckland District Law Society Issue 18 <www.adls.org.nz>. 
766 P Boshier (2011). Investing in Life: Meeting the Cost of Family Violence. NZ Lawyer Extra, 39 (25 
Nov 2011). See also Richardson, Thom and McKenna, above n 764, at 193 
767 Judge Lex de Jong “Family Violence Court Forum” (Paper presented to an Auckland District Law 
Seminar, Building, 9th April 2008, Auckland). See also Mills, A.; Thom, K.; Meehan, C. and Chetty, 
M. (2013). Family Violence courts: A Review of the Literature. Auckland: Centre for Mental Health 
Research, 7. 
768 See T Knaggs, F Leahy and N Soboleva ‘The Manukau Family Violence Court: An Evaluation of 
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problem included the stopping violence programmes, as research has found that these 
do not guarantee success.769 It is clear that most family violence occurs under the 
radar of the criminal justice system. The use of s 106 of the Sentencing Act 2002 
(discharge without conviction) is of concern as it provides little in the way of offender 
accountability. In addition, s 106 orders do not leave an accurate record of offending 
which is required in order to make appropriate decisions about future offending.  
 
Finally, there appears to be an emphasis and reliance on the role of the judge.770 First, 
judges take proactive steps to monitor and encourage feedback from the stakeholders, 
thus ensuring the workability of the Family Violence Court. Secondly, judges 
consistently tell offenders that they must take responsibility for their abusive 
behaviour and that crimes of violence towards family members are unacceptable. 
Without firm sentencing directives or Family Violence Court policy guidelines, there 
is no guarantee that all judges who sit in the Family Violence Court will adopt the 
same practices. 
 
According to Judge Lex de Jong, Family Violence Courts are here to stay and over the 
next few years the numbers of such courts will increase.771 Co-operation between the 
stakeholder groups in monitoring the process and consistency from the judiciary are 
keys to the success of the Family Violence Courts. It is suggested that the 
shortcomings identified, such as offender accountability, reliance on stopping 
violence programmes and decisions relating to future offending, can be met through 
the implementation of a tikanga based approach. Notwithstanding this success, 
attributed largely to the role of the judge, the ability to sustain this consistency can be 
problematic. It is suggested that the use of a traditional forum and tikanga practices 
can alleviate this concern. 
 
                                                                                                                             
the Family Violence Court Process’ (August 2008) Ministry of Justice, Wellington, where they note 
that the ‘Manukau Family Violence Court is providing an alternative response to family violence and 
most key informants believed this court’s approach was very positive because it attempted to respond 
to family violence holistically’. 
769 Deborah Mackenzie and Holly Carrington “Monitoring Report for the Auckland Family Violence 
Court The First Three Months 27 March 2007 – 30 June 2007” (Preventing Violence in the Home, 
Auckland, November 2007). 
770 Like many specialist courts a factor of a Family Violence Court is one judge, one court and the use 
of treatment and education programmes.  
771 Judge Lex de Jong, above n 767. 
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(b) Drug Courts 
 
A recent New Zealand study indicated that 80 per cent of crime is driven by alcohol 
and other forms of drugs.772  Alcohol and other forms of drugs feature in 33 per cent 
of all fatal road crashes and in 21 per cent of serious injury crashes with a social cost 
of $875 million, including costs for minor injuries. 773 The victims’ costs are estimated 
at $400 million each year, and for alcohol and other forms of drugs, the overall cost to 
society is $6.88 billion.774 In referring to recent statistics, a former Labour spokesman 
for the courts, Rick Barker noted: 775  
 
The cost per year per prisoner is $91,000;776 $44 million per year could be saved by 
reducing recidivism from its current rate of 68 per cent (74 per cent for Māori) to 20 
per cent; and only 6.1 per cent of the Department of Corrections budget goes to 
‘reintegration’, almost none of which is for low-level offenders. 
 
Taken in context there are clear reasons for their introduction, according to Hon. 
Peggy Fulton Hora, Judge of the Superior Court of California (Ret.), we have ‘Drug 
Courts’ because:777  
 
Alcohol, other drugs and crime is [sic] too broad for any single agency to tackle 
alone, incarceration doesn’t prevent crime for those with substance use disorders; and 
Drug courts bring judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, court personnel, probation 
and treatment providers together to solve the problem. 
 
In New Zealand there are two drug courts that operate within the youth justice system. 
One is based in Christchurch and focuses on enhancing the treatment of offenders 
                                            
772 See Gerald Waters “The Case for Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment Courts in New Zealand” 
(2011) <www.drugcourts.co.nz  
773 See Gerald Waters “The Case for Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment Courts in New Zealand” 
(2011) <www.drugcourts.co.nz>.  
774 Walters, above n 694.  
775 Rick Barker, cited in Waters above n 694, at 14. See also New Zealand Labour Party Barker Asks 
Committee to Hold Recidivism Inquiry (press release, 15 December 2010) <www.scoop.co.nz >. See 
also positive comments made by Rick Barker on Drug Courts in New Zealand Labour Party ‘A Pilot 
isn’t a Policy’ (press release, 20 October 2011 < www.scoop.co.nz>. 
776 See Department of Corrections Men’s Prison at Wiri: Facts and Factsheets (2014) 
<www.corrections.govt.nz>.  
777 Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora Judge of the Superior Court of California (Ret.) “Adult Alcohol and Other 
Drug Treatment Courts: Will They Work in New Zealand?” (Seminar given at University of Auckland, 
School of Law, 28 April 2011). 
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who have a serious drug dependency that has contributed to their repeated 
offending.778 The other is based in Auckland for ‘at risk’ youth with mental health 
and/or drug and alcohol issues, called the Intensive Monitoring Group.779  
 
Appearances before these two courts are accepted following recommendations from 
FGCs.  To be eligible the youth must be a repeat offender and exhibit a moderate to 
serious drug dependency.780 These courts, like other specialised courts, hold the 
offender accountable, whilst addressing the concerns and interests of the victims. The 
victim has opportunities to attend the initial FGC and together with the other 
stakeholders, including police, court staff and health agencies, will assist in the 
development of a treatment plan for the offender. After the successful completion of 
the treatment plan, balance or healing should be realised for the offender, victim and 
community.  
 
A pilot Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment Court has been established in Waitakere. 
Again it is still early days, but it is suggested that, following international trends, 
some degree of success will be expected. A recent documentary on Māori Television 
of the pilot Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment Court suggests that the pilot is 
achieving success and if the offender successfully completes their treatment the 
probability of re-offending is low.781 
 
(c) Māori Land Court782 
 
The Māori Land Court was established in 1865 as the Native Land Court of New 
Zealand with the primary purpose of changing title from Māori ancestrally owned 
land into individual titles to generate land availability for settlers. This purpose has 
now changed where the general objective of the Court is to retain Māori land and 
ensure its effective use.783  
                                            
778 Richardson, Thom and McKenna above n 764, at 190. 
779 At 190 
780 Becroft, above n 120. 
781 ‘Drug Court’ Māori Television screened Monday 1 September, 2014. 
https://www.maoritelevision.com/tv/shows/pakipumeka-aotearoa-new-zealand-
documentaries/S01E001/drug-court 
782 See also Chapter VII ‘A New Framework’ for a discussion on a possible extension of the Māori 
Land Court jurisidiction to include criminal and civil cases. 
783 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, s 17. 
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The jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court does not extend to criminality, but involves 
claims in law or equity related to the ownership of Māori freehold land, claims to 
recover damages for trespass to Māori freehold and to determine any proceedings 
founded on contract or tort where the damage relates to Māori freehold land.784 
Nonetheless, Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 adheres to tikanga Māori values 
throughout. For instance, there is a provision for additional members to be called 
upon when the matter referred is one of tikanga Māori.785 In light of the legislative 
inclusion of tikanga Māori within the Act, if the jurisdiction of the Court was 
expanded to initially include summary offences and available also to non-Māori, 
similar to the marae based Courts, this potentially provides a basis for an indigenous 
court. 
 
(d) Children and Young Persons Families Act 1989 – Youth Court  
 
The Youth Court is a division of the District Court786 and hears most criminal cases 
involving young people between the ages of 14 and 16, including serious offences.787 
The public are generally excluded788 as youth are seen as “less responsible than adults 
and may have offended as a result of disadvantage, or deficiencies in their 
background”.789 Further public access may impact negatively on rehabilitation for the 
offender. 
 
Upon first appearance the young person is asked to plead ‘denied’ or ‘not denied’. If 
not denied then the Judge will adjourn the case to allow a Family Group Conference 
(FGC) to be convened.790 As long as the youth admits the offence, the FGC then has 
the task of agreeing on the appropriate actions and or sanctions that should result and 
                                            
784 Section 17. 
785 Section 32. 
786 Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 s 329. See also recent presentation by Judge 
Becroft ‘Signed, sealed (but not yet fully) delivered’ at the Judges at the Healing Courts and Plans 
People, International Therapeutic Jurisprudence Conference October 9 – 10, First Nations Long House, 
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. 
787 See Institute of Judicial Studies Youth Court Bench Book (3rd ed, Institute of Judicial Studies, 
Wellington, 2008) for an example as cited by Yvette Tinsley and Elisabeth McDonald ‘Is there any 
other way? Possible alternatives to the current criminal justice process’ vol 17, 2011, Canterbury Law 
Review, 204. 
788 Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 s 258 (d).  
789 New Zealand Law Commission Seeking Solutions Options for change to the New Zealand Court 
System December 2002 Preliminary Paper 52, 149.  
790 Children Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 s 258 (d) and 259 (1). 
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subsequent recommendations are provided to the court.791 A FGC can be ordered by 
the Judge at any stage of the proceedings if the Judge deems it warranted.792 
 
If the charge is denied then a court date is set and the matter proceeds to a defended 
hearing. If the offence is proved, the Judge will adjourn the case and refer it to a 
FGC,793 which will decide how the youth should be dealt with and provide 
recommendations to the court.794 The Judge is not bound by these recommendations 
but must have regard for them.795 
 
If the requirements of the FGC have been satisfied within the agreed timeframe, the 
case is usually discharged.796However, the Judge makes further orders where the FGC 
plan has not been completed successfully, such as imposing a fine, disqualification of 
driving or community work.797 
 
Although there is no explicit mention of restorative justice in the CYPF Act, McElrea 
categorises three elements of the CYPF Act as restorative in nature. First, “the 
transfer of state power from the courts to the family and community; second, group 
consensus decision-making in the FGC; and third, the involvement of victims leading 
up to a healing process”. 798 
 
Notwithstanding the positive effect and inclusion of FGC in the court process, the 
current legal system sidelines the essence of tikanga Māori in favour of a law devoid 
of, and not grounded in indigenous values. Indigenous peoples, such as Māori, are 
unduly susceptible to government interference. Those who first created and 
administered the law did not ensure that indigenous people were granted the necessary 
                                            
791 At s 258 (d). 
792 At s 281B. 
793 At s 247 (e). 
794 At s 258 (d). 
795 At s 279. 
796 At s 282 or 283 (a). 
797 At s 283 for full list. 
798 F W M McElrea ‘A New Model of Justice’ in F W M McElrea and B J Brown (eds) The Youth 
Court in New Zealand: Four Papers (Legal Research Foundation, Auckland, 1993) as cited by Yvette 
Tinsley and Elisabeth McDonald ‘Is there any other way? Possible alternatives to the current criminal 
justice process’ vol 17, 2011, Canterbury Law Review, 204  
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structures to maintain and promote their identity against the assimilative pressures of 
the majority.799 
 
The absence of provisions to protect indigenous rights has resulted in an unacceptable 
socio-economic status for indigenous peoples within a generally prosperous society.  
 
Despite the statistics that indicate indigenous people are disproportionately 
represented in the criminal justice system, unlike Australia, New Zealand has not yet 
developed or proposed an indigenous court to address this issue. The recent initiative 
to establish a Drug Court in Auckland builds on the presence of the existing Drug 
Court in Christchurch. The drugs courts and marae based courts, as alternatives to the 
Youth Court, are the only other specialised courts in New Zealand with respect to 
criminal offending.  
 
The underlying philosophy of the Drug Court model is therapeutic jurisprudence. This 
approach recognises that the court processes, and in particular, the role of the judge 
can be used to facilitate treatment processes. Reports indicate that the rate of 
offending was lower for young people who attended the Youth Drug Court. 800 The 
key feature was the consistency of appearing before the same judge on a regular basis. 
The recent justice initiative of ‘marae based courts’ provides an interesting 
alternative. 
 
(e) Marae Based Courts – Ngā Kooti Rangatahi801 
 
The call for an alternative criminal justice system for Māori is not new. In 1988 Puao 
Te Ata Tu stated that:802 
 
Māori law observance depended on the maintenance of the mores of communal 
society. The Western Response … was individuals distanced from their communities 
but later to be inflicted back on them … It is not suggested that the old Māori ways 
                                            
799 John Borrows Drawing Out the Law (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2010) at 21. 
800 Ministry of Justice Publications and Reports (2004) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
801 I am grateful to Judge Heemi Taumaunu for the opportunity to visit and attend the recent sitting of 
Te Kooti Rangatahi at Waipareira in December 2013. 
802 The Report of the Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Māori perspective for the Department of 
Social Welfare (Wellington, 1988) at 74 <www.msd.govt.nz>. 
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should now be restored, but that ought not inhibit the search for a greater sense of 
family and community involvement and responsibility in the maintenance of law and 
order. 
 
The marae based courts originated from the Marae Youth Monitoring Court as a 
specialist Youth Court. The initiative to convene a specialised problem-solving Youth 
Court sitting at Poho-o-Rawiri Marae, Gisborne was piloted by Judge Heemi 
Taumaunu in 2008. There are now 12 operating in the North Island and the first South 
Island marae based court was opened in Christchurch on 28 April 2014 with the first 
sitting. Former Minister Chester Borrows commented that:803 
 
… the establishment of the latest court is a positive step for addressing youth 
offending in Christchurch. I want to congratulate Judge Taumanu and Principal 
Youth Court Judge Andrew Becroft, who have driven the successful expansion of the 
Rangatahi court programme, and thank them once for their commitment to helping 
our young people who have lost their way. 
 
Marae based courts are an initiative of the judiciary that builds on existing 
programmes for offenders804 and are informed by the Koori Courts in Australia.805  
 
This is the first time that a New Zealand Court has conducted criminal cases on a 
marae within the jurisdiction of the Youth Court. Most offenders referred to the 
programme are Māori and the process incorporates Māori tikanga (customs and 
protocols).  
 
The judges of Ngā Kooti Rangatahi consider that “rangatahi (youth) offending is 
related to lack of self-esteem, a confused sense of self identity and a strong sense of 
                                            
803 See New Zealand Law Society “First South Island Rangatahi Court for Christchurch” (24 March 
2014) <www.my.lawsociety.org.nz>. 
804 For example Te Whānau Āwhina programme, a restorative justice programme that involves the 
voluntary participation of the victim of the crime and the offender and whānau in discussions, usually 
within a marae setting, to "restore" the relationship, fix the damage that has been done and prevent 
further crimes from occurring. 
805 Evaluation of the early outcomes of Ngā Kooti Rangatahi. Submitted to the Ministry of Justice 17 
December 2012 at 8. 
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resentment which in turn leads to anger and ultimately leads to offending”.806 Judge 
Bidois noted:807 
 
Most offending is feelings based. Resentment, anger, greed, and hate are common 
feelings that motivate offending. To change an offender one therefore needs to 
change how they feel. The best way to encourage this change is to place the offender 
in a community of people who understand and recognise his or her feelings, but who 
also have the power and respect to alter those feelings. With understanding comes a 
commitment to accept the burden of punishment and with support comes the 
commitment to accept the burden of rehabilitation. There needs to be inclusion rather 
than exclusion to effect change. This process can be achieved on a marae.  
 
The ability to reconnect the offender with their identity and whānau is seen to 
contribute positively to the success of the process. The ultimate outcome for the judge 
is “for the rangatahi to be empowered to achieve their potential”.808 Challenges 
including adequate resourcing and continuing support by the whānau and wider 
community, however, will influence the outcome.809 According to Judge Clark:810 
 
Of course Te Kooti Rangatahi cannot ‘just’ happen. We rely heavily on the support of 
a number of people and organisations. Kirikiriroa Marae and marae whānau, the kuia, 
the kaumatua and the trustees have been all embracing of this initiative. The Courts, 
Ministry of Justice, Child Youth and Family, Police Youth Services, Iwi Liaison 
Officers, Iwi Social Services, Programme Providers, Youth Advocates and our Lay 
Advocate are all critical to this initiative happening to give our rangatahi and their 
whānau the opportunity to have cases heard in arguably a more appropriate way and 
with the opportunity for greater rangatahi whānau and community engagement and 
involvement. 
 
                                            
806 At 8 – 9.  
807 At 25. 
808 At 9. 
809 See also Study by the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples ‘Access to justice in 
the promotion of indigenous peoples, restorative justice, indigenous juridical systems and access to 
justice for indigenous women, children and youth, and persons with disabilties’ A/HRC/27/65 August 
2014 that notes ‘An additional crucial hurdle is the financing of indigenous juridical systems. Without 
sufficient resources, these systems are not sustainable and their contribution to ensuring access to 
justice is compromised.’ 




The marae process is open to all, providing a possibility that non-Māori may also seek 
to be heard in this process. Although Ngā Kooti Rangatahi are designed specifically to 
support tikanga Māori, they are available to any young person, regardless of their 
ethnicity or identity. There is no mandatory requirement for young people to be dealt 
with on the marae. If this option is not sought, the normal Youth Court process 
applies. 
 
Before the consideration of a marae as a venue, the process adheres to the normal 
Youth Court procedures. Upon appearance at the Youth Court, the rangatahi is 
assigned an advocate and the case is remanded.  
 
The charges are usually for lower level offending; for instance, burglary, unlawful 
interference with motor vehicles, traffic offences, shoplifting, theft and wilful 
damage. However, more serious charges, including aggravated robbery and cases of 
serious offending by 12 and 13 year olds, may also be heard. 
 
The charge is usually not denied or admitted in the normal manner in the Youth 
Court. If the charge is admitted, a lay advocate is still appointed.  
 
A Family Group Conference (FGC) is convened and held in the normal manner where 
the young person who has offended and their family, victim, agencies, social worker 
and advocate discuss and approve a FGC plan. The aim of the plan is to encourage the 
young person to accept responsibility for their actions, find practical ways to rectify 
the situation, ascertain why they have offended and how amends can be made.812 The 
marae hearings are designed to monitor the young person's performance of the FGC 
plan and also to sentence the young person on completion of the FGC plan. If the 
victim disagrees with the referral to Ngā Kooti Rangatahi, the rangatahi will not be 
referred. The presiding judge, after considering the FGC plan, will make the final 
decision on the eligibility of the rangatahi to have their case monitored by Ngā Kooti 
                                            
811 Judge Heemi Taumaunu ‘Te Kooti Rangatahi o Hoani Waititi Ka pu te ruha, ka hao te rangatahi!’ 
(2010) unpublished. 
812 See Ministry of Justice Rangatahi Court: Evaluation of the Early Outcomes of Te Kooti Rangatahi 
(17 December, 2012) at 21. 
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Rangatahi. If the referral is accepted, the rangatahi is remanded until the next sitting 
date. Whilst on remand the rangatahi is encouraged to learn their whakapapa (family 
tree) and pepeha (sayings) to inform the judge when they appear before him or her.813 
Unlike the Koori Courts in Australia, the presiding judge does not meet with the Elder 
and Respected Persons (ERP) to discuss the list commencing each morning.  
 
Similar to the Koori Courts and in accordance with Māori protocol, the marae 
hearings begin with a pōwhiri (a formal Māori welcome) that is initiated on the 
morning of the court hearing. A kuia (respected female elder) stands outside the 
whare nui (traditional meeting house) and calls the judge, court staff, lawyers, social 
workers, lay advocates, respected elders, as well as young people appearing and their 
families onto the marae. The pōwhiri is supported by the tangata whenua (local 
people). 
 
A kuia from the visitor group will respond to the call of welcome. All those present 
then move inside the whare nui where formal speeches are conducted. Once the 
formalities are completed, everyone proceeds to the dining hall for a cup of tea.  
 
The court then convenes and the proceedings commence inside the whare nui. The 
kaumatua (respected elder), who also assists in the Marae Court process, then recites a 
karakia (a prayer). When each case is called, the kaumātua, who sits next to the judge, 
will give a specific speech of welcome to the young person and their family.  
 
The young person is encouraged to respond to the welcome by saying a mihi (a Māori 
speech). This is aimed at re-establishing the young person in their identity as a Māori.  
The young person and his or her family are invited to participate fully in the hearing, 
as are all of the professionals. Together with the whānau (families), hapū (sub-tribes) 
and iwi (tribes), solutions are actively sought with the co-operation of agencies.  
 
Additional applicable principles include holding the young person accountable for 
their actions, ensuring the victim’s issues and interests are recognised and addressing 
                                            
813 At 21. 
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the underlying causes of the offending behaviour. The ultimate goal is to keep 
communities safer by reducing recidivism.   
 
The judge will then sum up the proceeding by noting the next date for appearance of 
the rangatahi. At the completion of the hearing, whānau members are invited to 
address the rangatahi.  
 
The hearing concludes with the kaumātua and judge participating in a hongi (a 
pressing of noses symbolising the meeting of mauri) with the young person and their 
families, and finally a karakia. This is in accordance with Māori protocol. 
 
Holding the process in the whare nui on the marae is a positive step. It provides an 
environment that seeks to reconnect the offender with their culture and community. 
The implementation of the Māori language, tikanga Māori (Māori practices and 
protocols) into the court process further consolidates this reconnection. Encouraging 
the offender to be accountable and addressing the underlying reasons for offending 
also contribute to the positive nature of marae based courts. The environment of the 
marae has engendered the ability for rangatahi to engage, with one rangatahi 
noting:814 
 
It’s easier to stand up in court cause [sic] you feel like everyone is your family. You’re  
able to let it out. Go hard – let it out. Youth Court is a cold court. The judges and lawyers - 
everyone is more subdued and long faced. We all share kai here. It makes a huge difference to 
how you feel. A far better process. When we hongi we are connecting our mana to one 
another. It’s less tense. Obviously we are willing to speak a bit freer, more comfortable. (Male 
rangatahi) 
 
The criminal justice system should be applauded for seeking a creative path to assist 
Māori youth offending. However, tikanga Māori and the realm of Te Ao Māori are far 
more complex than expressed in the current marae-based court process.815  
 
The marae based procedure is time consuming and lengthy thus restricting the ability 
to effectively reduce the long hearing lists. This would need to be factored in and 
                                            
814 Ministry of Justice, above n 812, at 36. 
815 Matiu Dickson “The Rangatahi Court” [2011] 19 Waikato Law Review at 86 – 107. 
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economically weighed against the costs of incarceration if a marae based indigenous 
court was to be established. 
 
(ii) Case Study816 
A 14-year-old who has admitted a charge of graffiti crime stands before Judge Heemi 
Taumaunu. 
“Have you got your mihi ready to go today?” the judge asks. 
“No.” 
“I’m sure we can help your maunga” 
“My what?” 
“Your maunga.” 
“Not too sure.” 
“You knew it last time. Have you forgotten it?” the judge says, referring to the boy’s 
previous appearance on the same charge in May. 
“Yep.” 
“What’s the name of your marae?” 
“I dunno.” 
“Have you ever been to it?” 
“Nah.”  
Kaumatua Denis Hansen, who sits alongside the judge, stands and recites the entire 
mihi, naming the boy’s mountain, river, marae, iwi and hapū. 
Then he tells the boy: “Lunch is at one o’clock. Don’t go away after that. You’re 
going to have a bit of whakapapa education.” 
                                            
816 Marty Sharp “Rangatahi Courts: A Quiet Revolution in Teen Justice” Newswire (online, New 
Zealand, October 2011) <www.newswirenz.wordpress.com>. 
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“Matua will teach you your mihi,” the judge says. “After that you can go away. 
We’re going to see a lot of improvement next time. We expect that from you. I expect 
you to be able to say the mihi the kaumatua just said to you,” the judge says. 
He says that the boy, who is Ngati Kahu, needs more monitoring. 
The boy’s advocate, Steve Trent, says he has improved attendance of his alternative 
education course, turning up 80 per cent of the time. 
What was …[a] zero attendance a few months ago, the judge [now] … expects 100 
per cent attendance and [enquires] … why this is not happening. The boy says he has 
lost his bus pass. 
When the boy first appeared, he was sentenced to 80 hours community work, and was 
ordered to attend courses on life skills as well as alternative education. He was also 
put under a 24-hour curfew. 
It transpired that he had not been completing his community work. 
After a brief conversation involving elders, a social worker and the judge, a kaumatua 
volunteers to collect the boy from his home each weekend to bring him to the marae 
where he can carry out his community work. The kaumatua says this will also provide 
an opportunity for him to teach the boy his mihi. 
Judge Taumaunu is pleased with that and adds that it has been three months since the 
boy last offended. He remands him on bail to reappear on October 6.  
(iii) Evaluation 
 
Offences before the marae based court system are confined to those perpetrated by 
youth.  
 
While the Rangatahi Court process is focused on Māori youth, both Māori and non-
Māori are eligible. This is an attempt to overcome the perception that separate 
procedures or special treatment have been instituted. It is suggested that this should 
also apply to any indigenous court that is established. 
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The key findings of the recent Rangatahi Court Evaluation Report noted:817 
 
Rangatahi reported experiencing positive outcomes as a result of their engagement 
with Ngā Kooti Rangatahi. The outcomes reported by rangatahi were consistent with 
the views of youth justice professionals and the observations of the evaluation team. 
 
The significant factors of success included the marae as a venue, the positive impact 
of kaumatua on the rangatahi, the impact of the lay advocates, and the collective 
commitment of the participants.818 A fuller explanation of the actual outcomes noted 
that:819 
 
the levels of attendance by rangatahi and whanau were high and rangatahi felt 
welcome and respected. Rangatahi experienced a sense of pride and achievement as a 
result of delivering their pepeha and felt better connected to their culture. Rangatahi 
understood the court process showing improved behavior and positive attitude, taking 
responsibility for their offending and its impact. When nearing the end of the FGC 
monitoring process rangatahi showed improved communication skills. 
 
Notwithstanding the recognition of tikanga, the underlying principle that applies to 
this approach is not based on tikanga, but on the law; that is, to honour and apply the 
objects and principles in the Children and Young Persons Act 1989. Although this 
project represents an attempt to incorporate Māori tikanga within the law, it is not 
designed to abandon the law and start a tikanga-based court. That is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Rangatahi Court.  
 
When tikanga is placed under the auspices of legislation, the robust nature of any 
tikanga-based outcome will become compromised.820 Further, if the kawa (protocol) 
or tikanga is not one to which they adhere, this may undermine the respect that any 
                                            
817 Ministry of Justice, above n 812, at 9. 
818 Ministry of Justice, above n 812, at 60 as cited in NZ Lawyer Magazine Issue 200 (25 Jan 2013) 
<www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz>.  
819 Ministry of Justice, above n 812, at 10. 
820 Primarily because the decision maker inevitably will be non-Māori and also when concepts are 
translated the meaning can be lost. See N Tomas ‘Māori Concepts of Rangatiratanga, Kaitiakitanga the 
Environment and Property Rights’ in David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor ‘Legal Aspects of Sustainable 
Development Property Rights and Sustainability The Evolution of Property Rights to meet Ecological 
Challenges’ (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011, Netherlands) 219 – 249. 
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offender or whānau will have for an outcome based on a hybrid process. At this stage 
it is not clear whether such concerns have been addressed. 
 
It is difficult to overlay two different worldviews; that of Te Ao Pākehā over Te Ao 
Māori.821 There are questions about how to handle urban Māori who do not identify 
with tikanga or the notion of the collective, and where they fit in a marae court 
process.822 One might also ask, which kawa (protocol) is to be adopted during the 
marae court process? The local marae protocol, that of a court, or a protocol with 
elements of both? What if the kawa of the offender does not align with the kawa of 
the marae court process? If the process is to be a marae process, then this implies that 
a kaumatua, rather than a judge, should lead the process. In such a situation, if a 
person who does not affiliate with the marae or the offender leads the process, this is a 
slight and a trampling on the mana (ancestral power) of the kaumatua and the whānau. 
 
Ideally, the kaumatua should be connected to the offender through whakapapa as it is 
the kaumatua who holds the responsibility for the offender. It is difficult to understand 
how, in a marae court, the judge can have the same status as a kaumatua, when there 
is no whakapapa connection or kin-based sense of responsibility.823  
 
In smaller communities, such as the hapū (sub tribe) of Ngati Rehua on Aotea (Great 
Barrier Island), this is even more pronounced. Primarily because in these small 
communities, kuia and kaumatua are often intimately linked to the offender and a 
judge is effectively viewed as an outsider, attracting a lesser standing. In this instance 
it is difficult for the offender to respect the judge as the offender often perceives their 
kuia or kaumatua as having the mana (prestige) not the judge. And further, the marae 
is his tūrangawaewae (place to stand) and not that of the judge. 
 
                                            
821 Nin Tomas above. 
822 See discussion Juan Tauri “Reforming Justice the Potential of Māori Processes” in Eugene 
McLaughlin, and others (eds) Restorative Justice Critical Issues (Sage Publications, London, 2003). 
823 See also discussion in New Zealand Law Commission Converging Currents (NZLC SP 17, 
Wellington, 2006), at 207 where it notes that ‘Although expatriate judges are cultural outsiders which 
may make this task more challenging, some national judges may be cultural outsiders too. In countries 
with a multiplicity of different customs it is just as difficult for a local judge from a different part of the 
country to rule on matters of custom as it is for an expatriate judge.’ 
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According to Matiu Dickson:824 
… Judges are doing the kaumatua's job and thus taking away the last bastion of 
Māori ownership of the process. 
On a marae, he says, all decisions are made by people who are affiliated to the marae, 
but the final decision rests with the kaumatua who hold the mana of the pā … the 
marae community should have the right to decide how low-risk young offenders are 
dealt with. 
Although anecdotal evidence and the Rangatahi Court Evaluation Report indicate 
some level of success for marae based courts, and this initiative should be applauded, 
concerns still exist.  Dickson stipulates two conditions that should be satisfied prior to 
the establishment of a marae based court: that the court should “retain mana and 
authority for decisions made concerning the young offender”, and that “the young 
offender should be connected by whakapapa to the marae”.825 The use of the marae as 
a forum will attract respective kawa of the relevant iwi group. However, there are 
concerns when court protocol can supercede the kawa of the marae.826 
 
Marae courts build on the precedent of the Koori Courts in Australia, but do not tackle 
the root problems of indigenous offending, such as the legacy of government 
oppression and the effects of colonisation. 827 This is a view shared by Marchetti and 
Daly, who state:828  
 
any effort to address the over-representation of Indigenous people in the criminal 
justice system must also confront a legacy of government policies and practices over 
the past two centuries, which systematically disadvantaged and oppressed Indigenous 
people. 
 
                                            
824 “Judges Doing Kaumatua’s Job in Youth Courts” Radio NZ (online, New Zealand, 13 October 
2011). <www.radionz.co.nz>.  
825 Dickson, above n 815. 
826 Judge Stephanie Milroy ‘Nga Tikanga Māori and the Courts’ (2007) Yearbook of NZJ, 18 where she 
notes can one feel comfortable telling a kaumatua (elder) to sit down as it is not his turn to speak? 
827 See discussion in Juan Tauri and R Webb “A Critical Appraisal of Responses to Māori Offending” 
(2012) 3(4) The International Indigenous Policy Journal. 
828 Elena Marchetti and Kate Daly, ‘Indigenous Sentencing Courts: Towards a Theoretical and 
Jurisprudential Model’ (2007) 29(3) Sydney Law Review 415 at 443. 
 194 
Also, these courts may place further strain on indigenous communities who are 
already affected by economic marginalisation and have few social services/resources. 
Often kuia and kaumatua voluntarily contribute their time and efforts to this process, 
thus compounding the economic strain on small indigenous communities. Unlike the 
Koori Courts where ERPs are statutorily appointed and are paid a sitting fee, the kuia 
and kaumatua from the marae based courts are not.  
 
Having regard to the growing success of these courts and the subsequent increase in 
numbers of both offenders accessing this court and courts themselves, the economic 
impact this will have on small regional communities will only be exacerbated. It is 
notable that the Rangatahi Court Evaluation Report provides positive outcomes for 
the participants. Although hard statistical data on recidivism rates is notably absent, 
the former Minister of Justice, Judith Collins, announced that the government’s 
Drivers of Crime progress report indicated that the offending rates for Māori youth 
between 2008 and 2012 had decreased by 32 per cent.829  
 
Notwithstanding the critique, if a marae based court led by a kaumatua who was 
linked by whakapapa to the offender can reduce the offending and recidivism rates for 
Māori, this would contribute to confronting the legacy of government policies and 
practices that have systemically disadvantaged indigenous people. This would result 
in Māori administering tikanga values, imbuing a sense of identity for the offender 
with the aim of achieving balance in the individual and within the community. 
Further, if successful, these courts should be adequately resourced to, at the minimum, 
alleviate the strain on the marae and accompanying support people who currently 
provide these services voluntarily.  
 
Judge Andrew Becroft recently noted that:830 
 
his [Rangatahi Court] is a significant step and there is much overseas interest. That 
said, I am concerned that in this evolutionary development of Rangatahi Courts the 
community understands more clearly what Rangatahi Courts are and what they aren’t. 
                                            
829 Judith Collins and Pita Sharples “Youth Māori Offending Down 32 per cent” (press release, 20 
August 2013) <www.beehive.govt.nz>. See also Drivers of Crime Progress Report December 2012 
Cabinet Social Policy Committee  
830 The Rangatahi Newsletter “Special Edition: Rangatahi Courts Hui” at 2 <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
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They are not a fully-fledged separate youth justice system, and neither are they a 
sentencing Court [emphasis added]. None of those involved in Rangatahi Courts 
(Judges included) are ‘imposing a sentence’ as is the process in an adult Court. Those 
Rangatahi who come to a marae have already undergone a family group conference 
and it is that conference that has set in place a comprehensive plan to ensure the 
young person is held to account and that the causes of his/her offending are 
addressed [emphasis added]. In the youth justice system (unlike the adult system) the 
quality of the response to a young person’s offending will usually stand or fall on the 
quality and appropriateness of the family group conference plan. In most cases, it is 
FGC plan which is accepted by the Youth Court as constituting the complete and the 
appropriate intervention. The Youth Court imposes no ‘sentence’ as such other than 
approving the FGC plan. In a few cases where there can be no agreement as to the 
components of the plan or the offending is too serious the Court will need to impose a 
formal Youth Court order which can include a conviction and transfer of the young 
person to the District Court. But the Rangatahi Court process is reserved for those 
young people who admit their offending and who have an appropriate family group 
conference plan in place [emphasis added]. The Rangatahi Court aims to ensure that 
this plan is completed and the young person and their family are supported during 
their journey to fulfil every aspect of the plan. In this sense, the Rangatahi Court is 
not a sentencing Court, but it is a Court that helps empower and galvanise a 
community based response to the young person’s offending [emphasis added]; it 
supports and monitors all the components of the family group conference plan 
formulated in response to the young person’s offending. 
 
We have much to learn. We will doubtless make many mistakes as we continue to 
develop and adjust the Rangatahi Court role and process. But we have begun a 
journey that we cannot retreat from. To change metaphors, we are all on something of 
a wave that is now bigger than any of us. We are now riding that wave to its 
conclusion, and landfall can only be when the disproportionate rates between Māori 
and non-Māori in the youth justice process are eliminated. 
 
It may be the case that these courts will achieve a transformation of the law in a way 





(f) Matariki Courts 
 
In Kaikohe an initiative led by the former Chief Judge of the District Court, the late 
Judge Johnson, was the establishment of a Matariki Court. This specialist court, 
which opened in February 2012, deals with cases involving adult Māori offenders, 
both prior to sentencing and in potential sentencing options, by focusing on ss 27 and 
25 of the Sentencing Act 2002. Of interest is the ability of this court to consider 
sentencing when the offender has commited a serious violent offence.831  
 
Importantly, this court has the support and involvement of the local iwi, Nga Puhi and 
Te Mana o Ngāpuhi Kowhao Rau (TMONK), who work with the offender to address 
the underlying issues during the sentencing phase. By December 2012 four hearings 
had been held. 
 
Section 27 stipulates: 832 
If an offender appears before a court for sentencing, the offender may request the court to 
hear any person or persons called by the offender to speak on— 
(a) the personal, family, whānau, community, and cultural background of the 
offender: 
(b) the way in which that background may have related to the commission of the 
offence: 
                                            
831 Williams above n 730. The Crimes Act 1961 section 2 defines a serious violent offence as any 
offence— 
(a) that is punishable by a period of imprisonment for a term of 7 years or more; and 
(b) where the conduct constituting the offence involves— 
(i) loss of a person's life or serious risk of loss of a person's life; or 
(ii) serious injury to a person or serious risk of serious injury to a person; or 
(iii) serious damage to property in circumstances endangering the physical safety of 
any person; or 
(iv) perverting the course of justice, where the purpose of the conduct is to prevent, 
seriously hinder, or seriously obstruct the detection, investigation, or prosecution of 
any offence— 
832 Judge David Carruthers “Community Involvement in Treatment of Offenders Prior to Sentencing: 
The New Zealand Experience” (paper presented to UNAFEI 147th International Training Conference, 
Japan, 13 January – 10 February 2010) <www.unafei.or.jp/english>. 
 197 
(c) any processes that have been tried to resolve or that are available to resolve, issues 
relating to the offence, involving the offender and his or her family, whānau, or 
community and the victim or victims of the offence: 
(d) how support from the family, whānau, or community may be available to help 
prevent further offending by the offender: 
(e) how the offender's background, or family, whānau, or community support may be 
relevant in respect of possible sentences.  
This provides a chance for the offender’s whānau, hapū and iwi to address the court.  
 
Section 25 stipulates: 
Power of adjournment for inquiries as to suitable punishment 
(1) A court may adjourn the proceedings in respect of any offence after the offender 
has been found guilty or has pleaded guilty and before the offender has been 
sentenced or otherwise dealt with for any 1 or more of the following purposes: 
(a) to enable inquiries to be made or to determine the most suitable method of 
dealing with the case: 
(b) to enable a restorative justice process to occur: 
(c) to enable a restorative justice agreement to be fulfilled: 
(d) to enable a rehabilitation programme or course of action to be undertaken: 
(da) to determine whether to impose an instrument forfeiture order and, if so, 
the terms of that order: 
(e) to enable the court to take account of the offender's response to any 
process, agreement, programme, or course of action referred to in paragraph 
(b), (c), or (d). 
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The programme offers four options for the offender, ranging from no involvement 
with sentencing proceeding to full involvement with both the victim and offender 
participating and completing participation prior to sentence. The four options are: 833 
 
Option 1 – the defendant declines a section 27 hearing then the sentencing process 
would proceed in the usual way. 
  
Option 2 – the defendant chooses a section 27 hearing, they may have a member of 
their whānau to speak on their behalf.  If the speaker is there then the sentencing is 
likely to go ahead on that day. Alternatively, counsel may ask for an adjournment so 
that the support person can attend.  There are no referrals; however, the defendant 
may offer restorative justice if the victim is willing. 
  
Option 3 – the defendant chooses a section 27 hearing.  An initial assessment is made 
by the court Kairuruku (co-ordinator), who talks to the defendant about what section 
27 offers as well as what community services and other agencies are available to help 
or support the defendant.  The Kairuruku then connects the defendant with these 
services as required, which could include restorative justice.  Either the Kairuruku or 
defence counsel will then stand up and suggest to the Judge that option 3 is the 
pathway for that particular offender.  The sentencing is then adjourned to give the 
defendant time to complete any programmes that may be deemed to be helpful. 
  
Option 4 – the defendant chooses a section 27 hearing.  This is a much more intensive 
option and requires a commitment from both the defendant and their whānau.  This is 
where Te Mana o Ngāpuhi Kowhao Rau (TMONK) get involved.  They are very 
clear with the defendant that this opportunity is not a “get out of jail free card” and 
that they will commit to the process as long as the defendant and their whānau 
commit to the work.  This then involves the sentencing being adjourned to an interim 
date.  This is to give TMONK time to start working with the defendant and their 
whānau and to complete a report which includes a plan that will help the defendant to 
address any underlying courses [sic] to their offending.  If this report and plan is 
accepted by the Judge then the sentencing is adjourned again so that the plan can be 
completed.  An important part of this process is that the work is completed before the 
sentencing, this gives the defendant the opportunity to prove their commitment, to the 
victim, their whānau and the court. 
                                            
833 Hauauru Takiwa Te Kooti o Matariki (Report No 1210, 16 October 2012) <www.hauauru.org>. 
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This provides an opportunity for the offender to access available community services 
in order to address their social needs and the underlying causes of offending. By 
addressing the cause of offending together with the support of the whānau, it is 
suggested that this will help reduce the recidivism and disproportionate offending 
rates for Māori. 
 
By increasing the involvement of whānau, including the use of te reo,834 and assisting 
the offender with available services, this Court seeks to empower the community. As 
such, it is unsurprising that early results have been positive. However, unlike the 
Rangatahi Courts where the victim’s consent is required, in the Matariki Court, the 
victim’s consent is not required for the offender to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
court.835 
 
Institutions such as courts and correctional facilities often perform roles of local 
communities in identifying and dealing with their own problems, particularly for less 
serious offences.836 The challenge, according to Judge Carruthers, is returning that 
power and responsibility back to the communities from which these offenders 
originate.837 It is acknowledged that many players within the criminal justice system, 
including judges, probation officers and officials, support and include the involvement 
of the community and Māori. The Matariki Courts are an example of this. It is 
unfortunate that in these early stages accurate statistics are not available.838  
 
In light of the paucity of statistics, reflecting on how this court would operate, a 
suggestion on how existing cases may be processed by a Matariki Court may prove 
helpful. In this regard the following section analyses two cases Tutakangahau v R839 
 and R v Wawatai840 against the Sentencing Act and Bail Act respectively. 
                                            
834 See section 3 of the Māori Language Act 1987 that provides for the Māori Language to be an 
official language of New Zealand; and section 4 of the Māori Language Act 1987 provides for the right 
to speak Māori in legal proceedings. 
835 Williams above n 730.  
836 Carruthers, above n 753. 
837 Carruthers, above n 753. 
838 The Ministry of Justice acknowledges the difficulty in recording the data from the Matariki Courts 
and therefore cannot provide accurate statistics of utilisation or results but are endeavouring to find 
methods to do so. At the time of writing these were not available. http://www.justice.govt.nz/  
839 Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279. 
840 R v Wawatai [2014] NZHC 2374 [3 October 2014] 
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(g) Sentencing Act 2002 
 
R v Wawatai 
The offender, Mr Wawatai,841 has been charged with manslaughter, arson and male 
assaults female.842 After considering the offending, the impact of the offending and 
personal circumstances the court begins to determine the appropriate sentence with 
reference to previous case law, elements of premeditation, violence and vulnerability. 
A sentence of 13 years imprisonment is passed after no mitigating factors could be 
found. 
 
Had this case been determined by a Matariki Court, in light of the seriousness of the 
offending, it would be recommended that Option 4, a much more intense option, be 
taken. Any sentencing would be deferred until a later date to allow an organisation, 
such as TMONK, to work with the offender and whānau to address underlying issues. 
From the facts it appears that the offender has the support of his family.843 It may be 
that an anger management or a male against violence course is planned for the 
offender. As alcohol was identified as linked with the offending844 an appropriate 
Drug and Alcohol rehabilitation course should also be undertaken.845 It may also be 
that some form of ‘muru’ is paid to the victim’s family; this may assist to overcome 
the ill feelings held by the victim’s family.846 Muru could be a form of financial 
payment, together with work related assistance for the family and regular group or 
community meetings. This plan and report from TMONK would then be submitted to 
the Judge who, if accepted, will adjourn the sentencing so the plan can be completed. 
 
Alternatively, if the offender chose option 1, the provisions of the Sentencing Act 
2002 would apply. The Sentencing Act provides a raft of sentencing options,847 
including imprisonment, home detention, home detention or community based 
                                            
841 Athough not explicit it is understood that the offender is of Māori descent. 
842 Respective penalties are Crimes Act 1961, s 177(1). Maximum penalty is life imprisonment, Section 
267(1). Maximum penalty is 14 years’ imprisonment and Section 194. Maximum penalty is two years’ 
imprisonment R v Wawatai para 1. 
843 Para [13], [17]. 
844 Para [18]. 
845 The nature of offending is serious and unlikely that a deferral to the existing AODT Court would be 
an option, nonetheless the programmes utilized by the Court may be instructive for cases such as this.  
846 Para [14]. 
847 Section 10A (2) lists the hierarchy of sentences. 
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sentences that includes community work, supervision, intensive supervision or 
community detention,848 a fine849 and or a combination of these options.850 If the 
offender presents with, for instance, a mental illness, the judge can intervene and 
commit the offender to a programme, such as Odyssey House, and impose judicial 
monitoring.851 If successfully completed this may provide grounds for variation or 
cancellation of their sentence.852 
 
Mr Wawatai has been charged with an offence punishable by imprisonment, so it is 
highly unlikely that any option other than prison would be considered by the court. 
However, if he was to apply for supervision,853 this could be granted if the court was 
satisfied that a sentence of supervision would reduce the likelihood of his reoffending 
through rehabilitation and reintegration of the offender.854 As Mr Wawatai is charged 
with more than one offence, the offences would be served concurrently.855 If 
supervision was granted, the sentence would be not less than six months but not more 
than one year, substantially less than 13 years sentence imposed by the court. The 
standard reporting conditions would be required to be followed, including reporting 
and residential address notification.856 
 
It would be assumed that in light of the nature of the offender and the offence 
committed, special conditions are imposed,857 including counselling858 and placement 
within a marae environment to take advantage of any existing programmes, such as 
Te Whānau Āwhina.859 If the offender was unable to fulfil these requirements the 
supervision sentence can be cancelled and the original sentence of 13 years 
imprisonment reinstated.860  
 
                                            
848 Section 44 (a), (b), (c), (d). 
849 Section 39 as a monetary penalty. 
850 Although it is noted that a prison sentence can not be combined with any option except some form 
of reparation and fine only if authorized by an Act specifying the offence. Also home detention cannot 
be combined with supervision, intensive supervision or community detention. 
851 Subpart 2B Sentencing Act 2002. 
852 Section 80ZM. 
853 Section 45 (1) (a). 
854 Section 46. 
855 Section 47. 
856 Section 49. 
857 Section 50. 
858 Section 51 (a). 
859 Section 51 (c) (ii). 
860 Section 54. 
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If a supervision sentence was not granted due to the seriousness of Mr Wawatai’s 
offending, he could apply for a sentence of intensive supervision.861 The requirements 
and access to programmes are similar to that of supervision,862 but the time period is 
longer and the reporting obligations more rigorous. In light of Mr Wawatai’s alcohol 
problem, the judge could impose a special condition that Mr Wawatai be subject to 
judicial monitoring. Nonetheless, again due to the seriousness of his offence and the 
purpose of the Act, balancing public safety, deterrence and rehabilitation,863 it is 
unlikely that a sentence other than prison is imposed. It is more probable that a 
supervised sentence would apply to Tutakangahau v R (below), as the offence is less 
serious. 
 
The provisions of the Sentencing Act 2002 support the use of programmes that are 
centred around the marae and iwi and hapū groups. The ability to address any 
psychiatric or addiction issue is also available, as is judicial monitoring. These 
attributes would underpin a proposed indigenous court. It could be that if such a Court 
was established, reliance could be placed on these provisions of the Sentencing Act 
2002.  
 
Nonetheless, although the Act contains provisions for marae programmes and iwi and 
hapu, these are very, very seldom used, indicative of an unwillingness of the judge to 
commit to these alternatives.864 Although there is provision for judicial monitoring, 
unlike a specialist court that is underpinned by therapeutic jurisprudence, there is no 
requirement or obligation on the judge to entertain a relationship with the offender or 
with community members in a marae setting. On the occasion a marae based sentence 
is imposed, there is often challenges from other players within the justice system.865  
It is suggested that a more inclusive approach, such as that of the Matariki, Te Kooti 
Rangatahi and AODT Court, be adopted. This would require a change in behaviours. 
 
                                            
861 Section 54B. 
862 Sections 54B – 54L. 
863 Section 7 and 8. 
864 This is based on a raft of personal court observations and also academic discussions with counsel 
attending court. 
865 See ‘Police unhappy at marae sentence’ NZH Nov 27, 1999. Judge Unwin granted a marae based 
sentence and a 15 month suspended prison sentence for two years.  
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Although these programmes could contain a requirement to provide reparation 
services to the victim, it is not explicit.866 Reparation, as muru, may be necessary to 
fulfill any reciprocity obligations. Further, there is a lacuna between arrest and 
sentencing where there is no express provision for iwi involvement or support that an 
indigenous court could potentially oversee.  
 
Tutakangahau v R 
 
The offender, an 18-year-old Māori youth, was convicted of two counts of burglary, 
pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 11 months imprisonment and now appeals this 
sentence to the Court of Appeal.867 In reviewing the previous lower court’s decision, 
the Court of Appeal found that there has been no recognition of the fact that one of 
the reasons identified for a discount for youth was the greater capacity for 
rehabilitation.868 Further, that it was not clear that any uplift for that offending would 
cancel outright the discount for youth.869 In conclusion, the Court found that a lesser 
sentence of imprisonment should have been imposed. 
 
Had this case been determined by a Matariki Court, option 3 would be suggested. 
After an initial assessment is made by the Kairukuruku they will then advise the 
offender of the provisions in section 27 as well as the community services and 
agencies that can support the offender.  
 
Although the Matariki Court focuses on section 27 of the Sentencing Act, it is not 
mandatory for the sentencing officer to offer a section 27 process to the offender nor 
draw attention to that process.870 If the Matariki Court shows signs of success, it is 
anticipated that this finding could be revisited. 
 
The process of restorative justice between the offender and victim should be, in my 
opinion, mandatory. Upon the court hearing, the defence counsel will then suggest to 
the sentencing Judge that option 3 is the pathway for the offender. Subsequently the 
                                            
866 Although available within a sentence of community work see Section 55.  
867 Tutakangahau v R at para [2]. 
868 Para [45]. 
869 Para [45]. 
870 RS v R [2014] NZCA 484. 
 204 
sentencing Judge will adjourn to allow the defendant time to complete any 
programmes or community service that may be helpful.  
 
It is noted that in this case bail was refused. Before proceeding to consider 





The Children, Young Persons and their Families Act 1989 requires, where possible, 
that all policies and services provided have particular regard for the values, culture 
and beliefs of the Māori people and support the role of whānau, hapū and iwi.871 The 
Sentencing Act 2002 also contains provision where culture can be considered by the 
court.872 
 
In New Zealand the Bail Act 2000 was introduced in order to reduce rates of 
offending by persons released on bail by raising the threshold for release on bail.873     
However, it contains no provision for the decision maker to take into account cultural 
factors when determining a bail application.874 Unlike comparative jursidictions there 
remains a paucity of case law to support the consideration of cultural factors during a 
bail application. 875 
 
It is acknowledged that even if granted bail, often, the offender is bailed to the 
existing environment in which they offended, increasing the likelihood of re-
offending whilst on bail. Dr Johnson has noted that:876  
 
                                            
871 Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 sections 7 (c) (ii) and (iii). 
872 Sentencing Act 2002 in particular Section 27 (a) and (e).  
873 See Department of Corrections above n 2.   
874 However see section 7 (5) Rules as to granting bail, which states ‘a defendant who is charged with 
an offence and is not bailable as of right must be released by a court on reasonable terms and 
conditions unless the court is satisfied that there is just cause for continued detention.’ In view of R v 
Sim it could be argued that culture may account as a reason for not continuing detention.   
875 R v Sim [2005] OJ No 4432 (Ont CA). 
876 Dr Peter Johnston ‘The NZ Department of Corrections Role and purpose in the criminal justice 
pipeline’ presentation to the Auckland Law Faculty, University of Auckland, Part 2 Criminal Law 
students October 2014. See also Department of Corrections above n 2. 
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92% of people charged with criminal offences are granted bail and do not spend time 
in custody remand; of these however, around a fifth commit new offences while on 
bail; of this offending, approximately 15% of this offending is violent in nature.   
 
These statistics are not disaggregated for Māori; however, in light of the 
disproportionate rates of offending for Māori, an intervention during the bail 
application could include that the offender is bailed to a local marae, such as 
Waipereira, as a condition of bail. This is similar to when an at-risk offender is bailed 
to Odyssey House and subject to judicial monitoring under the Sentencing Act 2002. 
When the offender reappears before the Judge, any programme they may have 
undertaken during a supervised bail term can be taken into account. It is suggested 
that there could be a provision within the Bail Act where culture can be a factor in 
considering a bail application and thereby support an application to a local marae as a 
bailable option. 
 
Had this provision been available in the case of Tutakangahau v R, it is suggested that 
the offender could have been bailed into a marae programme and when he reappeared 
for sentencing there would have been an opportunity for counsel to submit that in 
view of the community work and/or programmes undertaken, including a restorative 
approach, this should mitigate any sentence. Arguably a marae programme would 
offer more opportunity for rehabilitation than a short prison term. Further, a marae 
programme is consistent with tikanga and its aim of balance. The intervention of a 
culturally appropriate model such as this is not novel. The evaluation of the Australian 
Murri Courts noted:877 
 
While the program was initially conceived as a more culturally-appropriate 
alternative to mainstream court processes for sentencing Indigenous offenders, 
stakeholders involved in the Murri Court program identified a trend towards an 
expanded intervention model involving the use of bail programs [emphasis added], 
case management plans and pre- and post-sentence support provided by Elders, CJG 
members and community based organisations [emphasis added]. 
 
                                            
877 Evaluation of the Queensland Murri Court: Final report Anthony Morgan Erin Louis (2010) 
Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Government, Reports and Technical Background Paper 
39, Key issues , xii 
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An examination of the current initiatives, within the criminal justice system, reveal 
some exciting and promising developments. In the next section, a review of 
comparative jurisdictions of the constitutional recognition for the right to implement 





























































                                            
878 See report written for the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues by Professor 
Megan Davis, Simon William M’Viboudoulou, Valmaine Toki, Paul Kanyinke Sena, Edward John, 
Álvaro Esteban Pop Ac and Raja Devasish Roy (2013) “Study on National Constitutions and the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”  
 E/C.19/2013/18. I would also like to acknowledge the academic conversations with Professor Brad 
Morse and the provision of the research material that has been reproduced, in particular the Technical 
Report “Indigenous provisions in constitutions around the world”. 
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A. Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Rights 
 
It is clear that some settler nations are taking steps to recognise indigenous rights 
within their respective constitutions. Some constitutions, such as in Ecuador, are 
explicit, providing constitutional recognition of an indigenous legal system. 
Moreover, the interim Constitution of Nepal makes provision for indigenous courts.879 
 
Whilst some countries have incorporated the rights articulated in the Declaration on 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, such as Congo;880 others, such as Chile and 
Bangladesh, are not so progressive in including these rights. Although indigenous 
peoples within jurisdictions, such as the United States, already enjoy a level of self 
governance and have established tribal courts, incorporation of indigenous rights 
within domestic constitutions would support any initiative to establish an indigenous 
court. It is suggested that States that do not currently recognise indigenous peoples or 
indigenous rights in their constitutions should move towards a constitutional reform 
process in consultation with indigenous peoples.881  
 
Countries including Canada, Australia and the United States have moved towards 
implementing an indigenous court.882 In parts of Malaysia, native courts have been 
established primarily to deal with breaches of native law and customs.883 In addition, 
                                            
879 Although not explicit, some constitutional provisions, such as in the Norwegian Constitution, when 
read together with other articles, provide tentative opportunities for the implementation of an 
indigenous court. 
880 Congo-Brazzaville as opposed to Democratic Republic of Congo. 
881 It is noted that New Zealand and Australia have recently undertaken a review of their 
“constitutional” position. For New Zealand this has included questioning the place of the Treaty of 
Waitangi within a constitution. One of the recommendations from the Report above n was that 
Indigenous Peoples should be recognised in national constitutions and States that do not currently 
recognise Indigenous rights in their constitutions should move towards a constitutional reform process, 
in consultation with Indigenous People, and entrench the Declaration in national constitutions. See also 
Patricia Borraz and Loreta Ferrer (ed) Indigenous Peoples’ Human Rights in Domestic Courts (Human 
Rights Office of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 2013) that reviews the 
incorporation of the international standards for the protection of indigenous rights in the decisions of 
domestic courts. 
882 See discussion on Koori Courts, Gladue and Cree Courts in Chapter V ‘Initiatives in Comparative 
Jurisdictions’. 
883 ‘In Sarawak and Sabah, the Native Courts were set up primarily to deal with breaches of native law  
and customs.’ See Ramy Bulan Associate Professor Director, Centre for Malaysian Indigenous Studies  
“Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Participate in Decision Making in Malaysia” Discussion paper 
prepared for International Expert Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and The Right to Participate in  
Decision Making, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 20-22 January 2010. See also presentation given to the  
International Expert Seminar on Access to Justice including Truth and Reconciliation Processes  
(University of Columbia, New York, 27 February – 1 March 2013).  
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a number of indigenous courts have emerged across the African continent, dealing 
exclusively with indigenous law.884 In terms of their success, the anecdotal evidence 
is positive. Like the Rangatahi Courts in New Zealand; however, most are relatively 
new initiatives and reliable statistical information is lacking. 
 
Constitutional recognition of an indigenous right to culture and a right of self-
determination provides fertile ground for the meaningful implementation of cultural 
concepts to address the over-representation of indigenous peoples within the criminal 
justice system. Two progressive jurisdictions are Ecuador and Bolivia. Some states in 





The common denominator in the Ecuadorian Constitution is the idea of increased 
inclusion of people and nature in a participatory democratic project.886 Drawing on 
the commonality of a global culture, the Constitution aims to construct an ecological 
citizenship, recognising the interconnectedness of all peoples to nature.  
 
Two indigenous terms, pacha mama and sumak kawsay, are included in the preamble 
of the Ecuadorian Constitution. The preamble “celebrates nature, the pacha mama 
(Mother Earth) of which we are a part and which is vital to our existence”. Further, 
the preamble builds on “a new form of public coexistence, in diversity and in 
                                            
884 However, the Traditional Courts Bill has caused controversy. See Sipho Khumalo “Activists Berate 
Traditional Courts Bill” The Mercury (online ed, South Africa, 12 April 2012). It is also acknowledged 
that the jurisprudence recognising Indigenous peoples rights is just emerging and beyond well known 
cases in South Africa or Botswana it is difficult to find any single decision in domestic courts which 
takes UNDRIP into account. The lack of a legal framework which recognises the existence and rights 
of Indigenous peoples is an important obstacle in this context. However, the Endorois decision, will 
have an impact. 
885 See Part II Section 7 Fundamental Duties Every person has fundamental duties to … support and 
assist … culture and custom of the people of Vanuatu and Chapter 5 Section 30 Functions of  Council 
‘… may make recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture and 
languages.’  
886 This is an ongoing project. Rafael Correa: “I maintain that Ecuador and Latin America have 
elections but have yet to arrive at what is democracy. In truth, I don’t believe that there is democracy in 
a country where there is so much injustice, so much inequality.” Justin Delacour (trans), “Interview 
with Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa” (North American Council on Latin America, June 18 2009) 
<www.ecuador-rising.blogspot.com>. For discussion on reaching legal pluralism in Ecuador see Marc 
Simon Thomas, Legal Pluralism and the Continuing Quest for Legal Certainty in Ecuador: A Case 
Study from the Andean Highlands, (2012) 7 Onati Socio-Legal Series 57.  
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harmony with nature to achieve the good way of living the sumak kawsay”.  
 
Pacha Mama broadly translates as ‘Mother Earth’ and in this sense is analogous with 
Papatūānuku (earth mother) for Māori. Although often translated as ‘good life’ or 
‘living well’, the term sumak kawsay is from the Kichwa language relating to an 
ancestral Andean term that highlights the importance of harmony with nature and 
communities. Together with the further “recognition of our age-old roots” within the 
preamble, this concept confirms the relatedness between humans and nature. In this 
sense, it is closely aligned with whakapapa and whanaungatanga for Māori.  
 
The concept of sumak kawsay, which is referred to five times in the Constitution 
(once in the preamble and in four articles), encapsulates and reflects an indigenous 
worldview. Although the right to a healthy environment is codified in other 
constitutions, the Ecuadorian constitution is unique in that it connects the environment 
to cultural/spiritual principles in the realisation of the sumak kawsay.  
 
‘Living well’ is ecocentric and holistic in nature and is based on an ontological 
assumption of ‘relationality’, that “all beings exist always in relation and never as 
‘objects’ or individuals”.887 This relational understanding is also at the core of nature 
as Pachamama.888 Arturo Escobar suggests that a relational worldview must lead to a 
‘politics of responsibility’ that is “a sequitur of the fact that space, place, and 
identities are relationally constructed”.889 A relational awareness such as this 





                                            
887 Arturo Escobar, “Latin America at a Crossroads: Alternative Modernizations, Post-Liberalism, or 
Post-Development?” (Revised version of paper prepared for the Wayne Morse Center for Law and 
Politics and presented at the Conference, “Violence and Reconciliation in Latin America: Human 
Rights, Memory, and Democracy,” University of Oregon, Eugene, January 31- February 2 2008) at 38. 
888 A close analogy can be drawn between Pachamama and Papatūānuku of Māori cosmology. 
Similarly, a relational responsibility of kaitiakitanga as care for Papatūānuku is analogous to the sumak 
kawsay or suma quemaña care for Pachamama. 
889 Escobar, above n 807, at 41. 
890 See Chapter II ‘Maori and Tikanga’ on What is Tikanga? which notes the interrelatedness of 
animate and inanimate objects, the concept of whanaungatanga and whakapapa. 
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Article 14 notes: 
 
The right of [emphasis added] the population to live in a healthy and ecologically 
balanced environment that guarantees sustainability and the good way of living 
(sumak kawsay) [emphasis added], is recognized.  
 
Environmental conservation, the protection of ecosystems, biodiversity and the 
integrity of the country’s genetic assets, the prevention of environmental damage, and 
the recovery of degraded natural spaces are declared matters of public interest. 
 
Article 250 provides: 
 
The territory of the Amazon provinces is part of an ecosystem that is necessary for 
the planet’s environmental balance of the planet [emphasis added] [sic]. This 
territory shall constitute a special territorial district, for which there will be integrated 
planning embodied in a law including social, economic, environmental and cultural 
aspects, with land use development and planning that ensures the conservation and 
protection of its ecosystems and the principle of sumak kawsay [emphasis added] (the 
good way of living). 
 
Section VII, “The Good Way of Living System”, of the Constitution is an example of 
framing otherwise ephemeral principles in the language of human rights. This serves 
two purposes.  
 
First, it makes the rights justiciable. Although the sumak kawsay will be interpreted 
and practiced in ways unique to the Amerindian peoples living relatively 
autonomously in the Amazon and remote Andean regions, it will also increasingly be 
brought for determination in the courts.891 Second, it brings the system of rights into 
line with the international regime of rights as expressed in the International Labour 
Organisation Convention 169, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,892 the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the United 
                                            
891 Particularly the newly created Environmental Court. 
892 For instance, second and third generation rights. 
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Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.893   
 
Remarkably, in the section on development, sumak kawsay is cited as a primary 
consideration to guide decision makers. 
 
Article 275 notes: 
 
The development structure is the organized, sustainable [emphasis added] and 
dynamic group of economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental systems 
which underpin the achievement of the good way of living (sumak kawsay) [emphasis 
added].  
 
The State shall plan the development of the country to assure the exercise of rights, 
the achievement of the objectives of the development structure and the principles 
enshrined in the Constitution. Planning shall aspire to social and territorial equity, 
promote cooperation, and be participatory, decentralized, deconcentrated and 
transparent.  
 
The good way of living shall require persons, communities, peoples and nationalities 
to effectively exercise their rights and fulfill their responsibilities within the 
framework of interculturalism, respect for their diversity, and harmonious 
coexistence with nature [emphasis added]. 
 
One of the main concerns with the statement of a general principle that is not 
amenable to clear and easy interpretation in the context of an existing, property-
focused legal system is that it is left to be defined, interpreted and implemented in a 
non-specific time frame and manner. Alternatively, this flexibility may be a 
significant advantage, allowing the concept to be adapted to novel situations and 
emerging social perspectives without the concepts being ‘frozen’ in time.894  
  
The sumak kawsay is not to be rooted solely in ‘ancient’ or ‘traditional’ practices. 
Article 387 renders it the responsibility of the State to promote and generate 
                                            
893 For a summary of the insistence of the Latin American countries on the inclusion of these rights 
during the negotiation of the terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see Geoffrey 
Robinson Crimes Against Humanity, (3rd ed, Melbourne, Penguin 2008) at 37-38. 
894 For the New Zealand interpretations addressing this concern see, Ministry for the Environment Case 
Law on Tangata Whenua Consultation (Wellington, 1999). 
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knowledge in terms of the ‘good life’ through science and technology and provides: 
 
The following shall be responsibilities of the State [emphasis added]:  
1. To facilitate and promote incorporation into the knowledge society to achieve the 
objectives of the development system.  
2. To promote the generation and production of knowledge [emphasis added], to 
foster scientific and technological research, and to upgrade ancestral wisdom to thus 




The Ecuadorian Constitution also enables indigenous groups to practice their own 
traditional justice in their territories and their decisions and punishments are to be 
respected by State bodies, except where they substantially clash with other provisions 
of the Constitution. Article 57(10) provides that:  
 
Indigenous communes, communities, peoples and nations are recognized and 
guaranteed, in conformity with the Constitution and human rights agreements, 
conventions, declarations and other international instruments, the following collective 
rights…  
 
To create, develop, apply and practice their own legal system or common law, which 
cannot infringe constitutional rights, especially those of women, children and 
adolescents. 
  
The constitutional right to nature provided by the Ecuadorian Constitution, driven by 
a right that recognises their indigenous legal system, provides an opportunity to 
import indigenous concepts, such as reciprocity, harmony and balance, so as to attain 
environmental sustainability. 
 
Concepts such as balance, harmony, and healing are intrinsic to the philosophy of all 
indigenous peoples. For jurisdictions like Ecuador, appealing to environmental values 
and a right to nature provides an innate conduit for the recognition of indigenous 
values within a constitution. The embrace of these articles would lead to a re-
imagining and re-founding of the State by abandoning conventional development 
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narratives based on State and private ownership. Instead, a collective and relational 
worldview would be cultivated, focusing on the aims of solidarity, complementarity, 
co-operation and in particular, self-determination. 895  
 
Notwithstanding the environment falling outside the jurisdiction of the criminal 
justice system,896 this example provides a clear and tangible analogy and application 
of tikanga Māori concepts. Furthermore, there is an extensive decentralisation of 
power to localities with the freedom to choose representative, direct, communal or 
indigenous versions of democracy for governance of local affairs.897 Indigenous 
groups are able to practice their own traditional justice in their territories and their 
decisions and punishments are to be respected by representative bodies, except where 
they substantially clash with other provisions of the constitution.  
 
Notwithstanding the right of self-determination to implement constitutional 
indigenous rights, comparative jurisdictions, including those of Bolivia, engage 
concepts of plurination898 and culture within their constitution to achieve the same.899 
This is not dissimilar to the notion of legal dialogue in the courtroom to legitimise 




The 2001 census indicated that 62 per cent of the Bolivian population is of indigenous 
origin.900 The Constitution of Bolivia provides:901 
 
                                            
895 See also Chapter II ‘Maori and Tikanga’ on What is Tikanga Māori? and the discussion of the 
Māori world. 
896 However see Auckland Regional Council v Holmes Logging Limited HC Auckland CRI-2009-404-3 
where failure to comply with the legislation and/or breaches of the Resource Management Act 1991 
can lead to criminal charges.  
897 Title IV, Part One ‘Participatory Democracy’, Articles 95 -117 generally. 
898 Plurination is the coexistence of two or more national groups within a community. 
899 Although see comments in Will Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1989) where he defends the idea of minority rights with a discussion of the example 
of ‘the special status of First Nations Peoples as opposed to the segregation of blacks’. See also Will 
Kymlicka Minority Rights (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995) particularly Part III discussion 
on Forms of Cultural Pluralism and Legal Pluralism at 123 – 155. 
900 See Cæcilie Mikkelsen (ed) The Indigenous World (International Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs, Copenhagen, 2013) at 150. See also http://www.ine.gov.bo/. 
901 Article 99 (I). The terms are used twenty-four times in the Bolivian constitution, primarily in the 
sections on education: Articles 77 - 98.  
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Cultural diversity is an essential foundation of the Plurinational State Community. 
Interculturality is the instrument for cohesion and harmony and balance between all 
peoples and nations. Interculturality will take place with respect to differences and 
equal footing. 
 
The 1994 constitutional reform recognised Bolivia as an alternative to the nation-
state; that is, a plurinational state.902 This model offers the coherence of the State, but 
also allows for difference by way of indigenous ‘nations’ in a way that the 
assimilationist tendency of nationalism does not. It is recognition of the ethno-
ecological identity of the indigenous peoples of the plurination.903 A concept 
originally developed by Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador 
(CONAIE),904 plurinationality is defined as:905 
 
The recognition of a multicultural society in the insoluble political unity of the state 
that recognises and promotes unity … equality and solidarity among all existing 
peoples and nationalities … regardless of their historical, political and cultural 
differences. 
 
The concept of an indigenous ‘nation’ existing within the ‘nation-state’ is affirmed in 
Article 9 of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People. It provides: 
 
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous 
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the 
                                            
902 Article 1 of the 2009 Constitution reads: ‘Bolivia, free, independent, sovereign, multi-ethnic and 
pluricultural, embodied in a single republic, adopts representative democracy as its form of 
government, based on the union and solidarity of all Bolivians.’ See also Giselle Corradi ‘The right to a 
fair trial in legally plural jurisdictions: the case of Bolivia’ presentation at Human Rights and Legal 
Pluralism in Theory and Practice Conference 5th to 6th December 2014, Norwegian Centre for Human 
Rights (NCHR) in co-operation with the Rights, Individuals, Culture and Society Research Centre 
(RICS) at the Faculty of Law, University of Oslo. 
903 New Zealand can (contentiously) be considered a ‘plurination’. The Māori electoral option to 
register to vote within a Māori list is an unusual measure among the world’s democracies. See also 
Catherine Walsh, “The Plurinational and Intercultural State: De-Colonisation and State Re-Founding in 
Ecuador” (2009) 6 Kult 65 at 71-73 where Walsh suggests that Belgium, Finland (The Saami 
Parliament), Switzerland, and Canada may also be considered to be plurinational to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
904 The Spanish initials for the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador, the country’s 
largest Indigenous federation.  
905 Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) Politicas para el Plan de 
Gobierno Nacional. El Mandato del CONAIE, January 2003 at 2. Quoted from Walsh, above 828, at 
78. 
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community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind shall arise from the 
exercise of such a right. 
 
The ability of indigenous peoples who claim membership of an indigenous nation is 
not to be impaired in their right to hold citizenship of the State in which they live.906 
 
The Bolivian Constitution cements many of the rights outlined in the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,907 thus supporting the notion of indigenous self-
government and self-determination. Importantly, the Constitution affords indigenous 
people organised in an autonomous territory the right to compose their own statutes, 
provided these do not violate any laws or the Constitution.  
 
The Bolivian Constitution includes not only an indigenous right to culture, but also in 
Article 30(II) a right to exercise their political, legal and economic system.  When 
read together with the right to self-determination (Article 30(II)), it establishes a clear 
right for the indigenous peoples of Bolivia to an indigenous legal system and an 
indigenous court. It would be appropriate to realise an indigenous court within an 
autonomous area, for instance in Awas Tingi, established pursuant to the Constitution 
in Nicaragua.908 
 
By embedding many of the articles from the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples within its constitution, Bolivia has substantiated a clear acceptance and 
support of the fundamental rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples, including that 




Historically states such as Fiji have implemented Fijian Magistrates and Fijian Courts. 
After the Native Affairs Department was established in 1874, the primary purpose 
                                            
906 UNDRIP, Arts 6 and 33(1); Constitution of Bolivia Art 30(II)(3). 
907 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res 295 UN GAOR, 61st 
sess, 107th plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/295 (2007). 
908 In 2001, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”) delivered a landmark judgment in 
Mayagna (sumo) Awas Tingni Community v The Republic of Nicaragua (“Awas-Tingni”) Inter-
American Court of Human Rights No 79 (31 August 2001).  The IACHR extended the universal human 
right of property consistently with emerging indigenous rights, to include an indigenous right to 
property. Subsequently an autonomous zone was created for the Indigenous peoples. 
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was to impress upon the ‘Natives and High Chiefs of Fiji’ the need to have a separate 
institution so that the interests and welfare of the native population could be protected 
and to reduce colonial government interference in matters affecting native rights”.909 
The office of the Fijian Magistrate was created in 1876, and subject to some 
limitations, Fijian Magistrates were given the same powers as European 
Magistrates.910  
 
The Native Courts Regulations 1927 outlined the powers of the Native Magistrates 
and the practice and procedure of the Native Court. These included the power to try 
persons charged with an offence such as assault and disorderly conduct. This 
Regulation also enabled the Court to take into account Fijian custom. For instance, in 
lieu of a punishment, the Court could direct the person to supply turtles or make 
mats.911 Tikina Courts were a place where a Fijian Magistrate sat alone 912 and 
Provincial Courts with three Fijian Magistrates were also established.913 It was not 
until independence that the Fijian Courts ceased to function. Consequently, Fijians are 
now served by the police and the central justice system.914 
 
Unlike New Zealand, an important characteristic of the legal systems of the Pacific 
and Melanesian culture is the continued use and support of customary law systems 
within a Westminster structure.915 Furthermore, various constitutions in the Pacific, 
including those of Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Papua New Guinea, 
recognise customary law systems or kastom,916 particularly in relation to areas of 
conflict.917  
 
                                            
909 Guy Powles and Mere Pulea (ed) Pacific Courts and Legal System (Institute of Pacific Studies USP, 
Suva, 1988) at 78. 
910 At 79. 
911 At 80. 
912 Jurisdiction included lower level offending. 
913 Jurisdiction included more serious offending and could be heard by two Magistrates and a District 
Court Officer. 
914 Powles and Pulea, above n 829. 
915 See New Zealand Law Commission above n 823.  
916 Sinclair Dinnen “Restorative Justice in the Pacific Islands” in Sinclair Dinnen, Anita Jowitt and 
Tess Newton Cain (eds) A Kind of Meaning: Restorative Justice in the Pacific Islands (Pandanus 
Books, Canberra, 2003) at 14. 
917 See Tui Efi and others (eds) Pacific Indigenous Dialogue on Faith, Peace, Reconciliation and Good 
Governance (USP, Samoa, 2007). See also Converging Current above n 830 for further discussion. 
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Several authors note that “the struggle is not to persuade a coloniser state to provide 
space for the recognition of Indigenous interests but to adjust the state to fit the needs 
of the Indigenous community”.918 This is perhaps reflective of some States enjoying 
post-colonial independence and reverting to older, familiar justice systems after 
independence.919  
 
It is not a novel idea that the recognition of culture and tikanga Māori through the 
right of self determination be realised to allow Māori to address the disproportionate 
social statistics.920 The implementation of the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by 
an indigenous legal system and manifested by an indigenous court for Māori, should 
be pursued and supported within the domestic legal framework of New Zealand’s 
justice system. A review of existing judicial initiatives in comparative jurisdictions to 
address the over-representation of indigenous peoples within respective criminal 
justice systems in the areas of criminal offending, women and parole provides a 
helpful indication for the validity of the research question. 
 
B. Criminality Statistics  
 
(a) Indigenous offending  
 
The over-representation of indigenous peoples in prisons is endemic.921 In Fiji 
approximately 54 per cent are native Fijians and Indo-Fijians comprise 38 per cent. 
Out of a total prison population of 1,279, indigenous Fijians made up 984 prisoners of 
all prisoners (nearly 80 per cent), while only 222 were Indians (17 per cent).922 A 
cross sectoral programme formed in 2003, and working with the formal institutions of 
                                            
918 Dinnen, above n 836, at 44. 
919 At 14. 
920 See Nin Tomas “Indigenous Peoples and the Maori: The Right to Self-Determination 
in International Law - From Woe to Go” (2008) N.Z. L. Rev 639.  
921 “Indigenous peoples” is a term commonly used to describe any ethnic group who inhabit the 
geographic region with which they have the earliest historical connection. 
922 Ratu Filimone Ralogaivau “Problem Solving Courts of the Fiji Islands: Blending Traditional 
Approaches to Dispute Resolution in Fiji with Rule of Law – The Best of Both Worlds” 5 (July 2007).  
<www.aija.org.au>. 
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the Government of Fiji, identified the need to establish policies to reduce the over-
representation of indigenous Fijians in conflict with the criminal justice system.923  
 
In other jurisdictions the statistics for the imprisonment of indigenous women are 
even more alarming. It is well established in international literature that the offending 
and imprisonment rates for indigenous peoples far surpass those for non-indigenous 
peoples.924 Furthermore, in a number of ‘nation-states’, statistics indicate that for 
indigenous women, the rates of apprehension, prosecution and recidivism surpass 
those not only for non-indigenous women, but also for indigenous men. 
 
In Australia, for instance, where the indigenous population comprises a mere 2.5 per 
cent of the population,925 the imprisonment rate for indigenous or Aboriginal adults is 
approximately 15 times higher than that for non-indigenous Australian adults.926 Of 
the prison population in Australia, 24 per cent identify as aboriginal.927 In 1989 
Aboriginal women represented 16.3 per cent of the female prison population, while 
Aboriginal men comprised 14.1 per cent of the total male prison population. This 
indicates that the situation for Aboriginal women is much worse than that for 
Aboriginal men.928  
 
In Canada and the United States of America where indigenous people comprise 3.6 
and 1.7 per cent of the population respectively,929 their over-representation in prisons 
and jails is well documented.930 The following statistics indicate that the over-
representation of indigenous people in the Canadian prison system is growing at a 
                                            
923 Ralogaivau, above n 842, at 4. Law and Justice Sectoral Objectives – No 11. Formulated in 
consultation with the law and justice agencies across the Fiji Islands in conjunction with the Australia 
Fiji Law and Justice Sector Program.  
924 See for example William Tyler ‘Aboriginal Criminology and the Postmodern Condition: From 
Anomie to Anomaly’ Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology August 1, 1999 vol. 32 no. 2 
209-221 where he notes that the ‘very high rates of Aboriginal over-representation in the criminal 
justice systems of the white ‘settler’ societies are conventionally explained in terms of pervasive effects 
of cultural dispossession and social and economic disadvantage and dislocation.’ 
925 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Face the Facts (2005) 
<http://www.hreoc.gov.au>. 
926 See Chris Cuneen ‘Conflict, Politics and Crime: Aboriginal Communities and the Police’ (2001). 
Sydney: Allen and Unwin. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2196235 
927 Law and Justice Fact Sheet (2010) <www.reconciliaction.org.au>. 
928 S Payne “Aboriginal Women and the Law” in Law and Justice Section 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Canberra (1993) at 66 <www.aic.gov.au>. 
929 Mikkelsen above n 815, at 54 and 44.  
930 Carol La Prairie “The Impact of Aboriginal Justice Research on Policy: A Marginal Past and an 
Uncertain Future (1999) Canadian Journal of Criminology 252. 
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faster rate for women than for men. In the provincial system in 2005, for instance, 30 
per cent of female prisoners were Aboriginal,931 while in the federal system in 2006, 
25 per cent of female inmates identified as Aboriginal. Among federally sentenced 
women prisoners in Canada (those serving two years or more), over 30 per cent are 
Aboriginal women,932 whereas 21 per cent of the male prisoner population identified 
as indigenous.933 American Indians and Alaska Natives are 2.5 times more likely to be 
a victim of violent crimes than other ethnic groups.934  
 
As at February 2013 Aboriginal women represented 33.6 per cent of all federally 
sentenced women in Canada. According to Statistics Canada, “the disproportionate 
number of Aboriginal people in custody [is] consistent across all provinces and 
territories and particularly true among female offenders”.935 
 
In New Zealand the situation is similar. Apprehension rates for Māori women far 
surpass those for non-Māori women. While Māori women comprise just 15 per cent 
of the female population,936 in 1996, they constituted 44.4 per cent of female 
apprehensions, and 45.83 per cent in 2005. In the same year, 50.52 per cent of Māori 
women apprehended were prosecuted, compared to 40.1 per cent of non-Māori 
women. Of custodial sentences 58 per cent were given to Māori women and only 36 
per cent to non-Māori women.937 In 2005 58 per cent of the 329 female inmates in the 
New Zealand prison system identified as Māori.938 
 
These statistics indicate that indigenous women are more likely to be apprehended, 
prosecuted and imprisoned than non-indigenous women. As such, earnest 
                                            
931 Statistics Canada (2010) <http://www.vcn.bc>. 
932 The Elizabeth Fry Society of Manitoba, Canada “A Canadian Perspective on Addressing the 
Overrepresentation of Indigenous Women and Girls in the Canadian Criminal Justice System.” (2009) 
at 7 (2009) <www.aija.org.au>. 
933 Statistics Canada (2010) <www.vcn.bc.ca>. 
934 Greenfeld, L. A., & Smith, S. K. American Indians and Crime (NCJ 173386. Washington, DC, 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999) <www:bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov>. 
935 Office of the Correctional Investigator “Backgrounder: Aboriginal Offenders a Critical Situation” 
(2012) <www.oci-bec.gc.ca>.  
936 Department of Statistics “Ethnic Diversity of Women” (2010) <www.stats.govt.nz>.  
937 N Soboleva, N Kazakova and J Chong Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 
1996 to 2005 (Ministry of Justice, Wellington 2006) at 116. 
938 These statistics have not significantly changed. See Ministry of Justice Over Representation of 
Māori in Prison as at 31 March 2013 Māori women made up 58 per cent of that female prisoner 
population (291 out of a total female prison population of 504)’. 
 221 
consideration of gender and cultural issues should be given and reflected in the 
formulation of the relevant policies and legislation. 
 
(b) Criminality and Indigenous Women – International Response 
In October 2005 the United Nations Human Rights Committee noted its concern that, 
in Canada, Aboriginal women were far more likely to experience a violent death than 
other non-Aboriginal women.939 The Committee recommended that accurate 
statistical data be collected and that the root of this problem be fully addressed; 
namely the economic and social marginalisation of Aboriginal women, and the need 
for effective access to justice. The Committee also expressed concern about the 
situation of Aboriginal women in prisons, and recommended independent 
adjudication for decisions related to involuntary segregation or alternative models.940  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 941  recently 
noted that:942 
 
… the Committee remains concerned about serious acts of violence against Aboriginal 
women, who constitute a disproportionate number of victims of violent death, rape and 
domestic violence. Furthermore, the Committee is concerned that services for victims 
of gender-based violence are not always readily available or accessible, particularly in 
remote areas.  
 
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People provides three 
instances where indigenous women are specifically mentioned:943  
  
Article 21(2) calls upon States to pay “particular attention” to the “rights and special 
needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in 
the context of special measures to improve economic and social conditions”.  
                                            
939 Office of the High Commission of Human Rights UN Human Rights Committee: Concluding 
Observations, Canada (CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5) (2006) at [23] <www.pch.gc.ca>. 
940 At [18]. 
941 At [12]. 
942 CERD Report CERD/C/CO/18 25 May 2007 Seventieth Session 19 February – 9 March 2007 at 
Point 20 <www.unhcr.org>. 




Article 22(1) indicates that particular attention should be paid to the rights and special 
needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in 
the implementation of the Declaration; while Article 22 (2) provides that States 
should take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that 
indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all 
forms of violence and discrimination. 
 
Read together, Articles 21(2) and 22(1) emphasise the ‘rights and special needs’ of 
indigenous women.944 The inclusion of “full” and “all forms” in Article 22(2) 
provides further supports the State’s to provide particular protection to indigenous 
women.945   
 
Article 22(2) also derives from an extensive body of international human rights law 
relating to the protection from, and the elimination of, all forms of violence and 
discrimination.946 This includes general prohibitions against violence and 
discrimination contained in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights,947 as well as 
the two International Covenants  
 
Article 22(2) is also supported by general international law pertaining to women-
specific rights and protections against violence and discrimination,948 as well as 
children-specific rights and protections.949 This body of law includes the Declaration 
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, (CEDAW) and extensive treaty body 
                                            
944 I am grateful for the advice and expertise from Professor Megan Davis in writing this section. See 
also Eva Biaudet and others “Study on the Extent of Violence against Indigenous Women and Girls in 
Terms of Article 22 (2) of the UNDRIP” (2013) (UNPFII Report, E/C.19/2013/9). 
945 At 8. 
946 At 9. 
947 UNDRIP, Articles 2, 3, 5 and 7. 
948 General Women’s rights and protections are included in Article 3 International Covenant on Civil  
and Political Rights; Art 3 International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights; Human Rights  
Committee, General Comment 28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3), 68th sess, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (2000); and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women as cited in report above n 864.  
949 Biaudet and others, above n 864, at 9. 
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comments including General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women of the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.950 
 
Despite these provisions to protect indigenous women against violence and 
discrimination, indigenous women are disproportionately represented in the criminal 
justice system. 
 
C. Canada951  
  
(a) Background on Indigenous Offending 
 
The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics indicates that indigenous peoples constitute 
only 3 per cent of the total population, but comprise 19 per cent of federal prisoners. 
Between 1997 and 2000 indigenous peoples were ten times more likely to be accused 
of homicide than non-indigenous peoples. The rate of indigenous peoples in Canadian 
prisons climbed 22 per cent between 1996 and 2004, while the general prison 
population dropped 12 per cent.952 As at February 2013, this figure had risen slightly, 
with 23.2 per cent of the federal inmate population identifying as indigenous.953  
 
Statistics Canada indicates that the overall rate of domestic violence between 1999 
and 2004 remains unchanged.954 Aboriginal women continue to be victims of 
domestic violence.955 In her work with native women, Jacobs illustrates this problem 
by noting that:956 
 
… the vast majority of incarcerated aboriginal women, who make up a staggering 30 
per cent of female prisoners in Canada, are locked up for addiction-related crimes or 
for self-defense in a situation of domestic violence. 
                                            
950 11th sess (1992), UN Doc A/47/38 at 1 (1993) as cited in report Biaudet and others, above n 719. 
951 Parts of this section have been already published in V Toki “Are Domestic Violence Courts 
Working for Indigenous Peoples?” (2009) 35(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin at 255–286. 
952 Melissa Gorelick Discrimination of Aboriginals on Native Lands in Canada: A Comprehensive 
Crisis UN Chronicle (2007) <www.un.org>. 
953 Office of the Correctional Investigator, above n 835. 
954 See “Domestic Violence Rate Unchanged Statistics: Canada Report” CBC News (online, Canada, 14 
July 2005) <www.cbc.ca>.  
955 Phil Lane, Judie Bopp and Michael Bopp Aboriginal Domestic Violence in Canada (Aboriginal 
Healing Foundation, 2003). 
956 Gorelick, above n 872, at 7. 
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More recently Professor James Anaya noted:957 
 
Canada’s relationship with the indigenous peoples within its borders is governed by a 
well-developed legal framework a number of policy initiatives that in many respects 
are protective of indigenous peoples’ rights. But despite positive steps, daunting 
challenges remain … The well-being gap between aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
people in Canada has not narrowed over the last several years, treaty and aboriginals 
claims remain persistently unresolved, indigenous women and girls remain vulnerable 
to abuse, and overall there appear to be high levels of distrust among indigenous 
peoples toward government at both the federal and provincial levels.  
  
In light of this, and in recognition of the failure of traditional criminal and civil justice 
proceedings to appropriately address domestic violence matters, it is no surprise that 
Dawson 958 states that much of the legal research on indigenous peoples and the 
criminal justice system have been undertaken in North America.959 Despite the 
Aboriginal Justice programmes and policies that have been implemented, the 
disproportionate rate of Aboriginal offending and incarceration rates have not 
decreased.960 As a result Stewart argues that governments have followed a trend 
towards focussing on specific areas to redress the situation, with the establishment of 
specialist problem solving courts for crimes committed by offenders with social 
problems like drug addiction.961 The notion of healing courts has also been adopted by 
some jurisdictions in applying particular processes for dealing with indigenous 
defendants.962  
Spiteri argues that while First Nations people have not been able to implement a 
system of Aboriginal justice, it is apparent that concessions have been made within 
the criminal justice system to address the system’s deficiencies and its inability to 
                                            
957 James Anaya The Situation of Indigenous peoples in Canada A/HRC/27/52/Add.2 
958 Myrna Dawson and Ronit Dinoitzer “Victim Cooperation and the Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
in a Specialised Court” (2001) 18 Justice Quarterly 3 (September Issue) at 593 – 622. 
959 See Human Rights Watch ‘Those Who Take Us Away: Policing and Failures in Protection of 
Indigenous Women and Girls in Northern British Columbia, Canada’ (2013) for discussion on the high 
rates of violence against Indigenous and women and girls and the failure of law enforcement to deal 
effectively with this problem. 
960 La Prairie, above n 850, at 258. See also Carol La Prairie ‘Aboriginal Over Representation in the 
Criminal Justice System’ (2002) April Canadian Journal of Criminology 181 – 208. 
961 J Stewart Specialist Domestic Violence Courts within the Australian Context (2008) Issues Paper 10 
at 4. <www.austdvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au>.  
962 At 4. 
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take into account the unique problems faced by First Nations communities.963 These 
include sentence advisory committees, community mediation/diversion programmes, 
sentencing panels and sentencing circles. Sentencing is an area that lends itself, at 
least to some degree, to the application of elements associated with the idea of 
Aboriginal justice. Perhaps that is why the majority of the Aboriginal Justice 
Initiatives in Canada deal with sentencing reflected in the changes made to the 
sentencing provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code. These changes were designed 
to address the issue of over-representation of First Nations within the sentenced prison 
population. Section 718.2 (e) of the Criminal Code provides that: 964  
… all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the 
circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.  
 
This supports the need to investigate the implementation of an intervention prior to 
sentencing. The recent majority decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Ipeelee v 
R affirmed that s 718(2)(e) of the Criminal Code is:965  
 
a remedial provision designed to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation 
of Aboriginal people in Canadian prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have 
recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing.  
 
Similarly, in New Zealand s 8(i) of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides a series of 
principles for the judge to consider when passing a sentence including:966  
 
… the offender's personal, family, whānau, community, and cultural background in 
imposing a sentence or other means of dealing with the offender with a partly or 
wholly rehabilitative purpose. 
 
In light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ipeelee v R, it is contended that s 8(i) of 
the Sentencing Act 2002 could provide the same ameliorative impulse as s 718.2 (e) 
                                            
963 Melanie Spiteri Sentencing Circles for Aboriginal Offenders in Canada: Furthering the Idea of 
Aboriginal Justice within a Western Framework (2008) <www.iirp.org>. 
964 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C- 46, s 718.2(e). 
965 Ipeelee v R 2012 SCC 13, at [59]. 
966 Sentencing Act 2002, s 8(i). 
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of the Canadian Criminal Code.967 Although s 8(i) contains no express reference to 
Māori offenders, the inclusion of ‘whānau’ and ‘cultural background’ provides an 
opportunity to import tikanga Māori and explore a proposed intervention prior to 
sentencing. This could include a marae based forum or similar structure. 
 
Nonetheless, developing these ‘cultural’ provisions within this s 8(i) limits the ability 
of the sentencing judge and the judiciary as an institute, to address the core problems 
associated with offending. This provides support for an alternative forum to 
meaningfully address and ameliorate the underlying reasons of offending for Māori. 
 
(b) Circle Sentencing 
 
Circle sentencing is an updated version of the traditional sanctioning and healing 
practices of Aboriginal peoples in Canada. It is a holistic, re-integrative strategy 
designed not only to address the criminal and delinquent behaviour of offenders, but 
also to consider the needs of victims, families and communities. Within the ‘circle’ 
victims, offenders, their family and friends, justice and social service personnel, and 
interested community residents can speak from the heart in a shared effort to uncover 
the event. By working together all stakeholders can identify the steps necessary to 
assist in healing the affected parties and prevent future crimes. The significance of the 
circle is more than symbolic; all circle members, including police officers, lawyers, 
judges, victims, offenders, and community residents, participate in deliberations to 
arrive at a consensus for a sentencing plan that addresses the concerns of all interested 
parties. 
 
In analysing Canadian circle sentencing, Ross Green observes that:968 
 
A prominent goal of circle sentencing is to promote both community involvement in 
conducting the circle and consensus among participants during the circle.  
 
                                            
967 Just Speak – Māori and the Criminal Justice System Position Paper (2012) at 35 
<www.rethinking.org.nz>. 
968 Ross Green Justice in Aboriginal Communities: Sentencing Alternatives (Canada, Purich 
Publishing, 1998) at 72. 
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He also emphasises the role of indigenous community engagement and participation 
in justice practices.  
 
Circle Sentencing operates within the Canadian criminal justice system, and therefore 
within the parameters set out by the Canadian Criminal Code. This process often takes 
the place of court sentencing hearings once guilt has been established.  
 
Judge Cunliffe Barnett (1995) claimed that the term “circle sentencing” entered legal 
vernacular when Judge Barry Stuart embarked upon a circle format for sentencing 
after realising how rigid the sentencing process was, and how it leads to the 
dominance of the court system over Aboriginal peoples.969 In R v Morin,970 the Judge 
claimed that this focus on healing and restoration was in sharp contrast to the 
punishment and retribution of the Canadian Justice System. Nevertheless, the practice 
of circle sentencing has been described by the Chief Justice Bayda of Saskatchewan 
Court of Appeal as:971  
 
… part of the fabric of our system of criminal justice and … a recognised and 
accepted procedure. 
 
This discretion of the judge and the community in sentencing circles to impose non-
custodial sentences paves the way for incorporating aspects of an Aboriginal justice 
system. This is recognised by Luke McNamara as:972 
 
… a shift away from culturally inappropriate and unfair non Aboriginal sentencing 
processes towards processes that embrace a genuine respect for, and meaningful 
cooperation with, Aboriginal law and justice values and processes. 
 
Part XXIII of the Canadian Criminal Code codifies the fundamental purpose and 
principles of sentencing and the factors that should be considered by the judge in 
determining a sentence that is fit for the offender and the offence. This enables the 
                                            
969 See R v Moses (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 347 (Yukon Territorial Court). 
970 R v Morin [1995] S.J. No 457. 
971 R v Morin (1995) 4 CNLR 37 at 68-69 (Saskatchewan Court of Appeal). 
972 Luke McNamara “The Locus of Decision Making Authority in Circle Sentencing: The Significance 
of Criteria and Guidelines” (2000) 18 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 60 at 61. 
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judge to be creative and consider alternative methods of sentencing other than 
imprisonment for Aboriginal offenders.  
 
(c) Gladue Reports 
 
In 1999 the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision on a sentence appeal from 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal which involved the appropriateness of a three 
year jail sentence for an Aboriginal woman convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing 
death of her common law husband. In determining the effect of s 718(e) of the 
Canadian Criminal Code, the Court in R v Gladue stated that: 973 
 
It [s. 718.2 (e)] is remedial in nature and is designed to ameliorate the serious 
problem of over representation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage 
sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing. 
 
The Supreme Court further noted that the method of analysis for determining a 
sentence for an Aboriginal offender must be twofold. First, the consideration of the 
offender’s circumstances that may have been conducive to the offending, and second, 
the consideration of alternatives to imprisonment; and if there are no alternatives, the 
length of incarceration must be revisited.974 This places a burden on the prosecutors, 
defence counsel and the community to provide relevant information on the accused’s 
cultural background to the judge.975 Often this information is presented as an aptly 
named ‘Gladue Report’.976 The Supreme Court also ruled that this section only 
applies to non-violent and minor offending. However, Larry Chartrand notes that 
many Aboriginal offenders commit violent and/or serious crimes and have long 
criminal records.977 
 
                                            
973 R v Gladue [1999] 1 S.C.R 688 Lamer C.J and L’Hereux-Dube, Gonthier, Cory, Iacobucci, 
Bastarache and Binnie JJ, at 400 and 409. See also above n 859 and discussion of s 718 (e). 
974 At 417- 418 and 423. 
975 See R v Kakekagamick [2006] OJ No 3346 (Ont CA) where the Court held that there is a positive 
duty on counsel to assist the sentencing judge in gathering information as to the Aboriginal offender’s 
circumstances. See also Themla Chalifoux “A Need for Change: Cross-cultural Sensitization of 
Lawyers” (1994) 32(4) Alberta Law Review at 762-781; K Roach and J Rudin ‘Gladue: The Judicial 
and Political Reception of a Promising Decision’ (2000) July Canadian Journal of Criminology at 355-
388. 
976 See Appendix for two examples of Gladue Reports.  
977 Larry Chartrand “Aboriginal Peoples and Mandatory Sentencing” (2001) 39(2/3) Osgoode Law 
Journal 456. 
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For various reasons the general academic opinion is that Gladue reports have failed to 
make a substantial impact.978 These reasons range from the relatively high costs in 
compiling such a report, the fact that the consistency of the reports are not monitored, 
the violence of the offending can overshadow any benefit, and the community call for 
race neutral advocacy.979  
 
The effect of the Gladue decision has been incorporated within the wider justice 
system. For instance, in a youth bail decision,980 and in the case of R v Sims where the 
Ontario Court of Appeal extended the reach of Gladue to decisions of the Ontario 
Review Board stating that Gladue principles are to be considered whenever the 
decision maker is dealing with the liberty of an Aboriginal person at any stage of the 
justice system.981 In New Zealand the Bail Act 2000 contains no provision for the 
decision maker to take into account cultural factors when determining a bail 
application.982 This approach would be welcomed in any proposed Indigenous Court. 
 
Although it can be argued that the Gladue Reports have not assisted to reduce the 
disproportionate offending rates and can be perceived as the ‘ambulance at the bottom 
of the cliff’, it is suggested that this ability to consider an indigenous approach should 
be extended to all aspects of the criminal justice system and not be confined to 
sentencing or bail applications.  
 
Ideally this would include the training of lawyers and the judiciary to better 
understand the effects of domestic violence from an indigenous perspective. The flow 
on from this would bring a fuller understanding of the broader causes of crime and its 
relationship, especially with colonisation.  
 
                                            
978 Rana McDonald The Discord Between Policy and Practice: Defence Lawyers' Use of Section 
718.2(e) and "Gladue" (University of Manitoba, 2008). 
979 David Milward and Debra Parkes “Gladue: Beyond Myth and Towards Implementation in 
Manitoba” (2011) 35(1) Man LJ 84.  
980 See R v Bain [2004] OJ No 6147 (Ont SC) on a bail review. See also R v RRB [2004] BCJ No 2024 
(BC Prov Ct) Youth bail hearing. 
981 R v Sim [2005] OJ No 4432 (Ont CA). 
982 However, see section 7 (5) Rules as to granting bail, which states ‘a defendant who is charged with 
an offence and is not bailable as of right must be released by a court on reasonable terms and 
conditions unless the court is satisfied that there is just cause for continued detention.’ In view of R v 
Sim it could be argued that culture may account as a reason for not continuing detention.   
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The ability to apply indigenous concepts that have been realised by an indigenous 
legal system, and within the appropriate forum, is pivotal to address those areas of 
Aboriginal over-representation such as the incarceration of indigenous women 
resulting from domestic violence issues. 
 
(d)  Case Studies  
 
(i) Hollow Water 
 
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Canada notes an example where a 
First Nations community, Hollow Water, had to address persistent sexual abuse 
within the community.983 In Hollow Water 75 per cent of the residents were victims 
and 35 per cent were offenders. The residents, which comprised mostly of women, 
developed an approach to address this situation, requiring that the offender 
acknowledge responsibility and over time, be accepted by the group. The offender 
would then be allowed to stay in the community, but subject to a thirteen-step process 
that would take five years to complete. The process is described as:984 
 
The [Community Holistic Circle Healing] is not a program or project. It is a process 
with individuals coming back into balance, a process of the community healing itself 
[emphasis added]. It is a process which one day will allow our children and 
grandchildren to once again walk with their heads high as they travel around the 
Medicine Wheel of Life. 
 
 
(ii) Innu Community of Sheshashit985 
 
A non-Native offender confessed that he had committed an act of sexual abuse. He 
elected to be tried in the Supreme Court. He entered a guilty plea and applied for a 
‘sentencing circle’. After the Crown opposed the motion, an application was made for 
                                            
983 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Bridging the Cultural Divide: Aboriginal People and 
Criminal Justice in Canada (Canada Communications Group, Ottawa 1996) at 159 – 167. 
984 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, above n 903. 
985 Wanda McAuslin “Community Peacemaking” in W McAuslin Justice as Healing Indigenous Ways; 
Writings on Community Peacemaking and Restorative Justice from the Native Law Centre” (Living 
Justice Press, St Paul, Minnesota, 2005) at ch 6.  
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an informal ‘healing circle’ to take place. The Crown opposed this request, suggesting 
that the offender be tried by ordinary court methods. The Judge notified both counsel 
that they could attend. 
 
In considering sentencing Judge O’Regan found that: 
 
… [he was] cognizant of the fact that [the offender] did grow up in the community of 
Sheshashit and was exposed to Innu culture and thus can benefit from the 
community’s involvement in such thing as the healing circle. 
 
Judge O’Regan accepted the recommendations of the healing circle and imposed a 
non-custodial sentence. This confirms the ability of the Innu nation to develop and 
deliver justice based on their custom in order to meet the needs of their community. 
This provides fertile ground to support the implementation of an indigenous legal 
system that could cater for non-indigenous, as well as for indigenous peoples.986 
 
(e) Specialised Court – Domestic Violence Courts 
 
In general, domestic violence courts are designed to remove domestic violence cases 
from the day-to-day court process. The underlying objective is to ameliorate the 
victims’ experiences of the legal system and re-direct offenders into treatment, with 
the intention of providing better outcomes for victims and perpetrators, while 
operating within the criminal justice system. This distinguishes domestic violence 
courts from other problem solving courts, in that the safety of the victim and the 
offender’s responsibility and accountability are treated equally. 
 
In 2002 there were specialist domestic violence courts in Winnipeg, Manitoba; 
London, Toronto and Ottawa, Ontario; and Calgary and Edmonton, Alberta. Ontario's 
Domestic Violence Court is the most extensive programme in Canada. It facilitates 
the prosecution of domestic assault cases and the early intervention of abusive 
                                            
986 See also Sakeq Henderson First Nations Jurisprudence and Aboriginal Rights (Native Law Centre, 
Canada, 2006) for discussion on the creation of Constitutional space for the inclusion of First Nations 
jurisprudence. 
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domestic situations, thereby providing better support to victims and increasing 
offender accountability.  
 
An operational domestic violence court comprises an assortment of components: a 
Domestic Violence Court Advisory Committee, especially trained domestic violence 
prosecutors; Victim/Witness Assistance Program staff and interpreters; specialised 
evidence collection and investigation procedures by police; case management 
procedures to coordinate prosecutions and ensure early intervention; a Partner Assault 
Response intervention programme and the expanded training for police; Crown 
Victim/Witness Assistance Programme staff; court staff, Probation and Parole staff, 
and interpreters. These teams of specialised personnel work together to ensure priority 
is given to the safety and needs of domestic assault victims and their children. This 
aspect is not dissimilar to circle sentencing where circle members include a vast array 
of people who participate in deliberations to arrive at a consensus for a sentencing 
plan that addresses the concerns of all interested parties. Although it may be too soon 
to gauge the success or otherwise of these courts, there is good reason to be optimistic 
about its future. In fact, the Ontario government is currently committed to investing 
CA$10 million annually into the Domestic Violence Court programme.987  
 
The success of the implementation and use of domestic violence courts is not 
confined to Canada. For instance, statistics from domestic violence courts in the 
United Kingdom suggest that dedicated domestic violence courts are achieving 
conviction rates of about 70 per cent on average.988 This is a dramatic improvement 
when compared with only 46 per cent of cases being prosecuted successfully in 
December 2003. 
 
In Canada there is no specialist court to address indigenous offending related to 
domestic violence. There is debate that indigenous courts are not focused on “problem 
solving”; if there is a problem to be solved, it is the failure of the criminal justice 
system to accommodate the needs of the Aboriginal people to ensure that they are 
                                            
987 See <www.ontla.on.ca>. 
988 “Domestic Violence Court Success” News in Brief: The Evening Standard (online ed, London, 9 
March 2008) <www.thisislondon.co.uk>. 
 233 
fairly treated within that system.989 Any specialty recourse lies in the domestic 
violence courts within the Canadian Justice System.  
Notwithstanding the provisions in the Indian Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. I-5) that provide 
for the appointment of indigenous Justices of the Peace who have limited jurisdiction 
to try offences under that Act,990 only a few have ever been appointed, and they do not 
have jurisdiction to apply indigenous law. Other than the discretion of the judges at 
sentencing,991 there is no direction to take indigenous issues into consideration. 
 
(f) Canada – Conclusion 
 
Indigenous women are over-represented in the Canadian penal system. The majority 
of Aboriginal women, which make up 30 cent of female prisoners in Canada, are 
incarcerated for substance or addiction-related crimes or for excessive use of self-
defence in a situation of domestic violence. International bodies recommend effective 
access to justice for Aboriginal women. 
 
In Canada there are no courts to adjudicate disputes on the basis of indigenous law, 
such as the Navajo Tribal Courts992 and other Indian Tribal courts in the United States 
of America.993 A recent development in the Indian Tribal Courts in the United States 
establishes new laws, effective in March 2015, to restore to tribes the ability to 
prosecute non-Indians who commit domestic violence on the reservation.994 However, 
there are some specialist courts that adjudicate disputes and sentence convicted people 
                                            
989 See Western Australian Law Reform Commission Aboriginal Customary Laws (Discussion Paper, 
(Report No 94, 2005) at 146. 
990 Indian Act RSC 1985, c I-5, s 107. 
991 See Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, s. 718.2(e)  
992 See Chapter V ‘Initiatives in Comparative Jurisdictions’ for further discussion. 
993 For example Ordinance 21 of the Hopi Indian Tribe Law and Order Code was passed in 1972 to 
provide for the establishment of Hopi tribal courts, a police force, judges, tribal prosecutors, and the 
provision of a criminal code as discussed see Justin Richland Arguing with Tradition: The Language of 
Law in Hopi Tribal Court (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008). 
994 Personal academic communication with Melissa Tatum, University of Tuscon, Arizona who has 
completed an information road show on this issue. This ability to prosecute non-Indians was also 
articulated during the Conference on Indigenous Sustainability: Implications for the Future of 
Indigenous People and Native Nations Arizona State University 5th – 7th October, 2014. 
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on the basis of Canadian law, but have indigenous judges and are situated in places 
where many indigenous people reside.995  
 
The problems associated with domestic violence are multiple and complex. 
Responsibility for addressing such problems involves a complex array of services and 
agencies to provide a vast assortment of culturally appropriate services. Recognition 
of customary law to address indigenous over-representation is confined to “circle 
sentencing” or “healing circles”.  
 
Chartrand is skeptical of s 718 (e) of the Canadian Criminal Code, arguing that the 
sentencing guidelines have remained the same for everyone and do little, or nothing to 
address offending rates.996 He argues that the only way to reduce the high 
incarcerations rates of indigenous peoples is to attack the root causes of crime. This is 
a view shared by Marchetti and Daly, who state:997 
 
… any effort to address the over representation of Indigenous people in the criminal 
justice system must also confront a legacy of government policies and practices over 
the past two centuries, which systematically disadvantaged and oppressed Indigenous 
people. 
 
In acknowledgment of these statistics, Canada has implemented specialist domestic 
violence courts. However, this does not address the over-representation of Aboriginal 
women in prisons for offences relating to domestic violence.  
 
In order to address this over-representation, the indigenous principles and the legal 
system that underpin circle sentencing should be extended to all levels of the criminal 
justice system. This is particularly so, as Marchetti and Daly note that:998 
 
                                            
995 For example, see the Cree court in Saskatchewan, where Gerry Morin is the Cree speaking judge. 
Saskatchewan is also to establish a Dene court. There is a second Cree Court now, with Judge Bird. See 
http://www.sasklawcourts.ca/default.asp?pg=pc_div_cree_court for full discussion of Cree Courts. 
996 Paul Chartrand “Canada and Aboriginal Peoples: Recognition and other Constitutional and Legal 
Challenges” (Paper presented at a Staff Seminar, Faculty of Law, University of Auckland, 28th March 
2008). 
997 Marchetti and Daly, above n 828, at 443. 
998 At 429. 
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… indigenous sentencing courts have the potential to empower Indigenous 
communities to bend and change the dominant perspective of “white law” through 
Indigenous knowledge and modes of social control, and come to terms with a colonial 
past. 
 
As a result of the dissatisfaction with the mainstream criminal justice process,999 
alternative approaches to addressing criminal behaviour have been proposed, 
including therapeutic jurisprudence, non-adversarial justice, restorative justice and 
problem solving initiatives.1000  
 
These initiatives also include specialist or problem-solving courts such as drug courts, 
mental health courts, domestic violence courts and indigenous courts. The emergence 
of courts that seek to incorporate traditional law and culture, such as the Gladue 
Reports process, alongside a number of these specialist courts, reflects a “recognition 
that the traditional adversarial system, in structure, style and service delivery” may 
not be appropriate for all offenders.1001 The move is to focus on and address the 
underlying behaviour.1002 Whilst there is debate about whether indigenous courts can 
be characterised as problem-solving due to the historical context of colonisation,1003 
the move to incorporate culture in the Cree Courts of Saskatchewan or through the 
Gladue Reports signals philosophical changes in the criminal justice system. 
 
It is timely to engage shifting understandings and realities that characterise the 
Aboriginal experience across Canada; regarding issues of culture and tradition. 
Cultural difference arising from different traditions of conflict resolution are often 
central to explanations of not only why Aboriginal people clash more often than non-
Aboriginal people with Canadian laws, but why the processes linked to those laws are 
                                            
999 Andrew Goldsmith, Mark Israel and Kathleen Daly (eds), Crime and Justice: A Guide to 
Criminology (3rd ed, Lawbook Company, Sydney, 2006) at 440. 
1000 For example, see Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams, Non-Adversarial 
Justice (Federation Press, Australia, 2009) at 21; for more detail see, for example, ch 2 (‘Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’), ch 3 (‘Restorative Justice’), ch 4 (‘Preventative Law’), ch 5 (‘Creative Problem 
Solving’), ch 9 (‘Problem-Oriented Courts’). 
1001 See Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams Non-Adversarial Justice 
(Federation Press, Australia, 2009), at 21; for more detail. 
1002 See Arie Freiberg “Problem-Oriented Courts: Innovative Solutions to Intractable Problems?” 
(2001) 11 Journal of Judicial Administration 8 at 8–9. 
1003 Marchetti and Daly, above n 828; Elena Marchetti and Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Courts and 
Justice Practices in Australia: Trends and Issues (2004) Crime and Criminal Justice 277; Law Reform 
Commission of Western Australia, at 142–157 (‘Aboriginal Courts’). 
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not working for them.1004 
 
D. Australia  
 
As is the case in New Zealand, the Australian criminal justice system is, for the most 
part, the same model inherited from the British Westminster system. Since the 1980s 
Australia’s criminal justice system has come under increasing scrutiny for failing to 
resolve, or indeed to reduce the perceived problem of crime.  
 
This situation is exacerbated with the “getting tough on crime” rhetoric that has 
resulted in a worldwide burgeoning of prison populations.1005 In Australia between 
1982 and 1998 it is estimated that the number of inmates rose by 102 per cent.1006 
 
Jeffries stated that drivers behind this push have included governmental failure to deal 
with crime and thus reduce offending rates, mangerialist drives for savings and 
efficiency, calls from consumer groups for their needs to be recognised, and a better 
court service to be provided. 1007  In addition to the political, economic and social 
landscape, changing intellectual paradigms are also having a substantial impact on the 
criminal court practice.  
 
This current system also consistently yields high rates of recidivism by Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people.1008 As the prison population and the fear of crime 
increases, it becomes clear that the traditional methods of delivering justice are not 
working, particularly for the indigenous peoples. Indigenous Australians comprise 2.2 
per cent of the population. An Indigenous Australian is 11 times more likely to be in 
prison than a non- Indigenous Australian; and in June 2004, 21 per cent of prisoners 
                                            
1004 See Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol La Prairie "Will the Circle Be Broken? Aboriginal 
Communities, Restorative Justice and the Challenges of Conflict and Change (University of Toronto, 
Canada, 2005). 
1005 Home Office World Prison Population List (London, 2002) <www.homeoffice.gov.uk>. 
1006 Carlos Carcach and Anna Grant “Imprisonment in Australia: Trends in Prison Populations and 
Imprisonment Rates 1982 – 1998 Canberra” (Australian Institute of Criminology, Australia, 2000). 
1007 Samantha Jeffries “Transforming the Criminal Courts: Politics, Managerialism, Consumerism, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Change” Post-Doctoral Fellow thesis 
<www.criminologyresearchcouncil.gov.au>. 
1008 See Human Rights Equal Opportunity Commission Face the Facts (2005) <www.hreoc.gov.au>. 
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in Australia were indigenous.1009 Family violence is also widespread. In 2002 one out 
of every five (21 per cent) indigenous Australians aged 15 years and over reported 
that family violence was a common problem.1010 This over-representation of 
Indigenous Australians in prisons was brought to public attention by the 1987 – 1991 
Royal Commission Report on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody.1011 One of the Royal 
Commission’s main findings was that the high number of deaths of Aboriginal people 
in prisons was a result of the high rate of imprisonment of Aboriginal Australians 




identified the history of ‘domination’ over Indigenous people as the underlying basis 
for the disadvantage [emphasis added] … found that the current socio-economic 
disadvantage stemmed from the social and economic disempowerment of Indigenous 
people after British arrival, the dispossession of Indigenous people from traditional 
lands [emphasis added] (through violence, disease and the imposition of 
discriminatory policies and practices) and the subsequent erosion of Indigenous social 
controls, cultural identity and economic independence… found that the legacy of 
violence, government intervention and control had a lasting influence on Indigenous 
interaction with the criminal justice system… recognised, for example, a continuing 
hostility between police and many Indigenous communities, which affected the 
preparedness of some Indigenous people to identify as Indigenous when in police 
custody… identified a lack of faith by Indigenous people in court and corrections 
processes… [noted that] the Criminal justice processes, including court, sentencing 
and policing procedures, were also found to influence, or at least potentially 
influence, Indigenous over-representation… determined that court processes were 
culturally insensitive, intimidating and alienating for many Indigenous people. To 
address the high numbers of Indigenous persons in custody [emphasis added] … 
made 339 recommendations addressing the underlying causes of Indigenous 
disadvantage and modifying criminal justice processes [emphasis added]. 
                                            
1009 Australian Bureau of Statistics Australian Social Trends (2008) <www.abs.gov.au>. 
1010 Australian Bureau of Statistics, above n 929. 
1011 Royal Commission Report on Aboriginal Deaths in Custody Report <www.austlii.edu.au>. 
1012 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, Final Report (1991) at 
[1.3.7]–[1.4.20], [1.7.6]; see further vol 2, ch 10. Also [1.4]; vol 2, ch 10; vol 2, ch 13; vol 3, [21.2.4]–
[21.2.5]; vol 3, [22.4]. As cited in Dennis Byles and Tai Karp Sentencing in the Koori Courts Division 
of the Magistrates Court (Sentencing Advisory Council, Melbourne, 2010) 
<http://www.sentencingcouncil.vic.gov.au>. 
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To eliminate indigenous disadvantage, the Royal Commission called for 
empowerment, the associated right to self-determination and reconciliation.1013 
 
(a) Recognition of Aboriginal/Indigenous Law 
 
In 1986 the Australian Law Reform Commission completed a 10 year inquiry into 
processes for recognising Aboriginal Customary Law.1014 The Social Justice 
Commissioner made a lengthy submission to the Northern Territory Inquiry stating 
that:1015  
 
…there is currently a crisis in Indigenous communities. It is reflected in all too 
familiar statistics about the over representation of Indigenous men, women and 
children in criminal justice processes … ultimately these statistics reflect the 
breakdown of indigenous community and family structures … customary law should 
be treated by the Government as integral to attempts to develop and maintain 
functional self determining Aboriginal communities… [emphasis added]. 
 
 
This Report also supported the Northern Territory Government for its statements that: 
 
… in accordance with Australian and international law, Aboriginal Customary Law should be 
recognised consistent with universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms' 
and that it believes that 'there is much value in supporting and sustaining Aboriginal 
Customary Law, and that the knowledge contained in Aboriginal Customary Law can be of 
mutual benefit to all citizens of the Northern Territory as well as its custodians’. 
 
The disproportionate representation of indigenous peoples in detention centres, 
together with the need for a better court service against the background of changing 
political and intellectual paradigms, have contributed to the recognition of Aboriginal 
customary law and the establishment of Indigenous Sentencing Courts. 
 
                                            
1013 Above at vol 1, [1.7.6]–[1.7.9]; vol 4, ch 27; vol 5, ch 38. 
1014 See Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law (31 
Sydney, 1986) <www.austlii.edu.au>. 
1015 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Submission to the Northern 
Territory Law Reform Committee Inquiry into the Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law (Human 
Rights Equal Opportunity Commission, Sydney, 2003) <http://www.humanrights.gov.au/legal>. 
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There are two overriding principles at all stages of development and evaluation of an 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander Court. First, that the court is a special measure 
enabling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to enjoy their rights to equality 
before the law. Secondly, equal treatment before the court. Intrinsic to these two 
principles is the right of self- determination for the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Peoples afforded by these courts, particularly as Brennan J stated:1016 
 
The purpose of securing advantage for a racial group is not established by showing 
that the branch of government or the person who takes the measure does so for the 
purpose of conferring what it or he regards as a benefit for the group if the group does 
not seek or wish to have the benefits. The wishes of the beneficiaries for the measure 
are of great importance (perhaps essential) in determining whether a measure is taken 
for the purpose of securing their advancement. The dignity of the beneficiaries is 
impaired and they are not advanced by having an unwanted material foisted upon 
them. 
 
The first urban Indigenous Sentencing Court was convened in South Australia in 1999 
and all but one state (Tasmania) has established some type of indigenous justice 
practice.1017 There are various degrees to which these fora implement indigenous 
justice; these vary from a more formalised practice for sentencing indigenous 
offenders to a less formalised practice, where judicial officers elicit sentence related 
information from indigenous people. Hybrid forms have also developed with the 
introduction of circle courts. 
 
The doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence has recently provided legitimacy and a 
framework for the new indigenous courts. Problem solving courts are not a novel idea 
and have become increasingly common in Australia.1018 The main themes of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and problem solving courts include a shift of court practice 
away from the traditional adversarial model, a commitment to achieving offender 
rehabilitation, a focus on achieving tangible outcomes (i.e., reduce indigenous over- 
                                            
1016 Gerhady v Brown (1985) 57 ALR 472 at 514, 516 and 522 Australian High Court per Brennan J. 
1017 See Marchetti and Daly, above n 828, at 416. 
1018 For an interesting comparison between New Zealand and Australian problem solving courts see 
Richardson, Thom and McKenna above n 764, at 185 – 210.  
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representation), and the use of judicial authority to solve problems and change 
offender behaviour.1019 
 
A discussion paper confirms that the evolution of Australia’s ‘new’ indigenous courts 
occurred in response to the problem of indigenous over-representation in the criminal 
justice system.1020 Both the Murri (Queensland) and Koori Court (Victoria) were 
initiated in response to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and 
subsequent undertakings (formalised Indigenous Justice Agreements) by both 
Queensland and Victoria to reduce indigenous over-representation. In South Australia 
the Nunga Court also grew out of concerns over high rates of indigenous offending, 
but did not result directly from a State Justice Agreement.1021 
 
(b) Koori Court (Victoria) 
 
The Koori Court model was established in 2002 as a direct consequence of the 
Victorian Aboriginal Justice Agreement.1022 The Koori Court was designed to ensure, 
among other things, greater indigenous involvement in the criminal justice system and 
the integration of the government service provision into the indigenous 
community.1023 It was described as a major initiative and was designed to minimise 
indigenous over-representation in the criminal justice system through the application 
of mainstream law in a more appropriate way for the Koori people.1024 The Koori 
Court is more comprehensive than either the Nunga or Murri Court because it is 
enshrined in legislation. The Magistrates’ (Koori Court) Act of 2002 provides for the 
establishment of a Koori Division of the Magistrates’ Court and defines the 
jurisdiction and procedure of the Koori Division.1025 
 
                                            
1019 CJR Information paper Juxtaposition between Sentence Severity and Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
(2003) as cited in “Australia’s ‘New’ Indigenous Courts” <www.cjrn.unsw.edu.au>.  
1020 CJR, above n 939. 
1021 Mark Harris “From Australian Courts to Aboriginal Courts in Australia – Bridging the Gap?” 
(2004) 16(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 26 at 26-41. 
1022 See SA Council above n 932 at 8 for further discussion. 
1023 Mark Harris “The Koori Court and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2006) 1 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 129.  
1024 The Office of the Attorney-General “Hull Opens Melbourne’s First Koori Court” (press release, 
March 4, 2003). 
1025 See Magistrates Court (Koori Court) Act (Vic) 2002 <www.legislation.vic.gov.au>.  
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Australian jurisdictions that have set up specialist courts to deal with the sentencing of 
Aboriginal peoples have yielded far lower recidivism rates.1026 Anecdotal evidence 
supports the findings that these courts are showing signs of success.1027 Chief Justice 
Wayne Martin noted recently that:1028 
 
All the research that I have seen conducted on the outcomes of problem solving 
approaches to sentencing in Drug Courts and Domestic Violence Courts shows that 
they have been successful in reducing the risk of re-offending. 
 
However, he also stated that with respect to indigenous offending rates: 
 
…unless and until a whole of Government approach is taken to these issues in a 
conscious and deliberate attempt to restore traditional culture and lore, the over-
representation of Aboriginal people in the justice system is likely to continue 
[emphasis added]. However, there are things that can be done within the court system 
to improve the situation. Amongst them is the adoption of an approach in which 
Aboriginal people are given a greater sense of participation in the justice process 
through the adoption of sentencing processes such as those utilised in Circle Courts or 
Koori Courts which have been successful in other jurisdictions. 
 
(i) Court jurisdiction 
 
The Koori Court Division of the Magistrates’ Court1029 was established pursuant to 
the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989.1030 In order to appear before the court, the defendant 
                                            
1026 See Mark Harris A Sentencing Conversation: Evaluation of the Koori Courts Pilot Program 
October 2002 – October 2004 (Victorian Department of Justice, Melbourne, 2006) at 15 < 
www.justice.vic.gov.au>. 
1027 Rachael Mazza “Deadly Yarns launch and the Koori Court” ABC Network (online ed, Australia, 
22 April 2005) <www.abc.net.au>.  See also comments by Bonnie S. Fisher, Steven P. Lab, Barry A 
Fisher in Encyclopedia of Victimology and Crime Prevention (Sage Publications, 2010) pp 628 – 629 
where they note the complexity involved in the accurate evaluation of of Koori Courts. 
1028 Hon Wayne Martin CJ “The Magistrates of Western Australia Annual Conference 2006” (paper 
presented at Annual Conference, 8 November 2006) <www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au>. 
1029 For discussion on general background see Marchetti, Elena, and Kathleen Daly Indigenous Courts 
and Justice Practices in Australia (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2004) <www.aic.gov.au>;  See 
also K Auty and D Briggs “Koori Court Victoria: Magistrates Court (Koori Court) Act 2002” (2004) 
8(1) Law Text Culture Challenging Nation 7 <www.ro.uow.edu.au> for the views of the first sitting 
Magistrate and first enabling Aboriginal Justice Officer. See also Sentencing Council of Australia 
Report Sentencing in the Koori Court Division of the Magistrates Court  (2010) at ch 3; Department of 
Justice, Victoria, ‘Overview of the Koori Court’, Brochure (2006); Department of Justice Victoria 
“Koori Court – A Defendant’s Guide’ Brochure” (2008). 
1030 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), s 4D. 
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must be Aboriginal,1031 consent to the proceedings being heard in the Koori 
Court1032and plead guilty.1033 
 
The legislation provides that the Court is to be conducted with as little formality, 
technicality and with as much expedition as the requirements of the legislation and 
proper consideration of the matters before the Court permit.1034 The proceedings must 
be comprehensible to the defendant, family members and other Aboriginal persons 
who are in attendance.1035 
 
The Court may regulate its own procedure.1036 The Koori Court has the power to hear 
all matters within the jurisdiction of the Magistrates’ Court, with the exception of 
sexual offences and offences against the Crimes (Family Violence) Act.1037  
 
In relation to sentencing, the Koori Court may consider “any oral statement made to it 
by an Aboriginal elder or respected person”,1038 and the court may inform itself in any 
way it thinks fit.1039 Unlike the marae based court, which is not driven by legislation, 
the Magistrates’ Act provides for a number of persons who might be heard, including 
health workers, corrections officers, the victims and family members of the 
accused.1040 
 
Legislation, like the Magistrates’ Court Act (Vic) 1989, provides a clear directive and 
certainty to the judge and those involved within the criminal justice system. It is 
suggested that, should any indigenous court be established within New Zealand, 
similar legislative provisions should be implemented. 
  
Victoria currently has nine Koori Courts, seven adult Courts and two Children’s 
Courts. The adult courts are located in the rural areas of Shepparton, La Trobe Valley, 
                                            
1031 Section 4F(1)(a). 
1032 Section 4F(1)(d). 
1033 Section 4F(c). 
1034 Section 4D(4). 
1035 Section 4D(5). 
1036 Section 4D(6). 
1037 Section 4D(1). 
1038 Section 4G(2). 
1039 Section 4G(3). 
1040 Section 4G(3). 
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Mildura, Bairnsdale, Swan Hill, Warrnambool (including a circuit to Portland and 
Hamilton) and the metropolitan region of Broadmeadows; the Children’s Courts are 
located at Melbourne and Mildura. The setting of the location of the Koori Courts 
occurs through community consultation via the Aboriginal Justice Forum. 
The Aboriginal Justice Forum is the body responsible for supervising the 
development, implementation and direction of Koori initiatives under the Victorian 
Aboriginal Justice Agreement (AJA). The Forum meets regularly to review its 
progress and report to the Victorian Government on Koori justice outcomes. Its key 
roles are to:1041 
- promote best practice approaches in program development and service delivery 
- promote cross-program linkages and the development of a whole-of-government 
approach 
- monitor and report on implementation and justice outcome data. 
 
Elders and Respected Persons (ERPs) are recruited through advertising in local 
communities. The ERPs assist the court in relation to cultural and community issues, 
but have no role in sentencing. Unlike kuia and kaumatua from the marae based 
courts, ERPs are statutorily appointed and are paid a sitting fee. The ERPs undergo a 
week-long professional training regime and ongoing professional development is 
available. 
 
Similar to the training programme for the judiciary in New Zealand, magistrates also 
undergo continuing professional development.  However, the Victorian scheme is 
quite distinct from the Maori Land Court in New Zealand, where the judges are 
required to be well versed in tikanga Māori and have an understanding of te reo (the 
Māori language). Section 7(2A) of Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 provides: 
 
A person must not be appointed a Judge unless the person is suitable, having regard 
to the person’s knowledge and experience of te reo Māori, tikanga Māori [emphasis 
added], and the Treaty of Waitangi. 
  
                                            
1041 See Department of Justice Website for further discussion <www.justice.vic.gov.au>. 
 244 
A day-long training programme is conducted for magistrates who have previously 
presided over a Koori Court hearing, and it is recommended to all magistrates that 
they observe at least one full day’s hearing before presiding over Koori Court. The 
Judicial College of Victoria conducts a biennial cross-cultural immersion programme 
over three days. Koori Court magistrates have three days per year set aside for 
meetings, in which to discuss issues pertinent to the Koori Court and to undergo 
further professional development.  
 
It is acknowledged that the Judicial College of Victoria also conducts seminars in 
relation to Aboriginal issues and the Koori Court. In addition, the College supports 
the Judicial Officers’ Aboriginal Cultural Awareness Committee, which is chaired by 
Justice Stephen Kaye of the Victoria Supreme Court. 
 
(ii) Court Procedure1042 
 
The Victorian model complies with the requirements of the legislation.1043 Each Koori 
Court has a Koori Court Officer (KCO) who prepares the list and liaises with 
defendants and their families, legal practitioners, prosecutors, corrections officers and 
service providers. The KCO ensures that any issues relating to the establishment of 
Aboriginality or conflict of interest are resolved before the hearing. Where 
appropriate, the KCO arranges services and makes referrals on behalf of the 
defendant. 
 
Prior to the list commencing each morning, the magistrate meets with the KCO and 
the Elder and Respected Persons (ERP) who will be sitting with the magistrate later 
that day. The KCO provides a summary of the allegations, charges, prior convictions 
(if any) and any reports listed for the day with respect to each defendant. The 
documents are read and each case is discussed. The magistrate will explain any legal 
issues relating to the individual cases to the ERPs as well as any unfamiliar 
terminology. The magistrate also broadly discusses what the sentencing range might 
be for each case. 
                                            
1042 I am grateful for the assistance and academic conversations with Magistrate Jelena Popovic and 
acknowledge her support with this reproduction. See also Bridget McAsey “Critical Evaluation of the 
Koori Court Division of the Victorian Magistrates’ Court” (2005) 10(2) Deakin Law Review. 
1043 Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), s 4D- Koori Court. 
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The Magistrate will ascertain which order the ERPs wish to enter the courtroom, how 
the ERPs wish to be addressed, whether the ERPs wish to be introduced by the 
magistrate or would prefer to introduce themselves, whether they wish the persons in 
the courtroom to stand or remain seated upon the entrance of the magistrate and ERPs 
into the court room.  
 
The Bar table is set up as follows:  
 
 
Table 2: Diagram of Koori Courts (Department of Justice, Victoria, Australia 
November 2012) 
 
Similar to the mihi in marae based courts, each case commences with an 
acknowledgment of country,1044 as well as traditional owners, ancestors and elders. 
This is usually provided by the magistrate or by an elder. Reference is made to the 
court having been smoked,1045 the physical layout of the courtroom, and the artwork 
which is being displayed as an acknowledgment of the importance of culture and 
traditional beliefs; and the local Aboriginal community’s approval of the Koori Court 
being conducted at the court house. This “redefinition” of the environment is similar 
to the use of the ‘whare nui’ for marae based courts. 
 
                                            
1044 Country is similar to when Māori refer to their iwi or tribal area. 

















Extra Chair for service  
provider or supporter 
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The reference to the court having been smoked is highly significant. The smoking 
ceremony is conducted by an elder of the local community and involves eucalyptus 
leaves being lit and carried throughout the interior of the courthouse. This is similar to 
the smudging ceremony performed by First Nation peoples in Canada.1046 In addition 
to demonstrating the acceptance of the local community for the important business to 
be conducted in the court house, it is similar to a ‘karakia’ for Māori. Smoking clears 
away bad spirits, purifies the surroundings and establishes the way for a fresh 
beginning.  
 
The magistrate ascertains the defendant’s consent to having the matter dealt with in 
Koori Court. The case then proceeds as it would normally in the magistrates’ court; 
with pleas of guilty being entered, the prosecution summary of facts being read out 
and adopted, and any prior convictions tendered. 
 
The legal representative commences the plea. This may be interrupted by 
contributions or questions from the magistrate, elders, the defendant’s family, 
community members, police officers and prosecutors as appropriate. 
 
The KCO advises the court of arrangements which have already been put in place and 
of any programmes available to the defendant. Representatives of any other support 
agencies are also invited to speak, as are family members and any other community 
members. The most powerful aspect of the proceedings is when the ERPs address the 
defendant.  
 
The court allows sufficient time for ERPs, family members and community members 
to participate fully and feel confident to speak. The magistrate can assist with this 
process by asking individuals directly if they wish to add anything.  Often magistrates 
will need to remain silent and allow for quiet so that others have the chance to speak. 
If the victim is present, an opportunity to be heard will be provided. The defendant is 
asked what he/she would like to say and is encouraged to speak. The ERPs may speak 
to the defendant regarding his or her conduct.  
                                            
1046 See Wanda McAuslin (ed) Justice as Healing Indigenous Ways: Writings on Community 




The ERPs and the magistrate then confer audibly and openly at the bar table to 
discuss rehabilitation, community and family considerations. Conditions attached to 
orders may also be discussed at the table. The expertise of Community Corrections 
may be called upon. Everyone present in the courtroom is given the opportunity to be 
involved in the problem solving process. 
 
After everyone who wishes to have input has been heard, the magistrate will 
announce the defendant’s sentence. The defendant may again be asked to speak to 
ensure that he or she fully understands the nature of the sentencing order. 
 
At both the lunch adjournment and after the last case has been heard, the magistrate, 
ERPs and KCO will have the opportunity for a debriefing. 
 
(iii) Case Studies1047 
 
Scenario 1: The Koori Court changing offending patterns 
  
On the day of the offence, the Defendant had been consuming alcohol and decided to 
ride his motorbike to another nearby town and back again. While driving through the 
town, he lost control of the motorcycle and ran onto the footpath.  
 
The Defendant sustained minor injuries as a result of the collision and was taken by 
ambulance to a hospital. A sample of his blood was tested and it was subsequently 
found that his blood-alcohol levels were more than double the legal limit. At the time 
of the offence, the Defendant had been disqualified from holding a motorcycle 
license, and the motorbike that he was riding at the time of the accident was not 
registered.  
 
The Defendant initially denied that he had been driving the motorcycle at the time of 
the accident.  
                                            
1047 I am grateful to Magistrate Jelena Popovic for the reproduction of these case studies which are also 




- Careless driving  
- Exceed prescribed concentration of alcohol  
- Driving whilst disqualified  
- Driving an unregistered motorcycle  
 
Sentencing Considerations  
 
It was noted that the Defendant had four previous drink driving convictions. It was 
revealed in the course of the proceedings that the Defendant’s father-in-law had been 
killed in an accident, and that the Defendant had ridden his motorcycle to the scene of 
the accident.  
 
The incident that led to the Defendant being charged took place on the same day. In 
addressing the Koori Court, the Defendant noted that, at the time of the offence, he 
was “out of my mind with grief”. In speaking to the Defendant, one of the elders drew 
his attention to the fact that they were related. The elder noted that he had been 
through similar experiences in his own life.  
 
Elder:  
We’re related. I looked you know through our family trees and stuff … I was like you 
too, I mean I used to drink and I was pretty angry with myself and everybody else 
around me, but you know you’ve gotta pull yourself out of it, you get emotional.  
 
I attended alcoholics anonymous and that helped me in lots of ways you know, I was 
just sort of suggesting about what he was thinking, you know, I mean you could have 
killed someone, kids and things like that you know, and I done the same thing, I 
pinched a car and rolled it and you know, but I thought about it later, I could have 
killed myself or I could have killed someone else.  
 
The other elder in attendance during the hearing noted that there were two laws:  
white law and Aboriginal law. He went on to say that he followed Aboriginal law, but 
that in offences like driving cars, he and the Defendant had to accept that it was the 
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‘white law’ that had to apply, even though he felt that he may well have done exactly 
the same thing as the Defendant in the circumstances.  
 
The magistrate then addressed the Defendant:  
 
I wonder if anybody’s ever sat in this court as you have today and had such 
significant things said to them by members of their community who are such 
respected members. I wonder if it had ever been the case that they’d been told that 
those members of the community are going to support you but also tell you, you’ve 
gotta behave responsibly. Uncle ---- talked to you about the differences in white and 
Aboriginal law (and)…. Aunty ---- talked to you from the bottom of her heart about 
what she’s been through…  
 
The Defendant was asked whether he had anything he wished to say to the elders at 
the conclusion of the hearing, and he said:  
 
Like they’ve made sure that I’ve been keeping out of trouble, I’ve made another 
appointment for the drug and alcohol counselling, which I’ve gotta go back on 
Monday and I asked them if I can keep on attending so I can improve myself and 
suppose to say to the community and to me Elders that you know, I’m making a step, 
so that way I can just get on the right track, not the wrong one and by doing that I’ll 
make sure I’m gonna not ride me motorbike. 
 
In a subsequent media interview, the Defendant observed the impact that the Koori 
Court sitting had upon him. He said:  
 
Well in the Koori Court like you feel like the size of an ant. When they talk to you, 
you do, you start getting a lump in your throat, you feel like you know, crying. I’ve 
cried even in there, and they make you understand, we’re not above the law, and we 
get up and say what we have to say about ourselves, and they listen to what we say.  
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Scenario 2: The Koori Court and the importance of family and community in 
sentencing.1048 
The Defendant appeared at the Koori Court in relation to a number of charges. The 
first group of matters related to his driving at an excessive speed through a school 
area — a 40 kilometre zone. The vehicle he was driving at the time was also 
unregistered and had false registration plates. The second group of charges related to 
the actions in the early hours of a morning when he assaulted and abused two women 
in a nightclub. After being ejected from the nightclub, the Defendant became 
aggressive, took his shirt off, and abused the security personnel. A young woman, 
who approached him to tell him to put his shirt back on, was subsequently punched in 
the face.  
 
Charges  
- Intentionally causing injury (two counts)  
- Assault with a weapon  
- Driving while disqualified  
- Use of an unregistered motor vehicle  
- Fraudulently altering/using identification.  
 
Proceedings  
In this case the Defendant came from a well-known Koori family from the region. 
The Defendant was very keen to ensure that his father did not attend the court and had 
not told him of the seriousness of the charges.  
 
The Defendant also initially refused to accept one of the elders who had been listed to 
sit in at the hearing, alleging that there was a history of conflict between his family 
and that of the elder. As the summaries of the charges were read out, the father 
became quite distressed, both by the nature of the offences and by the fact that his son 
had received two severe beatings by unknown males after the nightclub assault.  
 
During the course of the hearing, it was made quite clear that there was a real prospect 
that the Defendant might be sentenced to imprisonment for his offences.  
                                            
1048 Harris, above n 1026, at 101. 
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Elder One: “Cos you know I’ve been through a lot of things with, with drinking 
alcohol, nearly killed myself, you know, jumpin’ off bridges and doing all them 
things.”  
 
Elder Two: “I had a good talk to [defendant’s name] and I told him that these are very 
serious charges, and I told him that the ----family were a very respectable family … 
they were all the family that came over here, the [family name] came to Shepparton 
when things were really tough, when racism was very bad … and they held their head 
up to everything … they challenged everything that come in front of them, and they 
were all good sportsmen and respectable people, and I don’t have to tell you any 
more, he knows what I said to him … that more or less he was degradin’ his 
grandfather and his grandmother and for what he’d done”.  
 
Defendant: “I’m just ashamed of what I’ve done … I’ve let a lot of people down and I 
know I’ve done the wrong thing. I’ve just got to learn by it, and so, and I apologise to 
youse for putting my family in pain yesterday.”  
 
Father of Defendant: “I’d like to first of all acknowledge the Elders as well and … I’d 
just like to acknowledge and thank my other community members here of the support 
they’ve had as for, for us here and as in the (family name). And I’d also like to 
acknowledge the concept of the Koori Court, I think it’s very, very good and, your 
Worship yourself, the cultural understanding of the issues, I think you can have these 
sorts of processes in place but I think that it takes that kind of partnership to 
understand some of the things …” 
 
Sentence  
The Defendant was placed on a Community Based Order (CBO) with conviction for 
twelve months, 150 hours of unpaid community work and a fine of AU$184.00. 
 
Observation  
From the initial possibility that the Defendant might be imprisoned, the Defendant 
was given a CBO. The magistrate observed, in handing down the sentence: 
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if you were here by yourself, standing in the back of the Court with a Magistrate 
hearing a submission in relation to submission, I think you’d be struggling to stay out 
of gaol. It’s down to your community that you’re not going to gaol.  
 
This case was a clear illustration of the importance of the Koori Court process in 
determining the underlying facts behind the case. The facts that were subsequently 
revealed in the course of the hearing were invariably highly emotional and ultimately 
influenced the magistrate not to order a term of imprisonment.  
 
This case also gives a strong indication of the importance of community. Even though 
the family no longer had such strong links with the local Koori community, they were 
placed in a network of shared history.  
 
The case was also significant for the conversation that occurred between the elders 
and the Defendant, and the father of the Defendant and the elders. Such was the 
intensity of this case that the magistrate commented in closing that: “It takes a bit of 
courage to come in here, and it takes a lot of guts to submit yourself to your Elders 
and we acknowledge that too.” Cases such as this one are a clear indication that the 
Koori Court is anything but the soft option that it is sometimes referred to. 
Scenario 3 The Koori Court giving the Defendant a chance to turn their life 
around. 1049 
 
The Defendant had a long history of drug use. She appeared in the Koori Court in 
relation to a number of incidents.  
 
The first matter arose when the Defendant and her partner became embroiled in a 
dispute whilst walking along the street. The Defendant pulled a knife from her 
backpack and slashed her own arm. After police attended she refused to drop the knife 
and was holding the knife to her throat when the police intervened with pepper spray. 
She was then taken to the local hospital.  
 
                                            
1049 Harris, above n 1026, at 106. 
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The second lot of charges related to an argument between the Defendant and two 
other persons, who she alleged had stolen some of her possessions. Upon arrival the 
police observed that the Defendant had a knife in her hand. She was ordered to place 
the knife on the ground. She complied. The Defendant was charged with using 
offensive language under the Summary Offences Act (Vic) 1966.  
 
The third incident occurred when the Defendant followed another person from an 
office and abused her. The Defendant grabbed the victim’s hair as she attempted to 
get into her car and struck her on the nose.  
 
The fourth incident involved the Defendant going to a store and taking a power tool 
without paying. When confronted by security staff, she refused to return to the store 
and left the premises. After police were contacted, they visited her home address 
where she confessed to the theft.  
 
The final incident involved theft of grocery items from a supermarket. The Defendant 
took the items from the shelves, placed them in her handbag and left the store without 
paying. When confronted by a staff member, the Defendant became abusive but then 
agreed to hand over the stolen goods. Police subsequently arrested her in relation to 
this matter and she was charged with theft.  
 
Charges  
- Two counts of shoplifting  
- Possession of a controlled weapon without lawful purpose  
- Possession of  a dangerous article  
- Use of indecent language in a public place  
- Possession of a prohibited weapon  
- Unlawful assault  
 
Sentencing Considerations  
The elders and respected persons expressed their concern at the Defendant’s history of 
self-harm and substance abuse. There was reference to a history of sexual assault and 
the pain suffered by the Defendant. However, the Court also insisted that it was time 
for her to take responsibility for the events in her life.  
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Elder: “It’s really heartbreaking to see you destroy, you’re trying to destroy yourself 
the way you do … I hate to see youse hurt, hurting yourself. And I really do love you 
[defendant’s name], I do love you. But, I want to see you pick yourself up and make 
your decisions for you.”  
 
Sentence  
The Defendant was convicted and placed on a Community Based Order (CBO) for a 
period of 12 months, which was to include psychological counselling through the 
Corrections Department of Victoria. In addition, the Defendant was referred to other 
service providers, including a detoxification programme for her drug and alcohol 
problems. The Defendant entered into a nine-month residential programme to combat 
her substance abuse.  
 
Observation  
A remarkable feature of this Koori Court case was the manner in which the elders 
affirmed their love for the Defendant, but also insisted that she take responsibility for 
her own life. It was then possible for the Koori Court to tailor a comprehensive order 
that addressed the underlying problems of substance abuse and made provision for a 
mental health assessment. At the end of the sentencing order, after the Defendant had 
thanked the elders, one of them responded from around the table that she should 
persevere with the psychological help, even though, they noted, “it’s not going to be 
easy”. The elder concluded by saying, “I think you’re beautiful and you are … you 
are a valued member of our community.”1050  
 
In a subsequent interview, the Defendant observed that the Koori Court had been a 
positive experience because it gave her the chance to tell her story. She said, “It gives 
you the chance to tell ‘em what you are and who you are and, you know, what you’ve 
been through and that.”1051  
 
                                            
1050 Harris, above n 1026. 
1051 Harris above n 1026. 
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The Defendant also emphasised the fact that the elders had been there as an important 
part of the experience, because “they live in it, they’re the same, they’re Aboriginal 
themselves. And they understand”.1052 
 
(iv) Evaluation of the Existing Koori Courts 
 
As with the establishment of the marae based courts, the catalyst for the Koori Courts 
has been the disproportionate offending rates of Aboriginal peoples. Victoria was 
chosen as the pilot court, mainly due to the ‘alarming statistics’ relating to indigenous 
offending in the State.1053 Since the first Victorian Koori pilot courts commenced in 
2002 and 2003, there has been a keen interest in their progress and effectiveness. 
 
Commissioned by the Victorian Department of Justice, a formal evaluation was 
undertaken by Dr Mark Harris of the two pilot Koori Courts in Shepparton, a regional 
city, and Broadmeadows, a suburb of Melbourne. The 2006 Report, titled ‘A 
Sentencing Conversation’ noted a significant reduction in recidivism rates from those 
two courts. 1054 The rate of reoffending for participants in the Koori Court was 
substantially less than the recidivism rates for the general population.1055 There was 
also a reduction in Koori offenders breaching correctional orders and a reduction in 
failures to appear in court. The positive evaluation resulted in the repeal of the sunset 
clause that prevented the Koori Court from operating beyond 30 June 2005.1056 
 
It is noted that the methodologies employed by Dr Mark Harris were questioned, in 
particular, for counting court files rather than individual defendants; using inadequate 
follow-up periods; and employing an ‘inappropriate comparison group’.1057 Despite 
this criticism, the sunset clause was repealed without opposition. 
 
                                            
1052 Harris above n 1026. 
1053 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 29 May 2002, 1282 (Justin Madden); 
Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 April 2002, 1129 (Rob Hulls) as cited in 
Sentencing Council of Australia, above n 927, at 3. 
1054 Harris above n 1026. 
1055 The rate from Shepparton Koori court was found to be 12.5 per cent and from Broadmeadows it 
was 15.5 per cent. In comparison, the recidivism rates for all Victorians was said to be 29.4 per cent. 
1056 Courts Legislation (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2005 (Vic), s 9. 
1057 See Jacqueline Fitzgerald “Does Circle Sentencing Reduce Aboriginal Offending?” (2008) 115 
Crime and Justice Bulletin 2; Marchetti and Daly, above n 828 at 419; Michael King, Arie Freiberg, 
Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, Australia, 2009) at 92. 
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In addition to an examination of the available statistics about offending and re-
offending, the Review included a collation of questionnaires and qualitative feedback 
from the various parties involved in the Koori Courts. Some of the qualitative 
observations are reproduced below:1058 
 
…. Consistent themes that emerge from the additional comments made by the 
defendants on their questionnaires were the importance of the role of Elders and 
cultural factors in their court appearance and the fact that they had the opportunity to 
speak and that they felt the Magistrate was listening to them. Significantly a number 
of the defendants indicated that they had a long prior history of involvement with the 
criminal justice system (ranging from 10 to 43 years) and they felt that the Court 
represented a significant and different justice experience for them. 
 
The Elders were unanimous in their belief that the Koori Court had improved 
relations between the local Koori community and the police. However, they were less 
emphatic on the question of whether they thought that the court was well understood 
and accepted by the local non-Indigenous community; with only one replying that 
they thought it was accepted, while six replied that they were “not sure”.1059  
 
In summary, the elders’ questionnaire indicated that they believed the Koori Court to 
be a success and that their role was respected and valued by the defendants and other 
court personnel.1060 Significantly, they believed that the Koori Court had improved 
relations with the local police force, although there was less certainty as to the degree 
that the Koori Court was understood and accepted amongst the wider non-indigenous 
community.1061  
 
The Report also contained 19 recommendations ranging from extending the Koori 
Court initiative to the provision of more Magistrates’ Court locations. This would 
place the Koori Court on stronger financial grounds as well as extending the 
jurisdiction to the Children’s Court.  
 
                                            
1058 Harris above n 1026. 
1059 Harris above n 1026. See also recent comments by Andrew Thompson in ‘Elders Want Koori Court 
to Stay’ The Standard (online ed, Australia, 27 April 2013).   
1060 Harris, above n 1026. 
1061 Harris above n 1026, at 93. 
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Statistics and measures of success 
 
One of the ongoing challenges is the collection of sufficiently accurate statistics and 
demographic information to inform future decisions. The Australian Bureau of 
Statistics defines an indigenous person as a person of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander descent who identifies as an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander and is 
accepted as such by the community in which he or she lives. There are three 
components to the definition: descent, self-identification and community acceptance.  
 
As with many Māori, it is not uncommon for an Aboriginal person to not self-identify 
as one upon arrest. Anecdotal reasons suggest that this is due to an unwillingness to 
become a victim of a negative stereotype, enforced by the over-representation within 
the criminal justice system, and thus classified as a problem. This presents a hurdle 
not only when comparing Aboriginals going through Koori Courts system with 
Aboriginals appearing in mainstream courts, but also in ascertaining accurate rates of 
criminality. Nonetheless, the recent report from Victoria indicate that over the last two 
years there has been a reduction of sitting days in the Koori Courts.1062 Although this 
is not conclusive, it supports anecdotal evidence that the Koori Courts reduce 
recidivism rates. Deputy Chief Justice Jelena Popovic further relates that:1063 
 
I met the mother of a young man whose case was heard before a magistrate and 
Elders at Koori Court several years ago. The young man’s mother said that, as an 
Aboriginal person, the most significant development in Aboriginal social justice was 
the introduction of Koori Courts. It was her firm belief that her son’s life may have 
taken a different turn entirely had his offending been dealt with in a conventional 
manner. The family had been part of the Stolen Generation and as a result, the son 
had not been particularly cultural before the Koori Court hearing. The hearing 
changed his life. For the first time in his life, the Elders connected him up to his 
elders and family members and he felt a sense of inclusion. Actually, he was made to 
feel valued by the community. The Elders told him about his family, provided him 
with support and reinforced community expectations. His sentence was deferred, 
during which period he attended Koori specific drug and alcohol counselling. He left 
                                            
1062 See The Magistrates Court of Victoria Annual Report 2012/13 ‘A varied, substantial and extensive 
jurisdiction’ 58.  
1063 Ibid at 57. 
 258 
the Court not only with a sense of identity, but of pride, purpose and belonging. He 
has not reoffended, has completed a trade and has a family of his own. This story 
encapsulates what Koori Court means to me as a magistrate. It demonstrates how 
powerful a culturally appropriate court process can be. The young man did not 
become a statistic in the substantial overrepresentation of Aboriginal persons in 
custody. The process connected him to his culture and community and assisted him to 
become a contributing member of the wider community. His response to the  
Koori Court had the further effect of allaying his mother’s concerns about his drug 
and alcohol abuse and his diminished future prospects.  
 
Magistrates’ resources, court staff and training 
 
Support for magistrates who have had previous experience working with Aboriginal 
peoples or receiving cross-cultural awareness training is crucial.1064A Koori Court 
Benchbook would ensure a level of consistency in the court process. Court Registrars 




An Integrated Services Programme that dovetails the various programmes needed to 
support a person’s housing, their physical, mental and educational well-being, as well 
as other pertinent issues in a holistic way would be beneficial. This is seen as an 
essential way to reduce offending patterns and behaviours — both for Koori and 




The possibility of extending the Koori Courts beyond hearing matters where the 
defendant pleads guilty is considered. As the ‘success’ of Koori Courts continues, the 
academic interest in widening this jurisdiction beyond sentencing will also 
increase.1066 
 
                                            
1064 Harris above n 1026, recommendation 4. 
1065 Recommendation 5. 




The report recommended continuing the existing exclusion of sexual offences and 
family violence crimes from the Koori Courts.1067 This area remains problematic. 
 
Indigenous academics such as Dr Kylie Cripps expressed concern during a recent 
Court of Appeal case in which an Aboriginal man, who was serving time for violently 
assaulting a fifteen year old girl, received a lesser sentence. This was in part because 
his shaming in the Koori Court constituted an additional customary punishment.1068 
This decision was in conflict with the official assurances that Koori Courts had 
nothing to do with customary law.   
 
Professor Marcia Langton further commented that:1069 
 
You cannot downgrade assaults on women and say it’s just a minor matter... – 
downgrading the seriousness of violence against women. She questioned why violent 
Aboriginal men were offered alternative court proceedings where the men are 
regarded as victims.  
 
(c) Specialised Court – Domestic Violence  
 
In Australia specialised family violence courts operate in New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Northern Territory and the 
Australian Capital Territory. In Western Australia there are customised programmes 
for indigenous persons and members of other cultural groups.1070 Notwithstanding this 
provision, the ability of these specialised courts to consider an indigenous legal 
system remains problematic. 
 
 
                                            
1067 Recommendation 12. 
1068 See R Guillnat “Aboriginal Courts Fail to Deter Offenders” The Australian (online ed, Australia, 
23 October 2010) <www.theaustralian.com.au>. 
1069 Gullinat, above n 838.  
1070 For full discussion see Australian Government Family Violence – A National Legal Response 
(ALRC Report 114, 2010) <www.alrc.gov.au>. 
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(d) Where the Future in Australia is Heading 
 
As Chief Magistrate Ian Gray has observed, there has been a paradigm shift in 
sentencing in the last 10 to 20 years. Moreover, “the growing realisation that crudely 
punitive sentencing is not a reliable way of dealing with recidivism, has led to the 
introduction into courts of various modes of therapeutic and restorative justice”. Koori 
Courts share many of the characteristics of the new form of rehabilitative sentencing 
that has been termed “therapeutic jurisprudence”.  
 
Clearly, the innovative approach of the Koori Court is more than just ‘special 
treatment’ or a ‘soft option’, but is, in fact, reflective of international trends in 
sentencing and legal development. What distinguishes the Koori Court, however, is 
the importance of the indigenous community and the role played by the elders and 
respected persons. It is therefore important to distinguish the Koori Courts as more 
than just an example of restorative justice or therapeutic jurisprudence and recognise 
the Koori Courts as sui generis.1071 Although the Koori Courts are progressive, they 
have the potential to further address the raft of issues faced by Aboriginal peoples 
within the legal system, particularly that of power imbalance.1072 
 
 
E. United States of America 
 
(a) Re-entry Courts – Specialised Courts  
 
Re-entry courts are modelled from the same principle that underpins drug courts. That 
is, they are designed to assist ex-prisoners to participate in a judicially supervised 
parole programme to promote their successful integration into the community.1073 
They are specialised courts established in the United States that help to reduce 
recidivism and improve public safety through judicial oversight. The Hon. Richard 
Gebelein has stated:1074 
                                            
1071 Harris above n 1026, at 134. 
1072 McAsey, above n 962, at 685. 
1073 Terry Saunders “Re Entry Court” in Bruce Winick and David Wexler (eds) above n 164, at 67. 
1074 Shadd Maruna and Thomas P LeBel “Welcome Home? Examining the ‘Reentry Court’ Concept 
from a Strengths Based Perspective” (2003) 4(2) Western Criminology Review 91 at 92. 
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…drug courts have succeeded because, unlike previous failed rehabilitative efforts, 
the drug court movement has been able to provide a narrative of what is causing the 
criminal behaviour of the drug court clients and what they need to get better. 
 
For Maruna and LeBel, the critical question about re-entry courts becomes: “… is 
there a similar narrative for how and why re-entry should work?” 1075 
 
The responsibilities generally assigned to re-entry courts include:1076 
 
(a) A review of the offender’s re-entry progress and problems; 
(b) The ordering of offenders to participate in various treatment and 
reintegration programs; 
(c) The use of drug and alcohol testing and other checks to monitor 
compliance;  
(d)       The application of graduated sanctions to offenders who do not comply
      with treatment requirements; and  
(e)       The provision of modest incentive rewards for sustained clean drug tests
      and other positive behaviour. 
 
Conventionally, the judiciary has no role beyond sentencing of an offender, at which 
point responsibility for the offender ends. In New Zealand the Department of 
Corrections takes over responsibility for the offender. Despite more prisoners being 
incarcerated and serving longer sentences before becoming eligible for parole,1077 the 
availability of treatment programmes in prisons in New Zealand and the USA is 
questionable, and programme participation among prisoners has been declining over 
the past decade.1078   
 
Countries such as the United States of America have shown that re-entry courts can 
assist released offenders to deal with a variety of problems that, if left unresolved, 
                                            
1075 At 92. 
1076 “Office of Justice JD Programs, Model Programs Guide” <www.dsgonline.com>. 
1077 Parole Act amendments now require the offenders to serve a greater proportion of their sentence 
before being eligible for parole, see Parole Act 2002, s 20. 
1078 James P Lynch and William J Sabol Prisoner Re-entry in Perspective: Crime and Policy Report 
Volume 3 (the Urban Institute, Washington DC, 2001).  
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could significantly interfere with their successful re-integration into the 
community.1079 The long term benefits of successful re-entry into the community are 
viewed as outweighing the costs associated with establishing and operating a re-entry 
court.  
 
The goal of re-entry courts is to reduce recidivism and the costs of incarceration and 
community disrepair, thus building a safer community in the process. 1080 To date, the 
supervision of offenders on parole has been poor.1081 These factors have given rise to 
a new approach to court management in which judges actively become involved in 
supervising the transition of the offender.  
 
This is not a novel idea. Specialised courts such as the drug court and domestic 
violence courts operate in this fashion. A key component in this type of court is that 
the court holds the judicial authority to which offenders respond positively.1082 In 
addition, frequent appearances before the court with the offer of assistance, coupled 
with the knowledge of the predictable and prudent consequences for failure, assist the 
offender in the re-entry process. 
 
A re-entry court can take various forms. A “Case Defined” Court provides for the 
judge to retain jurisdiction over a case during the entire life of the sentence.1083 A 
“Stand Alone” Court allows the judge to maintain exclusive jurisdiction over re-entry 
cases.1084 Another type involves parole boards working with the judiciary to develop 
quasi-courts through the use of an administrative law judge. This is similar to the 
situation in New Zealand where the Parole Board consists of members of the judiciary 
as well as community members to consider offenders for parole. All forms offer a 
unified and comprehensive approach to managing offenders from first appearance to 
                                            
1079 See for example discussion by Judge Terry Saunders on the Harlem Reentry Court in Winick and 
Wexler, above n 164, at 67 – 72. 
1080 This is consistent with New Zealand. See Reid v Parole Board (CA 247/05, 29 June 2006) where 
the Court of Appeal held that the Parole Board’s sole focus should be the recidivism risk of the 
individual offender. 
1081 See “Report Finds Failure in Parole Management” Newstalk ZB/One News (New Zealand, February 
17, 2009) <www.tvnz.co.nz>. 
1082 OJJDP Model Programs Guide Re Entry Court <www.dsgonline.com> 
1083 OJJDP, above n 1002. 
1084 OJJDP, above n 1002. 
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incarceration and back into the community, exploring a new approach to improving 
offender reintegration into the community.  
 
The goal is to establish a seamless system of offender accountability and support 
services throughout the re-entry process. Important elements of a re-entry court 
include the assessment of the offender’s needs and planning for release; active judicial 
oversight of offenders during the period of supervised release, including the use of 
graduated and stringent sanctions for violation of release conditions; a broad array of 
supportive services with community involvement; and positive judicial reinforcement 
of successful completion of re-entry court goals.1085  
 
(b) Procedure – An Example 
 
In February 2000 the Office of Justice Programs in the United States of America 
launched a re-entry court initiative to explore a new approach to improving offender 
re-integration into the community. One of the Delaware Superior Court re-entry pilots 
is the New Castle County Re-Entry Court Program, in which case managers’ work 
with offenders to create re-entry court plans. The probation officer works closely with 
the community police to enhance offender monitoring. 
 
This re-entry court process incorporates three tiers of supervision: 
 
(a) Phase I – participants meet weekly with the judge and probation officer  
(b) Phase II – participants meet every fortnight for three months and, if 
necessary, have further status conferences with the probation officer 
(c) Phase III – monthly status conferences are held at thirty day intervals 
 
Case managers act as service brokers and report directly to the re-entry judge on the 
appropriate services and treatment for participating offenders. 
 
The re-entry courts are situated in the heart of the community, close to where parolees 
live, receive services and work. This provides both convenience and a familiar setting 
                                            
1085 “Delaware State Courts Re Entry Courts <www.courts.delaware.gov>.  
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for the parolees. The period of time post release has been identified as a critical time 
for parolees; the provision of a quick and smooth transition is vital.  
 
(c) Current (Indigenous) Re-entry Models 
 
(i) A Spanish Comparison – Juez de Vigilancia Penitenciaria (JVP)  
 
Creative initiatives from jurisditions, such as Spain, have extended the reach of the 
judiciary in re-entry courts. David Wexler has proposed that the legal structure of 
Spain’s JVP could be used as the foundation for a re-entry court.1086 
 
The JVP law in Spain was created to provide judicial watchfulness over prisoner 
rights and liberties, and is responsible for monitoring the prisoner’s progress through 
an active treatment programme. One of the most remarkable features of the JVP is the 
prisoner’s active participation in the planning and execution of the programme.1087 
The JVP may impose relevant conditions on release, such as prohibiting contact with 
the victim, participation in particular programmes and periodic appearances before the 
JVP.1088 
 
The role of the JVP begins upon incarceration. Conditional release is not automatic 
once the offender has served a certain length of his or her sentence, nor does release 
lie in the unfettered discretion of the JVP. Conditional release authority resides in a 
single judge, rather than in a multi-member board. It is not the judge’s role to recall an 
offender. 
 
Although this option is somewhat underdeveloped, according to David Wexler:1089 
 
… the enviable JVP legal structure deserves to be studied seriously by those in the 
United States and in other Anglo American legal systems contemplating reform of the 
re-entry process. 
                                            
1086 See Organic Law of Spain 1/1979, Art 76. 
1087 Bruce J Winick and David Wexler (eds) Law in a Therapeutic Key (Carolina Academic Press, 
1996) at 3. 
1088 Winick and Wexler above n 1087, at 3. 
1089 Winick and Wexler above n 1087, at 7. 
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(ii) Tohono O’odham Nation 
 
The Tohono O’odham Nation in the United States has a Law and Order Code and 
retains jurisdiction over many criminal offences. 1090 The re-entry of these offenders is 
a community concern. This Law and Order Code1091 allows a tribal court to “parole” 
offenders after successfully serving a portion (typically one half) of the imposed 
sentence.1092 Upon parole application, a tribal judge will typically grant or deny 
parole. Recently, the Tohono O’odham judiciary has been contemplating the use of 
the (tribal) Law and Order Code parole provision to facilitate and create a re-entry 
court where the judges would play an active role.1093 The sovereign powers and 
jurisdiction of the Nation lies within their boundary. This would only extend to 
persons outside this boundary by consent. 
 
There are obvious issues that flow from such a proposition. These include the type of 
cases a re-entry court may best begin with, the nature of a judicial parole hearing, the 
type of preparation an offender should engage in, the kind of parole conditions that 
may be imposed, the role of the community and the follow up process between the 
offender and the judge.1094  
 
(d) Navajo Courts1095 
 
Prior to the arrival of the Spanish (1598) and the Anglo-Saxons (1846), Navajos 
governed themselves and resolved disputes in their own way. They lived in family 
groups and clans, and resolved disputes by ‘talking things out’. The judges were the 
hozhoji' Naat'aah, or peace chiefs. They were leaders, chosen by community 
                                            
1090 Tohono O’odham Nation comprises of a group of Native Americans who reside primarily in the 
Sonoran Desert of South East Arizona and northwest Mexico. 
1091 Tohono O’odham Law and Order Code 1.15 (5) 1994 “a person convicted of an offence and 
sentenced to jail may be paroled after he or she has served at least half of the particular sentence with 
good behaviour”. 
1092 Bruce J Winick and David Wexler ‘Practice Settings and Clinical Opportunities’ in David Wexler 
(ed) Rehabilitating Lawyers Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence for Criminal Law Practice 
(Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina, 2008) at 313.  
1093 Wexler above n 1092, at 314. 
1094 See Wexler above n 1092, at 316 for discussion. 
1095 For a similar example see also the Hopi Courts who have established both a civil and criminal 
jurisdiction and rely on Elders for the implementation of Hopi custom law. See Justin B Richland 
Arguing with Tradition: the Language of Law in Hopi Tribal Court (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2008) at 46-47 for further discussion. 
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consensus because of their wisdom, spirituality, exemplary conduct, speaking ability, 
and skill in planning for community survival and prosperity. They mediated disputes 
by encouraging people to discuss their problems fully in order to reach agreed 
settlements and restore harmony throughout the community.  
 
The Constitution and later federal laws granted local sovereignty to tribal nations, but 
not full sovereignty identifying them as ‘domestic dependent nations’. The Indian 
Reorganisation Act 1934 was enacted to support Native American self-government 
and self-management of assets. In 1953 the United States Federal Code granted full 
effect to Native American laws and customs, provided that they were not inconsistent 
with respective state laws.  
 
Any decision by a Tribal Court was recognised by State and Federal Courts and 
Native tribes held exclusive jurisdiction to pass laws and prosecute within their tribal 
boundaries. In cases where the offender was Native American and the victim non- 
Native American, or for serious offences, such as manslaughter or murder, the 
jurisdiction of State law applied. However, if the offender and victim were both 
Native American, but from different tribes, the respective tribal court jurisdiction 
applied.1096 
 
Unlike European law, traditional Navajo law was based not on power, but on 
relationships, respect and mutual need.1097 By the early 1980s members of the Navajo 
Nation Council, judges and the Navajo people themselves sought to revive traditional 
Navajo justice methods. As part of this initiative, local judges began to apply 
traditional Navajo legal principles in their decisions. They did so in the English 
language. These decisions provided a great deal of insight into Navajo common law.  
 
According to Justice Austin:1098 
                                            
1096 See Means v Nation 432 F 3d 924, 933 (9th Cir 2005) where following an appeal by an Oglala-
Sioux member against a Navajo Nation criminal prosecution for assault under the Navajo Nation Code 
the United States Supreme Court held that tribal court jurisdiction applies to all Native Americans. 
1097 Chief Justice (Emeritus) Robert Yazzie “History of the Courts of the Navajo Nation” (Paper 
prepared for the Orientation of the Judiciary Committee of the Navajo Nation, February 11 2003) 
<www.navajocourts.org/>. 
1098 Raymond D Austin “ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker Court” (1993) 32(2) The Judges’ Journal at 
47- 48. 
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The Navajo experience is one of going back to fundamental values. Given the 
disruptions of non-Indian schools … destruction of tribal land bases … Indians have 
many barriers to overcome. All those influences have eroded traditional values … so 
long as Navajos preserve their language, religion, traditions and culture they retain 
the framework for successful modern approaches. Navajo common law is not 
something quaint or curious – it is alive and vibrant … it adapts to the present and it 
will adapt to the future … this is a process of going back … back to the future. 
 
Three foundational Navajo doctrines are hozho (harmony, balance and peace), k’e’ 
(unity through positive values) and k’e’i (kinship or clan system). These concepts are 
equivalent to their Māori counterparts; namely, whakapapa, whanaungatanga, 
rangimarie, kotahitanga and balance — the ultimate aim for tikanga. These three 
doctrines have been incorporated by Navajo judges in a Navajo adjudicatory system 
that is designed for American style litigation.1099 The written decisions of the Navajo 
Courts provide information on how these doctrines provide tools for “healing” and 
attaining harmony within the community. In seeking answers for disproportionate 
rates of criminality and mental health issues, the potential answers lie not in the non-
Indian system that oppressed the people, but in their own languages, philosophies and 
cultural practices that are intrinsic to the three underlying doctrines applied in these 
courts.  
  
The Navajo Nation identifies and codifies the common law doctrines.1100 In addition, 
a traditional system is annexed to the modern court system to promote and facilitate 
the holistic use of Navajo culture, language, common law and spirituality. 
Unsurprisingly, restorative justice is a core responsibility of the Navajo justice 
system. 
 
                                            
1099 See In re Mental Health Services of Bizardi 8 Nav. Rptr (Nav. Sup. Ct. 2004) where the court 
referred to the principle of hozho, “bringing people in dispute back to harmony” as cited in Raymond 
Austin Navajo Courts and the Navajo Common Law (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
2009) at 65. 
1100 For example, ‘The Navajo Indian Nation recognize[s] common-law marriages between tribal 
members living on the reservation if these marriages meet the elements universally recognized as 
constituting a common-law marriage (agreement to be married, cohabitation, and holding out to the 
public as being married). Such a marriage may be validated by the Courts of the Navajo Nation upon 
application and submission of proof that the persons involved have entered into such a marriage and 
are recognized as husband and wife in their community.’ GN 00305.080 Navajo Tribal Common-Law 
Marriages <http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200305080>. 
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For example, in response to a request by the Navajo Supreme Court to review juvenile 
detention, the probation and peacemaking functions of the process were merged. This 
was to promote rehabilitation of offenders.1101 During this review many offences on 
the Navajo Nation were decriminalised and directed to restorative justice solutions, 
community participation and nalyeeh.1102  
 
A study undertaken of Navajo Peacemaking noted that “peacemaking participants 
show a rate of reoccurrence of the presenting problem of 29%, while those processed 
through the Family Court show a rate of 64%”. 1103 The study further suggests that 
“Peacemaking offers individuals and groups experiencing conflict a compelling 
opportunity to achieve resolution and community/family justice” and that the process 
offered:1104 
 
a pervasive sense of fairness, experiencing higher levels of case settlement … [and] 
that Peacemaking allowed them to communicate their feelings much more freely and 
maintained the centrality … as essential to the process. These data are bolstered by 
the fact that many of the Peacemaking participants had previously dealt with family 
conflict within Family Court and had a personal basis of comparison. 
 
 
F. Comparative Jurisdiction Conclusion 
 
In Canada international bodies recommend effective access to justice for Aboriginal 
women.1105 As a way to achieve this goal, the Canadian Criminal Code supports the 
implementation of circle sentencing. Evidence suggests that the use of circle 
sentencing can contribute to lower recidivism rates.1106  
 
                                            
1101 “Nábináhaazláago” Initiative Services to Youth in Detention 
<http://www.navajocourts.org/Nabinahazlaago%20Files/Nabinahaazlaago.html> 
1102 Initiative Services to Youth in Detention, above n 1021. 
1103 Eric K. Gross Evaluation/Assessment of Navajo Peacemaking April 5, 2001. Available also at 
<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187675.pdf>, 46. Athough the issue of selection bias was 
raised the author’s fieldwork dismissed this issue.  
1104 Ibid, 44.  
1105 For instance, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and also the  
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  
1106 See Carol La Prairie and Julian Roberts “Sentencing Circles: Some Unanswered Questions” (1996) 
39 Criminal Law Quarterly 69 at 73. 
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The Australian Law Reform (1986)1107 recognises the importance of customary law in 
addressing disproportionate offending rates. The Magistrates’ (Koori Court) Act 2002 
provides for the establishment of Koori Courts to operate during sentencing. Evidence 
indicates that the Koori Courts assist in issues of identity, the increase in community 
values and a contribution to the lowering of recidivism rates. 
 
In the United States the concept of self-governance, a form of self-determination, is 
supported and has manifested in the Navajo Courts. 1108 The jurisdiction of these 
courts is not confined to sentencing, but applies throughout the justice process. The 
concepts underpinning and actively employed by the Navajo Courts are similar to 
tikanga Māori. 
 
Research indicates that circle-sentencing defendants in Canada re-offended at the 
same rate — 40 per cent — as Aboriginal defendants in the mainstream court system. 
On the other hand, Queensland’s Attorney General, Cameron Dick, states the Murri 
Courts have better attendance, are valued by their communities and deliver culturally 
relevant sentences.1109 
 
In a recent review of Queensland’s Murri Courts, however, it was concluded that they 
did not reduce Aboriginal offending.1110 This is consistent with recent findings from 
New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia1111. The report found that two 
thirds of those appearing before these courts reoffended within twelve months. This is 
similar to the reoffending rate of mainstream courts. 
 
                                            
1107 Australian Law Reform Commission The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law (31 Sydney, 
1986) <www.austlii.edu.au>. 
1108 Tribal nations are recognised as "domestic dependent nations" by the Federal Government and has 
established a number of laws attempting to clarify the relationship between the federal, state, and tribal 
governments. 
1109 R Guilliatt ‘Aboriginal courts fail to deter offenders’ The Australian October 23, 2010. 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs> 
1110 Evaluation of the Queensland Murri Court: Final report Anthony Morgan Erin Louis (2010) 
Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Government, Reports and Technical Background Paper 
39, xv, where the report noted that ‘appearing for sentence in the Murri Court had no impact on 
reoffending among indigenous offenders, at least in the short term.’ 
1111 See J Fitzgerald Does Circle Sentencing Reduce Aboriginal Offending? (2008) Crime and Justice 
Bulletin: Contemporary Issues in Crime and Justice no 115, May 2008: 1-12 as cited by Elena 
Marchetti Indigenous Sentencing Court Brief 5 December 2009 <www.indigenousjustice.gov.au> 
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While the recommendations of the 1986 Australian Law Reform Commission Report 
enjoy wide support from indigenous communities, indigenous customary law receives 
only limited recognition through the existing criminal justice system. Australia’s 
‘new’ indigenous courts operates within the existing Magistrates’ Court systems in 
South Australia, Victoria and Queensland. These courts are responsible for sentencing 
only and require offenders to admit their guilt. They can be seen as a therapeutic 
response to the problem of indigenous over-representation within a more 
urban/mainstream location. The ‘new’ indigenous courts are also said to reflect the 
partnership practices that were recommended in Justice Agreements between State 
governments and indigenous organisations. 
 
As in the marae based courts, available research indicates some level of success, 
although a number of concerns have also been highlighted. These include the 
criticism that the new indigenous courts are simply a European justice initiative 
dressed up as an indigenous one, and do not tackle the root problems of indigenous 
offending, such as the legacy of government oppression and the inter-generational 
effects of colonisation.1112  
 
In addition, these courts may place further strain on indigenous communities that are 
already affected by economic marginalisation and have few social services/resources. 
Ironically, the current locations of the indigenous courts may not be suited to an urban 
setting and, in the case of the Nunga and Murri Courts, a lack of formalised 
legislation could potentially pose problems. Marchetti and Daly argue that these 
courts have broader aims and objectives, in that they seek to achieve a cultural and 
political transformation of the law.1113  
 
In general, these courts address minor offences. However, various issues concerning 
whether the court’s jurisdiction should be extended to include serious offences that 
warranted a jury have been raised.1114 As these courts could be available to both 
indigenous and non-indigenous offenders, then theoretically, the composition of any 
                                            
1112 Marchetti and Daly, above n 828. 
1113 Marchetti and Daly, above n 828. 
1114 See for example Criminal Procedure Act 2011 ss 71 – 74 that provides for four categories of 
offences attracting Judge alone or a Jury trial. It is envisaged that the proposed model would initially be 
open to Category 1 offences only (minor offences), with a review if the model proves successful. 
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jury should not present an issue. However, as these courts are primarily designed to 
address the disproportionate offending statistics of indigenous peoples, it is suggested 
that any jury convened should reflect an indigenous selection and composition. As the 
court is underpinned and directed by principles of healing, harmony and balance, any 
non-indigenous offender should not be disadvantaged. In any event the defendant may 
still choose to be tried in mainstream courts. 
 
Although some indigenous courts indicate signs of success, it is suggested that a 
similar forum that is underpinned by customary law, but positioned outside the 
colonial justice system, may provide a way forward.  
 
By identifying the ingredients of current initiatives from the comparative jurisdictions 
that have shown success and developing them further, it is suggested that the current 
implementation of traditional practices, such as circle sentencing, should be extended. 
Furthermore, a return to the concepts that underpin tikanga — an indigenous legal 
system — is pivotal to addressing disproportionate offending and imprisonment rates 
among indigenous peoples.  
 
 
G. A model for Māori? 
 
In the abstract, the model of a Navajo Court is amenable to a concept of an indigenous 
court for Māori. Notwithstanding this possibility, there are a few concerns. 
 
To retain the integrity of tikanga, it should not be subject to codification or 
interpretation by the legal profession. First, there is the danger that important concepts 
will be lost in translation, which invariably results in some redefinition of the original 
concept or term.  
 
In general, the incorporation of tikanga into Pākehā law implies a degree of 
acceptance and understanding of tikanga, which may not always be the case. 
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Second, the isolation of one concept or term from tikanga is an unnatural separation 
of the concept from its tikanga roots, its philosophical underpinnings and cultural 
constructs.  
 
Third, the codification or placement of tikanga within mainstream legislation is only 
one factor to be considered amongst many others. This is also unnatural and 
degrading to tikanga.  
 
The major problem with codifying tikanga is that these ‘right, proper’ ways of doing 
things are fundamentally contextual, rather than absolute.  Like any other system of 
law, they depend on the context, including the nature of the offence, the individuals 
and kin groups involved, their previous transactions with each other and the particular 
expectations about ‘proper’ behaviour that have been discussed in this case. 
 
The underlying tenets of customary law are common to all indigenous peoples. For 
the First Nations Peoples of Canada:1115 
 
Our traditions must be lived to be relevant, but it requires great effort to acquire and 
apply them. You have a choice about what laws you should follow … those choices 
are strengthened when they remain connected to the earth and all we can learn from 
her … 
 
Law is most successful when it reflects the values and mores of those it serves.  
 
The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence underpins the specialised courts and bears 
similarities with tikanga Māori. An examination of whether this doctrine of 
therapeutic jurisprudence can be used as a vehicle to import tikanga Māori concepts 





                                            






































A. What is Therapeutic Jurisprudence?1116 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence was developed out of the mental health system. American 
Professors Bruce Winick and David Wexler, both mental health law academics, were 
the pioneers of this movement. During their practice within the American health 
system, they conceived the idea that the operation of law and its accompanying legal 
processes can have a direct psychological impact on all the players, including lawyers, 
judges and the offender.1117 This impact could be both therapeutic or anti- 
therapeutic.1118 Thus a system that is designed to help people recover or improve their 
mental health often backfires and has the opposite effect.1119  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a perspective that regards the law as a social force that 
produces behaviours and consequences.1120 Sometimes these consequences fall within 
the realm of what we call ‘therapeutic’. At other times anti-therapeutic consequences 
are produced.1121 Therapeutic jurisprudence raises our attention to this and encourages 
us to see whether the law can be made or applied in a more therapeutic way, so long 
as other values, such as justice, can be fully respected.1122 For Māori, this means that 
the law should aspire to generate a state of ora (well-being) as opposed to an 
aggravated state of mate (ailing, ill). It does not trump other considerations or 
override important societal values, such as due process or freedom of speech and 
press.1123  Therefore therapeutic jurisprudence is the study of therapeutic and non-
therapeutic consequences of the law. 
 
                                            
1116 Parts of this chapter have already been published Valmaine Toki “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and 
Mental Health Courts for Māori” (2010) 33 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry at 440 – 447. 
1117 Winick and Wexler above n 164, at 7. 
1118 Brian McKenna, Sandy Simpson and John Coverdale “Implementing Civil Commitment: Doing 
with Not Doing to” in Brookbanks and Simpson (eds) Psychiatry and the Law (Lexis Nexis, 
Wellington, 2007) at 72. 
1119 Alan Feuer “The Revolving Door” in Bruce Winick and David Wexler (eds) Law in Therapeutic 
Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press, USA, 1996) at 13–19. 
1120 Bruce Winick Civil Commitment (Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina, 2005) at 6. 
1121 McKenna and Seaton above n 149, at 449. 
1122 Winick and Wexler above n 164.  
1123 William Schma “Judging for the New Millennium” (2000) 37(1) Court Review. 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence is thus described as the “study of the role of law as a 
therapeutic agent”.1124 One author offered the following definition as best capturing 
the essence of therapeutic jurisprudence:1125 
 
… the use of social science to study the extent to which a legal rule or practice 
promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects. 
 
In this sense therapeutic jurisprudence is more of a descriptive and instrumental tool 
than an analytical theory.1126 It focuses on the impact of law on emotional life and 
psychological well-being.1127 Therapeutic jurisprudence can be thought of as a lens 
through which to view regulations and laws, as well as the roles and behaviour of 
legal actors: the legislators, lawyers, judges and administrators.1128 It is through this 
lens that an indigenous legal system such as tikanga Māori can be implemented. 
 
(a) Disadvantages and Criticisms 
 
Support for therapeutic jurisprudence varies within academic circles from enthusiasm 
to mixed reviews. One of the early criticisms of therapeutic jurisprudence was that it 
was paternalistic. Perhaps this was a confusion in the title itself, which may have 
suggested a return to a therapeutic state.1129 The State legal system is paternalistic, so 
if the implementation of a therapeutic jurisprudential approach is successful in 
reducing Māori offending rates and those relating to domestic violence, then the 
positive outcome of restoring a state of ora would outweigh any criticism of 
paternalism.  
 
                                            
1124 Winick and Wexler, above n 164. 
1125 Christopher Slobogin “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder” (1995) 1 Psychol., 
Pol and Law 193 at 196. 
1126 Warren Brookbanks “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Implications for Judging” (paper presented at the 
District Court Judge’s Triennial Conference, Rotorua, 1 April 2003). 
1127 Winick and Wexler, above n 164. 
1128 Schma, above n 1123. 
1129 Dennis P Stolle and others “Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Law and 
Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering” in Dennis P Stolle, David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick 
(eds) Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence Law as a Helping Profession (North Carolina Academic 
Press, Durham, 2000) at 8.  
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In his article Judge Arthur Christean 1130 outlined a number of criticisms, such as 
issues of due process and constitutional infringements, which are also echoed by 
David Wexler.1131 These criticisms involve the use of therapeutic jurisprudence within 
a specialist court setting. They include the belief that therapeutic jurisprudence puts a 
tremendous strain on resources and judicial collegiality, because of the ‘one court, one 
judge’ concept common to most specialised courts.  
 
In New Zealand there is a move towards a proliferation of specialised courts.1132 A 
specialist judge creates consistency of response. This is pivotal to the success of the 
Family Violence Court, where the judge is proactive in monitoring and the success of 
the court hinges on consistency from the bench. In a recent evaluation of the 
Waitakere Family Violence Court, Morgan found that:1133 
 
Consistency of approach among the judiciary is very important. If we have visiting 
judges we do whatever we can to make sure they don’t go into the Family Violence 
Court.  
 
Whilst this may seem to exacerbate the strain on judicial resources, the importance of 
specialist courts and the long term benefits outweigh this concern. 
 
Christean further added that therapeutic jurisprudence works against the goal of a 
unified court system in the direction of specialised courts. These courts operate on a 
different judicial philosophy from other courts within the same district. However, 
proponents of problem solving courts have been quick to defend critics’ attempts to 
pick apart these new initiatives by comparing them to an idealised vision of justice 
that does not exist in real life.1134  
 
There is also the concern that therapeutic jurisprudence undermines the separation of 
powers by asking the courts to fashion solutions to social problems, rather than 
                                            
1130 AG Christean Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Embracing a Tainted Ideal (2002) The Sutherland 
Institute <http://www.sutherlandinstitute.org>. 
1131 Wexler and Winick, above n 164, at 80.  
1132 Family Court, Youth Court, Environment Court, Maori Land Court, Domestic Violence Court 
1133 Mandy Morgan, Leigh Coombes and Sarah McGray “An Evaluation of the Waitakere Family 
Violence Court Protocols” (Massey University and WAVES, Palmerston North, May 2007).  
1134 Winick and Wexler, above n 164, at 82. 
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leaving the legislature to deal with them.1135 Christean states that the line between the 
judicial and executive branch is blurred whenever courts become service providers, 
intent on achieving specific outcomes. In this regard the judge becomes part of a 
treatment team and assumes the responsibility for overseeing programmes sponsored 
by the team, thus exercising both an executive and a judicial function. 
Notwithstanding this criticism, it may be that therapeutic jurisprudence is being 
identified or conflated with drug courts or other problem-solving courts, where the 
judicial officer is more actively involved than are the judges in mainstream courts.  
 
Berman has acknowledged these concerns of impartiality, including coercion, 
paternalism and zealous advocacy.1136 However, Berman is also an advocate for 
therapeutic jurisprudence and problem solving courts, suggesting that better planning 
and dissemination of best practice standards can assist to allay these concerns.1137 
 
This occurs in New Zealand within the youth justice sector as well as in the family 
court jurisdiction. In a family violence court, the effectiveness of its programmes is 
discussed regularly between the stakeholders. Judges make policy by taking 
advantage of the discretion that has traditionally been afforded to them over 
sentencing in order to craft more meaningful sanctions, or to direct programme 
changes.1138 
 
There is merit in maintaining clear boundaries with respect to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty1139 and the separation of powers.1140 But in a therapeutic 
problem solving court, this could undermine the relational element that is necessary 
between the judge and the offender. By stating clear boundaries and defining roles at 
                                            
1135 Although there are sometimes blurred lines, the role of the Court is to apply the law whereas the 
legislature ‘makes’ the law.   
1136 Winick and Wexler, above n 164, at 80–83; See also Greg Berman “Redefining Criminal Court: 
Problem-Solving and the Meaning of Justice” (2004) 41 Am.Crim.L.Rev 131.  
1137 Berman, above n 1136; See also Kathryn Sammon “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Examination of 
Problem Solving Justice in New York” (2008) 23(3) Journal of Civil Rights and Economic 
Development.  
1138 Winick and Wexler, above n 164. 
1139 See Phillip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1993) at 418; Parliamentary Sovereignty - ‘Parliament enjoys unlimited and 
illimitable powers of legislation.’ 
1140 Joseph, above n 1139 at 208; Separation of Powers - ‘the doctrine of separation of powers seeks a 
unified reconciling theory of constitutional government – the separation of powers identifies the 
legislative, executive and judicial functions of government – it provides a check and balance system.’ 
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the outset, this problem may be overcome and the judge’s position of respect 
maintained. In addition, therapeutic jurisprudence does not trump long-standing 
notions of due process or the rule of law. However, in order to work strictly within the 
current Westminister system, a compromise must be made.  
 
It has been claimed that therapeutic jurisprudence compromises the objectivity and 
impartiality of judges. Christean argues that the collaborative process requires the 
judge to act as part of the therapeutic team. In doing so the judge cannot avoid 
unethical ex parte communications that are traditionally a serious ethical breach of the 
judge’s role. However, such communications form a regular part of the therapeutic 
process.1141 When the judge becomes the enforcer of the treatment team’s decisions, 
rather than an independent adjudicator of the facts and the law, the appearance of bias 
cannot be avoided. To the defendant the judge becomes one of them. On the other 
hand, this can also be seen to be an effort by the judge to deal more effectively and 
humanely with the people who come before the court.  
 
It is also argued that the new model substitutes a judge’s subjective judgment for the 
time honoured due process checks. This eliminates a vital check on the abuse of 
government power. Christean is concerned that judges cannot effectively act as 
impartial and detached officers to hear and rule on the competing claims of 
adversaries when they simultaneously function as advocates and defenders of the 
programmes and procedures under challenge. Beneficial intent, rather than legal 
soundness is seen to be the benchmark of the effectiveness of any treatment regimes 
that are imposed.1142 
 
Finally, therapeutic jurisprudence is said to abandon the role of equal justice under the 
law; that is, programmes are necessarily limited to those offenders who qualify rather 
than to all defendants who would like to participate. This implies that some 
defendants will be treated differently from others, depending on whether they are 
deemed to be worthy candidates for available programme openings. Christean 
suggests that difficult or resistant candidates are ‘screened out’ in favour of presenting 
                                            
1141 Christean, above n 1130. 
1142 Brookbanks, above n 1126, at 9. It is noted that Professor Brookbanks now offers a Masters Paper 
at the University of Auckland in Therapeutic Jurisprudence. 
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a public face to a programme that may be attractive to the media and an endorsement 
of the programme’s success. However, there would be no reason why the jurisdiction 
could not be widened to include all offenders once the programme becomes 
successful.  
 
The author acknowledges the validity of these criticisms; therapeutic jurisprudence 
advocates are currently addressing them.1143 Nonetheless, one should not lose sight of 
the aim and should bear in mind that law does not exist in a vacuum and is ever 
changing. If therapeutic jurisprudence has the desired healing effect, this will result in 
less offending. The flow on from this will be a lighter case load and a lessening strain 
on resources, and arguably, one justification against these criticisms.  
 
However, according to David Wexler:1144 
 
… a therapeutic approach should be taken whenever such an approach is consistent 
with other values, considerations and understandings of justice, such as the rule of 
law. 
 
If this is the case, it seems possible from a policy perspective that therapeutic 
jurisprudence can be mainstreamed. This rationalisation is not new. The 
mainstreaming of restorative justice into the Sentencing Act of 2002 (NZ) requires the 
Court to take into account offer, agreement and response to make amends.1145 Also 
the Canadian Criminal Code directs a consideration of sanctions, other than 
                                            
1143 See B Arrigo, B. (2004) The ethics of therapeutic jurisprudence: A critical and theoretical  
inquiry of law, psychology and crime. Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, Vol. 11, No  
2, 23-43 for further critique. See M. King (2003), Applying therapeutic jurisprudence in regional areas 
in the Western Australian experience, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 10, 2,  
also Winick and Wexler, above n 164. Michael King, Arie Freiberg, Becky Batagol and Ross Hyams, 
Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, Australia, 2009) ch 2 (‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence’), 
1144 David Wexler “An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (1994) 20 New Eng J on Crime and 
Civil Confinement 259. See also Bruce Winick “The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence” in 
Bruce Winick and David Wexler (eds) Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence (North Carolina, Carolina Academic Press, 1996) at 665. 
1145 See John Braithwaite “Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence” (2000) 38(2) CLB 244 – 
262. Restorative Justice defined as “a process where all stakeholders involved in an injustice have an 
opportunity to discuss its effect on people and to decide what is to be done to attempt to heal those 
hurts”; Sentencing Act 2002, s 10. 
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imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances, with particular attention to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. 1146 
 
Whilst there has been enthusiastic support for therapeutic jurisprudence, a common 
response is that therapeutic jurisprudence is a re-branding of previous models or a soft 
approach to crime. In a scathing critique, Hoffman criticised therapeutic jurisprudence 
as possessing a “New Age pedigree” and for being both anti-intellectual and wholly 
ineffective.1147 This critique fails to acknowledge the favourable evidence that drug 
courts have achieved in regard to keeping offenders in treatment, reducing drug use, 
reducing recidivism rates and saving prison costs.1148 
 
These criticisms should not discount the possibility that therapeutic jurisprudence may 
assist in reducing Māori offending rates. The commonalities between the philosophy 
behind therapeutic jurisprudence and Te Ao Māori will show that therapeutic 
jurisprudence should not be dismissed as an irrelevant and ineffective model.  
 
 
(b) Advantages and Suitability  
 
From a practical point of view, a significant advantage of therapeutic jurisprudence is 
that it co-exists with the existing legal system. This would answer the political 
arguments against a separate system for Māori. Additionally, therapeutic 
jurisprudence simultaneously allows for the incorporation of tikanga Māori. The 
inclusion of tikanga can occur, prima facie, at all levels of the criminal justice 
process.  
 
Collectivity and relationality are central tenets to Māori. Therapeutic jurisprudence is 
asserted as being a relational based construct.1149 Te Ao Māori, like therapeutic 
jurisprudence, shares the idea of communitarianism or collectiveness, and the notion 
of whanaungatanga or relatedness. This move away from a rule based approach 
                                            
1146 Section 718 (2) (e). 
1147 Morris B Hoffman “Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neorehabilitationism, and Judicial Collectivism: 
The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous” (2002) Fordham Urban Law Journal at 2063.  
1148 Winick and Wexler above n 164, at 80. 
1149 Warren Brookbanks “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework” (2001) 8(3) 
Jnl of Law and Medicine at 328 – 341.  
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towards a principle or relational approach is consistent with Māori tikanga. Thus, 
from a conceptual point of view, therapeutic jurisprudence represents a movement 
away from a heavily rule based approach to one that is more collective, relational and 
principle based.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence allows and acknowledges different conceptual frameworks. 
The Māori conceptual framework is at odds with the existing monocultural justice 
system in New Zealand. It is acknowledged that the CYPF Act 1989 provides for 
concepts of support and involvement of iwi and hapū groups. Section 16 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 (now repealed) also allowed an offender’s supporter to 
present information at sentencing relating to their ethnic or cultural background to 
help avoid future offending.  
 
However, in a review of section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, now repealed 
and replaced by section 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002, the paucity of its use was 
noted.1150 There was no mandatory requirement that the offender’s cultural 
background be considered as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The application of this 
section was at the discretion of the judge and the cultural information regarding an 
offender was but one factor to consider.1151 However, when the section was employed 
and the cultural background of the offender was taken into consideration, it was not 
uncommon for the sentence to be suspended.1152  
 
Notwithstanding these provisions, issues central to Māori, such as reciprocity, have no 
equal in the State justice system. The judge is the ultimate decision-maker under the 
CYPF Act 1989 and the Sentencing Act 20021153. So it is evident that there are 
differences in approach and differences in how justice should be administered 
between the Māori and State systems.  
                                            
1150 Alison Chetwin, Tony Waldegrave, Kiri Simonsen with Strategic Training and Development 
Services and the Family Centre Social Policy Research Unit Speaking about Cultural Background at 
Sentencing (Ministry of Justice, November 2000) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
1151 Interpretation confirmed in RS v R [2014] NZCA 484. This “balancing act” also occurs under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 when the Judge in attaining the purpose of the Act considers various 
factors including principles of the Treaty (section 8), the concept of kaitiakitanga (section 7) when 
reaching a decision. These concepts are but one to be considered in a raft of many. 
1152 Chetwin, Waldegrave and Simonsen, above n 1070. See now ss 8(i) and 27 of the Sentencing Act 
2002 which illustrates the intention to incorporate tikanga Maori into the sentencing process.  
1153 Section 27 of the Sentencing Act 2002 replaces section 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
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Therapeutic jurisprudence, like tikanga Māori, is a forward looking process. In 
comparison, the criminal justice system looks back, punishing the offender for past 
actions and focusing on the penalty. Tikanga Māori, like therapeutic jurisprudence, is 
not penalty orientated. It looks for the ’right’ or tika way of doing things, ultimately 
resulting in a healing or restoration of balance and ora for the participants.  
 
Two important issues can be drawn from this. The first is that the commonalities 
between therapeutic jurisprudence and tikanga Māori allow both systems to work in 
tandem. This also provides a window for the introduction of tikanga programmes that 
focus on indigenous law as a basis to understand why the crime or hara should not be 
committed. Acknowledging the effect of colonialism and the law on the role of 
women is instrumental in understanding the true ‘hara’ or ‘crime’ that underlies 
domestic violence. This primarily turns on the breakdown of the whānau.1154 
 
The second issue is that the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence allows the 
administration of justice in the existing legal system to promote the well-being of 
communities, thereby empowering Māori to look after one another.1155 The challenge 
will be the realisation, implementation and practicality of therapeutic jurisprudence in 
a suitable court forum.  
 
Addressing the criticisms for therapeutic jurisprudence from a tikanga perspective, the 
facilitator of a dispute is usually a rangatira, tohunga, kaumatua or kuia.1156 The set of 
principles attached to resolving disputes is supported by other principles that 
traditionally provided the guidelines for actions amongst individuals and groups 
throughout Māori society. Principles provide flexibility as to the appropriate choice of 
action. For this reason, Māori society is often described as “principle based” as 
opposed to “rule based”. There is less emphasis on rules, but more emphasis on 
principles. Thus within a tikanga Māori perspective, the principle of a healing 
outcome would outweigh rules, such as those based on the notion of unethical ex 
parte communications.  
                                            
1154 Ani Mikaere ‘Māori Women Caught in the Contradictions of a Colonized Reality’ (1994) 2 
Waikato Law Review. 
1155 Mikaere, above n 1154. 
1156 “Tohunga” defined as expert. 
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Asher J viewed ex parte communications as a necessity to achieve justice.1157  
However, ex parte communications with a judge can result in disciplinary actions.1158 
On motions to dismiss, Judge Silvia Cartwright, sitting in the Cambodian Supreme 
Court, noted that ex-parte communications “create the appearance of asymmetrical access 
enjoyed by the prosecutor to the trial judge and for that reason alone should cease”.1159   
 
The collectivity tenet is central to tikanga Māori, together with the principle of 
everyone being on the same level. This effectively assists to dispel the criticism of 
therapeutic jurisprudence that the defendant perceives the judge becoming the same as 
them. Further it dispels the objectivity and impartiality criticism.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence, like tikanga Māori, is a relational ethic. In a submission on 
the Victims’ Rights Bill to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee, the New 
Zealand Human Rights Commission considered that a therapeutic jurisprudence 
model was appropriate and could be addressed through progressive amendments to 
the justice system.1160  
 
It is noted that section 9 of the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 makes provision for 
meetings to resolve issues relating to the offence. Viewed in isolation this is similar to 
the provisions of a family group conference in the CYPF Act 1989 and consistent 
with tikanga Māori. Further provisions of the Victims’ Rights Act 2002 include the 
provision for Victim Impact Statements, to be placed before the court on sentencing, 
which potentially offers an opportunity to seek balance for the victim and offender — 
the aim of tikanga Māori.  
 
The programmes currently in place for Māori offenders may be stemming the tide but 
are not solving the problem. Over the generations the physical and spiritual move of 
                                            
1157 Du Claire v M Palmer and Crown Law Office [2012] NZHC 934 per Asher J para [105]. 
1158 See comments made by Judge David Harvey ‘Social Media and the Judiciary’ NZL (28 April, 
2013).  
1159 Decision on Motions for Disqualification of Judge Silvia Cartwright [2012] Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia - 
Supreme Court Chambers) at [24]. 
1160 John Galtry “Submission of the Human Rights Commission on: Victims’ Rights Bill to the Justice 
and Electoral Select Committee” March 2001 at 9 <www.hrc.co.nz>. 
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Māori away from their turangawaewae (ancestral place to stand) has alienated many 
urban Māori from their culture. The result of this is manifested, in part, by some 
Māori who perceive a marae setting for the Te Āwhina Whānau programme as 
strange as a courtroom.  Consequently, the whole process is seen as having an anti-
therapeutic effect. This is but one reason to support the need for an alternative system 
to address the disproportionate rates of Māori offending. 
 
It is acknowledged that Te Puni Kokiri has delivered many services to Māori and 
advises on policy affecting Māori well-being, including Whanua Ora. Funding is also 
available to assist whānau towards greater self-reliance and self-management by 
building and strengthening whānau connections to achieve goals and aspirations.1161 
 
The Law Commission has noted that:1162 
 
Māori should retain the right to organise as Māori, and to administer and manage 
their own affairs … The establishment of specific Māori services to provide access to 
justice would be a further indicator of progress in this outcome category. 
 
Notwithstanding these initiatives by Te Puni Kokiri and the recommendations by the 
Law Commission, the statistics, which indicate that Māori are over-represented in 
criminal proceedings, are difficult to ignore.1163 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has encouraged people to think creatively about how to 
bring promising developments into the legal system. The use of tools from social 
sciences to promote psychological and physical well-being opens the door to tikanga 
Māori. In doing so therapeutic jurisprudence may be able to offer a vehicle that will 
ultimately decrease Māori offending rates. It is pertinent to note that David Wexler 
stated:1164 
 
In many respects, the roots of this new judicial approach can be traced back to 
indigenous and tribal justice systems [emphasis added], including noteworthy 
                                            
1161 See <http://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/services/wiie> 
1162 Law Commission, above n 5, at [425]. 
1163 See statistics noted by Department of Corrections above n 2. 
1164 Winick and Wexler, above n 164, at 3. 
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examples in what today constitutes the United States, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand [emphasis added] … and a serious effort is now underway to learn from 




B. Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence, as a vehicle for an indigenous legal system 
such as tikanga Māori, be effective for a Domestic Violence Court? A 
Proposed Model 
 
On average, in New Zealand, 10 children and 14 women are killed every year in 
domestic violence.1165 In 2013 Women’s Refuge assisted 20,000 women and children 
in one year.1166 With regard to victimisation:1167  
- Māori women are over-represented among victims of domestic violence and are more 
likely to experience repeat victimisation from a partner.  
- A higher proportion of Māori women than non-Māori women apply for protection 
orders under the Domestic Violence Act 1995.  
- Māori women and children are heavy users of Women's Refuge Services. There is 
some evidence that Māori women do not access other services for victims at the rate 
that might be expected.  
With regard to offending:1168  
- Both female and male Māori youth are far more likely to be apprehended and 
prosecuted than their non-Māori counterparts.  
- Māori women are five times more likely to be prosecuted for an offence than non-
Māori women, and Māori men are over three times more likely to be prosecuted than 
non-Māori men. 
- Although far fewer Māori women than Māori men offend, there are some indications 
that Māori women are becoming increasingly involved in offending.  
                                            
1165 Womens Refuge New Zealand Domestic Violence Statistics. <https://womensrefuge.org.nz> 
1166 New Zealand Police Protection Orders and the Domestic Violence Act 
<http://www.police.govt.nz>. Also above. 
1167 Hon Lalia Harre Minister of Women’s Affairs speech Māori Women: Mapping Inequalities and 
Pointing Ways Forward (Report released September 26, 2001) <www.executive.govt.nz>.  
1168 Above. 
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- Māori women make up over 60 per cent of the women prison population, a higher 
percentage than Māori men compared to non-Māori men (around 50 per cent).  
Establishing and maintaining sustainable families, whānau and communities is 
seriously threatened by:  
- The high incidence of domestic violence experienced by Māori women. 
- The disproportionately high representation of Māori women in offending.  
- The significant and rising over-representation of young Māori women in the criminal 
justice system.  
- Impacts of the offending of male partners on Māori women.  
- Impacts of Māori offending on children.  
- High rates of Māori reoffending. 
 
Domestic violence is a different crime, partly because the lives of the perpetrator and 
the victims are usually intertwined. A domestic violence court would bring cases 
before a judge more quickly than in the ordinary courts. Importantly, as Rivera notes: 
1169 
 
… it would keep the victim working with the same judge and prosecutor; that means 
the victim doesn’t have to repeat the story of abuse over and over, sometimes to the 
point of giving up. 
 
(a) Domestic Violence  
 
Here it would be valuable to look at how effectively tikanga ensured that Māori 
women and children were cared for and valued. Strong evidence from the early 
contact period indicates that women and children were not hit and abused, with the 
exception of taurekareka (war captives) who had lost their mana.1170 According to 
many early European commentators, relations within the kin group were generally 
harmonious. Things have changed drastically since then.  
 
                                            
1169 Ray Rivera “Our View: Boise Needs New Method to Stop Domestic Violence” in Bruce Winick 
and David Wexler (ed) Judging in a Therapeutic Key, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts 
(Caroline Academic Press, North Carolina, USA, 2003) at 58. 
1170 This is from personal knowledge and teachings from my kuia (respected elder). 
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It has to be said, though, that the sanctions for breaches involved actions now 
regarded as illegal; for example, muru raids, in which property was confiscated and 
the guilty party was humiliated and perhaps beaten (although they were not badly 
hurt) before being brought back into the kinship fold.  
 
This section of the thesis suggests the application of a therapeutic jurisprudence 
approach as a vehicle to implement tikanga Māori within a specialised court setting, 
such as a domestic violence court, and alleviate the alarming rates of domestic 
violence in New Zealand. The use of therapeutic jurisprudence in a domestic (family) 
violence court is not a novel idea.1171 Both South Australia and Western Australian 
domestic (family) violence courts are inter-agency and community initiatives aimed at 
reducing violence in families by integrating treatment into the court process. Unlike 
the ordinary criminal courts, the domestic violence court seeks not only to punish and 
rehabilitate the offender, but also to provide support and services required by the 
victim after physical or psychological abuse.1172 
 
The current trial process for domestic violence offences has an anti-therapeutic effect 
on victims. The ‘crime against the state’ perspective on prosecution disempowers 
victims and closes any avenue to seek balance for both the victim and defendant. 
There are many negative effects from the current system that tend to fracture and 
permanently end relations, rather than heal or restore them to balance. 
 
The domestic violence courts operating throughout New Zealand are problem solving 
courts and generally focus on the underlying behaviour of the defendant. It is 
acknowledged that victim support agencies are attached to these courts. However, 
such agencies operate quite separately and are distinct from the justice process. 
Acting on the input of a team of experts from the community, a problem-solving court 
judge orders the defendant to comply with an individualised plan, such as anger 
management, and then the judge (with the assistance of the community team) 
                                            
1171 See Micheal King Applying therapeutic jurisprudence from the Bench, Challenges and 
Opportunities. www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/ 
1172 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia – Court Intervention Programs: Consultation Paper, 
Chapter Four Domestic and Family Violence Court Intervention Programs, at 145. 
<http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au>. Also under the Crime Compensation Act victims of domestic 
violence in Victoria may be entitled to compensation of up to $70,000. 
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exercises intensive supervision over the defendant to ensure compliance with the 




 The proposed model of this thesis is comprised of two components. First, a ‘re-tuned’ 
domestic violence court that incorporates the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
Secondly, this doctrine might then support the implementation of tikanga in a similar 
way to that of circle sentencing in Canada or indigenous sentencing courts, in 
Australia. However, I suggest that the application of tikanga is extended to include the 
whole criminal process, not just at the sentencing phase of the justice system. 
Ultimately, legislative recognition will provide certainty for this process. 1174 
 
Ideally, this would include the training of lawyers and the judiciary to better 
understand the effects of domestic violence and battered women’s syndrome from an 
indigenous perspective. The positive flow-on effect would be a broader understanding 
of the causes of crime and its relationship with colonisation, in particular the effect 
colonisation had on the position of Māori women in society and the Māori concept of 
property.  
 
From a practical point of view, this model will utilise the relevant systems and 
framework already in place, including the existing court forums, marae, Māori 
Committees, and legislative provisions such as the Community Development Act 
1962. Local evidence suggests that although this mechanism (Community 
Development Act and Māori Committees) is already in place, it is under-utilised, due 
in part to under-resourcing. 1175 
 
Ideally, the judges would be Māori. However, it is acknowledged that there is a 
shortage of Māori judges. Considering the education and ongoing training of judges in 
the fields of tikanga, te reo and marae protocol, it is possible that non-Māori judges 
                                            
1173 Daniel J Becker and Maura D Corrigan “Moving Problem Solving Courts into the Mainstream” 
(2002) 39(1) Court Review 4. 
1174 Legislative recognition of indigenous practice is not new. See Magistrates Court (Koori Court) Act 
2002.  
1175 For example small town “Māori Committees” such as the Aotea Māori Committee are usurped by 
“Marae Committees” primarily due to better access to funding sources. 
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could fill the roles. However, they would need to be well-versed in tikanga Māori. In 
the alternative, kaumatua or a panel of kaumatua could assist a non-Māori judge in an 
advisory capacity.1176 This is not novel as the Resource Management Act of 1991 
provides for a similar option, even if this option is not often exercised.1177 This would 
allay current concerns regarding the consistency of judges in a domestic violence 
court and address the problem of increased workloads identified in the Australian 
domestic violence courts.  
 
(c) Procedure – Tikanga Māori Component 
 
The jurisdiction would ideally be open to all offenders. One of the criticisms of the 
domestic violence court is the limitation to less serious offences1178 and the inability 
to deal with serious offences.1179 Whilst this concern may be warranted, the practical 
difficulty of dealing with hardened criminals alongside first-time offenders is 
acknowledged.  
 
In the initial stages, the jurisdiction could be confined to the less serious or Category 1 
offences with the anticipation that, once the success of this model has been proven, 
the jurisdiction could be widened to include more serious offences.1180 In light of the 
statistics that indicate the recidivism rates for Māori are higher than any other 
ethnicity in New Zealand and that Māori are more likely to commit more serious 
offences there is a need for an indigenous court to eventually address serious 
offences.1181  
 
This would address the criticism of the jurisdictional limitations identified by the 
Australian domestic violence courts. At such time necessary provisions for security of 
the offender and community would need to be addressed. 
                                            
1176 Te Ture Whenua Māori Land Act 1993, s 62 – “Additional members with knowledge and 
experience in tikanga Māori.” 
1177 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 252 and 269(3), which provides for the consideration of 
tikanga values. 
1178 For example, ‘failing to stop for red and blue flashing lights’ classified as a Category 1 offence. See 
section 71 Criminal Procedure Act 2011. 
1179 For example, murder or manslaughter classified as a Category 4 offence. See section 74 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 2011  
1180 Such as Category 2, 3 and 4 offences. See sections 72, 73, and 74 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
2011 respectively. 
1181 See Department of Corrections above n 8. 
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This model and the accompanying processes are entirely integrated. The model takes 
effect at the beginning of the criminal procedure, upon the arrest of the offender. The 
arresting officer would enquire as to whether the offender identifies himself, or 
herself, as Māori and advise them of the process. If the offender does not self-identify 
as Māori, irrespective of their appearance, then that person would fall within the 
general criminal justice process or in this instance, the domestic violence court. 
 
If the offender identifies as Māori, it would be mandatory for a Māori representative 
or warden to be called in. It would also be mandatory for the offender to become part 
of the programme.1182 This is similar to the juvenile arrest process adopted by the 
New Zealand Police.1183 It would be helpful, but not vital, that the representative be 
from the legal profession. This representative would become responsible for the 
offender until their first court appearance.  
 
If the offender is ostensibly non-Māori but self-identifies as Māori, this should not 
inhibit the offender from partaking in the process, primarily because it is a principle 
based process. If successful, there should be no reason why this model ought not to be 
extended to non-Māori. As the statistics indicate, however, it is Māori offending and 
Māori victim rates that are of the greatest concern. As such, Māori offenders would 
need to be targeted and prioritised 
 
The offender would be assessed within the local marae forum, allowing for whānau 
involvement. Initially the offender would have no choice as to which marae he/she 
would appear.1184 In Auckland there are several “pan” iwi marae that cater for Māori 
from all different iwi.1185 These marae are typically urban based. It is envisaged that 
initially a “pan” iwi marae would be used consistent with the concept of 
                                            
1182 See for discussion of powers for mandatory involvement to compel whanau to attend, etc and 
employ Māori justice practices see Tauri, above n 710, at 204. 
1183 For comparative instances see Anne Skelton “Reforming the Juvenile Justice System in South 
Africa: Policy, Law Reform and Parallel Developments” Resource Material 75 (paper presented to 
UNAFEI 136th International Training Conference, Japan, 23 May to 28 June 2007) at 43 for the 
discussion on the use of home based supervision as an alternative to detention upon the arrest of 
juveniles as a result of an amendment to the Probation Services Act <www.unafei.or.jp>. 
1184 This is similar to the Māori Focus Units in prisons where upon sentencing the offender has no 
choice but is allocated to an area where his protocol or kawa may or may not apply. 
1185 For example see Hoani Waititi Marae in West Auckland. 
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whanaungatanga (kin-like reciprocal relationships).1186 The offender could then be 
transferred to a tribal, or iwi specific marae if he/she requested, provided that funding 
resources are available.  
 
As with the indigenous courts model, both parties would sit at eye level (kanohi ki te 
kanohi). The use of existing indigenous fora, such as a marae, addresses those 
concerns associated with unsuitable locations, as identified by the siting Koori Courts. 
The arresting warden would assist to ensure that the offender, victim and both of their 
families do not feel uncomfortable in such a setting. This would allow all parties to 
address any feelings of alienation from the process, consistent with the concept of 
manaakitanga (process of showing care, respect, kindness and hospitality).1187 Unlike 
actors within the mainstream criminal justice system, these actors would not be 
constrained by existing policies. For instance, Probation Officers are guided by the 
Correction Department policies.  
 
After the ‘intake’ has been completed, an appropriate programme would be specified 
for the offender, consistent with the concept of kaitiakitanga (watch or guard).1188 
This takes on board the success from Te Whānau Āwhina Programmes and utilising 
existing Youth Programmes.1189 At this point it would be crucial for the offender to 
understand, from a tikanga perspective, the nature of his or her crime, take 
responsibility for his or her actions, face the victim and address the need for utu and 
balance, and importantly, understand the role of women prior to colonisation. The 
underlying tikanga or cultural perspective of these programmes will address the safety 
needs of the victim and the future well-being of the offender. This could also include 
programmes to address issues such as drug and alcohol addiction. These are 
shortcomings of the Australian system, as identified by Stewart.1190  
 
For the model to be successful, this stage requires legislative promulgation, similar to 
the legislative provisions acknowledged by the Koori Court Act 2008 (Vic). This 
                                            
1186 Benton and others, above n 204, at 524. 
1187 At 205. 
1188 At 105. 
1189 He Tete Kura Mana Tangata Programme for Māori violent offenders based at Nga Whare Waatea 
Marae in Mangere Auckland. See Department of Corrections Judges Update Information for the 
Judiciary (Issue 3, 2001) <www.corrections.govt.nz>.  
1190 Stewart, above n 881. 
 292 
would provide appropriate recognition and give a clear direction to the court to follow 
the recommendations given. 
 
The current “stopping violence” programmes used by the domestic violence court can 
also be undertaken in conjunction with any tikanga based programme. The difference, 
however, is that in this model, the participation of the offender would be monitored. 
If, as research suggests, such programmes show no guarantees of success, this will be 
identified by the monitoring offender participation.  
 
Intrinsically, tikanga-based programmes encompass the concept of an offender taking 
responsibility for his/her actions. Although this directive given by the judge in 
domestic violence cases is often criticised, if successful, this is a shared feature 
between mainstream and tikanga judicial proceedings.    
 
The process demonstrates direct intervention, the administration of tikanga Māori and 
the notion of Māori looking after one another. This overcomes the criticisms that are 
levelled at indigenous sentencing in which indigenous courts are not seen as adopting 
customary laws. Rather they are seen as using Australian criminal laws and 
procedures when sentencing indigenous people while allowing indigenous elders to 
participate in the process. 
 
At this point there is room for the adoption of Moana Jackson’s concept of a marae 
based model of diversion.1191 Māori Committees established under legislation, such as 
the Māori Social and Economic Advancement Act 1945 and its successor the Māori 
Welfare Act of 1962, could easily be reconstituted as community or marae-based 
committees. These committees would then have the right to hear all charges under the 
Māori Community Development Act 1962, instead of processing the charges under 
                                            
1191 See Jackson above n 31 – although see Courts Consultative Committee Report (1991) on He 
Whaipanga Hou, Wellington, Department of Justice that recommended to the then Minister of Justice 
that culturally appropriate resopnses to Māori offending was achievable through existing state 
mechanisms and further recommended against transferring criminal justice-centred processes into 
Māori setting, spacially marae settings being used for court cases, as cited by Juan Tauri above n 827. 
The Committee was comprised of judges, lawyers and community representatives. 
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the Domestic Violence Act 1995.1192 Its jurisdiction could also extend to cover a 
broader range of offences, such as those set forth in the Summary Offences Act 1981.   
 
Where the offender is Māori, there is no conventional question of guilt. In accordance 
with tikanga Māori, if you are alleged to have commited an act or offence then you 
must take responsibility. The offender would enter into a marae based programme. 
There is no question of guilt or innocence, it is rather a question of mana and 
instituting a process to achieve balance. It may be that the person did not commit the 
offence alleged. This will be uncovered during the process and the ensuing actions or 
muru will reflect this.  
 
If the person refuses to accept responsibility at the initial stage and disputes the 
allegations then a tikanga programme can not apply and the offender will be subject to 
the general court jurisdiction. 
 
The philosophy behind this “First Intervention Step” or “Pre-Plea” is twofold. First, it 
provides for the involvement of whānau and implementation of tikanga Māori. This 
moves towards satisfying the call for the administration of justice for Māori and by 
Māori. Secondly, it recognises the fact that defendants often come before the court 
with problems that place them at risk of reoffending. In the case of domestic violence, 
the victim is also often at risk and there is a need to ensure their safety. If left without 
treatment, such defendants may well find themselves back before a court, having been 
charged with further offences while on bail. Early treatment or intervention may 
prevent this situation from occurring and reduce reoffending statistics while on 
bail.1193 This may also eliminate the jurisprudence on bail conditions and breaches 
thereof.1194  
 
                                            
1192 If these marae committees had the same standing as the New Zealand Māori Council, for the 
purposes of the Māori Community Development Act 1962, then these marae committees could 
‘collaborate with and assist Sate Departments, such as Justice and Corrections, and other organisations 
in the assistance of Māoris in the solution of difficutues or personal problems, such as those associated 
with domestic violence – see section 18 (1) (d) (vii). 
1193 Ministry of Justice Trends in the Use of Bail and Offending While on Bail: 1990 – 1999 (Research 
and Evaluation Unit, January 2003) indicates that 21 per cent of people offended while on bail. 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz>  
1194 See Sen v Police [2007] NZFLR 733 – 736 Lang J; Kerisiano Aeau v The Police HC, CRI 2007-
404-247 11 September 2007, Winkelmann J. 
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Ideally, admission to this first intervention stage would be contingent upon the 
offender having a problem that places them at risk of offending. Also, the offender’s 
acknowledgement of the existence of the problem, a commitment to its resolution and 
participation in a marae or other suitable programme would be required.  
 
Upon the offender’s court appearance, the judge would call for a report from the 
Māori representative (similar to a probation report).  Taking into account the findings 
of the report, the judge would then assess the effectiveness of the programme and if 
satisfied, the offender could be returned to the community and be convicted and 
discharged.1195 Proposed legislation would, at this stage, provide clear directions for 
the judge. 
 
(d) Domestic Violence Court – Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
It is acknowledged that there will be offenders who have not satisfactorily completed 
the programme for various reasons. The marae forum, for instance, may be alien for 
both the offender and the victim. The offenders, together with those who chose not to 
participate in the tikanga Māori component, would then be subject to a domestic 
violence court based on the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence. The victim, in this 
instance, would accordingly have recourse to support through victims support 
services. In May 2011 the former Minister of Justice, Simon Power, announced new 
initiatives for victims of serious crime, including trauma counselling, discretionary 
grants, court attendance grants, travel assistance and a victim emergency grant. 
 
Although that particular proposed tikanga programme may not have worked,1196 the 
judge still has the opportunity to incorporate other programmes or social sciences to 
assist in further treating the offender. For instance, in recognising that the offender’s 
adverse behaviour has led to the offending, the judge could adopt a preventive 
approach, such as confining the offender to home detention on the days that he or she 
                                            
1195 Sentencing Act 2002 section 106 
1196 Unlike the Youth Court, where the judge does not tend to depart from the Family Group 
Conference Report, the discretion would be broader here for various reasons; one being there is still 
another step before the General Court process would come into effect and secondly the offender would 
not always be a youth.  
 295 
is more likely to reoffend.1197 Alternatively, for domestic violence cases, the 
imposition of a protection order by the court could be imposed. 
 
The judge could also incorporate tikanga Māori. For instance: 
 
- Kanohi ki te kanohi encounter (face to face or at eye level) 
- Maintaining the importance of reciprocity between the offender and victim  
- Adhering to the principles used by rangatira such as aroha, atawhai and 
manaaki.  
 
By considering the notion of utu, the judge could also incorporate the offender’s 
wider family in assisting the offender to complete the programme. This is based on 
the understanding that utu may be exacted from those who have done no wrong. In 
this regard, utu can be seen as a mechanism for restoring lost mana — a healing tool. 
 
The judge would take a more active role with the offender, similar to the probation or 
re-entry courts, by using a court processes aimed at promoting the rehabilitation/crime 
prevention programmes. These processes would seek to facilitate the offender’s 
participation in such programmes to maintain the offender’s dignity and to promote 
the offender’s trust. 
 
Upon entry into the programme, the offender would sign a behavioural contract, 
agreeing to comply with the programme agenda. 1198  The offender could also be 
encouraged to participate in the development of the programme. This programme 
could be tailored to suit the problem or offence as relevant to the offender and could 
be specific, such as participation in an anger management course. Part of the 
programme would include regular court appearances for review that would decline in 
regularity as progress is made.  
 
Participants would be actively involved in the process and provide input into the 
programme for changes to be made. The judge would interact with the offender 
                                            
1197 See for discussion Wexler and Winick, above n 164. 
1198 See also David B Wexler “Robes and Rehabilitation How Judges Can Help Offenders Make Good” 
(Spring 2001) Court Review at 19 for discussion also see David B Wexler “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
An Overview” (2000) 17 TM Cooley Review at 131. 
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expressing interest in his/her life and praising any progress that has been made. This 
would be an endeavour to establish the ‘tika’ or correct approach.  
Successful completion of the programme could be acknowledged with the award of a 
“graduation certificate”. This approach is based on the ethic of care and the central 
tenet of therapeutic jurisprudence, given its ‘relational-based’ construct. The ethic of 
care approach is capable of offering such an alternative approach to legal problem 
solving, which is more overtly relational and deliberately less adversarial.1199  
Notwithstanding every effort to adhere to the tenets of therapeutic jurisprudence, it is 
acknowledged there will be occasions when the offender has made no progress in the 
programme. In such cases the programme would be terminated and the offender 
subjected to the jurisdiction of the general courts.  
 
A similar model in Geraldton, Western Australia integrated therapeutic jurisprudence 
into a sentencing regime that showed promising results.1200 This is comparable to 
what happens in the drug courts, using therapeutic jurisprudence to import holistic 
concepts, such as transcendental meditation. This approach is based on the premise 
that alleviating stress-related problems of the mind, body and behaviour, as well as 
promoting overall growth in life, can remove the underlying causes of substance 
abuse and offending.1201  
 
Introducing a mix of tikanga Māori values and problem solving skills or other more 
mainstreamed legal practices is not a new concept. Rather, it conforms to the long-
term plans to integrate problem-solving courts into established judicial systems.1202 
Judge Joe Williams, the Chief Judge of the Māori Land Court, in reflecting upon the 
future of the Māori Land Court, proposed a model which would incorporate principles 
from equity and public law, mixed with tikanga values.1203 The changes also 
envisaged the inclusion of a name change and move towards a Waitangi Tribunal-like 
                                            
1199 Brookbanks, above n 1069. 
1200 Micheal King “Geraldton Alternative Sentencing Regime: Applying therapeutic and holistic 
jurisprudence in the Bush” (Oct 2002) 26(5) Crim LJ at 260; also Micheal King and Steve Ford 
“Exploring the concept of wellbeing in therapeutic jurisprudence: The example of the Geraldton 
Alternative Sentencing Regime” (2006) E LJ, Vol. 1. 
1201 King, above n 1200, at 267. 
1202 Becker and Corrigan above n 1173, at 7. 
1203 Chief Judge Joe Williams “Māori Land Court” (Lecture given at the Law School, University of 
Auckland, on 24th July 2003). 
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forum. This would incorporate more of a community or people’s court notion. 
Maintaining the integrity of a tikanga approach within the current criminal justice 
process addresses the criticism levelled at Koori Courts, that they are European or non 
Indigenous justice dressed up as indigenous courts and do not tackle the underlying 
causes of indigenous offending.1204 The current mainstreaming of therapeutic 
jurisprudence within the general court system, as an evolving model, is consistent 
with this development.1205 
 
An analysis of the practicalities of government resourcing for such a model is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Except to note that it is a problem recognised by the 
government, which is continually engaged in criminal law reform,1206 as well as 
allocating resources to reduce Māori offending.1207 If this system is shown to be 
effective, then the end result should contribute towards outweighing any resource or 




Therapeutic jurisprudence can apply equally to the victim as to the offender.  The 
focus is on the offender whose liberty is at risk. However, victims of crime also 
experience a negative effect on their well-being. This is often manifested in feelings 
of anxiety, fear and powerlessness, requiring treatment or a similar process to re-
establish well-being and balance within the victim. In this way the victim can become 
a contributing member of society.  
                                            
1204 Marchetti and Daly, above n 828. 
1205 The AODT Courts, Family Violence Courts and the Homeless Courts (Te Kooti o Timatanga Hou 
was established in ‘Auckland in 2010 and aimed at defendants who have pleaded guilty; have 
committed on going, low level reoffending within Auckland’s inner city; are homeless and/or have no 
fixed address; are affected by mental health concerns and/or intellectual disability; and are affected by 
chronic alcohol and/or substance abuse’) are examples of the mainstreaming of therapeutic 
jurisprudence into the general court system. See K Thom, A Mills, C Meehan, and B McKenna 
Evaluating problem-solving courts in New Zealand: A synopsis report (Centre for 
Mental Health Research, Auckland, 2013). 
1206 See “Major Project to Simplify Criminal Procedure” Law Talk (Issue 707, 5 May 2008) at 1. See 
also Drivers of Crime Progress Report December 2012 Cabinet Social Policy Committee which 
allocated ‘10 million package of initiatives to improve access to alcohol and drug assessment and 
treatment for offenders; significant expansion of Incredible Years and Triple P Positive Parenting 
programmes through health and education settings; and an extra 600 restorative justice conferences per 
year to achieve a total of 2,000 in 2012/13’.  
1207 Such as the Tahua Kaihoatu Fund that is administered by Te Puni Kokiri. Te Whare Ruruhau o 
Meri and Tu Tama Wahine are examples of funded programmes that have a tikanga component.  
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The victim can experience a myriad of issues, including violation, re-victimisation, a 
need to tell their story, loss of control, emotional distress, helplessness and post-
traumatic stress. The criminal justice system may provide funding for the victim. 
However, victims are often treated in ways that are distressing and demeaning, with 
many victims finding the criminal justice system as an assault on their dignity and 
unfair.1208 As the prosecutor rarely consults with the victim, this contributes to 
feelings of helplessness.  
 
To avoid further re-victimisation, therapeutic jurisprudence suggests that more 
attention and procedural information1209 be shared with the victim and adequate 
training by players within the criminal justice system be performed, including the 
police, prosecutors, corrections and the judge. This will contribute to a feeling of 
empowerment for the victim.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence advocates that “treating victims with procedural justice can 
help to ameliorate their psychological stress and restore their emotional 
equilibrium”.1210 The ability of the victim to face the offender also contributes to a 
feeling of empowerment and a step towards re-establishing balance. Bruce Winick 
notes:1211 
 
Unlike the retributivist focus of many criminal justice systems, this model 
[therapeutic jurisprudence] gives greater recognition to the fact that a crime has 
harmed the victim and upset the equilibrium of the community, and seeks to address 
these through victim/offender conferencing [emphasis added] … Such victim/offender 
conferencing typically includes family and other support group members of both 
victim and offender. It provides victims an opportunity to describe to the offender the 
harm they experienced as a result of the crime and the feelings it produced. This 
sometimes provokes feelings of empathy in the offender and sometimes an apology. 
An acknowledgement of wrongdoing and a genuine apology can allow victims to 
heal. When the defendant pleads not guilty and seeks a trial to contest the charges, 
                                            
1208 Bruce J Winick “Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Victims of Crime” (7 March 2008) Social Science 
Research Network <www.ssrn.com>. 
1209 See Victims Rights Act 2002 section 11. See also ss 7 – 11 and 12.  
1210 Winick, above n 1208.  
1211 Winick, above n 1208. 
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such victim/offender conferencing would likely be unavailing and it may not be 
possible to compel the defendant to participate. However, when the defendant has 
pled guilty and is facing a future sentencing, such conferencing with the victim might 
provide the defendant with an incentive to apologize and provide the victim with a 
healthy opportunity to express feelings.  
 
As Māori are also disproportionately represented as victims in the criminal justice 
system, it is recommended that therapeutic jurisprudence principles apply equally to 
the victim as the offender.  
 
The offending rates for Māori, and Māori women in particular, are disproportionately 
high. After an analysis of comparative jurisdictions and the judicial process for 
indigenous peoples, this thesis proposes a model that may offer one solution to 
address disproportionate rates of Māori offending.   
 
There are Māori actors within the criminal justice system including court officials, 
prosecutors, lawyers and judges. The Māori Language Act 1987 provides for the 
ability to address the court in Te Reo.1212 From July 2012 opening and closing 
announcements in the District, Family and Youth Courts were provided in Te Reo.1213 
These provide positive steps to engage with tikanga Māori. 
 
Notwithstanding this inclusion, elements of the existing system, such as the 
inaccessibility of the judge to the offender, the alien court process and the lack of 
concern or relationship with the offender after their court appearance, have been 
shown to be mono-cultural and inconsistent with tikanga Māori.1214  
 
                                            
1212 Māori Language Act Right 1987, s 4: right to speak Māori in legal proceedings. See also Natalie 
Akoorie and Teuila Fuatai “Jury’s Out on Compulsory Use of Māori in Court” New Zealand Herald 
(online ed, Auckland, July 18 2012). 
1213 Ministry of Justice Media Release “Te Reo Introduced into District Court” (press release, 19 July 
2012) <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
1214 See comments by Judge Stephanie Milroy ‘Nga Tikanga Māori and the Courts ‘15 (2007) 
Yearbook of NZJ where she notes ‘… a court setting is a really strange experience …’ 
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Given a criminal justice system which lacks any appreciation or analysis of the 
broader role that colonisation has played in contributing to the high rates of offending, 
the persistence of these elements has resulted in anti-therapeutic outcomes. 1215  
Despite the connection between colonisation and Māori offending, courts have found 
that “it does not logically follow that a person is more likely to be at a disadvantage 
and to offend simply by virtue of his or her Māori heritage. To some such a 
proposition may appear offensive”1216.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence as a vehicle allows: 
- Māori offenders to take responsibility for their actions; 
- formal recognition of the validity and applicability of tikanga Māori; 
- a fully integrated bicultural approach;  
- involvement of Māori through the whole process; 
- Māori administering justice; 
- the placing of decision-making back in the community; and  
- a system predicated upon tikanga Māori as well as Māori people. 
 
The most important commonality between tikanga Māori and therapeutic 
jurisprudence is the recognition of collective responsibility or communitarianism, and 
the healing process. Therapeutic jurisprudence allows the underlying reasons for 
Māori offending to be addressed in a Māori way. The goal for both therapeutic 
jurisprudence and tikanga Māori is whakahoki mauri or restoring the balance and 
returning the mauri. This enables the offender to participate successfully in the 
community.  
 
The model incorporates the doctrine of therapeutic jurisprudence within a court 
setting. It is through the vehicle of therapeutic jurisprudence that a separate 
                                            
1215 For instance, the raft of English law statutes did not recognise tikanga and custom. Māori women 
as property owners and equivalent to, and not the property of, men was not recognised. The 
replacement of extended family support structures by nuclear families is an example of the 
internalisation of colonial values. This breakdown of the family structure together with the alienation of 
Māori from their land through the Native Land Court legislation and policies have contributed to the 
widening the socio economic gap between Māori and non Māori, increasing vulnerability to crime and 
associated drug, alcohol and poverty issues. See Jackson above n 31. See also Maynard and others 
above n 90. 
1216 Mika v R [2013] NZCA para 12. 
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indigenous legal system — tikanga Māori — is incorporated. This incorporation of 
tikanga is legislated to provide greater certainty. 
 
The high rates of Māori offending challenge both our politicians and the judiciary to 
implement and embrace legal systems that have shown success, but which lie outside 
the Westminster structure.  
 
Indigenous courts are underpinned by therapeutic jurisprudence and offer one such 
option. Evaluations of indigenous courts, suggest that they have:1217  
 
both criminal justice aims (reducing recidivism, improving court appearance rates and 
reducing the over-representation of Indigenous people in the criminal justice system) 
and community building aims (providing a culturally appropriate process, increasing 
community participation and contributing to reconciliation). Of the criminal justice 
aims, only the impact of the courts on re-offending has been assessed. 
 
The adoption of tikanga Māori and a therapeutic jurisprudential approach within a 
New Zealand court setting could effectively open a pathway for tikanga Māori to 
walk together with te ture (law) Pākehā to step towards reducing the disproportionate 
offending rates of Māori and contribute to reconciliation and balance within the 
community. 
 
Many challenges are involved in this, but it is a step in the right direction in terms of 
creating a new criminal justice system that incorporates the values of all members of 
our society. 
 
C. An Indigenous Reentry Court for Māori? 
 
Indigenous re-entry courts are based on indigenous legal systems. Since half of all 
offenders before the NZPB will be Māori, the question now becomes  
 
                                            




Will an indigenous re-entry court for Māori underpinned by tikanga Māori assist 
Māori to re-enter the community successfully and reduce recidivism? 
 
(a) Proposed Model 
 
Upon the incarceration of an offender, a kaumatua/judge would co-ordinate, monitor 
and motivate the offender’s progress within the correctional facility. This would 
require the offender to participate in various tikanga programmes within the 
correctional facility, such as the Māori Focus Units,1218 and concentrate on identified 
areas of rehabilitation, such as drug treatment. As in the JVP programme, through 
periodic review hearings, the kaumatua/judge could help instill in the offender a 
vision of eventual release.1219 This could be a healing process in itself. 
 
Ideally, this model would involve all offending, but in the early stages, it would be 
limited to less serious offending. The kaumatua/judge would be a different person 
from the sentencing judge, who might be viewed by the offender in a negative light, 
whereas the monitoring judge would be perceived to ‘care’ or maintain an ‘ethic of 
care’ in regard to the prisoner’s rights. 
 
Upon entry into the programme, the offender would sign a behavioural contract 
agreeing to comply with the programme agenda.1220 The offender could also be 
encouraged to participate in developing the programme and have the ability to set 
release conditions. The release conditions would require the taking of responsibility as 
a collective (whānau). Like the JVP, the ability to set release conditions allows for the 
possibility of dialogue between the court and offender, and enables a conditional 
release to be conceptualised as a bilateral behavioural contract, rather than a unilateral 
judicial fiat. Such a conceptualisation is likely to promote an offender’s sense of 
fairness and participation, and should enhance the offender’s compliance with the 
release conditions.  
 
                                            
1218 Department of Corrections Māori Focus Units (2009) <www.corrections.govt.nz>. 
1219 Winick, above n 856, at 4. 
1220 See also David B Wexler “Robes and Rehabilitation: How Judges can Help Offenders Make Good” 
(2001) 38(1) Court Review 18. 
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Such a programme could be ‘tailor-made’ to suit the problem or offence relevant to 
the offender, and could be specific to include tikanga programmes within the 
correctional institute that focus on anger management and other behavioural 
problems.  
 
The offender’s genuine involvement in correctional programmes would have a 
bearing on the prisoner’s progress through the levels, and on their prospect of 
eventual release.1221 
 
The kaumatua/judge would take on a more active role with the offender by using the 
court processes aimed at promoting the rehabilitation of the offender or the prevention 
of crime. These processes would seek to facilitate the offender’s participation in a 
programme, to maintain the offender’s dignity, and to promote the offender’s trust.  
 
Part of the programme would include regular court appearances for review that would 
decline as progress is made. Participants would be actively involved in the court 
process and provide input into the programme for changes. In an endeavor to establish 
the ‘tika’ or correct approach, the judge would interact with the offender, expressing 
interest in their life and praising any progress that has been made.  
 
This philosophy is based on the “ethic of care” approach and the central tenet of 
therapeutic jurisprudence, of it being a ‘relational-based’ construct. The ethic of care 
approach recognises, and is capable of offering, an alternative method to legal 
problem-solving that is more overtly relational and less adversarial. 
 
If parole is granted and the offender’s release conditions are subsequently breached, a 
process of deferred revocation similar to that suggested by David Wexler could be 
adopted.1222 This envisages a clinical approach where the burden lies on the offender 
to defer revocation of parole based on a rehabilitative plan that the offender, with 
support and help of the collective (whānau). Assistance for hearing preparation would 
be provided by a clinic, composing possibly of law students, where advocacy could be 
                                            
1221 Winick, above n 856, at 6. 
1222 David Wexler and Bruce Winick Rehabilitating Lawyers Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
for Criminal Law Practice (Carolina Academic Press, North Carolina, 2008) at 312. 
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enhanced through a therapeutic viewpoint.1223 
 
Although therapeutic jurisprudence may provide a window to import tikanga Māori 
concepts, the question arises as to why therapeutic jurisprudence is required? A 




























                                            





































The similarities between tikanga Māori concepts and therapeutic jurisprudence 
suggest that tikanga Māori concepts are valuable and effective principles when 
addressing indigenous issues. As a principle based doctrine, tikanga is comprised of 
concepts working together to achieve balance. It is premised on, and reflective of 
social and environmental mores. Orthodox legal systems are also reflective of social 
mores. 
 
The recognition of tikanga and indigenous concepts is sanctioned in instruments such 
as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Te Tiriti o 
Waitangi. Both instruments support the right of self-determination and tino 
rangatiratanga. Various jurisdictions have formalised this recognition through 
domestic legislation and have been manifested with the implementation of indigenous 
courts, such as Koori Courts (Australia), Gladue Courts (Canada) and Navajo Courts 
(United States of America).  
 
As part of this final chapter, it is timely to identify what is feasible and applicable 
within a New Zealand context. It is proposed that the clear directive to consider 
indigenous concepts during sentencing, for instance in the Koori Courts, is extended 
to the arrest stage. This is similar to the proposed therapeutic jurisprudence models 
and the Navajo Courts. It is suggested that an extension of jurisdiction to the Māori 





This thesis tests the proposition that: 
 
Applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine is the most promising way forward for Māori to ameliorate the 





B. Social statistics – A Catalyst 
 
In 2006 the Te Rau Hinengaro report suggested that Māori have a higher level of 
mental health needs than non-Māori.1224 This is reflected in the over-representation of 
Māori within forensic mental health facilities.1225 Māori are also disproportionately 
represented in the prison population, with half the prison population identifying as 
Māori.1226 For Māori women the statistics are as high as 60 per cent of all women who 
are incarcerated. The incidence of mental illness within the criminal justice system is 
also disproportionately high.1227  
 
Taken separately, these statistics are of concern. Taken cumulatively, the statistics are 
tragic, indicating that an unacceptable number of Māori are within the criminal justice 
system, with a correspondingly higher incidence of mental illness than the rest of the 
population.  
 
Both judges and solicitors, as officers of the court, lament at the continual high 
numbers of Māori that appear before them or they represent within the criminal 
justice system.1228 Irrespective of these initiatives, it is clear that an alternative forum 
underpinned or driven by more holistic principles, such a tikanga Māori, is required. 
This thesis suggests that the concepts of tikanga Māori be applied within a suitable 
forum.  
 
Borrows suggested that:1229  
 
                                            
1224 Joanne Baxter and others “Ethnic Comparisons of the 12 month prevalence of mental disorders and 
treatment contact in Te Rau Hinengaro: the New Zealand Mental Health Survey” (October 2006) 40(1) 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry at 905–913. 
1225 Baxter and others, above n 1224.  
1226 Bronwyn Morrison, Natalie Soboleva and Jin Chong Conviction and Sentencing Offenders in New 
Zealand: 1997 – 2006 (Ministry of Justice, 2008) at 118; See also Michael Rich Census of Prison 
Inmates 1999 (Department of Corrections SAS Policy Development, Wellington, December, 2000) at 
43 <www.corrections.govt.nz >. 
1227 Baxter and others, above n 1224.  
1228 See also comments by the Judges at the Healing Courts and Plans People, International Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Conference October 9 – 10, First Nations Long House, Vancouver, British Columbia 
that also reluctantly recognize the continual high number of indigenous offenders that appear before 
them.  
1229 Borrows, above n 235, at 181. 
 308 
… both indigenous and other Canadian governments could enact legislation or 
undertake similar official acts that recognise and harmonise Indigenous legal 
traditions with the common law … I also suggest that Indigenous Courts, along with 
federal and provincial courts, could better implement Indigenous law by applying 
appropriate interpretive mechanisms [emphasis added] and ensuring that at least 
some of those who are appointed to the bench have a knowledge of receptivity to 
Indigenous legal traditions … Indigenous governments and the Canadian Parliament 
should pass Indigenous law recognition legislation to facilitate the rule of law’s 
[emphasis added] development in Canada. 
 
Justice Heath notes that tikanga Māori aligns more closely with an inquisitorial model 
seeking to achieve a common and mutually beneficial goal, as opposed to the current 
adversarial system. In proposing two avenues to incorporate Māori customary law, 
Justice Heath proposes that the entire judicial system could be overhauled, and either 
parallel systems of adjudication be developed or a stand-alone system of adjudication 
be created, which takes equal account of Māori custom and "European" values.1230  
Second, the existing framework could be modified, thereby permitting Māori concepts 
and custom to operate in the appropriate circumstances.1231 Considering the first 
option as unlikely for a number of reasons, including the current political climate, 
Justice Heath considers that option two is the only politically viable solution. His 
Honour notes that:1232   
 
While this could be seen as consigning Māori custom and values to a gap-filling role, 
I am more sanguine about the prospects of producing a more substantive solution. 
 
The incorporation of Māori concepts into legislation by the government acknowledges 
and promotes Māori cultural identity and gives practical effect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi within its legislative frameworks.1233 However, there is no nexus between 
the passage of domestic legislation and tikanga Māori. The doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty does not require Parliament to consider tikanga Māori before passing 
legislation. Further, when tikanga is included within legislation, it is often only one 
                                            
1230 Heath above n 294 at 200. 
1231 At 209. 
1232 At 200. 
1233 Arnu Turvey “Te Ao Māori in a Sympathetic Legal Regime: The Use of Māori Concepts in 
Legislation (2009-2010) 40 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 531. 
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factor to be satisfied or considered by the decision maker. Likewise, whether or not 
the definition of tikanga is satisfied is determined by the decision maker. Taking 
concepts such as tikanga or kaitiaki out of context runs the risk of mistranslation.1234  
 
Paul McHugh describes this process as “a conscious effort by government and Māori 
to move from the embattled processes of rights recognition to reconciliation”.1235 This 
process is achieved through the development of a "sympathetic legal regime" that 
"accommodates the cultural disposition" of indigenous groups.1236 
 
Despite the two texts of the Treaty of Waitangi, it is the English version — in which 
Māori cede sovereignty to the Crown — that is most often referred to. There is no 
impetus on the Crown to consider tikanga Māori from a Treaty perspective. 
 
The monopoly of the government and its agencies interpret tikanga Māori in 
accordance with the underlying values and interests of the dominant group, rather 
than promoting tikanga Māori culture.1237 The meaning of the terms themselves 
become subservient to the political objectives of a government that, while sympathetic 





Before addressing an extension of the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court, it is 
important to discuss the issue of equality and whether the establishment of an 
indigenous court is an anathema to equality and the rule of law, which includes the 
                                            
1234 See Nin Tomas “Tangata Whenua Issues: Implementing Kaitiakitanga under the RMA” 
(1994) July New Zealand Environmental Reporter at 39-42 where Nin discusses the problems of 
importing Māori concepts into legislation in particular that of kaitiaki 
1235 McHugh above n 12 
1236 McHugh, above n 12, at 55. 
1237 Turvey, above n 1233. See also Jeremy Waldron "One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural 
Accommodation" (2002) 59 Wash & Lee L Rev 3 at 3 where he notes that the policy behind legislation 
can be culturally biased. He states "one law for all" ... is the inherent ally of state law, 
rather than an independent consideration that helps settle the issue between state law and its cultural 
competitors. 
1238 Turvey, above n 1233. 
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principle of “one law for all” and the position that humans are all basically alike.1239 
 
Justice Heath echoes a commonly held perspective:1240 
 
In my view, New Zealanders generally will not accept a system whereby different 
laws are applied to different classes of people … if there are laws for Māori and other 
laws for other New Zealanders, what happens when the two collide? Which law 
prevails? Indeed, how can two legal systems founded on race and culture be justified 
on a principled basis? 
 
For Māori, the whakataukī “me haere whakamuri kia haere whakamua” (we must 
journey back, or understand our past before we can move forward) is instrumental 
when considering the relevance of “one law for all”.  
 
Whilst there are competing arguments that range from consideration of culture will 
result in greater differences1241 to the call for indigenous people to embrace self-
determination and establish their own systems of governance,1242 there is an 
underlying need to consider the context against which the laws of New Zealand were 
crafted.  
 
In the colonial era, a raft of legislation alienated Māori from their land and resources. 
Many early government policies were also discriminatory towards Māori. It would be 
disingenuous to claim that at this time the principle of equality applied when, in 
particular, Māori were subject to policies that resulted in land alienation. Similarly the 
application of “one law for all” in the criminal context is clearly not working. 
 
It is superficial to claim that the recognition of Māori rights will discriminate against 
                                            
1239 See Jeremy Waldron “Basic Equality” Nellco Legal Scholarship Repository New York University 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 19 December 2008, at 44. Available also 
<www.lsr.nellco.org> for further discussion. 
1240 Heath, above n 294, at 201. 
1241 Brian Barry Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Polity Press in 
association with Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, 2001). 
1242 See for instance Taiaiake Alfred Peace, Power and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (2nd 
ed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008). See also Brad Morse “Regaining Recognition of the 
Inherent Right of Aboriginal Governance” in Yale Belanger (ed) Aboriginal Self-Government in 
Canada: Current Trends and Issues (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004)  
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non-Māori before understanding the justifications for those rights.1243 Furthermore, 
the Human Rights Act 1993, that generally prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
race, does recognise an exception for affirmative action programmes and provisions 
done in good faith to assist or advance persons who need assistance or advancement 
to achieve an equal place with other members of the community.1244 
 
There is usually little obstacle to a parallel or separate criminal justice system when 
the offender and victim are both Māori and there is no dispute as to the offender’s 
guilt.1245 Current legislative provisions, including Sentencing Act 20021246 and the 
Māori Community Development Act 1962, permit Māori committees to impose 
penalties on Māori for certain conduct falling within the Summary Offences Act 1981 
and the CYFP Act. This provides for the inclusion of customary law or tikanga Māori 
within the justice system. The Sentencing Act further supports the use of marae 
programmes, iwi and hapū involvement.1247 Despite these incremental steps to 
recognise tikanga Māori, it is difficult to ignore the persistent disproportionate 
offending rates for Māori.  
 
Justice Heath noted that:1248  
 
Education and intellectual flexibility are key allies in the challenge to apply custom. 
Greater understanding is likely to breed confidence. With education, understanding 
and confidence on the part of all participants, it may be possible to find a significant 
place for Māori within the New Zealand judicial system. But it will be a significant 
challenge to do so. 
 
It is unlikely that a right to secede or a right to external self-determination manifest in 
an indigenous court will be realised for Māori. Nonetheless, a form of internal self- 
determination could be achieved through an extension of the existing legal forum, 
                                            
1243 Claire Charters “Do Māori Rights Racially Discriminate against Non-Māori? (2009-2010) 40 
Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 649 at 668. 
1244 Human Rights Act 1993 section 73. 
1245 Jackson above n 31. 
1246 Section 10 – this would assume that the offender would appear before a Māori Committee and the 
Māori Committee could then impose actions upon the offender to compensate, apologise or ‘make 
good the harm’ this can then be taken into account by the sentencing judge. 
1247 Sentencing Act ss 51 (c) and 54H (c). 
1248 Heath, above n 294, at 212. 
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where the right to culture and the principles that underpin tikanga Māori are 
appreciated.  
 
This next section will consider two possibilities: an extension of the jurisdiction of the 
Māori Land Court and the introduction of a ‘specialist’ Tikanga Court that has 
similarities with the current Rangatahi Court, as well as the Alcohol and other Drug 
Treatment Court. If successful, it is proposed that like the Rangatahi Courts, the 
jurisdiction would be open to both Māori and non-Māori, thereby complying with the 
principle of “one law for all”. 
 
D. Māori Land Court: An Extension of Jurisdiction or a Tikanga Court? 
 
Various pieces of legislation, including the Native Land Court Act of 1865, sought to 
simplify tikanga Māori and ‘freeze’ Māori entitlements to deal with their land by 
requiring alienation to be made to the Crown (by sale and at time confiscation) with 
the approval of the early Native Land Courts. This was facilitated by assimilating 
native or customary title into an individualised system of land tenure and then vesting 
Māori land into Crown ownership.1249 This process ‘fast tracked’ the alienation of 
Māori land and had an enduring detrimental effect on Māori society and, 
consequently, re-defined the nature of tikanga Māori.  
 
The Māori Land Court is a creature of statute with the authorisation to be a court of 
record under Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993.1250 Today the Act provides for a 
different philosophy. Underpinned by tikanga values, the preamble notes: 
 
… And whereas it is desirable to recognise that land is a taonga tuku iho of special 
significance to Māori people and, for that reason, to promote the retention of that land 
in the hands of its owners, their whānau, and their hapū, and to protect wahi tapu: and 
to facilitate the occupation, development, and utilisation of that land for the benefit of 
its owners, their whānau, and their hapū: And whereas it is desirable to maintain a 
                                            
1249 See D Williams Te Tango Kooti Whenua (Huia Publishers, Wellington, 1999). See also discussion 
by Richard Boast ‘Evolution of Māori Land Law 1862 – 1993’ in Richard Boast, Andrew Erueti, Doug 
McPhail and Norman F Smith (eds) Maori Land Law (2nd edition, Lexis Nexis, New Zealand, 2004) at 
65 – 117 where he noted that “… difficulties associated with the management and development of 
Māori freehold land are not likely to be readily or easily overcome”. 
1250 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, s 6. 
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court and to establish mechanisms to assist the Māori people to achieve the 




When President John Rogan of the then Native Land Court was appointed on 25 June 
1864, so too were four Māori judges: Wiremu Tipene, Matikikuha, Te Keene of 
Orakei and Tamati Reweti. On 25 October 1864 a further seven Māori judges were 
appointed: Hone Mohi Tawhai, Penetana Papahurihia, Hoterene Tawatawa, Wepiha 
Pi, Tango Hikuwai, Riwhi Hongi and Tamatai Huingariri. It was not until 15 August 
1974 that Edward Taihakurei Durie, the next Māori judge, was appointed to the 
bench. 
 
Today judges, such as the Chief and Deputy Judges of the Māori Land Court, are 
appointed by the Governor General.1251 Furthermore, the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 
1993 provides that:1252   
 
… the person must not be appointed unless the person is suitable, having regard to the 
person’s knowledge and experience of te reo Māori, tikanga Māori … 
 
Cases before the Māori Land Court can be complex and often involve tikanga or 
customary concepts. The judge will determine the conduct of the hearings that are 
usually held within existing court rooms in the Māori Land Court districts. Rules of 
marae kawa may be applied by the judge as considered appropriate, including a 
karakia (prayer) to commence and mihi whakatau (greetings). Te Reo Māori (the 
Māori language) is often used in court.   
 
Since the passing of the Native Lands Act 1862, the Māori Land Court (Te Kooti 
Whenua Māori) and the Māori Appellate Court (Te Kooti Pira Māori) have continued 
in various forms under Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 (TTWM Act).  
 
                                            
1251 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, s 7(1). 
1252 Section 7(2A). 
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The Māori Land Court has jurisdiction to hear matters relating to Māori land, 
including successions, title improvements, Māori land sales, and the administration of 
Māori land trusts and incorporations. 1253 More specifically the Māori Land Court is 
to:1254 
 
- Administer and apply Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993 and other relevant 
legislation;  
- Maintain the records of title and ownership information of Māori land;  
-  Make available Māori land information held by the Māori Land Court; and  
-  Facilitate Māori land administration and development through the professional   
delivery of services to Māori land owners, their whānau or hapū. 
 
The TTWM Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation but does not codify all Māori 
land issues. The application of other statutes, such as the Income Tax Act 2007, Land 
Transfer Act 1952 and the Property Law Act 2007, is not excluded by the TTWM Act 
and it must be read in conjunction with these and other relevant statutes.1255 The 
TTWM Act has been amended to include sections on the ‘Jurisdiction of the Court 
under the Maori Fisheries Act 2004’ and the ‘Jurisdiction of the Court under the 
Māori Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004’. The Court has exclusive jurisdiction 
to advise on disputes referred to it under the Māori Fisheries Act 2004 and the Māori 
Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004.1256 As a court of record, the Māori Land 
Court’s decisions are subject to judicial review.  
 
McGuire described the Māori Land Court as: 1257 
 
… a special class of administrative court designed to administer and implement 
policy … It deals with a particular class of case where it is essentially an alternative 
to the ordinary courts. 
 
                                            
1253 See also Jeremy McGuire “The Status and Functions of the Māori Land Court” (1993-1996) 8 
Otago L. Rev. 125.  
1254 See Judge N F Smith “Māori Land Court Jurisdiction and Procedure” in Richard Boast, Andrew 
Erueti, Doug McPhail and Norman F Smith (eds) Māori Land Law (2nd ed, Lexis Nexis, New Zealand, 
2004) at 121 – 149 for full discussion on the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court; also Māori Land 
Court see <http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/maori-land-court> 
1255 McGuire, above 1253, at 125. 
1256 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, ss 26B and 26P. 
1257 McGuire, above n 1253, at, 128. 
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Looking to an expanded Māori Land Court jurisdiction, as an answer an appropriate 
starting point to consider, this possibility is noted by Joe Williams, the then Chief 
Judge of the Māori Land Court:1258 
 
It seems to me therefore that there is a real argument for a new form of Māori Land 
Court — a judge sitting with two or more pūkenga or experts — adjudicating, 
facilitating, and mediating through issues confronting the new tribal organisations in 
respect of the new tribal asset. What is genuinely exciting is that the Court would be 
applying and developing a separate system of law — a system which is a mix of those 
aspects of tikanga Māori which continue to inform the lives of Māori today and those 
principles of the common law which have stood the test of time. A system which, as 




The Māori Land Court is comprised of judges who are Māori, well-versed in tikanga 
Māori and guided by a preamble that seeks to establish mechanisms to assist Māori 
litigants. It is proposed that in view of the recent amendments to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court, a further amendment is needed to extend the 




The procedure would mirror the proposed model outlined in Chapter Seven. Ideally, 
the jurisdiction would be open to all offenders with the anticipation that, after the 
success of this model has been proven, the jurisdiction would be widened to include 
more serious offences. So initially it is recommended that only the lesser offending 
would apply. Upon review the jurisdiction could be extended to include more serious 
violent offences provided for in the Crimes Act 1961.1259  
 
This model and the accompanying process would be entirely integrated. The 
jurisdiction would be open to both Māori and non-Māori as the principles applied 
                                            
1258 Chief Justice Joe Williams “The Māori Land Court – A Separate Legal System?” (Occasional 
Paper 4, The New Zealand Centre for Public Law, VUW, July 2001) at 11. 
1259 It is noted that the Matariki Court already considers serious violent offenders. 
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therein are universal. Upon arrest, an advocate, warden or similar person would be 
contacted. This advocate would be responsible for the offender until his or her next 
court appearance. This is not novel. The Child and Young Persons and their Families 
Act, although relating to young persons and children, allows the child to be delivered 
to any iwi social service or cultural social service with the child’s agreement 
following arrest.1260  
 
The offender would be assessed within the local marae forum, allowing for whānau 
involvement. Initially, the offender would have no choice as to which marae he/she 
would appear in,1261 but could be transferred to a tribal or iwi specific marae if he/she 
requested. In view of recent Treaty Settlements, the ability for Iwi to fund and support 
this marae based initiative within their respective area is encouraged to complement 
government support.  
 
All parties, including the kaumatua panel and the offender, would sit at eye level or 
kanohi ki te kanohi. An advocate would assist to ensure that the offender and their 
families do not feel uncomfortable in such a setting and alleviate any feelings of 
alienation from the process. This would be consistent with the concept of 
manaakitanga — the process of showing care, respect, kindness and hospitality.1262  
 
During this marae based phase, community members and the disputants would be 
encouraged to talk things through with the help of respected members of the 
community in order to reach a consensual agreement.1263 The consensus of the 
participants is the culmination of collective decision-making. This goal is similar to 
the Peacemakers Court; the achievement of hózhóji k'é náhóodleel (peacemaking), 
much like the tikanga Māori concept of rebalancing. This step is seen to empower the 
community and encourage the principle of inclusivity and reciprocity. 
 
                                            
1260 Section 234 (c) (ii) Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989. 
1261 This is similar to the Māori Focus Units in prisons where upon sentencing the offender has no 
choice but is allocated to an area where his protocol or kawa may or may not apply. 
1262 Benton and others, above n 204 at 205. 
1263 It is noted that section 4A of the District Courts Act 1947 provides for Judge alone criminal or civil 
proceedings to be heard at another convenient place, this provision could be adapted and included to 
enable the express use of a marae as a forum. 
 317 
Also during this stage, an appropriate programme would be specified for the offender, 
consistent with the concept of kaitiakitanga (watch or guard).1264 At this point it 
would be pivotal that the offender understands, from a tikanga perspective, the nature 
of his or her crime, take responsibility for his or her actions, face the victim, and 
address the need for utu and balance. The composition and underlying tikanga or 
cultural perspective of these programmes will assist in addressing the safety needs of 
the victim and the future well-being of the offender. Intrinsically tikanga-based 
programmes encompass the concept of the offender, taking responsibility for his or 
her actions.  
 
This process recognises that defendants often come before the court with problems 
that place them at risk of reoffending. Any additional problems, such as drug or 
alcohol dependency, can be identified and the appropriate programmes recommended. 
If left without treatment, defendants may well find themselves back before a court, 
charged with further offences. For instance, early treatment or intervention may 
prevent this situation from occurring and reduce the statistics of offending while on 
bail.1265  
 
Upon the offender’s first court appearance, the judge would call for a report from the 
Māori representative (similar to a probation report). Taking into account the findings 
of the report, the judge would then assess the effectiveness of the programme and if 





Although the preamble of the TTWM clearly indicates an onus to adhere to principles 
of tikanga Māori, this is within a ‘land’ or civil context, not a criminal one. 
Incarceration is not consistent with tikanga Māori. Further, it is likely that a Māori 
Land Court judge would not be comfortable with sentencing an offender.  
                                            
1264 Benton and others, above n 204 at 105. 
1265 Ministry of Justice Trends in the Use of Bail and Offending while on Bail 1990 – 1999 (Research 
and Evaluation Unit January 2003) indicates that 21 per cent of people offended while on bail. 
<http://www.justice.govt.nz>  
1266 Sentencing Act 2002 section 106. 
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Currently, the Māori Land Court is not associated with Police, Corrections, Crime and 
Prison, and as such, does not attract the negative connotations. If the Māori Land 
Court was associated with such themes, the negative stigma would follow.  
 
The Māori Land Court judges would need to be ‘warranted’ within this jurisdiction. 
Unlike the District Court, the associated court machinery and administration services 




An extension of the Māori Land Court’s jurisdiction to include civil matters, 
including contractual and commercial issues, may be more difficult. Like the Māori 
Fisheries Act 2004 and the Māori Aquaculture Claims Settlement Act 2004, the 
court’s jurisdiction would need to be confined to the resolution of disputes in the first 
instance. A respective amendment may also be required in the corresponding 
legislation to recognise the extended jurisdiction of both criminal and civil trials.  
 
It is encouragingly noted that a special session of the Kaitaia District Court at Roma 
Marae in Ahipara, held in November 2014, was a New Zealand legal first where the 
District Court heard civil charges on the marae. Mr Tepania, a small-time commercial 
fisherman, appeared before Judge Greg Davis on six Fisheries Act charges relating to 
the late filing of fishing returns on six occasions between February 2012 and January 
2013.1267 He also faced three more serious charges of filing a return more than a 
month late that carried a maximum penalty of a $100,000 fine and forfeiture of his 
boat. He had earlier pleaded guilty and was appearing for sentencing. 
 
It was noted by the court that Mr Tepania was a highly regarded conservationist and 
community worker and was discharged without conviction and ordered to pay zero 
dollars in costs to the Ministry of Primary Industries. 
 
                                            
1267 R v Te Pania – [2015] DCR 25. See also Peter de Graf No conviction for conservationist Nov 26, 
2014 Northern Advocate < http://www.nzherald.co.nz/> 
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It is noted, however, that the current purview of the Māori Land Court includes 
reference to provisions of the Family Protection Act 1955 and the Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949.1268 
 
Both Māori and non-Māori applicants would need to apply to the court to have the 
matter determined. Matters or disputes concerning property, equity, contract and 
related civil matters that concern Māori, either as plaintiff or defendant, or the 
subject-matter of the proceeding, e.g., land, would fall under the jurisdiction of this 
new framework. If one party is non-Māori, then the other party would need to seek 
their consent before proceeding with an application.  
 
The application would need to be first accepted by the Māori Land Court.1269 If the 
application fails, then the general jurisdiction of the District or High Court would 
apply. Once an application is lodged, the applicants would need to undergo mandatory 
mediation or arbitration prior to any court hearing. Mediation or arbitration will 
follow the same process as the current marae based court model and be consistent 
with the Peacemakers Court, with the appropriate support people. These requirements 
would be mandatory.  
 
During this marae based phase, like a Peacemakers Court, it is envisaged that this 
route may be used to resolve many issues, including land use permits, validation of 
paternity and marriage, dissolution of marriage, correction of records, traditional 
adoption, guardianship, declaration of death and probate.1270 This step is seen to 
empower the community and encourage the principle of inclusivity and reciprocity. 
 
If no resolution can be reached, a court date will be set. The court process is 
underpinned by tikanga and its aim is to achieve balance — the goal of tikanga Māori. 
Similar to that of the Navajo jurisdiction and customs, tikanga Māori could be 
employed by the judges to assist the court.  
 
                                            
1268 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act, s 106. 
1269 It is acknowledged that a set of regulations and guidelines would need to be established. 
1270 It is noted that s 4A of the District Courts Act 1947 provides for Judge alone criminal or civil 
proceedings to be heard at another convenient place, this provision could be adapted and included to 
enable the express use of a marae as a forum. 
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Similar to the Tribal Courts in the United States where two judges may sit, one from a 
state court and one from a tribal court, section 26G of the TTWM Act 1993 provides 
the opportunity for kaumatua to sit alongside the judge:1271 
 
The court may, of its own motion or at the request of any party to the proceeding, 
appoint 1 or more additional members (not being Judges of the Māori Land Court) 
who have knowledge of relevant tikanga Māori or other expertise to assist the court 
[emphasis added]. 
 
Assisted by two experts, a ruling can be made within the current legislative 
framework.1272 Until appropriate the “tikanga” is infused, and the legislation is 
promulgated, legal adjudicators will need to make every effort to utilise the common 
law principles that support tikanga. 
 




It is anticipated that a wider civil jurisdiction would require the support of Māori and 
adequate resourcing. An extension to include family issues would be more consistent 
than criminal issues.  
 
Currently the Resource Management Act 1991 contains provisions where the 
expertise of a Māori Land Court judge can be called upon when the case involves 
tikanga Māori. It may be that similar to the Environment Court when a case before, 
for instance, the Family Court involves tikanga Māori the expertise of the MLC 
judges is required and called upon. It may also be that in criminal cases involving 
tikanga Māori, such as R v Mason, a Māori Land Court judge is requested to sit with 
                                            
1271 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act 1993, ss 26G, 26S, 26T(4), 26U(5), 32 and 62. 
1272 Akin to Magistrates Court Act 1989 (VIC), s 17A: Appointment of Aboriginal Elders or Respected 
Persons. 
1273 A review of Te Ture Whenua Māori Land Act 1993 has just been completed and is now open to 
submissions and consultation. The focus of this review was to enable Māori land to be available for 
commercial use. 
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the judge. The Law Commission foreshadows the potential use of the Māori Land 
Court to determine issues pertaining to burial.1274 
 
As the review of the TTWM is in progress, it is suggested that some of the 
administrative aspects of the Māori Land Court could be removed and replaced with a 
mediation role for disputes. Such a transformation would result in the court no longer 
being a “land court”. Despite this potential change of jurisdiction, it is anticipated that 




It is envisaged that an extension of the Māori Land Court would include the 
following: 
 
(a) Expansion of jurisdiction to include civil and criminal areas; akin to the 
jurisdiction of the District Court; 
(b) Within these two areas — speciality ‘courts’ to hear cases on 
environmental, family and employment matters; and 
(c) Change of name to ‘Te Kooti Māori’. 
 
It is acknowledged that this would increase the workload of the judges and it is 
suggested that more Māori judges be appointed. But the inclusion of kaumatua is 
pivotal, particularly in youth criminal offending cases, as the kaumatua, through 
tikanga and whakapapa, is ultimately responsible for the offender. It is suggested in 
such cases, the kaumatua be afforded the mana to adjudicate. 
 
As for a proposed solution, there are no hard statistics to support such an initiative. 
Nonetheless, the identification of serious issues, such as alcohol abuse and offending, 
has led to the establishment of the Alcohol and other Drug Treatment Courts. 
                                            
1274 Law Commission Report Burial in New Zealand Today (NZLC IP34) at 32, 45, 46, 73. See also 
comments from Mihiata Pirini in Law Commission looks at burial rights 4 August 2014 Radio NZ. 
<http://www.radionz.co.nz/>  who noted that ‘the (Law) commission wanted to see a judge from the 
Family Court and another from the Māori Land Court together to hear claims over burial rights … the 
Law Commission was tweaking its original proposal so that the onus was put on having a judge from 
each court where there was a dispute involving tikanga and Pākehā.’  
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Similarly, the marae courts initiative was launched to address the issue of youth 
offending, in particular, that by Māori youth. Judges and legal counsel are well aware 
of the over-representation of Māori in the criminal justice system and support an 
initiative to address this problem.   
 
Recent specialised courts, such as Alcohol and other Drug Treatment Court and the 
marae courts have been established as a response to social and community difficulties. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that these initiatives are working. Comparative 
jurisdictions confirm the success of these so-called ‘specialised courts’. 
 
E. Specialist ‘Tikanga Māori’ Court 
 
Building on the success of the Rangatahi, Matariki, and Alcohol and other Drug 
Treatment Courts (AODTC), the proposed Tikanga Court, as a stand alone court, 
would operate in a similar way with an initial focus on criminal offending. 1275 The 
underlying purpose of this court is to provide a forum where principles of tikanga can 
be meaningfully implemented and applied to achieve balance, healing or harmony 
within the individual and the community. Like the AODTC, the Tikanga Court would 




The jurisdiction would be open to both Māori and non-Māori as the principles applied 
are universal. The process would commence upon arrest, where the offender would be 
offered the option to appear before a judge and two kaumatua at a Tikanga (marae) 
based court, or fall under the general jurisdiction of the District or High Court.  
 
By choosing the option of a Tikanga (marae) based court, the defendant would need 
to enter a guilty plea. This reflects an important concept of tikanga Māori; namely, if 
one is charged with or alleged to have committed an act, then that person must take 
                                            
1275 Section 4D of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 (Vic) provides for the establishment of Koori Courts 
– similar provisions could be enacted. 
1276 See Chapter I ‘Causes of offending’. 
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responsibility. This is similar to a strict liability offence under criminal law; however, 
assuming responsibility increases a person’s mana.  
 
If the offender chooses the marae based option, they would then to register with a 
‘Marae Services’1277 facility. The Marae Services would provide all administrative 
assistance including compiling a court list for marae sittings and maintaining all files 
for the offenders. It is suggested that a District Court registrar be part of the Marae 
Services to ensure consistency between the two facilities (District Court and Marae 
Court). This is important, particularly if the offender chooses to opt out of the marae 
process for the general court jurisdiction. 
 
The Marae Services would advise the offender at the time of registration of the next 
available date for the initial hearing, in accordance with the ‘heard as soon as 
practicable’ provision.1278 At this point a lay advocate,1279 such as a kaitiaki, would be 
assigned and become responsible for the offender. The Marae Services would then 
provide the file to either the lay advocate or the marae where the offender would 
remain. 
 
The lay advocate would assist to ensure that the offender and their families are 
familiar with the process that lies ahead.1280 This would also include appearing with 
them in support (awhi and manaaki) and during the next step, the hearing at the 
marae.1281 The lay advocate would also provide support (awhi) to the victim and their 
families in a similar fashion, as it is expected that the victim would also appear.  
 
The procedure for the marae hearing would be similar to that of the Rangatahi Courts 
with a pōwhiri, mihi, kai, korero and poroporoaki. The judge would sit with two 
community members and preside over the hearing. Like the Rangatahi Courts, if 
                                            
1277 This would be similar to the service offered by the District Court.  
1278 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 s 23 (3).  
1279 Section 163 CYPF Act 1989 provides for the appointment of a lay advocate. It is envisaged a 
similar provision could be enacted alternatively this section could be amended to include a lay advocate 
for a Tikanga Court. 
1280 Section 327 CYPF Act 1989 provides for representation of the offender’s interest. Again it is 
envisaged a similar provision could be enacted, alternatively this section could be amended to include a 
lay advocate for a Tikanga Court  
1281 In light of the review of the role of Māori wardens, it is submitted that Māori wardens could 
provide their services as a support role within a Tikanga Court. 
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relevant, a member from Hauora (Ministry of Health) and social support services as 
well as members from the community would take an active role in promoting the 
principle of inclusivity. This would provide support to the offender for behaviour 
related issues, such as mental health and anger management problems or alcohol and 
drug addictions. This could also encompass an offender with domestic violence 
charges who suffers from mental health issues. It is anticipated that existing 
programmes could be used. 
 
The judge, together with the two community members and support services, will 
determine a suitable programme/s for the offender. With the appropriate support of 
the respective programme representatives and potential supervision of the lay 
advocate and/or the marae, the offender will commence the programmes and then 
report back to the Marae Court once completed.  
 
Upon the offender’s next Marae Court appearance, the Judge and two kaumatua 
would review the offender’s progress, programme completion and also take into 
account any reports from the programme leaders. At this point it could be determined 
that the offender be released without conviction1282 or it may be that a further 
programme is suggested to the offender for completion. If the offender has 
successfully completed their programme this would be noted on his file and the file 
returned to Marae Services or a similar justice depository for any future reference 
should it be warranted. 
 
Ideally, legislation similar to that of the Koori Court Act would be promulgated to 
provide certainty and a clear direction for the court. 
 
At any stage the offender should have the chance to opt for the general jurisdiction of 
the District or High Court.  Alternatively, if the offender fails to comply with the 
process, then they could be reassigned to the general District Court process. 
 
Similar to the Alcohol and Other Drug Treatment Court (AODTC) pilot scheme, a 
Tikanga Court pilot could sit weekly at Hoani Waititi and Orakei (or alternatively 
                                            
1282 Similar to a section 106 Sentencing Act 2002. 
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Kaikohe) as these are venues already successfully utilised by Te Kooti Rangatahi. 
This could potentially cater for 100 participants each year. It is accepted that 
unforeseen glitches will arise if a Tikanga Court pilot is realised. And despite the 
positive nature of a Tikanga Court, a major challenge will be finding the adequate 
funding and resources, particularly to support the community services. However, it is 
proposed that the benefits of a Tikanga Court would outweigh the costs involved, 
particularly since the existing infrastructure (e.g., marae, social services, Corrections, 
judiciary) is already established.  
 
Moreover, the District Court judges have the required judicial criminal and trial 
warrants.  Further, the machinery and administrative support is already in place.  
 
Comparative jurisdictions have found positive experiences with similar initiatives, 
although statistics show that disproportionate offending rates persist. The Ministry of 
Justice recognises that culturally appropriate responses are required. Collectively, this 
supports such an initiative as a Tikanga Court. 
 
 
(b) Hypothetical Example 
 
Hemi is a twenty-year-old unemployed Māori male.  
 
He lives at home with his mother and six younger siblings. His father, when he visits, 
routinely abuses Hemi’s mother and siblings. Although he was the top student in his 
class, Hemi left school at 14 to find work and raise his siblings. Recently, Hemi has 
been enticed by a local gang to sell drugs.1283 However, Hemi has also become an 
addict, using more drugs than he can sell. To bridge the loss, Hemi decides to rob the 
local dairy. He is caught and charged. 
 
For Hemi, the option of a marae based court would be ideal. It would give him the 
opportunity to undertake the necessary rehabilitative drug programmes, and provide 
information and support on completing his education. This option would also provide 
                                            
1283 Cannabis, a class C drug. 
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advice to his mother regarding the ongoing abuse from his father as well as any 
possible housing issues. Depending on the quantity of drugs sold, and in view of the 
potential damage to the community, it would be suggested that Hemi engage in anti-
drug treatment programmes. It would be hoped that, after the completion of these 
programmes, Hemi and his family will become positive members of the community.  
 
Like the Matariki Courts, the victim’s consent would not be required for acceptance 
into the Tikanga Court process. However, the victim would have the chance to face 
the offender and provide input into any programme. This could include reparation 
payment of the goods stolen. As offenders are often unemployed and without funds, 
appropriate work, such as cleaning the shop or stacking shelves, could be considered 
to satisfy the principle of reciprocity and balance. This situation would be preferable 
to a possible prison or community detention sentence with limited opportunity for 
rehabilitation.  
 
Anecdotally, members of the judiciary have commented on the disproportionate 
representation of Māori within their courts1284 and welcomed the need to employ 
creative solutions to reduce recidivism rates.  
 
A proposed Tikanga Court reflects a merging of two existing initiatives — Te Kooti 











                                            
1284 For example Mika v R [2013] NZCA 648 at para [12] where Justice Harrison notes the awareness 
of judges to the disproportionate offending rates for Maori and accepts that economic, social and 
cultural reasons contribute to this offending. However, he does also note that ‘the virtue of being 





































This thesis seeks to test the proposition that: 
 
Applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realized by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine, is the most promising way forward for Māori to ameliorate the over-
representation of Māori in the criminal justice system — A case for an Indigenous 
Court for Māori. 
 
Chapter One sought to introduce the validity of this proposition.  An overview of the 
current relationship between Māori and the criminal justice system provided a 
backdrop to test this proposition. This included areas of criminal offending, parole 
and mental health together with the relevant legal provisions, practices and policies 
and statistical and qualitative information that confirm Māori are disproportionately 
represented across all stages of the criminal justice system. Fundamental to Chapter 
One is the discussion on causes of offending. 
 
In Chapter Two, after discourse answering two fundamental questions: ‘Who are 
Māori?’ and ‘What is tikanga Māori?’ the part examined ancestral conceptions of 
tikanga Māori and correct conduct. This established a potential framework for further 
consideration. Two examples provided an insightful reflection and confirmation of the 
detrimental effect of British law on tikanga Māori. First, the changing significance of 
Māori women in society and the related problem of domestic violence; and second, 
the issue of Māori mental health.  
 
The concept of tikanga was set against more commonly known theories of law — 
natural law and positive law — to provide a benchmark as to where tikanga sits 
within a non-indigenous legal world. It was established that although tikanga shared 
concepts with both theories of law, it was still marginalised within our current 
criminal justice system.  
 
Chapter Three employed a discussion of New Zealand’s constitutional history to 
determine where an alternative system, predicated on tikanga Māori, may sit within 
the legal system of Aoteroa, New Zealand. This historical review of the introduction 
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of British law and legal systems clarified the negative and almost fatal impact that 
colonisation had on tikanga Māori.  
 
The analysis of two key documents — the Treaty of Waitangi and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples — firmly established indigenous 
peoples’ right to culture. The evaluation of the pivotal right of self-determination, 
contained in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and 
the analogous right of tino rangatiratanga in the Treaty of Waitangi, supported a 
contextual right for the return to the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an 
indigenous legal system.  
 
Although New Zealand is reluctant to include international standards on indigenous 
peoples’ rights or the concept of tikanga Māori within a written constitution, an 
examination of comparative constitutions reveals that it is not uncommon to include 
indigenous rights within national constitutions. International jurisprudence and 
constitutional examples confirm and entrench indigenous peoples’ rights. The right to 
implement tikanga Māori meaningfully through an indigenous court within the 
criminal justice system in New Zealand was still unclear.  
 
Chapter Four considered the historical and contemporary criminal justice initiatives, 
including Maāri Juries, Maori Wardens and Family Group Conferences; and the use 
of alternative judicial fora such as Te Kooti Rangatahi, demonstrated a willingness 
from the criminal justice system to meaningfully include tikanga concepts. Te Kooti 
Rangatahi provided a convincing vehicle within the current criminal justice system in 
which offenders could reconnect with their culture. Anecdotal evidence suggests this 
initiative was helpful in reducing recidivism rates. The recent opening of additional 
Te Kooti Rangatahi in Christchurch indicates political support. The availability of the 
Rangatahi Court to both Māori and non-Māori offenders alleviates concerns over 
equal treatment under the law.  
 
Chapter Five investigated comparative jurisdictions, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, 
which have incorporated and entrenched similar concepts to tikanga Māori in their 
constitutions. This includes the importance of Earth Mother and balance and 
harmony. A review of comparative jurisdictions revealed that vehicles such as Koori 
 330 
Courts in Australia employ culture within the criminal justice process. The use of 
alternative judicial fora in comparative jurisdictions, such as Koori Courts, not only 
supported the right to culture and the right of self-determination, but also provided 
interesting and practicable precedents for further consideration in Aotearoa, New 
Zealand. Given the disproportionate representation of indigenous peoples in areas of 
crime and mental health, it was suggested that drawing upon indigenous concepts, 
such as hozho (healing) and similar doctrine, may provide an answer.1285 A discussion 
of the Navajo Court system in the United States was informative. This prompted the 
question on whether the solution may lie in the realisation of self-determination and 
the ability for Māori to make decisions over their own political and legal structures. 
Tikanga Māori, as a discreet system of law together with the existing court systems 
from comparative jurisdictions, supported a return to an indigenous legal paradigm.  
 
The discussion in Chapter Six on therapeutic jurisprudence within domestic violence 
courts and re-entry courts highlighted the similarities between therapeutic 
jurisprudence and tikanga Māori. It was suggested that because therapeutic 
jurisprudence already exists within the criminal justice system, it may provide a 
window to import tikanga Māori. In addition, proposed models for domestic violence 
and re-entry courts were advanced. These models were underpinned by tikanga Māori 
and could be worked in conjunction with the current legal system. Rather than rely on 
a doctrine to import tikanga concepts, it was proposed that these concepts should 
apply directly. 
 
Constitutional rights are derived from the people themselves. It was concluded that 
tikanga Māori is intrinsic to all Māori. Its concepts or principles should be included to 
strengthen the laws of New Zealand and promote harmony and healing.  
 
Nonetheless, the negative aspects of this initiative were reviewed. This included a 
revisiting of the rule of law, the issue of equality, together with practical 
considerations, such as financial resources. It was determined that a focus on an 
existing court structure with legislation clearly directing the consideration of tikanga 
                                            
1285 Indigenous law relates to that system of law developed by, and relating to, indigenous peoples. 
Terms such as Customary Law and Aboriginal Law can also be used. For Māori this system of law is 
“tikanga”. See also New Zealand Law Commission above n 33 for discussion on tikanga Māori and 
Māori custom law. 
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Māori by judges versed in tikanga Māori, such as the Māori Land Court, was a viable 
option. It was suggested that a focus on existing court structures, coupled with clear 
legislation requiring judges to both consider and be well-versed in tikanga Māori, 
would render the Māori Land Court a credible forum. 
 
Chapter Seven consolidates this research and tests the possibility of a new framework; 
either an extension of the Māori Land Court’s jurisdiction1286 or a specialised Tikanga 
Court1287 with similarities to the AODTC and the Rangatahi Court. Like an extension 
to the Māori Land Court’s jurisdiction, a Tikanga Court would be underpinned by 
important concepts, such as manaakitanga, kaitiakitanga and whanaungatanga. 
Further, the requirement to attain healing, harmony and balance at both an individual 
and community level is also intrinsic. Through drawing and building upon the 
positive developments of the Rangatahi Court, as well as the AODTC pilot, a Tikanga 
Court could empower the community with decision-making. In this sense it would be 
consistent with the right of self-determination.  
 
The Māori Land Court is comprised of judges who are Māori and well-versed in 
tikanga Māori. The preamble of the TTWM Act seeks to establish mechanisms to 
assist Māori. Importantly, the personnel, infrastructure and legislation are already in 
place.  
 
An extension to the jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court to include criminal and civil 
matters, together with respective amendments in corresponding legislation, would be 
required.1288 Until appropriate ‘tikanga-infused’ legislation is promulgated, every 
effort to utilise the common law principles that support tikanga would need to be 
employed. A change of name to ‘Te Kooti Māori’ to reflect the extended jurisdiction 
is also proposed. It is acknowledged that a number of difficulties lie ahead. 
Nonetheless, the extended jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court would embrace both 
                                            
1286 The jurisdiction of the Māori Land Court is currently to hear matters relating to successions, Title 
improvements, Māori land sales and the administration of Māori Land Trusts and Incorporations. The 
jurisdiction also includes cases under the Māori Fisheries Act 2004, Māori Commercial Aquaculture 
Claims Settlement Act 2004. An extension to the jurisdiction to capture criminal offending may be 
suggested.  
1287 Although phrased as a “new” Indigenous Court there are many such Courts already operating. In 
Canada the National Judicial Institute provides educational courses for the Judiciary on Aboriginal 
Courts covering the Reality, Theory and Future of these Courts.  
1288 For example, the Māori Fisheries Act 2004. 
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Māori and non-Māori applicants and would be underpinned by concepts such as 
healing, harmony and balance.  
 
These proposed models recognise that a separate system may not be practical for 
Māori. The biggest obstacle being political will.1289 However, the meaningful 
implementation of tikanga concepts ‘by Māori, for Māori’ and fully supported by the 
community, provides an answer to the following question: 
 
Applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realized by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by an indigenous court, premised on fundamental Māori concepts and 
doctrine, is the most promising way forward for Māori to ameliorate the 






















                                            




The historical and continual disproportionate statistics across all stages of the criminal 
justice system are notorious and unjust. Arguments based on race, unemployment, 
social problems, as well as those that insist we already recognise tikanga within our 
current legal system cannot ignore these continuing statistics. Returning to an 
indigenous legal system is not novel. A return to the principles that underpin an 
indigenous legal system — Te Ao Māori — is warranted. In extending this approach 
to non-Māori, two quotes from wahine toa (female leaders) are advanced. 
 
First, Justice Rothstein of the Supreme Court of Canada notes:1290 
 
the goal of aboriginal … jurisprudence should not be to separate Canadians into two 
camps with two competing interests but rather to unite them with the shared goal of a 
just peaceful and safe society ... 
 
Second, Professor Dame Anne Salmond recommends a more balanced approach in an 
attempt to grapple with the following questions: “What is it to be human, what do we 
have in common and what divides us?”1291 Human understanding and reciprocal 
exchange is required. Anne Salmond notes that:1292 
 
… in New Zealand, at least, collaboration between Māori and Western knowledge 
seems possible. It may lead, eventually, to studies of cross-cultural encounters that do 
justice to the ancestors on both sides.  
 
Finally Professor John Borrows notes that the thesis of his work1293 “Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution’ is that Indigenous laws can be recognized and affirmed in a 
Canadian legal context, and can also be justified through Western legal 
argumentation”. He further notes that:1294 
  
                                            
1290 R v Ipeelee 2012 SCC 13 [2012] 1 SCR 433. 
1291 Salmond, above n 128, at 513. 
1292 Salmond, above n 128. 
1293 Borrows above n 799 at xiv. 
1294 Borrows above n 799 at 69. 
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… Indigenous peoples’ law has been scattered by the prevailing order. It was 
believed to be insubstantial in comparison with the developing common law and 
constitutional structures… perhaps the most promising development for the 
maintenance and extension of Indigenous stories comes at those moments when 
Indigenous law’s elements mingle with the land and those of the non-Indigenous 
jurisprudential order” 
 
It is acknowledged that, in 2015, a return to an indigenous court within a separate 
criminal justice system might not be practical. However, an extension of an existing 
forum, such as the Māori Land Court or establishing a specialist Tikanga Court to 
meaningfully incorporate Te Ao Māori, may indeed provide an opportunity to return 
to an indigenous legal system, a return to Te Ao Māori, and a return to a sui generis 
Indigenous court.  
 
Applying the philosophy of Te Ao Māori, realised by an indigenous legal system, 
manifested by a sui generis Indigenous Court — an extension to the Māori Land 
Court or a specialised Tikanga Court — premised on fundamental Māori concepts 
and doctrine is an appropriate way forward for Māori to ameliorate the 
disproportionate offending rates.  
 
What is now required is political will.  
 
 












List of Tables 
 
Table          Page  
 
Table 1: Composition of the Prison Population     15 




Table 2: Diagram of Koori Courts  

























List of Appendices 
 
   Name                 Page 
Appendix 1  Gladue Reports       337 
 
(a) Gladue Report – Regarding Myrna S. 
Prepared for Justice Vaillancourt 
Defense Counsel Rebecca Rutherford 
By Kris Pheasant 
Submitted July 29, 2008 
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto 
 
(b) Gladue Report – Regarding Carson M. 
   Presiding Justice: The Honourable Justice Kenneth G. Lenz 
Report Requested By:  Dwayne Jacobs, Legal Counsel 
Sentencing Date:  June 15, 2005 
Prepared By: Mandy Eason, Gladue Caseworker, Aboriginal 
Legal Services of Toronto 
 
 













































Presiding Justice: The Honourable Justice Kenneth G. Lenz 
Report Requested By:  Dwayne Jacobs, Legal Counsel 
Sentencing Date:  June 15, 2005 





       As per the request of Mr. Dwayne Jacobs legal counsel for the accused 
on May 4, 2005, Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto submits the following 
Gladue Report regarding Carson M.  The information compiled within this 
report was gathered through interviews with Mr. M and relevant third parties.  
As the Gladue Caseworker assigned carriage of this file I performed all 
interviews and necessary preparation for the report.  
       The purpose of this report is to provide the court with information 
regarding the life circumstances of the accused, Carson M., an Aboriginal 
offender, in compliance with the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in R. v. 
Gladue1295.  The report is consistent with the Court’s interpretation of section 
718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, which directs the courts when sentencing, to 
explore alternatives to imprisonment, where appropriate, with special attention 
to the life circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.   
                                            
1295 R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688. 
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Background: 
       Carson M., is a 27-year-old man, of Mohawk ancestry and is a registered 
member of Six Nations of the Grand River First Nation near Brantford, 
Ontario.   
       The Six Nations of the Grand River Territory is the largest populated First 
Nation in Canada, with a total membership population of 21, 785, over half of 
whom reside in the community.1296     The First Nation’s membership is 
comprised of six Iroquois Nations: the Mohawk, Onondaga, Seneca, Cayuga, 
Oneida and Tuscarora nations.1297 
       On May 4, 2005, before the Honourable Justice Kenneth G. Lenz, Mr. M. 
pled guilty to the charges of: 
§ Assault With A Weapon; 
§ Breach of Probation and 
§ Unlawfully at Large 
 
       Mr. M. was arrested on January 22, 2005, and remanded into custody at 
the Brantford Jail.  At the time of sentencing, Mr. M. will have spent nearly five 
months in pre-trial custody. 
 
Family and Life Circumstances: 
       Carson M. Jr. was born on November 22, 1977, in Brantford.  He is the 
eldest of three children born to Judy M. and Carson M. Sr.  Both of who are 
Mohawk and registered members of the Six Nations First Nation. 
       Carson’s two younger sisters are Hope M, born on March 14, 1980 and 
Loretta M. born August 10, 1990.  In addition to their three children together, 
                                            
1296 Six Nations Council, “Community Profile,” online: Six Nations Council 
<http://www.sixnations.ca>. 
1297 McMaster University, “Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve,” online: The Pauline 
Johnson Archive, McMaster University <http://humanities.mcmaster.ca>. 
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both Judy and Carson Sr. each have children from other relationships.  In 
total, Carson has five siblings. 
       At the time of Carson’s birth, his father Carson Sr. worked with Six 
Nations’ Public Works Department, where he continues to work, while Judy 
was a stay-at-home mother. 
       Carson’s earliest memories of childhood are marked by abuse 
perpetrated by his father, which his mother confirms took place:   
I was thrown around and slapped around…just by my dad though…I 
can’t remember when it started, but it happened as far back as I can 
remember…I remember once I got belted upside the head.  I was in 
the bedroom with my mom and my father walked in, his fly was down,  I 
was laughing and the next thing I know he strapped me in the head 
with a belt, I went flying off the bed.  I asked him what that was for but 
he never answered.  I was probably around six or seven years old. 
        
       Carson made no mention of whether his father was abusive towards his 
sisters and he is uncertain whether Carson Sr. abused Judy in the same way 
on a regular basis; however Carson clearly recalls witnessing one incident of 
abuse against his mother: “I only saw it happen one time and she got 
stitches.” 
 Over the course of his childhood, Carson recalls the family relocating a few 
times but each move was always to a residence on the reserve.   
       In 1990, when Carson was 14 years old, the family moved to a house on 
Chiefswood Road.  Over the course of the following year, Carson’s parents’ 
marriage began to dissolve: “I guess they weren’t getting along for a while.  
He’d sleep on the couch a lot.” 
      Parallel to the problems at home, Carson was having difficulty at school.  
He was enrolled at Mackinnon Secondary School in Caledonia for 
approximately five years; however, he did not obtain his secondary school 
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diploma.: “I was an average student before high school…but in high school it 
was all I could do to get by…the school standards on reserve are below the 
off-reserve schools.”  
      During the first year of high school, Carson began to experiment with 
drugs and alcohol: “I was smoking weed and I drank one time in grade 
nine…after mom and dad split up I went back to drinking alcohol…I’d drink a 
lot a house parties.” 
       In 1991, Judy and Carson Sr. divorced.  Judy along with the two girls, 
Hope then 10 years old and 2 year-old Brooke, left the home and moved in 
with Judy’s sister Shirley temporarily, before securing an apartment in nearby 
Caledonia, while Carson remained at the house with his father.   
       According to Judy, this arrangement of Carson residing with his father 
was at Carson Senior’s request: “I let him stay with his father because his dad 
asked me if Carson could stay with him – he needed a father figure so I said 
OK…fine.  But it only lasted a few months.” 
       Both Carson and Judy say that Carson Sr. was frequently absent from 
the home during this time: “I didn’t like it because he was never around.  But I 
could come and go as I please.  I’d go to school for half a day the other half 
I’d sit around school getting high…sometimes I’d go back to class.”  Of 
himself, during this time, Carson says he had a bad attitude towards 
everyone.  Although it would have been beneficial to the report to include 
comments from Carson Sr. unfortunately, despite a number of attempts on 
both our parts, I was unable to speak with him directly for comment. 
       Shortly after his parent’s separation, Carson began counselling sessions 
with Penny Hill, a counselor at New Directions on Six Nations: “I had sporadic 
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contact with Carson between 1993 and 1998.  I met him at the high school for 
counseling it was some what of a self-referral.”  Of his need for counseling 
Ms. Hill says:  
Carson definitely has family problems and issues.   More so because 
he had an inconsistent home life.  He was living with his parents at 
different times and other times with extended family.  Alcohol was an 
issue at home.  But his problems related to him not getting what he 
wanted and being left out.  He can go from 0 to 90 in anger.  
 
       Within a few months of his parents separating, Carson was suspended 
from school: “That’s when I said it’s enough.  His father was never around so I 
told him you’re coming to live with me,” says Judy.   However, after a few 
months Judy found the task of single handedly caring for three children to be 
overwhelming: “It got out of hand…they didn’t want to listen to me so I asked 
their dad to take him in for a while.”   Judy adds that a contributing factor to 
the stress was the limited amount of space in the house they were living at 
that time. 
       A short time later, Judy was able to secure a house with much more 
space then the previous residence and Carson returned again to live with his 
mom and sisters. 
     In 1996, at the age of 16 years old, Carson had his first brush with the law: 
“We were sitting outside, back behind the arcade, when the cops stopped me 
and my friend.  He told us they got a call we were being too noisy.  We were 
both fined for drinking under age.” 
        In 1997, Judy and the children moved back to Six Nations, living on 
Bicentennial Trail.  At this time Judy began a relationship Sonny H. and within 
the year he and his son Eli moved in with them.   
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       Over the course of the next few years, Carson would frequently argue 
with his mother about various issues and on at least two occasions he was 
asked to leave the house.  During such times he usually stayed with Crystal 
M., his aunt: “The first time was probably when he was around 17 or 18 years 
old.  His mother had a new life with her new man.  I took him in to give them 
some time together,” says Crystal. 
      Initially, Sonny and Carson did not get along: “At first it wasn’t so 
good…not for a while.  I think Sonny didn’t like me because I had a fight with 
Eli.”  Sonny’s son only lived with them a short time before leaving to live with 
his mother.  However, the tension between Sonny and Carson remained: “We 
didn’t talk much…I didn’t even like being in the same room as him.  If I’d ask 
him a question he’d ignore me or if he did answer he would tell my mom his 
response…never talking to me.”    
       Frustrated by their inability to get along, Judy discussed the matter with 
Sonny and eventually Carson and Sonny developed a civil relationship which 
over the past few years has become much better: “Now we’re on the same 
wavelength,” says Carson of his relationship with Sonny. 
       In 1998, the family relocated to a house on First Line where they continue 
to reside today.  On March 1, 1998, Judy gave birth to her and Sonny’s only 
child together Charlie Anita Dawn H.  During this time Carson was living with 
his aunt Crystal when he met Krissy H., 16 years old at the time and they 
began a tumultuous seven year relationship.  Krissy is the victim in the current 
matter before the court and is no relation to Carson’s step-father Sonny H. 
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      Of their relationship Carson says: “It’s been rough all the way 
through…cheating here and there…her cheating then I’d go and cheat.  She 
cheated while I was doing weekends!   We’ve been off and on over the years.”    
       Sarah Doxtater, Victim Rights Advocate with Aboriginal Legal Services of 
Toronto, spoke with Krissy on June 9, 2005.  During that interview Krissy 
confirmed that her relationship with Carson has been unstable over the past 
several years. 
       In 1999, Carson found employment with the Lumber Yard, located on 
Mohawk Road, on Six Nations.  According to Carson, he worked at the 
Lumber Yard for approximately four years before his employment was 
terminated due to his arriving late for work. 
       On May 16, 2003, Krissy gave birth to the couple’s first child, Jersey.  By 
February 2004, Carson had started employment as an ironworker with 
Sonny’s company Eagle Welding and Steel Erecting.   
       The following year, on May 27, 2004, Krissy gave birth to twins, Jaycee 
Ryan and Jewellz Reed.  Despite the fact that Carson and Krissy share three 
children together, their relationship is still beset with problems.  On October 
10, 2004, Carson was charged with Uttering Threats, the threats were made 
against Krissy.  According to  Krissy, the incidents that make up the charges 
before the court are the only time Carson has been physically abusive 
towards her: “That was the first time.  But I noticed his temper about a month 
into our relationship.” 
       The couple’s three children all reside with Krissy who has full custody of 
Jersey while the matter of custody over the twins remains outstanding.  When 
asked whether he is involved in his children’s lives, Carson replied: “I’d say 
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I’m there for them.  When we’re together its not a problem but when I’m not 
living with her she won’t let me see them…I have to stay there in order to see 
them she wouldn’t let me take them anywhere else...” 
       Regardless of a court order stipulating Carson was not to have contact 
with Krissy, stemming from the October 2004 incident, both of them confirm 
he was living there prior to and including the day of the January incident.  
Carson says he was living at the house since November 2004: “We were 
together before I came in and I was living at the house even though we both 
knew I wasn’t suppose to be there.”  Krissy confirms Carson was  living at the 
house with her and the children at the time of current matter but says he only 
returned to live there in December 2004.  
 
Previous Matters Before The Courts: 
       In 1997, at the age of 20 years old, Carson M. had his first criminal 
conviction for the charges of Assault and Theft Over, he was sentenced to 7 
days on each charge and a term of one-year probation.   
       Carson has no recollection of the details regarding the Theft Over charge; 
however of the assault charge, Carson says: “It was self-defence, I even had 
scratches all over my neck.  But everyone [referring to the Judge and Duty 
Counsel] was telling me you can’t put your hands on a woman.”   
       According to Carson, the victim in the matter was his then girlfriend 
Larissa L. Notwithstanding the fact that Carson was convicted of assaulting 
Larissa, he says they continued dating for some time after the incident.   
       As a gesture to illustrate there were no hard feelings, Larissa took him out 
for an evening of bowling and drinks upon his release from jail.  That same 
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night on December 18, 1997, he was charged with Mischief Under for an 
incident at the bowling alley.  Of that charge and his subsequent seven 
convictions, Carson says he was consuming alcohol during the time leading 
up to each offence. 
 
Current Matter Before The Court: 
       The following summary recounts the facts agreed upon at the time of 
plea, as well as the accused’s comments regarding the incident. 
       During the evening of January 21, 2005, the day immediately prior to the 
date from which the current charges stem, the accused was out for an 
evening of entertainment and drinking in Brantford.  First attending a local 
bowling alley then to the Rodeo Bar.  At approximately 2 a.m. the accused left 
the bar, receiving a ride to the reserve: “I got dropped off at my mom’s house 
but nobody was answering the door so I walked over to Glenn’s house on 
First Line.”  Glenn is Krissy’s father.  While at Glenn’s house, the accused 
consumed a few more beers before calling the victim informing her that he 
was on his way home: “It must have been around 6 a.m. or 7 a.m. by the time 
I left.  At that point I had close to 24 beers over the past 9 hours.” 
       The accused took a taxi from Glenn’s house to the victim’s residence on 
Seneca Road:  
She let me in…she says I was getting mad first – she broke my 
cigarette.  I was just following her around, being a pest and I ended up 
getting a backhand across the face.  Then I blacked out...I guess I went 
ape shit…it’s very rare that I can’t remember what I did, it only happens 
when I get pissed off. 
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       The accused does recall climbing through the basement window back 
into the house: “I saw Jaycee sitting in her stroller, nobody was around…I 
picked her up and held her, I had her sitting on my lap. 
       According to the synopsis, on Saturday January 22, 2005, the Six Nations 
Police received information that a Domestic Assault was occurring at the 
residence of Krissy H. involving threats made by the accused Carson M. with 
“a large knife.”  The threats were made against the victim, Krissy.   
       While enroute to the residence Police were advised that the accused was 
then inside of the basement of the house. 
       Upon arrival, Police were directed by the victim to break the door down as 
she could not get it open.  According to the police, the victim appeared very 
upset and distraught informing them that the accused was in the basement 
with their 8-month-old daughter and she did not know where the knife was 
which he had been using in attempt to pry off the doorknob to gain entry into 
the residence. Although the accused’s attempts to gain entry through the front 
door failed he entered the house through an open basement window. 
       The synopsis goes on to state that the police located the accused in the 
basement with the child.  He appeared intoxicated and when police spoke to 
the accused about the incident he began crying and then regained 
composure.  Police asked the accused where the knife was to which he 
replied: “What knife?”  Police were able to remove the child from the accused 
and return her to the victim.  No knife was ever recovered. 
       The police then escorted the accused outside the residence and advised 
him of the assault complaint.  The accused denied the allegation saying the 
victim hit him first.  Police observed evidence of an assault on the victim’s 
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face, neck and arm.  The accused was arrested for Domestic Assault, and 
advised he would be held for a bail hearing. 
       Investigation revealed the accused was on probation with conditions to 
keep the peace and be of good behaviour, abstain from alcohol and abstain 
from communication with the victim.  The police received an audio taped 
statement from the victim indicating the accused threatened to kill her as well 
as assaulting her and brandishing the large butcher knife.  Thus, the accused 
was charged accordingly and detained for a bail hearing. 
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Victim’s Response To The Current Matter Before The Court: 
       As already indicated, Ms. Doxtater, Victim’s Rights Advocate spoke with 
the victim, Krissy about the current matter before the court.  Krissy admits that 
she and the accused have maintained regular communication by telephone 
during his detention at the Brantford Jail, saying he typically calls her twice a 
week, to speak with her and the children.   
       Although she readily speaks with the accused and does not fear for her 
safety, she does not want Carson to reside with her and their children upon 
his release: “I’ve told him that he must quit drinking first…I don’t want any 
drinking at home.” 
       Of Carson’s drinking habits, Krissy says: “He’s a huge drinker he goes 
and he can’t stop.”  Krissy described occasions where he would start drinking 
on the weekend and she would have no contact with him until the following 
Wednesday or sometimes he’d be gone for an entire week. 
       Apart from the alcohol related issues, Krissy says their relationship is 
stable: “When he’s not drinking our relationship is pretty solid.”  When asked 
whether they are a couple, Krissy said “yes.”  Krissy also indicated that she 
was open to the possibility that the accused might one day return to live with 
her and their children. 
 
Recommendations: 
       Carson M., the accused before the court, was remanded into custody 
after being denied bail for the present charges.  At the time of sentencing the 
accused will have spent nearly five months in pre-trial custody at the Brantford 
Jail. 
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       During his detention, Carson has been working towards his General 
Equivalency Diploma.  According to Carson, he is now only four credits short 
of obtaining his GED. 
       In addition to the educational upgrading he has had regular contact with 
Kelly Curly, the Native Inmate Liaison Officer.  According to Mr. Curly, he has 
been counseling Carson extensively on a one-to-one basis: “When I’ve talked 
with him he has a lot of repressed anger towards his parents.  The reason I 
believe is because of their  divorce…he’s looking for some sort of validation to 
comfort him that he wasn’t the reason for their break-up.  But he’s looking in 
the wrong places.”    
       During the course of preparing this report, it became apparent that 
Carson has an addiction to alcohol and that this addiction is a major 
contributing factor to his continued involvement with the criminal justice 
system.  Based on his contact with Carson, Mr. Curly concurred that alcohol is 
a major issue that much be addressed.   
       Mr. Curly is of the opinion that Carson would benefit from a residential 
treatment program, suggesting Native Horizons Treatment Centre, located on 
the Mississaugas of the New Credit First Nation, to address his alcohol 
addiction.  The program is a six-week residential program. 
       When asked directly whether he has an addiction to alcohol Carson 
stated: “Everybody says I have a problem with alcohol but I don’t think I do…I 
like to drink but who doesn’t like to drink?…Maybe I carry it to far.”  Later on 
the topic of treatment was discussed with Carson and he expressed a 
preference for a non-residential treatment programming, specifically individual 
counseling. 
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       As part of researching appropriate recommendations the following service 
providers were consulted: Mr. Fred Lascelles, Aboriginal Addictions 
Counsellor with St. Leonard’s Community Services and Ms. Doris Henry, 
Director at Ganohkwásra Family Assault Support Services. 
       With regard to addictions counselling, Mr. Lascelles indicated that if 
Carson were to be released into the community, he could access the 
addictions counseling services offered at St. Leonard’s Community Services. 
Carson would be required to undergo an assessment as to the severity of his 
addiction and to identify his specific needs. Following the assessment a 
treatment plan would be developed to address the identified needs.  Should a 
residential treatment program be deemed appropriate at a later date, Mr. 
Lascelles would assist Carson in the application process.   
       Part of the reason Carson is partial to participating in counseling rather 
than a residential treatment program is that the former would allow him to 
resume employment as an iron worker.  Sonny H., Carson’s stepfather and 
employer confirms that a job is available for him upon release with Sonny’s 
company, Eagle Welding and Steel Erecting.  Furthermore, should a non-
custodial sentence be imposed, Sonny says that Carson may reside with him 
and Judy at their home on First Line Road. 
      Ms. Doris Henry, Director at Ganohkwásra Family Assault Support 
Services described the services available at that organization that would be 
appropriate for Carson. The programs offered at Ganohkwásra apply a holistic 
approach based on Ogwehó:weh teachings integrating the mind, body and 
spirit.  Moreover, the teachings combine mainstream counseling techniques 
providing a basis for assisting the individual to accept responsibility for their 
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actions.  There is no determinate time for counseling as each counselling 
program is based upon client specific issues and needs.  
       Ms. Henry indicates there is a Men’s Program offered at the Centre called 
Saho nikonri:ion e (His Mind, Body and Spirit Has Been Healed).  There is 
both individual and group counseling offered.   Ms. Henry confirms that 
Carson would be eligible for the Men’s Program saying: “He simply has to go 
through the intake process and that only takes about one hour.”  The program 
accepts individuals who attend of their own accord as well as those ordered to 
do so by the courts. 
       Carson M., a 27 year-old man of Mohawk ancestry is contending with an 
alcohol addiction and issues related to his perpetrating acts of domestic 
violence.  He has accepted responsibility for his actions as expressed in his 
guilty plea entered on May 4, 2005, before the Honourable Justice Kenneth G. 
Lenz. 
       In light of the life circumstances of the accused, the following 
recommendations are respectfully submitted to the court for consideration in 
imposing sentencing on Carson M., an Aboriginal offender: 
§ Consult Fred Lascelles, of St. Leonard’s Community 
Services/Addictions Services for an intake assessment regarding 
addictions issues and to adhere to recommendations for appropriate 
addictions counseling; 
§ Consult Ganohkwásra Family Assault Support Services for an intake 
assessment regarding counseling to address the issues of domestic 
violence and to participate in the Men’s Program at the Centre;  
§ To seek and secure gainful employment, or training/education to gain 
employment; and  
§ To reside at the First Line residence of Judy M. and Sonny H. 
 
Respectfully, 
ABORIGINAL LEGAL SERVICES OF TORONTO 
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           As per the request of defense counsel Rebecca Rutherford, the 
following Gladue report regarding Ms. Myrna S. has been prepared to provide 
an overview of Ms. S.’s life circumstances. The information provided here was 
gathered by way of one in-person interview, several telephone interviews, as 
well as follow-up telephone interviews with family members and other relevant 
third parties. Kris Pheasant, Gladue Caseworker from Aboriginal Legal 
Services of Toronto (ALST), conducted all the interviews relied on in this 
report. 
 The intent of this document is to provide information to the court, for 
sentencing purposes, regarding the life circumstances of Myrna S., an 
Aboriginal offender. This report is produced in accordance with the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s ruling in R. v Gladue (1999), specifically pertaining to the 
interpretation of section 718.2 (e) of the Criminal Code, which directs the 
courts to explore alternatives to imprisonment with special attention to the 
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders. In addition, this report contains 
recommendations for the Court’s consideration during sentencing. 
 Ms. S. pled guilty to possession for the purposes of trafficking; 
unlawfully in dwelling, and one gun charge1298 before Justice Vaillancourt at 
the Ontario Court of Justice, College Park. 
 
Background 
 Myrna S., 34, was born June 30, 1974 to Francois S. and Laura S. nee 
I.. Myrna has two brothers born of this union: older brother John S., and 
younger brother Trevor S.. Myrna has one older half sister on her mother’s 
                                            
1298 Ms. S. has been charged with a number of gun charges. This writer was informed by 
defense counsel that Myrna pled to one of these charges. It was not specified which charge 
she pled to. 
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side, Melissa I.. She had a half brother on her father’s side, James S., now 
deceased. 
 Myrna is of Cree ancestry from both sides of her family; she is a 
registered status Indian with band membership with Fort Albany First Nation. 
Laura S. is a registered member of the Moose Cree First Nation.1299 Laura’s 
parents are Minnie I. (maternal name unknown) and Billy I.. Myrna believes 
both of her maternal grandparents attended residential school, but does not 
know where they attended or for how long. She does not believe her mother 
was forced to attend. 
 Francois S. has roots in both the Attawapiskat1300 and Fort Albany First 
Nations1301. His mother, Jean S., is originally from Attawapiskat. Upon her 
marriage to Mr. S.1302 she became a registered member of his band, the Fort 
Albany First Nation. The practice of dissolving an Aboriginal woman’s band 
membership upon marriage was in effect until 1985.1303  
 Myrna’s father Francois was forced to attend residential school for 
eight years as a child. He began to attend at age seven. Francois attended 
the St. Anne’s Indian Residential School, located in Fort Albany. Myrna does 
not know very much about her father’s time in residential school. She knows 
                                            
1299 Moose Cree First Nation is located approximately 530 kilometers north of Sudbury, 
Ontario on the south west side of James Bay. It is a small community. A 2005 community 
census states the total population is 3, 562 people, of whom 1, 500 live on reserve.  
1300 Attawapiskat First Nation is an isolated, fly-in community located approximately 720 
kilometers north of Sudbury on the west side of James Bay. The Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development (DIAND) June 2008 census lists the total registered population of 
this reserve to be 2, 963. Of this number, 1, 359 members live on the reserve.  
1301 Fort Albany First Nation is an isolated fly-in community located approximately 570 
kilometers north of Sudbury, Ontario. It is located to the west of James Bay. Further recent 
demographic information could not be found regarding Fort Albany. 
1302 Myrna was not sure the name of her grandfather. 
1303 The federal legislation governing First Nations peoples is the Indian Act. The Indian Act, 




that he had a difficult time there, as he told her he was abused, but notes that 
he is very reluctant to discuss his time there in any detail. 
 When speaking with this writer Mr. S. declined to disclose details of his 
time at St. Anne’s Indian Residential School, saying only “it was a rough time.” 
It should be noted however that this school was home to some of the worst 
abuses inflicted upon its young wards, and all students were therefore likely 
subject to the climate of fear that existed in this institution.  
A 2005 article published by Persons Against Ritual Abuse-Torture 
gives a detailed description of some of the horrors children were exposed to 
at St. Anne’s: 
One specific example of acts of child torture which were 
called acts of abuse is taken from media articles 
discussing the Cree and Ojibwa children from Fort 
Albany First Nation who attended St. Anne’s Residential 
School operated by the Roman Catholic Church from 
1904-1973. Victimizations reported consisted of severe 
beatings – being punched, strapped, kicked, hit with a 
ruler, hair pulled, and their heads pushed into walls; 
whippings to their bare buttocks with a wire strap; forced 
immobility – forced to kneel on a concrete floor for 
hours, and locked overnight in an unlit basement. 
Electric shocking delivered to children strapped into a 
homemade electric chair was used for punishment and 
for the entertainment and pleasure of staff and visiting 
dignitaries. These are acts of physical torture not abuse. 
Sexualized torture including fondling, forced 
masturbation, and heterosexual and homosexual rapes, 
and forced impregnations and abortions. Mind-spirit 
dehumanization occurred when children were forced to 
eat their own vomitus, when forced to eat off the floor 
while being told to “eat like a dog”, when forced to stand 
with their underpants over their heads if their 
underpants had fecal stains, and when they were 
laughed at during electric shocking.1304 
 
                                            
1304 Sarson, J., MacDonald, L. (2005). Torture and ritual abuse-torture: Perpetrators who are 
“religious” men and/or women. Persons Against Ritual Abuse-Torture.  
http://www.ritualabusetorture.org/religion.pdf.  
For more information on the use of an electric chair on Aboriginal children see: Moon, P. 
(1996, October 21). School’s Electric Chair Haunts Natives. The Globe and Mail. 
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Mr. S. did recount one story to his daughter Myrna. Myrna recalls her 
father telling her that he was forced by a nun to eat his own vomit after 
throwing up the rotten food they were fed. He was told if he didn’t eat the 
vomit he would not be allowed to see his mother. A 1997 Globe and Mail 
article confirms that other residential schools survivors have come forward to 
share similar stories publicly.1305  
 When asked how his time in residential school influenced him as an 
adult and as a parent Francois stated “it didn’t affect my family.” It is not 
uncommon for survivors of residential school to downplay or even ignore their 
history of past attendance and the impact it had, as the memories are too 
painful. Myrna believes that both of her parents were affected by the 
residential school legacy, for “how could it not have?” 
The basic premise of the Indian Residential School system was to 
eradicate all traces of Aboriginal culture and assimilate First Nations people 
into mainstream society by attacking their most vulnerable members, the 
children. 
The British Crown and then the Canadian government established 
residential schools as part of a broader plan to assimilate Aboriginal 
people.1306 The object of residential school system was to sever the artery of 
culture that ran between generations, the connection between parent and 
child sustaining family and community.1307  
                                            
1305 Appleby, T. (1997, September 19). Former Staff of Ontario Residential Facility Accused. 
The Globe and Mail. 
1306 Duncan Campbell Scott – the powerful and influential Deputy Superintendant General of 
Indian Affairs – said in 1920, “Our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in 
Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there is no Indian question.” 
 
1307 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Part Two: False Assumptions and a Failed 
Relationship, Chapter 10 Residential Schools, Disciple and Abuse.  
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A part of this assimilation was to convert Aboriginal people to 
Christianity; therefore the government along with several churches and 
religious orders co-operated to operate the residential schools. The schools 
used excessively strict discipline practices to attempt to convert the children. 
In addition to the physical, mental and emotional abuse, many children were 
also sexually abused in these schools. While attending these schools contact, 
if any, with family was limited.  
According to the findings compiled in Reclaiming Connections: 
Understanding Residential School Trauma Among Aboriginal People,1308 the 
inter-generational impact of residential school is threefold: the trauma 
experienced at the school effects the individual, the family and the community. 
The detrimental effects of residential school include, but are not limited to:  
• Communication barriers, especially an inability to express affection;  
• Families where no nurturing or affection was present for generations;  
• Discomfort expressing love for children in physical ways, especially 
hugs;  
• Lack of communication within the family;  
• Children taken into custody by the Children’s Aid Society; and  
• Addictive and self-destructive behaviors… 1309 
   
According to the research gathered in Reclaiming Connections, 
increasingly psychological trauma is understood as an affliction of the 
powerless. Trauma can be a one-time occurrence or a series of on-going 
experiences over the life span of an individual as well as across generations:  
In the context of residential school abuse and forced 
relocation, there are survivors who attended residential 
                                            
1308 Reclaiming Connections: Understanding Residential School Trauma Among Aboriginal 
People was published by the Aboriginal Healing Foundation. A copy of this report can be 
found on their home page of: www.ahf.ca. 
1309 Ibid, 46-47. 
 
 359 
schools, as well as their descendants who have 
suffered the historical or inter-generational impacts.1310  
  
As noted above, the impact of residential school was not just felt by 
those who attended the schools – but their children as well. Pathways to 
Healing: A mental health guide for First Nations People, a publication of the 
Canadian Collaborative Mental Health Initiative, describes the impact on the 
next generation as follows:  
As these residential school children grew up, most of 
them did not have the skills, knowledge, or emotional 
strength to parent their own children. In many 
communities, our next generation of children were 
raised in families with chaos, substance abuse, and 
violence. Parents, unable to care for themselves, leave 
children to care for each other. Kids turn to alcohol, 
drugs, unsafe sex, and acting out as a means of coping 
and numbing their pain. This is how they see their 
parents cope…Violence has replaced the true strength 
that comes from knowing who you are as a person and 
as a people: to know where one belongs in the world; to 
find one’s place and create a healthy space.1311  
 
The federal government issued a formal apology to the 
survivors and family of residential schools on June 11 this year. 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper noted that the harms of residential 
school remain present to this day: 
    The government now recognizes that the 
consequences of the Indian residential schools policy 
were profoundly negative and that this policy has had a 
lasting and damaging impact on aboriginal culture, 
heritage and language. 
     While some former students have spoken positively 
about their experiences at residential schools, these 
                                            
1310 Ibid. 
1311 Pathways to Healing: A mental health guide for First Nations people was published by the 




stories are far overshadowed by tragic accounts of the 
emotional, physical and sexual abuse and neglect of 
helpless children, and their separation from powerless 
families and communities. 
    The legacy of Indian residential schools has 
contributed to social problems that continue to exist in 
many communities today.1312  
 
To the best of Myrna’s recollection neither Francois nor Laura practiced 
their Aboriginal culture or spirituality, nor were they involved with the 
Aboriginal community. Francois recalls that he would speak to Myrna in Cree 
when she was a child in an attempt to teach her the language, but “she lost 
the language growing up.” 
Both Laura and Francois grew up on their reserves. Francis remained 
in Fort Albany until he was sixteen years old, when his father died. He had to 
leave his community to find work elsewhere so he could support his mother 
and siblings. 
Laura and Francois met, and married, and began their family in 
Moosonee, Ontario.1313 When Myrna was about two years old the family 
relocated to Toronto. It was at this point that her sister Melissa re-joined the 
family – she had been living with her grandmother prior to this. Francois 
worked as a butcher and Laura worked as a health aide for seniors. 
The S.s settled into a subsidized Native housing unit run by Wigwamen 
Housing. Melissa and Myrna both have childhood memories of their parents 
                                            
1312 House of Commons Debates. VOLUME 142.  NUMBER 110.  2nd SESSION 39th 
PARLIAMENT. Full transcript can be found at: 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=39&
Pub=hansard&Ses=2&DocId=3568890&File=0 
1313 Moosonee is a small town located  along the Moose River. It is a ferry ride north of Moose 
Factory.  The population is approximately 3,000 people. Eighty five person of the population is 
Cree, and there is also a small French Canadian presence as well. Moosonee is the main 
arrival and destination point for the James Bay area communities and reserves as it is 
accessible by train as well as by air and water. 
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abusing alcohol. They recall many incidents of drunkenness in the home, 
arguing and physical fighting between Laura and Francois, especially late at 
night when they came home from the bar.  
With the adults incapable of or unwilling to attend to domestic duties, 
young Melissa would be left to look after her siblings. She recalls being 
frequently left to babysit and having to enforce house rules and curfews. 
Melissa was also being sexually abused by her stepfather Francois. She does 
not know if he was also abusing Myrna, but she did her best to protect her 
siblings from possible abuse. She recalls going to Myrna’s room to stay with 
her “to make sure he didn’t bother [her].”  Melissa tried to speak to her mother 
about the abuse but would be “ignored”. She believes Laura was in denial and 
must have known about the sexual abuse. Melissa refused to keep silent and 
confronted Laura with her abuse again when she was fourteen. They ended 
up getting into a fight. Melissa moved out at age sixteen to escape the abuse. 
Myrna’s paternal grandmother Jean S. was aware that her son and 
daughter-in-law were abusing alcohol and neglecting their children. Jean lived 
in Toronto and did what she could to help her grandchildren. “I used to look 
out for them because they [Francis and Laura] were drinking back then. I 
would take food over to them because there would be no food in the house.” 
Jean also kept her doors open to the children, and Myna would frequently 
stay at her home to escape the alcohol-fueled chaos of her own home. 
Melissa would make the same offers when she was eighteen and had a place 
of her own. 
Myrna considers her parents to be alcoholics but is not sure what, if 
any, kind of insight they have into their addictions. She provided the contact 
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information for her parents but cautioned this writer that her parents would 
probably downplay their negligence and alcoholism. 
Laura S. agreed to be interviewed, but after being asked one question 
said she had to “leave” and concluded the conversation.1314 Francois S.’s first 
language is Cree he but also speaks English. For his part, he offered that 
family life was fine. He asserts that no one in his family has any addictions, 
that he and Laura got along “alright”, and that they would only drink on 
weekends and when the children were in bed – “but we still looked after 
them.”  
Francois and Laura were evicted from Wigwamen Housing for failure to 
pay rent. After a brief stay in Dwight, Ontario1315 they came back to the 
Greater Toronto Area and settled into Gabriel Dumont Native housing in 
Scarborough. 
 When Myrna was about twelve years old her parents split up. Laura 
took the separation very hard and became depressed. Melissa remembers 
she would stay in her room crying. She had just given birth to her youngest 
son Trevor. At this time Laura was diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
History began to repeat itself as many of the childcare responsibilities 
fell to Myrna now that Melissa had left home. Francois was not paying child 
support nor did he have joint custody. No one explained to Myrna what was 
happening to her mother: “I just knew I had to look out for my brother.” 
 Laura struggled with managing her mental illness. She would go off 
and on her prescribed medications and began to drink more heavily. Her 
                                            
1314 Further attempts were made to contact Laura S. and she did not keep a pre-arranged 
interview time. She does not have a phone message service. No calls were answered when 
repeated calls were made. 
1315 Dwight, Ontario is located approximately 20 kilometers east of Huntsville, Ontario. 
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periods of instability and psychosis were frightening to her children. Melissa 
recounts one such experience. “She was hearing voices, seeing people 
looking in through the windows, getting paranoid.” Her siblings called her 
over, saying “mom’s acting weird.” Melissa came to the house to find Laura 
screaming that there was a fire in the kitchen although there was in fact no fire 
at all.  Melissa called 911 but when the ambulance arrived Laura refused to 
go with them to hospital and the emergency team starting to leave. “As soon 
as they left she started screaming and freaking out, throwing things, flipping 
the kitchen table over to get at the fire. That’s when they took her.” The 
emergency crew was re-summoned and this time took Laura to hospital 
where she was formed into acute care and held for three weeks of 
observation and for stabilization.  
 Myrna does not recall any additional social service support being 
offered to her or her family during these difficult times. Her father would take 
the children during crises and return them to Laura shortly afterwards, relying 
on Myrna to take care of herself and her brothers. Melissa sympathizes: “I 
know she’s hard a really hard life. She had to do a lot of growing up too fast at 
age twelve, thirteen.” 
 Torpedoed into a pseudo-adulthood as a pre-teen, Myrna began to 
seek out ways and opportunities to have some fun. Following the only model 
she knew, she turned to alcohol. Myrna began drinking socially with friends 
when she was about thirteen years old. They would get together to drink and 
party on weekends. Myrna was never disciplined for her underage drinking: 
her father was not present, and her mother was too ill to notice. With no limits 
 364 
being set, Myrna’s drinking quickly escalated and by age fifteen she was 
drinking “quite a bit”. 
 Myrna recalls that she did well in Catholic grade school but her 
education took a turn for the worse after her mother became ill. She began to 
miss a lot of school, and later began to skip school to play hooky and drink 
with her friends. She attended public high school in grade nine but dropped 
out; she does not believe she earned any grade nine credits. 
 Myrna became pregnant at age sixteen and gave birth to her first child, 
Dylan S., born April 16, 1991. Vaughn St. is Dylan’s father. Myrna was still 
living with her mother in Gabriel Dumont. Vaughn was in and out of jail 
throughout her pregnancy. When Dylan was six months old Vaughn was 
sentenced to six months time and Myrna decided to end the relationship. 
 Myrna quickly became pregnant again and on December 13, 1992, 
gave birth to her second son Christopher S.. Christopher’s father is Aaron D.. 
Aaron and Myrna ended their relationship when she was six months pregnant. 
Aaron moved back to his reserve, Wikwemikong Unceded Indian Reserve, 
and Myrna began a new relationship with Jim Sm.. 
 Shortly after Christopher’s birth, Myrna came to the attention of the 
Catholic Children’s Aid Society (CCAS) because “I was drinking at the time.” 
A neighbour called CCAS to make a complaint about Myrna being out late at 
night with her children and frequently leaving them with babysitters. CCAS 
records note “protection concerns included poor parenting skills, exposure to 
domestic violence and neglect of the children, and parental drug and alcohol 
abuse.” Christopher and Dylan were apprehended in August of 1993 and 
remained in care until March of 1995.  
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 Myrna took the apprehension of her children as a wake up call and 
began to seek sobriety. She cut down on drinking on her own and sought out 
third party assistance. In late 1993 she attended a twenty eight day outpatient 
program at the Addiction Research Foundation (ARF)1316, followed by eight 
weeks of aftercare. Myrna was able to maintain her sobriety for the next 
several years. 
 Myrna applied for her own subsidized housing with Wigwamen. Once 
she was housed she was able to regain custody of her children and began to 
make a home with Jim Sm. Their first child Justine S. was born February 28, 
1995, followed quickly by Damien Sm., born June 26, 1996. Myrna has 
registered all her children with the Fort Albany band office. 
 Jim and Myrna were together for the next ten years. They both 
describe their relationship as loving but simultaneously troubled. They were 
charged with domestic assaults against one another. Both resolved the 
charges by having them stayed; they both successfully completed the Partner 
Assault Response Service (PARS) through Native Child and Family Services 
of Toronto. Jim was grateful to have received this therapeutic intervention: “I 
think I was a better man after that.” He believes it also made him a better 
parent. 
 When her two youngest children were old enough to attend the Nativity 
of Our Lord Catholic School, Myrna began to volunteer at there. She would 
help the children in their arts and crafts, read stories, and supervise lunch and 
recess periods. “I really enjoyed it”, Myrna says, “I was a very responsible 
                                            
1316 The Addiction Research Foundation (ARF) was formed in Ontario in 1949 with the 
mandate to study the scope of alcoholism. In 1961 it expanded its mission to include drug 
abuse as well. In 1998 ARF was merged with the Donwood Institute, the Queen Street Mental 
Health Centre and the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry to form the Centre for Addiction and 
Mental Health (CAMH). 
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person once upon a time.” Myrna chose to put her children into the Catholic 
school system as she had also attended Catholic school and enjoyed it. 
Myrna recalls feeling like she had so little experience as a girl in school 
herself that she quite liked being back in a school environment with her 
children. She continued to volunteer until approximately 2002, when she 
began to abuse substances again. 
 In 2002 Myrna began to drink again socially with Jim. They began to 
argue frequently and decided to break up. Jim states “I thought it would be 
better for us to go our separate ways.” 
 In May of 2003 Myrna was introduced to crack cocaine by an 
“acquaintance”. She became addicted straightaway, possibly “as an excuse to 
get out and party and have fun.” By June she had left Jim and the children 
and was using crack daily. Jim assumed guardianship of all four children as 
Myrna took to disappearing for weeks and months at a time. She also began 
to come into conflict with the law.1317 
 Jim did not have custody of all the children for long. Dylan went to live 
with his father and later his father’s girlfriend’s parents. Christopher spent 
some time living with his father in Michigan and other relatives before being 
apprehended again by CCAS in 2006.  Jim maintained custody of Justine and 
Damian. 
 In 2005 Myrna first used powder cocaine and liked it. She went on a 
three month binge. She began dating a man named John who she says 
supported her habit socially and financially. She began to visit with her 
younger children less and less and her older sons cut ties with her, angry at 
                                            
1317 Unfortunately further details cannot be provided as this writer was not provided with a 
copy of Ms. S.’s criminal record. 
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the way she was acting. Myrna continued to use both crack and powder 
cocaine on a daily basis for the next few years. She also began to inject 
cocaine as her tolerance grew.  
It was about this time that Myrna learned she had Hepatitis C. She was 
informed by Dr. Jeu, her G.P. She says she was shocked to find out she had 
the disease and left the office without learning more about the illness and how 
to manage it. Instead Myrna tried to forget the news in a haze of drugs. 
Continuing to neglect her health care needs regarding this disease is 
dangerous.1318 
Myrna continued to be influenced by the men she dated. She was 
introduced to intravenous heroin use by another boyfriend. They would also 
inject Oxycontins when heroin was not available. Myrna overdosed twice 
while using heroin and crack. Both times her partner failed to bring her to 
hospital. Myrna eventually broke up with this man and stopped using opiates.  
In February of 2006 Myrna sought treatment for her drug use. She 
entered a residential treatment program at Destiny Manor as part of a court 
order.1319 Myrna discharged herself from the program after two weeks. When 
asked why, she said that she was not ready for treatment or to confront the 
                                            
1318 Frequently Asked Questions About Hepatitis C. Public Health Agency of Canada. 
www.phac-aspc.gc.ca. 
What happens if you don’t treat hepatitis C? It is difficult to predict, and each individual is 
different. Approximately 15-25 percent of people infected with HCV appear to clear or resolve 
their infection without treatment. The majority (75 to 85 percent) progresses to chronic 
infection. The course of the chronic disease is generally slow, without symptoms for two or 
more decades after infection. However, once symptoms develop, the quality of life generally 
decreases, with chronic fatigue, abdominal pain, and nausea being the main symptoms. 
The disease attacks the liver, which causes inflammation. This inflammation causes scarring 
of the liver (called fibrosis), which in turn affects how the liver functions. The scarring caused 
to the liver can progress into cirrhosis, and makes the liver more susceptible to cancer. 
1319 Destiny Manor provides drug and alcohol treatment services for women. The facility is 
located in Whitby, Ontario. 
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reasons she uses drugs. Myrna returned to the streets and began using crack 
and cocaine heavily once again. 
Myrna says she has been “bouncing around” places of residence for 
the last five years. She spent time living with Jim Sm., other friends or 
boyfriends, and with an ex boyfriend of her mother. 
In April of 2007 Myrna went to the Woman’s Own Withdrawal 
Management Centre1320 and participated in the day program for one week 
before leaving. She continued to use both alcohol and cocaine and crack. 
On December 5, 2007, Myrna was arrested and held in custody 
pending sentencing. 
 
Previous Matters Before the Court 
 ALST was not provided with a copy of Myrna’s criminal record, and so 
cannot comment on any previous matters before the court. 
 
Current Matters Before the Court 
 Myrna comes before the court with guilty pleas for possession for the 
purposes of trafficking; unlawfully in dwelling, and one gun charge. She has 
been in custody since December 5, 2007. 
 Myrna says she was staying at the place she was arrested at after 
moving out of her boyfriend’s place due to a cockroach infestation. She had 
been there for a couple of days smoking crack and drinking prior to being 
arrested. 
 
                                            




 Myrna has been making good use of her time in custody. Ms. Charlene 
Ninham has known Myrna for about five years in her capacity as Vanier’s 
Native Inmate Liaison Officer. She has seen Myrna come and go over the 
years. Charlene states that she has seen a positive change come over Myrna 
during this last period of incarceration. Myrna has become a regular and 
involved participant in the Native programming offered by Charlene; she has 
completed the program and re-enrolled to attend it once more so as to have 
continued access to Native teachings, cultural activities and smudging. 
Charlene confirms that Myrna has also completed the Inner Child Healing 
program, which runs for twelve sessions. Charlene has also assisted Myrna in 
completing the 8 Tools Assessment so that Myrna can attend a substance 
abuse treatment program. “She’s very motivated to get into treatment” says 
Charlene. “She’s really trying this time. This is the hardest she has tried.”  
 Myrna has also been working with the Charlene and Vanier social 
worker Ms. Tina Wong to arrange for treatment and apply for housing. Myrna 
has filled out several applications for subsidized and Native housing in the 
Hamilton area and has been placed on waiting lists. She has also successfully 
secured a place in a residential treatment facility for substance abuse 
treatment. Myrna has been accepted to the Kii-Kee-Wan-Nii-Kaan Southwest 
Regional Healing Lodge for August 4th. 
 Tina also confirms that Myrna has completed the anger management 
and substance abuse programs. 
 Myrna has also begun to attend to her health care needs. She spoke 
with the Vanier doctor about her Hepatitis C and is learning about how to 
 370 
manage the illness independently. She intends to return to see Dr. Jeu upon 
her release. She has also secured a placement at Kii-Kee-Wan-Nii-Kaan to 
learn how to manage her diabetes. Myrna has also been taking steps to 
address her mental health needs. She has been having one-to-one 
counseling sessions with the Vanier psychologist to discuss her drug use 
triggers and relapse prevention strategies. 
Tina Wong has also assisted Myrna in keeping in contact with her 
family lawyer so that she can know the whereabouts of her son Christopher 
and re-establish regular contact and custody of him. Myrna has been in 
regular contact with Justine and Damian by telephone. Jim is glad they are 
speaking often and says their children are “ready to give her a second 
chance.” He has offered to let Myrna stay with him until she is able to attend 
the Healing Lodge. He says he and Myrna still care for one another and he 
wants to be there as a support for her as she begins her recovery process. 
Both Jim Sm. and Melissa are invested in assisting Myrna to get clean 
and stay sober. Jim believes that Myrna will learn to feel better about herself 
in treatment. Melissa believes that Myrna is finally ready to make lasting 
changes. “She’s talked about it before. She is sounding serious now. This 
time, she’s listening to what she is being told by the counselors. She’s more 
open now.” She notes that Myrna is finally demonstrating that she is ready to 
confront the demons of her past. “It [their conversations] gets uncomfortable 
because she is revisiting the stuff in the past, things that make her use.”  
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Myrna has made an application to receive individual therapy at 
Breakaway1321, but is also open to receiving services from the Centre for 
Addiction and Mental Health. 
 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are made for the courts consideration upon 
sentencing: 
• That Myrna reside at the home of Mr. Jim Sm. at 4201 Kingston Road, 
apartment 207, section B, in Scarborough until she leaves to attend 
residential treatment; 
 
• That Myrna attend the Traditional Healing Lodge Program at the Kii-
kee-wan-nii-kaan Southwest Regional Healing Lodge.1322 The program 
begins August 4th and ends August 22nd. The Gladue Aftercare 
Program budget can cover the cost of transporting Myrna to this facility. 
The Gladue Aftercare Worker will make the travel arrangements; 
 
• That Myrna attend the Diabetes Residential Healing Program at the Kii-
kee-wan-nii-kaan Southwest Regional Healing Lodge. This program 
begins August 24th and ends September 12th;1323and 
 
• That Myrna seek out counseling services for individual therapy. She 
can access services at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health 
(CAMH) through the Aboriginal Services department. The direct line for 
Aboriginal Services is 416.535.8501 ext. 7652. The office is located at 
393 King Street East. She can also access services through 





Kris Pheasant, B.A. 
Gladue Caseworker 
Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto 
 
                                            
1321 Breakaway offers out-patient substance abuse counseling services. 
1322 The Kii-kee-wan-nii-kaan Southwest Regional Healing Lodge is located in Muncey, 
Ontario, approximately 40 kilometers southwest of London. 
1323 There is a one day/two evening gap in time between the completion of one program and 





United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
 
 The General Assembly, 
 
 Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations, and good faith in the fulfilment of the obligations 
assumed by States in accordance with the Charter,  
 
 Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other 
peoples, while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to 
consider themselves different, and to be respected as such, 
 
 Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and 
richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common 
heritage of humankind, 
 
 Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices 
based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the 
basis of national origin, racial, religious, ethnic or cultural 
differences are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally 
condemnable and socially unjust, 
 
 Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their 
rights, should be free from discrimination of any kind, 
 
 Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic 
injustices as a result of, inter alia, their colonization and 
dispossession of their lands, territories and resources, thus 
preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to 
development in accordance with their own needs and interests, 
 
 Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the 
inherent rights of indigenous peoples which derive from their 
political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, 
spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially their rights 
to their lands, territories and resources, 
 
 Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the 
rights of indigenous peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements with States, 
 
 Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing 
themselves for political, economic, social and cultural enhancement 
and in order to bring an end to all forms of discrimination and 
oppression wherever they occur, 
 
 Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over 
developments affecting them and their lands, territories and 
resources will enable them to maintain and strengthen their 
institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their 
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs, 
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 Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures 
and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable 
development and proper management of the environment, 
 Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the 
lands and territories of indigenous peoples to peace, economic and 
social progress and development, understanding and friendly 
relations among nations and peoples of the world, 
 
 Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and 
communities to retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, 
training, education and well-being of their children, consistent with 
the rights of the child, 
 
 Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements 
and constructive arrangements between States and indigenous 
peoples are, in some situations, matters of international concern, 
interest, responsibility and character, 
 
 Considering also that treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements, and the relationship they represent, are 
the basis for a strengthened partnership between indigenous peoples 
and States, 
 
 Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, affirm the 
fundamental importance of the right of self-determination of all 
peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development, 
 
 Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used 
to deny any peoples their right of self-determination, exercised in 
conformity with international law, 
 
 Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous 
peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and 
cooperative relations between the State and indigenous peoples, 
based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, 
non-discrimination and good faith, 
 
 Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement 
all their obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under 
international instruments, in particular those related to human rights, 
in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned, 
 
 Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and 
continuing role to play in promoting and protecting the rights of 
indigenous peoples, 
 
 Believing that this Declaration is a further important step 
forward for the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights 
and freedoms of indigenous peoples and in the development of 
relevant activities of the United Nations system in this field, 
 
 Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are 
entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in 
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international law, and that indigenous peoples possess collective 
rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and 
integral development as peoples, 
 Recognizing also that the situation of indigenous 
peoples varies from region to region and from country to country 
and that the significance of national and regional particularities 
and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken 
into consideration, 
 
Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be 
pursued in a spirit of partnership and mutual respect: 
 
 
  Article 1 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a 
collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the 




  Article 2 
 
 Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all 
other peoples and individuals and have the right to be free from any 
kind of discrimination, in the exercise of their rights, in particular 
that based on their indigenous origin or identity. 
 
 
  Article 3 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
 
  Article 4 
 
 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways 
and means for financing their autonomous functions. 
 
 
  Article 5 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen 
their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural 
institutions, while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they 




  Article 6 
 
 Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality. 
 
 
  Article 7 
 
 1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical 
and mental integrity, liberty and security of person. 
 2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in 
freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be 
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subjected to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, 
including forcibly removing children of the group to another group. 
 
 
  Article 8 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to 
be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. 
 2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention 
of, and redress for: 
 (a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them 
of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or 
ethnic identities; 
 (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing 
them of their lands, territories or resources; 
 (c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the 
aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; 
 (d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration; 
 (e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite 
racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them. 
 
 
  Article 9 
 
 Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to 
an indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the 
traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned. No 




  Article 10 
 
 Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their 
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, 
prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and 
after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, 
with the option of return. 
 
 
  Article 11 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and 
revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the 
right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future 
manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and 
historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and 
visual and performing arts and literature. 
 2. States shall provide redress through effective 
mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, 
intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, 




  Article 12 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, 
develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs 
and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have access in 
privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and 
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control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation 
of their human remains. 
 2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation 
of ceremonial objects and human remains in their possession 
through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms developed in 
conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
 
  Article 13 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, 
develop and transmit to future generations their histories, languages, 
oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems and literatures, and to 
designate and retain their own names for communities, places and 
persons. 
 2. States shall take effective measures to ensure this right is 
protected and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand 
and be understood in political, legal and administrative proceedings, 




  Article 14 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and 
control their educational systems and institutions providing 
education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their 
cultural methods of teaching and learning. 
 2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the 
right to all levels and forms of education of the State without 
discrimination. 
 3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take 
effective measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly 
children, including those living outside their communities, to have 
access, when possible, to an education in their own culture and 
provided in their own language. 
 
 
  Article 15 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and 
diversity of their cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which 
shall be appropriately reflected in education and public information. 
 2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and 
cooperation with the indigenous peoples concerned, to combat 
prejudice and eliminate discrimination and to promote tolerance, 
understanding and good relations among indigenous peoples and all 
other segments of society. 
 
 
  Article 16 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own 
media in their own languages and to have access to all forms of non-
indigenous media without discrimination. 
 2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-
owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, 
without prejudice to ensuring full freedom of expression, should 





  Article 17 
 
 1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to 
enjoy fully all rights established under applicable international and 
domestic labour law. 
 2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with 
indigenous peoples take specific measures to protect indigenous 
children from economic exploitation and from performing any work 
that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s 
education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral or social development, taking into account their 
special vulnerability and the importance of education for their 
empowerment. 
 3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected 
to any discriminatory conditions of labour and, inter alia, 
employment or salary. 
 
 
  Article 18 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making 
in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives 
chosen by themselves in accordance with their own procedures, as 




  Article 19 
 
 States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative 
measures that may affect them. 
 
 
  Article 20 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and 
develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, 
to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and 
development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other 
economic activities. 
 2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of 
subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.  
 
 
  Article 21 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without 
discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social 
conditions, including, inter alia, in the areas of education, 
employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, 
health and social security. 
 2. States shall take effective measures and, where 
appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of 
their economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be 
paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women, 
youth, children and persons with disabilities. 
 
 
  Article 22 
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 1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special 
needs of indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons 
with disabilities in the implementation of this Declaration. 
 2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children 
enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of 
violence and discrimination. 
 
 
  Article 23 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop 
priorities and strategies for exercising their right to development. In 
particular, indigenous peoples have the right to be actively involved 
in developing and determining health, housing and other economic 
and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to 
administer such programmes through their own institutions. 
 
 
  Article 24 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional 
medicines and to maintain their health practices, including the 
conservation of their vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals. 
Indigenous individuals also have the right to access, without any 
discrimination, to all social and health services. 
 2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health. States shall take the necessary steps with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of this right. 
 
 
  Article 25 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen 
their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned 
or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal 
seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to 
future generations in this regard. 
 
 
  Article 26 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories 
and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired. 
 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop 
and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by 
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or 
use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired. 
 3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these 
lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted 
with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems 
of the indigenous peoples concerned. 
 
 
  Article 27 
 
 States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open 
and transparent process, giving due recognition to indigenous 
peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure systems, to 
recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining 
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to their lands, territories and resources, including those which were 
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous 






  Article 28 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means 
that can include restitution or, when this is not possible, of a just, 
fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories and 
resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, 
used or damaged without their free, prior and informed consent. 
 2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples 
concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and 
resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary 
compensation or other appropriate redress. 
 
  Article 29 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation 
and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of 
their lands or territories and resources. States shall establish and 
implement assistance programmes for indigenous peoples for such 
conservation and protection, without discrimination. 
 2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no 
storage or disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the 
lands or territories of indigenous peoples without their free, prior 
and informed consent.  
 3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as 
needed, that programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring 
the health of indigenous peoples, as developed and implemented by 
the peoples affected by such materials, are duly implemented. 
 
 
  Article 30 
 
 1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or 
territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant 
public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the 
indigenous peoples concerned. 
 2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the 
indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and 
in particular through their representative institutions, prior to using 
their lands or territories for military activities. 
 
 
  Article 31 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge 
and traditional cultural expressions, as well as the manifestations of 
their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human and 
genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of 
fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and 
traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the 
right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual 
property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and 
traditional cultural expressions. 
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 2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take 







  Article 32 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and 
develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their 
lands or territories and other resources. 
 2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior 
to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories and 
other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources. 
 3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and 
fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall 
be taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, 
cultural or spiritual impact. 
 
  Article 33 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own 
identity or membership in accordance with their customs and 
traditions. This does not impair the right of indigenous individuals 
to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live. 
 2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the 
structures and to select the membership of their institutions in 
accordance with their own procedures. 
 
 
  Article 34 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and 
maintain their institutional structures and their distinctive customs, 
spirituality, traditions, procedures, practices and, in the cases where 
they exist, juridical systems or customs, in accordance with 
international human rights standards. 
 
 
  Article 35 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the 
responsibilities of individuals to their communities. 
 
 
  Article 36 
 
 1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by 
international borders, have the right to maintain and develop 
contacts, relations and cooperation, including activities for spiritual, 
cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own 
members as well as other peoples across borders. 
 2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples, shall take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and 
ensure the implementation of this right. 
 
 
  Article 37 
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 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, 
observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements concluded with States or their successors 
and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and 
other constructive arrangements. 
 2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as to 
diminish or eliminate the rights of Indigenous Peoples contained in 




  Article 38 
 
 States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous 
peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative 
measures, to achieve the ends of this Declaration. 
 
  Article 39 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial 
and technical assistance from States and through international 
cooperation, for the enjoyment of the rights contained in this 
Declaration. 
 
  Article 40 
 
 Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to and 
prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution 
of conflicts and disputes with States or other parties, as well as to 
effective remedies for all infringements of their individual and 
collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the 
customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous 
peoples concerned and international human rights. 
 
 
  Article 41 
 
 The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations 
system and other intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to 
the full realization of the provisions of this Declaration through the 
mobilization, inter alia, of financial cooperation and technical 
assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of indigenous 
peoples on issues affecting them shall be established. 
 
 
  Article 42 
 
 The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, including at 
the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full 
application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the 
effectiveness of this Declaration. 
 
 
  Article 43 
 
 The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards 




  Article 44 
 
 All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally 




  Article 45 
 
 Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing 
or extinguishing the rights indigenous peoples have now or may 




  Article 46 
 
 1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as 
implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the 
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States. 
 2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present 
Declaration, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be 
respected. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration 
shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law 
and in accordance with international human rights obligations. Any 
such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for 
the rights and freedoms of others and for meeting the just and most 
compelling requirements of a democratic society. 
 3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, 
respect for human rights, equality, non-discrimination, good 
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Ariki chief of noble birth, priest 
Aroha love, Affection for others 
Atawhai foster, caring for the welfare of others 
āwhina  help 
Atua deity, god/s 
Hangi earth oven 
Hapu subdivision of a tribe, or sub tribe 
Hara crime or offence 
Hee mistake/error 
Hongi a greeting, by the pressing of noses 
Hui gathering together of people for discussion, or to socialise 
Iwi a tribe which traces descent from a common ancestor or ancestors 
Kai food 
Kaitiaki caretaker/guardian 
Kaumatua male elders 
Kawa symbol, sign, protocol  
Kuia female elders 
Korero talk/speak 
Mana prestige, authority, power or psychic force 
Manawhenua having mana or prestige/power over the land 
manaaki blessing 
Mauri life force 
Marae 
sacred meeting place, situated within a 
village, traditional meeting house, area in 
front of the whare 
Moko tattoo, which can be either on the face, arms, thighs or buttocks 
Mokopuna grandchild 
Muru wipe or rub; seizing of goods to address an imbalance 
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Ora well being 
Pa a village; settlement or fortified area of a tribe or sub-tribe 
Pae here tangata to bind people together 
Papatūānuku  mother earth  
Pakeha 
person of English descent (also used in 
earlier times as reference to traders, 
settlers, missionaries) 
Pono just 
Powhiri ritual ceremony of encounter. 
Rahui 
prohibition; the setting aside of a place or 
thing for a specified time ; permanent 
reservation of land for a specific purpose 
Rangatira leader, person of senior lineage 
Rangatiratanga leadership authority 
Take reason 
Tangata whenua 
literally, a person of the land or people 
belonging to a tribal region; hosts as 
distinct from visitors  
Tangi to weep, grieve, mourn or cry 
Tangihanga a ceremony of mourning 
Tapu Set aside - sacred 
Tika correct/right 
Tikanga principles, truth, customary practice 
Tinana body 
Tohunga 
a healer or a priest ; an expert in traditional 
lore or a person skilled in a particular 
activity 
Utu 
revenge, recompense, reward, price, 
payment ; repayment in goods ; retribution 
in battle to the death 
Waiata song ; to chant or to sing 
Wairua spirit, spirituality 
Whakahoki mauri restoring the balance 
Whakapapa layer – family tree 
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Whanau literally - to be born or to give birth, family or an extended family  
whanaungatanga relatedness 
Whare a house, or a dwelling 
Whare wananga a university, or a learning place 
Whenua literally - afterbirth; land, ground, earth, a country 
  
 
 
 
 
